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Islamism in Indonesia and Malaysia has undergone a fascinating transformation from social movement roots to mainstream politics. How did this take place, and to what ends? Drawing on social movement theories, this Element explains this transformation by focusing on key Islamic social movements in these two countries. It argues: first, that the popularity and appeal of Islamism in Indonesia and Malaysia cannot be understood without appreciating how these social movements have enabled and facilitated mobilization; and second, that it is precisely these roots in civil societal mobilization that account for the enduring influence of Islamist politics evident in how Islamic social movements have shaped and transformed the political landscape. These arguments will be developed by unpacking how Islamist ideas took root in social movement settings, the kinds of institutional and organizational structures through which these ideas were advanced, and the changing political landscape that facilitated these processes.

For countries with religiously diverse populations that have a record of tense relations with each other, the notion of a covenantal pluralism, if successfully established and entrenched as an orga...

The development of Islamic education in southern Thailand has been in the spotlight of researchers in the last decade in efforts to establish a national education, although this study is still less attractive. The existence of Pondok schools as Islamic educational institutions is considered to have mobilized separatist movements and the authority of traditional Malay Muslim elites to fight for territory. The existence of the Malay rulers with their authority in the fields of religion and culture made traditional Islamic education deeply rooted in the southern Thailand region. Muslims in the southern province are allegedly a monolithic entity whose existence constructs the institutionalization of Thailand as a state, thus opening up space for separatist seeds that emerge from Islamic educational institutions. The existence of Islamic reformers such as Haji Sulong Abdul Kadir is strong evidence that his movement is treading the religious and cultural field in the process of reviving the institutionalization of Islamic education in Southern Thailand. The establishment of Madrasah al-Ma'arif al-Wataniah Fatani as a forum for Haji Sulong Abdul Kadir to fight for reforms in Islamic education institutions, despite strong opposition from the state and the authority of the traditional Malay Muslim elite but ultimately the principles of reform were realized even though the reformers had died and the madrasa was closed.

The election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United States has occasioned intense discussion over the likely shape of his administration's foreign policy toward Southeast Asia. Two broad views have emerged in this regard. The first contends that the political neophyte will attempt to make good on his campaign promises to reconsider U.S. commitments to friends and allies, and this will lead him to depart from prevailing policy toward East Asia and upend the order that has undergirded the region's prosperity and economic dynamism. A second view maintains that, after an initial period of bluster, good sense will prevail and policy toward Asia will fall back into a more familiar pattern as a result of geostrategic realities, combined with the appointment of cabinet members who by most measures are of the order of previous incumbents. Needless to say, the dust has yet to settle on this debate, and it continues to be followed with great interest-not to mention a fair amount of trepidation-around the world, not least in Southeast Asia.The first part of this essay highlights the key differences that have emerged in U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia under the Obama and Trump administrations. The essay then concludes by discussing the outlook for U.S.-Southeast Asia relations and identifying several reasons for concern.Differences between the Obama and Trump Administrations' Policies toward AsiaThe Barack Obama years were heady days for Southeast Asia. Not since the ill-fated Vietnam War era had the United States paid as much attention and devoted as many resources to the region. Obama's Asia policy, christened the "pivot" and later the "rebalance," saw the United States initiate the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue and accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation established by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the way to joining the East Asia Summit. During his presidency, Obama visited all Southeast Asian countries except for Brunei (which he would have visited in October 2013 if not for the U.S. government shutdown). To demonstrate the comprehensive nature of the rebalance, the Obama administration joined-and eventually led-discussions for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was pitched as the "gold standard" for global trade and involved twelve Pacific Rim countries, including four from Southeast Asia. At the time, the hope and ambition surrounding the TPP also held out the prospect of other regional states coming on board in the future.With the inauguration of the Trump administration in January, Southeast Asian countries found themselves staring at the prospect of a considerable rollback of U.S. interest in the region. In nursing these fears, they were not alone. U.S. allies Japan, South Korea, and Australia shared similar concerns. Candidate Trump's decision to adopt a cantankerous line toward China is hardly unusual for U.S. presidential campaigns. What caused greater consternation was his suggestion that he would withdraw the United States from the TPP and review the country's security commitments to regional allies South Korea and Japan. Trump did little to dispel these concerns following his electoral victory in November. He chose to break with tradition and receive a phone call from the independence-leaning Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen. This was followed by capricious comments about possibly reviewing Washington's long-standing one-China policy. Days after assuming office, Trump withdrew the United States from the TPP by means of executive order. The appointment of China hawks to key positions on trade did little to dampen the growing adversarial climate. Meanwhile, during his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson suggested that efforts should be made to prevent China from having access to the artificial islands it had built in the South China Sea, raising concerns that Sino-U.S. relations were headed for conflict.Four and a half months since his inauguration, President Trump's approach to East Asia appears to be more considered than many pundits and observers were expecting. …

While Malaysia has often been portrayed in the popular media as a progressive and pluralist country, some scholars have argued that an upsurge in religious conservatism - manifesting itself in exclusivist Islamist narratives - has created the conditions from which extremist ideas associated with ISIS draw support and sympathy. Yet even as legitimate concern for the appeal of ISIS and the return of foreign fighters grows, the very existence of these conservative and exclusivist religiopolitical narratives articulated by Malaysian Islamists operating in and referenced to a distinctly Malaysian context in fact limits the appeal of ISIS in Malaysia. By focusing specifically on the nexus between religion and ethnicity in Malaysia, and the historical development of a modern yet traditionally rooted expression of Malay-Islamic identity in contradistinction to "Westernization", this article reveals the underpinnings of Malay Muslim religiopolitical legitimacy and contrasts them to the narratives of ISIS, outlining that ISIS's failure to adequately contextualize its narratives has significantly blunted the terrorist organization's appeal.

A signature initiative that bears the personal imprimatur of President Xi Jinping, the Belt and Road Initiative has been articulated by the Chinse leadership as a grand narrative. Yet, given the reality that it comprises a series of mostly bilateral developmental initiatives that China has entered into with various countries, can we identify broader strategic intent behind the BRI? This essay attempts to answer this question by exploring the geopolitical and geoeconomic dimensions of the BRI and how they may be interlinked with China’s domestic considerations. It also assess the potential, shortcomings, blind spots, and criticisms of the BRI.