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It has long been known that most of the private law content of the Theodosian Code has not been preserved independently of the Lex Romana Visigothorum. Certain constitutions, not contained in the LRV but dating to the period covered by the CT, have survived in the Code of Justinian. This article discusses this problem with respect to a particular topic: fideicommissa. The article discusses whether a particular constitution, CJ 6.37.21, might have been included in the CT, either as part of a general rubric concerning inheritance or as part of a separate rubric on fideicommissa, and concludes by suggesting what the constitution might have looked like had it been under a separate heading.

A.H.M. Jones, the great British historian of the later Roman Empire, was once asked what difference conversion to Christianity made to Rome. His answer: None. Brutal gladiatorial contests continued to be held, slavery was not abolished, and cruel penalties were laid down for seemingly minor moral infractions. Thus, Jones reasoned, the actual impact of Christianity on secular Roman society is difficult to see. Jones's view, however, has not been universally shared, particularly when it comes to the Roman legal system. Biondo Biondi saw Christianity as bringing about “un profundo rivolgimento” in late Roman law, which had ramifications in many different areas. As a religion, Christianity differed in unmistakable ways from its pagan competitors, and it would be quite surprising if these differences did not have some impact on Roman law and society when Christianity was adopted as the official state religion. The late Roman era offers a fertile testing ground for the impact a nascent religion might have on a society and its legal institutions.

The writ of quare impedit was, until the mid-nineteenth century, a standard real action for the recovery of advowsons. This article argues that the writ was most likely created between 1187 and 1196, and that it was, at least in part, a response to pressure from religious houses that acquired advowsons by charter of gift and were precluded from bringing the writ of right of advowson or the assize of darrein presentment.

The recent rise of perpetual trusts has brought new attention to previously obscure state constitutional prohibitions of perpetuities. This symposium commentary examines the historical origins of the first such prohibition, Clause 23 of the 1776 North Carolina Constitution and Declaration of Rights, which provided that “perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free State, and ought not to be allowed.” Although many good reasons can be offered for the provision, it is curiously absent from the constitutions of the twelve other original states. Why did this provision emerge only in North Carolina, and not in Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, or any of the other “free states” that together rose up against their colonial masters? This commentary suggests a possible answer to that question. Although the problems with perpetuities were well known to learned inhabitants of all the newly independent American states, those problems were particularly salient in North Carolina in 1776 due to that colony’s unique history as a former proprietary colony. The decision by the heir of one of the original Lords Proprietors not to sell his share back to the British crown gave rise to specific grievances in North Carolina that did not exist in the other twelve former colonies. Moreover, North Carolina was unique in witnessing a violent confrontation between the colonial authorities and backcountry farmers that stemmed in part from those grievances. The peculiar case of the Earl Granville and assorted problems in his Granville District shifted the problem of perpetuities from the periphery to the center of North Carolina politics in the late eighteenth century, and made perpetuities warrant an explicit mention in the 1776 North Carolina Constitution and Declaration of Rights.

Nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs ameliorate pain and fever by inhibiting cyclooxygenase (COX) and suppressing prostanoid formation. Microsomal prostaglandin E synthase-1 (mPGES-1) catalyzes formation of PGE(2) from the COX product PGH(2) and has emerged as a therapeutic target. Inhibition of mPGES-1, however, renders the PGH(2) substrate available for diversion to other PG synthases. To address the possibility that substrate diversion augments formation of PGs that might modulate bronchial tone, we assessed the impact of mPGES-1 deletion in a mouse model of ozone-induced airway hyper-responsiveness. Ozone exposure increased total lung resistance to inhaled methacholine in wild-type mice. Deletion of mPGES-1 had little effect on total lung resistance in either naive or ozone-exposed animals. The carbachol-induced narrowing of luminal diameter in intrapulmonary airways of lung slices from acute ozone-exposed mice was also unaltered by mPGES-1 deletion. Likewise, although concentrations of PGE(2) were reduced in bronchoalveolar lavage fluid, whereas 6-keto-PGF(1alpha), PGD(2), and PGF(2alpha), all were increased, deletion of mPGES-1 failed to influence cell trafficking into the airways of either naive or ozone-exposed animals. Despite biochemical evidence of PGH(2) substrate diversion to potential bronchomodulator PGs, deletion of mPGES-1 had little effect on ozone-induced airway inflammation or airway hyper-responsiveness. Pharmacologically targeting mPGES-1 may not predispose patients at risk to airway dysfunction.

Much has been written on the possible influence of Roman or canon law on the early English common law of property. Maitland thought that the canonist's actio spolii was the inspiration for the assize of novel disseisin. Sutherland argued that the assize borrowed from the Roman interdict unde vi. Milsom, by contrast, thinks that the early common-law writs must be understood within a feudal framework, and that the early common law took nothing from Roman law than the Latin language. This Article offers a new perspective on ownership and possession in the early common law. It examines the theoretical development of proprietary and possessory concepts in the ius commune as it would have been understood in England in the late twelfth century, taking into account the Liber pauperum and the early ordines as well as reports of ecclesiastical court cases. After surveying the current debate, the Article then turns to the advowson writs, which have not yet been studied as a possible example of Roman law influence. Finding some evidence of the ownership/possession distinction in the advowson writs, the Article comes to the conclusion that the possibility of influence from the ius commune is greater than Milsom thinks.