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Honor, freedom of expression, and judicial independence are core values in modern societies. The latter two are associated with democracy and liberalism, while the roots of honor lie in the need for recognition. The British in Mandate era Palestine came from a democratic tradition, but it is unclear whether, and to what degree they intended the locals to enjoy these values. The article analyzes a series of defamation cases which shed light on the way the British Mandate courts balanced these concepts when plaintiffs sued after being accused of loyalty to the British. Such cases were unique in requiring judges to exert independence in their balancing of the plaintiffs honor, the defendant's freedom of expression, and the courts' willingness to accept loyalty to the Crown as negative and offensive. This was a three-dimensional test case of British attitudes towards the three values. We show that at least some of British judges in the lower courts perceived themselves as independent and were willing to set aside the honor of the British government in order to allow the local inhabitants to defend their own honor. This adds to our understanding of the roots of judicial-independence and honor in (pre)-State Israel. Keywords: Honor; Defamation; Judicial Independence; Freedom of expression; British Mandate., INTRODUCTION THE BRITISH MANDATE ERA WAS A TIME OF RAPID CHANGE IN LOCAL societies and cultures. During these tumultuous times, the British government had to maneuver between the heritage of [...]

I. INTRODUCTION When Tsai Ing-wen was inaugurated as president of the Republic of China on Taiwan in May 2016, she named coming to terms with the unresolved problems of Taiwan's [...], Referring to Taiwan's recent transitional justice legislation as a first tentative step towards the possibility of judicial solutions for problems of injustice dating from the authoritarian era, this paper elaborates chances and difficulties of introducing the judiciary to the ongoing processes of coming to terms with the past in Taiwan. It intends to argue that apart from the specific circumstances of Taiwan's transition to democracy after the lifting of martial law in 1987, the avoidance of a judicial approach to transitional justice was both caused by and the reason for a deficit in narratives of judicial justice. Together with the judiciary's reluctance to communicate with society and to confront the sensitive aspects of their professional history, a lack in stories of the judge dispensing justice to those in need of it is identified as a precondition disqualifying the courts as potential agents of transitional justice. At the same time, the exclusion of the courts from the agenda of redressing the wrongs of the past is understood as having deprived the members of the judiciary of an opportunity to identity and be identified as those restoring justice to society. On a second level of investigation, the implied need for a consolidation of the image and self-understanding of judges and procurators, is shown to link the agenda of transitional justice to the one of judicial reform. The text departs from the assumption of a complementarity of the two agendas, in the sense that becoming actively engaged in the handling of transitional justice may further distinguish the courts as legal platforms of communication and provide a neutral space for a non-politicized negotiation of the politically sensitive issues of Taiwan's past and present. A shared narrative of "justice in transition," both in the sense of justice as a parameter of transition and the notion of justice itself undergoing transition, is proposed as a foundation and prerequisite of an integrated and mutually beneficial approach to transitional justice and judicial reform in Taiwan.

The belief that courts should be open to the public is a guiding principle of the Canadian legal system. This article examines the principle of open court in the digital age by analyzing policies governing live text-based communication in Canadian courtrooms. We argue that courts have and have not responded to the changing digital landscape. While Canadian journalists have the ability to use live text-based communication in courts, the general public does not despite new affordances provided to them by digital technologies. This article explores the tensions between administrative judicial independence, open court, and digital technology. Un principe directeur du systeme juridique canadien consiste a penser que les tribunaux se doivent d'etre ouverts au public. Cet article etudie le principe de l'audience publique a l'ere numerique, en effectuant une analyse des politiques regissant la communication textuelle en direct dans les salles d'audience canadiennes. Nous soutenons que les tribunaux a la fois repondent et ne repondent pas a l'univers numerique changeant. Alors que les journalistes canadiens ont la possibilite d'utiliser la communication textuelle en direct dans les tribunaux, ce n'est pas le cas pour le grand public malgre les nouveaux avantages que leur offrent les technologies numeriques. Dans cet article, nous nous penchons sur les facteurs de tension entre l'independance judiciaire administrative, l'audience publique, et la technologie numerique., Introduction The principle of open court is a key element of access to justice. Open court is fostered by allowing the public to attend court, and through media reporting on [...]

I am honored to have been asked to deliver the Griswold Lecture this year. I know that it is customary at these presentations to say a few words honoring Dean [...]

