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The article examines the question of the meaning of the term for accepting inheritance in Ukraine, the calculation procedure and the consequences of omission. The six-month period established by current legislation for submitting an application for acceptance of inheritance is sufficient for the heir to take legally significant actions regarding acceptance of inheritance. According to the civil legislation of Ukraine, the heir is obliged to take active actions to accept the inheritance, in particular, to submit an application for its acceptance to a notary, if he did not live with the testator. The passive behavior of the heir indicates a lack of desire to accept the inheritance and, accordingly, a rejection of the inheritance. In the civil legislation of the Republic of Poland, one can observe the opposite approach to acceptance or rejection of inheritance. However, in practice, there are often situations of missing the deadline for accepting the inheritance, which can lead to the loss of the right to inheritance, and in turn, raises problematic issues regarding the granting of an additional deadline for accepting the inheritance. The legislation of Ukraine provides for the possibility of the court granting an additional term for accepting the inheritance under certain conditions. The heir may submit an application for acceptance of the inheritance with the written consent of other heirs who have already accepted the inheritance. Also, the court can determine an additional deadline for submitting an application, if the deadline was missed due to valid reasons. Based on the analysis of judicial practice, the reasons for missing the deadline, which were recognized by the court as valid, were considered. These are the circumstances that objectively made it impossible to submit the application in a timely manner. Circumstances related to objective, insurmountable and significant difficulties for the heir in carrying out these actions are important reasons for missing the deadline for accepting the inheritance. The resolution of the issue of granting an additional term for acceptance of the inheritance depends on the specific circumstances of the case and belongs to the discretionary powers of the court, that is, it is decided at the sole discretion of the court. With this in mind, it is impossible to predict all possible circumstances that may be considered relevant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the impact of the Judicial Reform of 1864 on the establishment of the legal profession in Ukraine. It is noted that as of the middle of the 19th century. the decision to modernize the judicial system on the basis of effective Western judicial models was ripe in the environment of the official authorities. Although this initiative contradicted the foundations of the imperial autocracy, the judicial reform had a significant impact on the judicial system, procedural and material law of the state. First of all, this affected the separation of judicial power from legislative executive and administrative power. It is noted that the Judicial Reform of 1864 became a necessary element of total changes in the social and political system of that time. It occupied a prominent place in the history of the judiciary and the judicial system of the state, and its indisputable achievements were the equality of citizens before the law, the transparency and competitiveness of the judiciary, the immutability of judges and their independence from administrative officials, the introduction of competition in the judiciary and the creation of a system of magistrates’ courts. It is proven that the judicial reform, in addition to important democratic changes, included the creation of the legal profession, whose role in society was constantly growing. According to the idea of the initiators of the reform, the Institute of Advocacy was organized as an independent organization. This principle was manifested in the fact that in each district of the court chamber, lawyers were united in a single organization by its general meetings and the Council. It is noted that the control and supervision of the activities of lawyers was carried out by councils elected by lawyers from among themselves. Thanks to the creation of the management system of the lawyer corporation, it was possible to ensure the autonomy and independence of the legal profession from the bureaucratic apparatus. It is noted that with the establishment of the Institute of Advocacy in the Russian Empire, the official authorities sought, at least formally, to declare the foundations of equality and competition between the parties, to modernize the theory of formal evidence and the judicial process. In this way, it was planned to revive the judicial process and make it more complete and objective. This would provide an opportunity for a comprehensive consideration of the case by the judge, a more detailed insight into its essence, which would significantly affect the objectivity of justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the legal nature of the Civil Council of International Experts (PCIE) in the context of the legal status of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJU) and the peculiarities of their interaction during the selection of judges to the High Anti-Corruption Court. The use of the historical method made it possible to state that with the changes injudicial legislation in 2016, bodies of judicial governance were determined at the legislative level, which are independent in their activities and are responsible for the formation of a professional and virtuous judicial corps. The concept of autonomy (independence) of judicial