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Background: Since 2009, the CDC has invested in nationwide outbreak response capacity through Healthcare-associated Infections and Antimicrobial Resistance (HAI/AR) Programs in public health departments. The unpredictable nature of outbreaks requires public health programs to be able to scale operations and adapt strategies to effectively respond to emerging challenges, as demonstrated by the COVID-19 pandemic. This analysis characterizes HAI/AR Programs response capacity in scalability, adaptability, and technical expertise. Method: We reviewed data from HAI/AR Programs in 50 state, 6 local, and 2 territorial health departments (August 2019–December 2022). HAI/AR responses were defined as specific public health actions to assess an acute risk and prevent further harm in the context of a confirmed or possible healthcare outbreak; responses were categorized as involving novel or targeted multi-drug resistant organisms (nMDROs), COVID-19, and HAIs or infection control breaches. Descriptive statistics were used to analyze reported responses in three domains: scalability (number of responses per year), adaptability (number of pathogens and healthcare facility types involved in responses), and technical expertise (number of responses involving onsite or remote infection control assessments). The annual number of responses conducted in 2019 was estimated based on five months of data (Aug–Dec); all other results were calculated directly. Results: From August 2019 to December 2022, 58 HAI/AR Programs reported 141,445 responses (87% COVID-19, 11% nMDROs, 2% other HAIs or infection control breaches). Annually, programs conducted an estimated 5,546 responses in 2019, and this figure rose to 42,359 in 2020, 49,124 in 2021, and 47,651 in 2022. Outbreak responses involved 110 different pathogens, including emerging infectious diseases (e.g., SARS-CoV-2, mpox), nMDRO (e.g., carbapenemase-producing organisms, Candida auris), and other pathogens (e.g., hepatitis viruses, Mycobacterium abscessus) across >20 setting types (e.g., acute care hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, ambulatory surgery centers, assisted living facilities). Additionally, programs responded to infection control breaches in the absence of identified patient infections, including drug diversion, medical device reprocessing, and injection safety breaches. Programs conducted 50,245 infection control assessments during reported responses. Conclusion: From 2019–2022, as the COVID-19 pandemic took hold, HAI/AR Programs effectively utilized CDC funding to scale their response operations with an 8-fold increase in annual response activity, including a 24% increase for non-COVID-19 responses. Programs adapted responses to various pathogens, including emerging infectious diseases, across various setting types. Health department staff utilized technical expertise to conduct infection control assessments. This analysis provides valuable insights into the resilience and impact of HAI/AR Programs nationwide.

Background: Healthcare activities that include instrumentation or manipulation of mucosal tissue or normally sterile sites, such as the eye and its associated structures, place patients at risk of infectious and other complications. We reviewed queries to the CDC Prevention and Response Branch that were focused on ophthalmologic procedures and settings to examine opportunities to improve infection prevention and control (IPC) practices in these settings. Methods: We reviewed internal CDC consultation records received from January 1, 2016, through December 31, 2021, to identify those involving ophthalmologic procedures or settings. Consultations were reviewed to determine setting type, number of patients affected, organisms identified, nature of infection control breaches, and whether medical products were implicated. Descriptive statistics were calculated. Results: We identified 24 consultations among 19 states and US territories. Of these, 21 (87.5%) involved outpatient settings, of which 9 (43%) were ambulatory surgery centers. Consultations included the following non–mutually exclusive categories. There were 18 adverse postsurgical events (75%), such as mycobacterial infection after laser surgery and toxic anterior segment syndrome following cataract surgery (n = 5). There were 11 infections following ophthalmologic clinical care (46%), such as epidemic keratoconjunctivitis due to adenovirus 8. There were 8 suspected medication-related events (33%) including contamination of ophthalmic medication when manufactured or compounded offsite. There were 8 medical-device reprocessing concerns (33%) including inappropriate high-level disinfection. There were 8 instances of improper environmental cleaning and disinfection (33%), for example, during an adenovirus outbreak. There were 3 cases of potential mishandling of medications onsite (12.5%), such as multiuse eye drops. Also, 3 events (12.5%) were associated with potentially contaminated donor tissue, such as corneas for transplantation. When a consultation included identification of a pathogen (n = 11), organisms included bacteria (n = 7, 64%), viruses (n = 2, 18%), and fungi (n = 3, 27%). In total, 202 patients had confirmed ophthalmologic infections or adverse events. Conclusions: Based on our review of recent outbreaks, healthcare personnel in ophthalmologic settings may have deficits in training related to instrument reprocessing and environmental cleaning specific to ophthalmic equipment and settings that can result in harm to patients. These settings could benefit from targeted training to improve IPC practices specific to ophthalmologic examinations and procedures. This review was limited to analysis of investigations that were voluntarily reported to the CDC. A formal surveillance system for adverse outcomes in this setting could clarify the nature and frequency of IPC issues of greatest concern.