INTRODUCTION In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton argued that "[t]he interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is in fact... fundamental law. [...], In American legal culture today, it is widely acknowledged that the Supreme Court of the United States has the final authority "to say what the law is." Whether they agree or disagree with a decision of the Supreme Court, the coordinate branches of the federal government, state governments, and citizens everywhere respect and adhere to those decisions. On the whole, it seems that little stands in the way of the Supreme Court exercising its fundamental duty to issue authoritative interpretations of the Constitution using its own independent judgment. Yet this assumption may be flawed. This note draws attention to a subtle and underappreciated way in which proposed legislation in Congress, if enacted, would undermine the power and independence of the Supreme Court in interpreting the Constitution. For example, the Constitution Restoration Act of 2005 purported to outlaw the consideration of foreign legal or political materials in the interpretation of the Constitution. This note argues that this kind of proposed statutory rule of constitutional interpretation is unconstitutional for two reasons. First, the federal courts, and in particular the Supreme Court, retain a limited set of inherent powers by their very nature as a court of law that can be traced back to English common law. Among these inherent powers is the power to choose and apply an interpretive methodology in carrying out the judicial function of deciding a case. The Framers would have understood that courts exercised some inherent powers, and the Constitution did nothing to displace those inherent powers. Second, under the original meaning of "judicial Power" in Article III, the federal courts have the authority to choose a particular interpretive methodology and arrive at a definitive interpretation of the Constitution without interference from Congress. This authority is not only consistent with the text of Article III, it is also supported by the structural independence of the federal courts under the Constitution as the framing and ratification debates make clear. Table of Contents Introduction 288 I. Inherent Judicial Power and Article III Courts 290 A. Inherent Judicial Power at English Common Law 292 B. Inherent Judicial Power and the Framing and Ratification of the Constitution 294 C. Inherent Judicial Power to Interpret the Constitution 296 II. Constitutional Interpretation and the Structural Independence of the Federal Courts 301 A. First Conceptions of the Need for an Independent Judiciary 303 B. An Independent Judiciary Is Born 304 C. Article III and the Supreme Court's Independent Power of Constitutional Interpretation 308 III. Statutory Rules of Constitutional Interpretation and the Supreme Court's Independence 310 Conclusion 313

This panel was convened at 1:00 p.m., Friday, April 6, 2018, by its moderator, David Bigge, Deputy Legal Counselor, Embassy The Hague and U.S. Agent to the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, [...]

Judge Joan Donoghue of the International Court of Justice, and discussant Dapo Akande, Professor of Public International Law at Oxford University Faculty of Law, provided the Twentieth Annual Grotius Lecture [...]

I POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY Not every act of adjudication by a court is an exercise of judicial responsibility. Some exercises of judicial power are not grounded in the reasons favouring [...]

When I was asked to speak at this conference, it was suggested that I might like to talk about the relationship between academics and the judiciary in light of Judge [...], Richard Posner laments what he sees as an unfortunate gulf between academia and the courts. To assess whether there is such a gulf in New Zealand, this address analyses the role of academics and judges. It concludes that academics provide valuable insights and assistance to the courts but that their role is much wider, being at its broadest the advancement of knowledge. By contrast, the primary role of judges at all levels is to decide the case in front of them according to law. This means that academics and the judiciary are engaged in different pursuits and, while the roles may converge at times, ultimately the differences must be respected. But there can and should be constructive dialogue. In this regard, the address discusses three areas where the New Zealand Supreme Court has received criticism from academics.

Merci d'etre la si nombreux. Je n'en ai pas l'habitude. Quand nous attirons autant de gens en meme temps a la Cour, ce sont généralement des manifestants. Merci aux organisateurs [...]

CONTENTS I Introduction II Scope of the Principle III Purposive Construction and the Principle of Legality A Purposive Construction Generally B The Stultification Principle C Broader Approaches to Purpose 1 [...], The principle of legality has in recent years become an increasingly important tool of statutory interpretation. Despite its prominence, it has, I will argue, been applied inconsistently. This article examines two methodological difficulties in the application of the principle: its interaction with the doctrine of purposive construction, and its application to legislation cast in linguistically clear but broad terms. This analysis suggests that Australian courts are applying the principle in different ways without acknowledging emerging doctrinal differences. The last part of the article examines a series of contextual factors which courts have suggested may affect the strength of the presumption, but concludes that these have very limited explanatory or predictive value when charted against the methodological differences discussed earlier.

1976. Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc. (1) Detroit imposes special zoning restrictions on adult movie theaters. "If the theater is used to present 'material distinguished or characterized by an emphasis [...]