governance bodies, in particular in matters of formation of the judicial corps, creates prerequisites for the analysis of the legal nature of advisory and auxiliary bodies, their direct or indirect influence on the adoption of relevant decisions. The Law of Ukraine "On the High Anti-corruption Court" introduced an auxiliary body for the purposes of selection to the said court - PCIE, the legal nature and status of which require research and the formation of approaches to solving certain scientific and practical tasks. The conducted research established that the PCIE does not fully meet the characteristics of an "advisory, auxiliary body", taking into account its influence on the decisions of the HQCJU. At the same time, PCIE is not endowed with legal personality in legal relations that arise in connection with the adoption of relevant decisions of the HQCJU and does not bear legal responsibility for the adopted decisions. The analysis of the legal nature of the PCIE made it possible to formulate the conclusion that, in the presence of the mandatory characteristic of "honesty" both in the members of the HQCJU and in the members of the PCIE, the advisory (auxiliary) function of the latter is realized exclusively through the prism of the professional experience of its members, the qualification requirement for which have experience of working in other countries for at least five years in the implementation of procedural management, support of state prosecution in court or implementation of judicial proceedings in cases related to corruption. According to the direction of the performed function, PCIE acts as an additional subject of legitimization of the judiciary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In The Federalist, Publius makes five defective assumptions about judicial power, which underestimate and invite the danger of judicial supremacy. Contemporary judicial practice conforms to Publius's assumption that the judicial branch holds final authority in interpreting the Constitution, but contradicts his expectation that this would not lead to judicial supremacy in the political regime. This article excavates and critiques Publius's assumptions about judicial power from a close reading of The Federalist. It argues that any successful check on the judiciary requires adoption of the theory of coordinate construction. It concludes with an exploration of the institutional and normative implications of coordinate construction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Taiwan Law Review is the property of Angle Publishing Co., Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This Article challenges one of the most robust commonplaces in the study of Indian Constitutional Law, viz. that Directive Principles of State Policy under Article IV cannot be enforced by the judiciary. Through a careful reading of the Constitution's text and structure, as well as an investigation of relevant precedents within India, the United States, and other common-law jurisdictions, it argues: (1) Article 39A commands 'the State' to promote justice on the basis of equal opportunity, in particular through legal services enacted through legislation or other methods; (2) The judiciary is part of the State that Article 39A commands; (3) Courts, then, must use their powers to fulfill Article 39A even if that Article is not judicially enforceable; (4) The judiciary has authority over the maintenance and integrity of the legal system; (5) It also has its own authority to spend money to maintain and improve that system; and (6) it has the authority to allocate funds to pay lawyers and other legal personnel in civil cases if it believes that doing so will strengthen the legal system and fulfill its Article 39A mandate. The Constitution's promise of the right to counsel in civil cases thus lies well within the judicial power to accomplish. The Article suggests areas where the judiciary should use this power, e.g., family law, housing, and the environment. It also raises important questions about the very nature of Directive Principles and the meaning of judicial 'enforcement.' [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article strives to find out how monetary contestation, when brought before the courts, can generate institutional change. The goal is to show if the contestation conveyed by local currencies at a specific point can be considered as a driving force via the evolution of monetary rules. This article focuses on the case of eusko—a French local currency of Basque Country. What has become the most extended French and currently European local currency was the subject to a legal conflict between the State, through the prefecture of the Pyrénées-Atlantiques, and the City of Bayonne. By using a qualitative approach by a set of semi-structured interviews, the article analyzes, helped by the theoretical framework of John R. Commons, how the dissemination of new monetary practices could be selected by judicial and political powers, respectively. Based on empirical results, and considering the Commonsian concepts of "artificial selection" and "institutionalized compromise," I conclude that the legislation changed due to this legal conflict. This change has paved the way for other French municipalities to mobilize the terms of the agreement and aim to pay part of their public expenditure in local currency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Environmental & Social Management Journal / Revista de Gestão Social e Ambiental is the property of Environmental & Social Management Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Pravnik is the property of Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of State & Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article explores the need for procedural reform in statutory review, specifically in relation to planning legislation. It provides an overview of the history and purpose of statutory review, as well as the role of the High Court in the process. The article also highlights the ambiguity surrounding the definition of a "Planning Court claim" and questions whether certain provisions should apply to all statutory reviews or only specific ones. It suggests that the Rules Committee should consider amending the rules to provide clarity in statutory reviews outside of the planning context. [Extracted from the article]