Background: Rapid response is critical to control healthcare-associated infection (HAI) and antibiotic resistance threats within healthcare facilities to prevent illness among patients, residents, and healthcare personnel. Through this analysis, we aimed to quantify public health response activities, by healthcare setting type, for (1) novel and targeted multidrug-resistant organisms or mechanisms (MDROs), (2) SARS-CoV-2, and (3) other possible outbreaks. Method: We reviewed response activity data submitted by US state, territorial, and local health department HAI/AR programs to the CDC as part of funding requirements. We performed descriptive analyses of response activities conducted during the funding reporting period (August 2019–July 2020). SARS-CoV-2 response activities were reported from January through July 2020. Data were analyzed by response category (novel or targeted MDRO, SARS-CoV-2, other HAI/AR responses), and healthcare setting type. Results: During August 2019–July 2020, 57 HAI/AR Programs (50 state, 1 territorial, 5 local health departments, and District of Columbia) reported 18,306 public health responses involving healthcare facilities. These data included 3,860 responses to 1 or more cases of novel or targeted MDROs, 13,992 responses to SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks (beginning in January 2020), and 454 responses to other possible outbreaks. Novel and targeted MDRO responses most frequently occurred in acute-care hospitals (ACHs, 64.5%), skilled nursing facilities (SNFs, 24.5%), and long-term acute-care hospitals (LTACHs, 5.8%). SARS-CoV-2 responses most frequently occurred in SNFs (55%), and assisted living facilities (24%). Other HAI/AR responses most frequently occurred in ACH (50%), SNF (28.4%), and outpatient settings (19.6%). Of the “other” HAI/AR responses, 76% were responses to cases, clusters, or outbreaks, and 23.8% were responses to serious infection control breaches including device and instrument reprocessing, injection safety, and other deficient practices. Conclusions: During the study period, public health programs performed a high volume of HAI/AR response activities largely focused on SARS-CoV-2 in nursing homes and assisted living facilities. Other important response activities occurred across a range of other healthcare settings, including responses to novel and targeted MDROs, HAI outbreaks, and serious infection control breaches. Whereas SARS-CoV-2 response activities largely centered in long-term care settings, MDRO and other HAI/AR responses occurred mostly in acute-care settings. These data demonstrate the importance of building and sustaining public health response capacity for a broad array of healthcare settings, pathogens, and patient populations to meet the range of current and emerging HAI/AR threats.

Background: Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, CDC Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion (DHQP) has provided technical assistance in support of state, tribal, local, and territorial health departments for COVID-19 healthcare outbreak management and infection prevention and control (IPC). We characterized the volume and trends of technical assistance provided during the pandemic to inform the future needs of health departments for COVID-19 healthcare IPC and DHQP resources required to meet these needs. Methods: In January 2020, DHQP began receiving COVID-19 IPC TA requests directly from health departments for remote assistance or from CDC staff on field deployments providing onsite support. DHQP subject-matter experts provided responses via e-mail or, for more complex inquiries, outbreaks, or field deployments, via phone consultations. Records of e-mail communications and phone consultations were entered into an inquiry database for tracking. We calculated the number, mean, and range of technical-assistance responses by jurisdiction and by month from January 2020 through December 2021. We designated months as high-volume periods for technical assistance if inquiries surpassed the 75th percentile. Results: In total, 1,869 IPC technical-assistance responses were provided. Of all technical-assistance responses, 1,725 (92%) were to state or local health departments, 115 (6%) were tribal nations, and 28 (2%) were US territories. IPC technical assistance was provided to all 50 states and the District of Columbia, 16 tribal nations, and 5 US territories. The average total number of technical assistance responses per site during the 24-month period was 34 to state and local HDs (range, 2–111), 6 to tribal nations (when tribal nation was specified; range, 1–17), and 6 to US territories (range, 1–15). E-mail communications comprised 1,164 responses (62%); phone consultations made up the remaining 705 responses (38%). Of phone consultations, 350 (50%) were with CDC field deployers providing onsite support to health departments. The average number of technical-assistance responses provided each month across all jurisdictions was 78 (range, 0–334); months with high volumes included April–August 2020 and January 2021. Conclusions: These findings highlight the high-level collaboration between federal and state, tribal, local, and territorial health department partners in remote and onsite support of COVID-19 prevention and response efforts in healthcare settings. Variations in monthly volumes of health-department COVID-19 healthcare IPC technical assistance requests may reflect factors such as fluctuations in community infection rates and changes in CDC IPC guidance. The ability to provide effective technical assistance during pandemic response depends on the CDC maintaining sufficient healthcare IPC staffing and expertise.