In my office, I have a bobble-head doll of Justice Stevens. In one hand, he holds a golf club. Or, at least, he used to before my children--early in their [...]

ABSTRACT The Supreme Court exercises far less constitutional authority in American law and practice than one would gather from reading judicial opinions, presidential speeches, or the standard tomes for and [...]

Abstract While courts historically have taken a hands-off approach to settlement, judges across the legal spectrum have begun to intervene actively in "aggregate settlements"--repeated settlements between the same parties or [...]

I. INTRODUCTION The U.S. Supreme Court sits atop the nation's adversarial system of law, one premised upon the idea that the most just results will be achieved through party presentation [...]

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 133 II. JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING AND THE INTEREST CONVERGENCE PARADIGM 137 A. Overview of Existing Models 138 B. Interest Convergence 140 1. The Theory 141 2. [...]

A. The Critical Ear While oral argument sound recordings are experientially rich, much of their content and format aligns with the merits briefs. (239) Similarly, the opinion announcement recordings customarily [...]

I. Introduction II. Oral Advocacy in Environmental Cases A. Historic and Demographic Notes B. Advocacy Lessons and Environmental Lawyering C. Advocacy Greatness III. Voices from the Bench in Environmental Cases [...], Today's technology unleashes new, digitized information resources with immense scale and speed. This Article examines one such resource--the archive of audio recorded proceedings of the United States Supreme Court--appraising, for the first time, its value to those who study and practice environmental law. From hundreds of hours of audio across six decades, a history of environmental litigation sounds forth, imparting rich lessons on advocacy, judicial reasoning, and the role of the Court in environmental law's development. The Article organizes itself in three major parts, furnishing insights on: oral advocacy in the environmental docket; the voices from the bench; and the audience for prospective engagement with any selection or subset of recordings. Serving partly as a listener's guide, the Article defines the reach of environmental litigation in the audio archive and demonstrates its unique value as a tool for learning and the professional betterment of environmental law scholars and practitioners.

B. Damages and Ex Ante Behavior Next, we consider accuracy in the determination of damages. This Subpart addresses the consequences of greater accuracy for ex ante behavior, and the next [...]

INTRODUCTION I. INFORMATION AND SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL COMMANDS A. Rules Versus Standards B. Precision II. DECISION CRITERIA IN ADJUDICATION A. Burden of Proof 1. Regulation of proposed conduct 2. Incentives for [...], Adjudication is fundamentally about information, usually concerning individuals' previous or proposed behavior. Legal system design is challenging because information ordinarily is costly and imperfect. This Article analyzes a broad array of system features, asking throughout whether design should aim at the truth or at consequences, how these approaches may differ, and what general lessons may be drawn from the comparison. It will emerge that the differences in approach are often large and their character is sometimes counterintuitive. Accordingly, system engineers concerned with social welfare need to aim explicitly at consequences. This message is not one opposed to truth per se but rather a strong admonition: it is dangerous to be attached to the alluring view that adjudication is primarily about generating results most in accord with the truth of the matter at hand.

INTRODUCTION Notwithstanding the rich scholarly literature debating the proper roles of lawyers and the precise contours of lawyers' ethical conduct, as a descriptive matter, the American legal system operates as [...]

Figures 4 and 5 correspond to Figures 2 and 3, respectively, showing changes within the distinct sets of civil and criminal cases. Evidently, the tendency of the courts to keep [...]

INTRODUCTION I. THE POLICY SHOCK A. Earlier Forms of Decision B. The New Constraints C. Implementing the Change II. CONSTRUCTING THE DATA III. REVEALING PRIORITIES A. Civil or Criminal? B. [...]

This article explores the common law duty of courts to provide publicly available reasons for their decisions. The pre-modern position was that a failure to provide reasons did not constitute [...]

A. Olga Tellis and the Narrative of History, Circumstances, and a Respect for Pluralistic Contributions to Urban Life The foundational case of modern treatment of slum residents is Olga Tellis, [...]

ABSTRACT Comparative legal research in property and urban planning law has taken an increasing interest in the policy patterns and legal arguments that municipal bodies and courts employ in the [...]

INTRODUCTION Good evening. (1) It is a pleasure to be here at the University of Notre Dame London Law Centre, and I am deeply honored to have been asked to [...]

INTRODUCTION Until approximately thirty years ago, expert witnesses hired by parties to litigation in the United States could testify almost without limit about any relevant issue within the scope of [...]