The delay in the distribution of inheritance from the perspective of Islamic law is one of the crucial issues because it can trigger various conflicts among heirs. The purpose of this study is to apply the concepts of Tabayyun and Ta'awun as a dispute resolution mechanism in the inheritance distribution that has been postponed for a long time in a non-litigation manner and is based on maqasid as-sharia. This research is important to provide understanding and knowledge about the delay in implementation of inheritance distribution which can trigger disputes and divide relationships in the family. The qualitative analysis method was used to obtain a more comprehensive understanding related to the resolution of inheritance disputes that occur due to the delay of the distribution or munasakhat. The results show that lack of understanding of fiqh of Islamic inheritance is a key factor causing disputes among families. The lack of clarity in the identification of the right heir is also a major factor triggering disputes among the families. In addition, the lack of knowledge of the udzur shari'i recognized in Islam can also cause conflicts among family members. The aim of this paper is to use the concept of Tabayyun and Ta’awun to resolve inheritance disputes. The study also discusses the role of religious leaders, such as ustadz or kyai, in maximizing the mediation stage at the court level in order to realize the principle of simple, fast, and low-cost justice as stipulated in the Judicial Power Law, potentially offering strategies to enhance the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of legal processes in inheritance dispute resolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article titled "Judicial Power and Potential Unconstitutionality: A Scholastic Perspective" examines the distinction between making and applying the law, using the Supreme Court's severability doctrine as an example. The author proposes a framework for replacement doctrine based on the philosophies of Thomas Aquinas and Chief Justice John Marshall. The article argues that judicial law declaration is an exercise of practical reason and that the judiciary does not change the law enacted by Congress. It critiques modern severability doctrine and concludes with hope for a correction in the Supreme Court's understanding of constitutional adjudication. The text also discusses the role of judges in applying the law and contrasts two approaches: statutory disregard and statutory excision. It highlights a case, Murphy v. NCAA, where the Supreme Court used conventional severability doctrine to invalidate an entire law, leading to criticism of the doctrine. Justice Thomas argues against the severability doctrine, while Justice Ginsburg suggests a limited deletion approach. The text concludes by suggesting a shift from excision to disregard in addressing potential unconstitutionality. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Anali Pravnog Fakulteta u Beogradu is the property of University of Belgrade, Faculty of Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Annals of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade is the property of University of Belgrade, Faculty of Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Ayer: Revista de Historia Contemporánea is the property of Asociacion de Historia Contemporanea and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article states that the subjects of special criminological prevention of criminal offenses committed by probation subjects are probation bodies, police, non-specialized subjects of prevention (legislative and judicial power, their structural bodies and institutions, various formations and public associations, owners of enterprises), as well as judicial authorities and other bodies of state control, local self-government bodies, etc. Among the main directions of special criminological prevention of criminal offenses are: counteraction to manifestations of antisocial orientation and criminogenic motivation of the convict; involvement of psychologists and specialists from other spheres of life in the process of correction and resocialization of convicts; reducing the influence of external causes and conditions for the commission of a criminal offense, etc. It is proved that the introduction of these directions is an important step towards building a qualitatively new model of probation, created not on the ideology of control and authority, but on the therapeutic and rehabilitation philosophy. It is determined that probation personnel process a large amount of information and make strategic decisions, but it is necessary to take into account numerous and competing professional, political and personal interests in providing assistance to probation subjects. Since most of the decisions made by the probation officer during the preparation of the pre-trial report are intuitive, taking into account previous experience and rarely focus on the study of criminogenic needs and taking into account the results of the study of the convict's personality, taking into account the