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Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) such as the MQ-4C Triton and the RQ-7B Shadow-200 Tactical Uncrewed Aircraft System (TUAS) each utilise unique approaches to aviation safety. This presents new challenges to both regulators and operators. Whilst each UAS is unique and presents different safety challenges, the fundamentals of UAS safety do not vary simply as a function of the complexity or size of the UAS. This paper compares and considers the drivers for aviation safety effort and rigour between a large UAS like Triton versus smaller UAS such as Shadow-200. To that end, the safety case of both Shadow-200 and Triton will be examined. In doing so, it will be shown that the UAS platforms can have similar levels of aviation safety rigour applied to them. As it stands, Triton and Shadow-200 make use of different risk-based approaches. These approaches are explained and analysed with a view to highlight key differences and argue that despite the scale of each system, a common approach is not only possible, but necessary. This paper will leverage UNCLASSIFIED aviation safety material from the Shadow-200 and Triton programs as prime source material and provide broader insight into the activities that support UAS operations in the ADF. The paper will also consider the differences in the configuration, role and environment (CRE) for the platforms and will highlight the main differences and similarities that support the aviation safety activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The MQ-4C Triton is categorised as a Specific Type-A Uncrewed Aerial System (UAS) under the Defence Aviation Safety Regulations (DASR). The DASR requires that such systems comply with initial and continuing airworthiness regulations to the extent that it makes a direct and meaningful contribution to safety. For Triton - a large UAS designed to a tailored set of airworthiness standards and required to operate in shared airspace - the decision on what, and how, elements of the DASR will be applied is non-trivial. Further complicating matters is the absence of formal Recognition from the Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA) of the United States Navy (USN) as a competent organisation for the design of UAS, thus preventing the simple absorption of technical data and information from the manufacturer. In order to address this, the AIR7000 Phase 1B Project Office has undertaken a comprehensive analysis and tailoring of DASR Part 21 and Part M, and conducted an internal due-diligence assessment of the USN. This tailoring and assessment, overlaid with the Defence Seven Step risk management framework, forms the basis of design safety as part of systemic risk mitigation for Triton. The result is 'small-c' certification applied to the Triton design and 'small-r' recognition applied to the USN for UAS, all of which is driven by the need to eliminate and mitigate risk So Far As Reasonably Practicable (SFARP). To that end, this presentation will provide an overview of the DASR tailoring process, examine its key artefacts and outcomes, and describe how the absence of formal Recognition has been addressed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]