correctional programs he has undergone. It is determined that the basis of special criminological crime prevention by the probation body should be a change in the strategy of probation from a form of supervision focused on individual preventive influence on the convict to a form that would be based on compliance with the conditions of probation, implementation of plans for special criminological prevention, support of the convict, assistance in restoring the violated rights not only to the convict, but also to the convict, but also the victim, which would provide an opportunity to determine the optimally appropriate number of supervisory meetings between the probation officer and the convict and reduce the workload of probation officers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article summarizes, expands and substantiates scientific knowledge about the theoretical and practical aspects of the influence of judicial law-making on judicial reform. The legal nature of judicial law-making is characterized, taking into account modern contextual and conceptual approaches to understanding the law-making potential of the court. Judicial law-making is an important, integral and special type of law-making. The legal nature of judicial law-making is deep and multifaceted, in particular, it is a way of achieving the goal of justice and ensuring the rule of law; an important guarantee of the protection of human rights; a necessary element of implementing the rule of law in the mechanism of ensuring human rights and freedoms; a means of overcoming legislative gaps and exceptional legal problems in the course of law enforcement; a tool for supplementing the law; «insurance» agent of the legislator, etc. In the democratic countries of the world, judicial law-making has proven itself as an effective tool entrusted to the courts within the limits of their judicial activity, and they use this tool with an appropriate level of responsibility. The peculiarities and directions of influence of international and national judicial law-making on reforming the judicial system and legal reform are analyzed. The theoretical and practical value of the influence of judicial law-making on judicial and legal reforms lies in the fact that it is a conceptual basis for the qualitative transformation of the domestic judiciary, judiciary, justice and the legal system, in particular the field of judicial law. The state and trends of the introduction of judicial law-making into the national legal system of Ukraine based on the results of the last judicial reform are revealed. With each stage of judicial reform in Ukraine, the need for official recognition of judicial law-making becomes more relevant. The judicial reform of 2016 did not positively resolve this issue. Currently, the need to introduce judicial law-making is mostly recognized at the doctrinal level, but is rejected by the legislator. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article tries to bring to the light the specifics of exercising the right to apply to the court within the frameworks of the action types in administrative proceedings in general, deeply analyzing Armenian practice within the framework of international best practice. Defining the types of action in administrative proceedings as a procedural mode of case investigation is important for the proper investigation of the claim, but it cannot predetermine whether the claim is subject to examination in the court or not. In the light of the above, the subject of this study is the essence of the administrative action, the purpose of defining the action types, their influence on the investigation of the case, both in practice and in the theoretical literature, within the framework of the principle of finding out the factual circumstances of the case ex officio specific to administrative proceedings, the powers of the court when filing an inappropriate type of action and its consequences on the investigation of the case. The administrative procedural process starts upon submitting an administrative action, but the nature of the administrative action is manifested with some features, due to the legal mechanisms of exercising the right to apply to the administrative court and various judicial-scientific interpretations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Realidad Economica is the property of Realidad Economica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In response to China’s notorious enforcement gap, the judiciary has assumed a more prominent role in environmental governance through a process called judicialisation, or the expansion of judicial scope and power. Specifically, the development of environmental public interest litigation (EPIL), the growing number of environmental cases, and the establishment of specialised environmental courts have emboldened the courts to deeply participate in environmental governance. An outstanding question is what role environmental courts have played in enhancing environmental enforcement and protecting environmental public interest in such prominent environmental judicialisation. After examining related judicial interpretations and litigation practices, this article finds that environmental courts act differently in different types of environmental litigation. They are active, supportive and even ‘innovative’ in holding polluters accountable in civil EPIL. In administrative EPIL, however, the courts are less proactive and generally defer to the procuratorate’s claim in confirming administrative illegality or requiring the responsible government or agency to perform their duties. In private environmental litigation, judges either disregard what has been stated in legislation and adopt their own strategies favouring the polluter-defendants or are extremely restrained in reviewing the decisions of administrative-defendants. Given the fact that environmental public interest and private interests are highly entangled, the court’s deviation from legislation in private litigation fails to effectively deter polluters and achieve synergistic protection of environmental public interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modern judicial review of agency action invites several potential formalist objections: Do litigants have the right legal interest for Article III standing? Does Chevron violate a duty of judicial independence? Can a court enter a universal remedy against an agency rule? When can the Supreme Court hear a direct appeal from an executive body? These important and timely questions share a premise: because federal courts use judicial power to review agency action, the review is subject to Article III’s constraints. This Article challenges that premise by asking whether, in some important facets of modern administrative law, federal courts might be using executive power—not judicial—when reviewing agency action. In particular, certain judicial review of agency rulemaking might best be understood as an extension of the administrative process itself, in which case Article III’s constraints are perhaps largely beside the point. Although counterintuitive, this understanding could be constitutionally proper in certain circumstances. Article III tells us a lot about constraints on the judicial power, but it tells us surprisingly little about what that power is or how it relates to the executive power. A careful reading of constitutional text and structure, the political theory underlying Article III, and historical practice from the Founding onward, however, might suggest that federal courts can (and do) use executive power when reviewing some agency action. After unpacking the historical, textual, and conceptual grounds for this executive power model of judicial review, the Article explains how the model informs ongoing debates about standing to challenge agency action, the use of Chevron and universal remedies in pre-enforcement review, and the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in agency review cases. The Article concludes by exploring how this novel conception of judicial review of agency action advances legal stability and agency accountability while also informing ongoing debates in other areas of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (JCDA), it falls to federal judges in each circuit to investigate and redress complaints about their colleagues' behavior. A controversial provision of the Act authorizes the temporary suspension of misbehaving judges from new case assignments. Judges suspended under the Act--most recently, Judge Pauline Newman in the Federal Circuit--have argued that this amounts to effectively removing them from office without impeachment, violating constitutional protections of judicial tenure and independence. No court has invalidated a suspension on this basis so far. Yet courts have reserved the question taken up here, namely whether a long-term suspension could, by its practical effect, cross the line into removal. Returning to first principles, this Comment develops and defends a bright-line rule for conceptualizing effective removal. Article III vests federal judges with the power to decide legal cases and controversies within limits set by the Constitution and Congress. Individual judges are not entitled to dockets of any particular size or scope. Yet possessing some measure of case-deciding power is a necessary condition for holding judicial office. It follows that a judge does not hold office if she does not wield any judicial power, as when a categorical prohibition on hearing cases eliminates her entire docket. When a case-suspension sanction under the JCDA even temporarily has that effect, disqualifying a judge who lacks assigned cases from further assignments, it unconstitutionally removes the judge from office. After crystallizing the concept of effective removal, the Comment attends to non-merits-related reasons that courts are unlikely to accept this challenge to the JCDA even in compelling cases; assesses the risk that the Act's case-suspension provision could be abused to effectively remove judges for improper reasons; and ultimately proposes a targeted amendment to the provision that would foreclose the possibility of effective removal and conform the Act's scheme of judicial self-discipline to the Constitution's separation of powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Judicial and political power are inextricably linked, but at this point in time that link seems more important, more pervasive, and more fragile than ever before. Courts are now under stress in many, even consolidated, democratic countries, becoming one of the most stimulating topics for understanding European politics. Indeed, bringing Courts back to the centre of political analysis is a privileged perspective for understanding how and why democracies change. By highlighting the characteristics of the complex political context of conflicting actors, institutions and political processes, this special issue of European Politics and Society reveals the different dynamics and patterns of the role of Courts in contemporary European politics. This paper presents the phenomenon of 'Courts under stress' and the related research questions. In addition, it introduces the articles that make up this special issue, which are indicative of the maturation of Courts as a crucial topic in European political science. Indeed, each article emphasizes different aspects of their role, bringing out new perspectives and complementary theoretical approaches and methodologies, thereby advancing comparative studies of judicial behaviour and constitutional jurisprudence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most important aspects of making the 1990 Croatian Constitutional Court was the 'establishment of an independent and potentially powerful' court. For the first time since 1963, the Court obtained full powers of judicial review. Yet, despite its newly gained powers, the Croatian Constitutional Court refrained from an activist approach adopted by other constitutional courts in the region and was not fond of annulling laws adopted by the legislator. One possible explanation of such a conformist approach was the ideological consonance between the centre-right legislative and the centre-right Court. Most of the constitutional judges were appointed by the centre-right party (HDZ), which held the majority in the Parliament during the first decade of the country's independence. However, recent years have witnessed an increase in the dissenting opinions, following the nomination of five judges from the centre-left opposition (SDP) to a predominantly centre-right Court. Based on the large-scale data collection efforts, this paper looks into the origin of these nominations, as well as their effect on the emergance of dissenting opinion and the growing ideological polarisation on the Court, which changed the relationship between judicial and legislative powers in Croatia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article compares secular judicial law and canon judicial law on the basis of the distinction (present in both) between an ordinary situation and an emergency situation. This perspective enables an understanding of a "two-speed system" in canon law. Ordinary canonical justice has consistently and effectively asserted and continues to assert the independence of the judiciary, the quality of justice, as well as the efficiency of their processes. There is also canonical justice that is exercised largely by the executive authority; this is a consequence of a weakening of the sense of Church as society, in general, and because of the recent abuse scandals, in particular. Entrusting justice to the executive authority may be understood as a "state of emergency". However, the "justification" for this shift to executive authority requires three conditions, which are also encompassed by secular law: temporariness, proportionality, and suitability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the stress, vicarious trauma, and burnout experienced by judicial officers and their need for protective skills. Compassion is one skill that can be incredibly beneficial. Compassion involves recognising a person's suffering, and 'turning towards' the sufferer. This has been said to be 'neurologically rejuvenating'. In contrast, empathy alone can lead to distress and generate burnout. There are three pillars of compassionate practice: (1) procedural fairness; (2) judicial engagement; and (3) other therapeutic jurisprudence approaches and court programs. The authors, both experienced judicial officers, have experienced how compassionate practice can inspire offenders to achieve rehabilitation goals. These practices can also be implemented in traditional court lists by judicial officers acknowledging the possibility of suffering of court users and empowering them by judicial engagement and granting them agency. A compassionate approach to justice can improve judicial effectiveness, health, and the fostering of a healthy work environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main aim of this paper is to deconstruct the Trias Politica Doctrine in the South African context, with specific reference to the influence and power of the judiciary over the other two arms of government (legislature and executive).Through utilising case study design, qualitative methods, and document analysis as data collection technique, we argue that the judiciary, through its various courts, has in numerous cases influenced the legislative and executive activities and programmes of government. We conclude that, while John Locke and Charles De Montesquieu offered, great contribution in explaining the concept of separation of powers, the judicial power and influence in South Africa over the activities of the legislature and executive suggest that separation of powers does not fully hold water in the context of this sub-Saharan African state. However, there is what should be understood as judicial Hegemony informed by the principle of constitutional supremacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australian authority holds that there is a critical distinction between superior and inferior courts when it comes to the legal force of judicial orders affected by jurisdictional error. It is said that such orders, when made by a superior court, have legal force unless and until set aside but that, when made by an inferior court, they lack legal force from the outset. This distinction -- recently consigned to pre-1846 history by the United Kingdom Supreme Court -- does not align with the contemporary reality of the integrated system of courts established under Ch III of the Australian Constitution. The appeals in Commonwealth v Stradford, Judge Vasta v Stradford and Queensland v Stradford present an opportunity for the High Court of Australia to set a new approach that reflects the constitutional context for Ch III court operation. Specifically, the appeals may be upheld on the basis that any purported order made by a Ch III court acting as a repository of judicial power has legal force unless and until set aside. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]