Search

Excessive secrecy has always compromised the integrity of Mozambique’s elections. The National Elections Commission secretly changes results with no records kept nor any public notice that changes have been made. The official final results of the 2019 elections were changed three times by the Constitutional Council with no comment and identical document numbers. The political parties want a politicised electoral machine with party nominees to all electoral bodies, and integrity has steadily declined. By 2018-9 elections had become dominated by the ruling party, Frelimo, which was able to openly change the outcome of municipal elections and create 329 430 ghost voters in the national elections. Civil society observers had become an important check on elections; but in 2019, independent observation was blocked in several provinces and the head of civil society observation in one province was assassinated by a police hit squad. The judiciary, which ordered a rerun in one town in the 2013 municipal elections, has become politicised and will no longer intervene. This paper is an empirical account of those events.

Controlling floods and raising rice production in Bangladesh have been the centres of struggle for nearly a century - between North and South, and between engineering solutions and local knowledge. Decades of disastrous construction of dikes and polders led first to local protest, including cutting dikes, and then to a structured local solution known as tidal river management, which won the support of Bangladeshi scientists and academics. Suddenly, the global North has noticed and is rushing to catch up - asking what local farmers knew and hydraulic engineers did not, while trying to maintain the dominance of aid industry engineers and technicians in Bangladesh.

Gas, rubies and other minerals have proved a curse for most Mozambicans. Poverty and inequality have increased. Despite its resource wealth, Mozambique remains one of the poorest countries in the world, falling ever lower on the Human Development Index. But an elite has become wealthy. There is now a civil war in Cabo Delgado province, which has the gas and rubies - and also the worst poverty.

Background/objective Uncertainty regarding benefits and risks associated with acetylcholinesterase inhibitors (AChEIs) in severe dementia means providers do not know if and when to deprescribe. We sought to identify which patient-, provider-, and system-level characteristics are associated with AChEI discontinuation. Design Analysis of 2015 to 2016 data from Medicare claims, Part D prescriptions, Minimum Data Set (MDS), version 3.0, Area Health Resource File, and Nursing Home Compare. Cox-proportional hazards models with time-varying covariates were used to identify patient-, provider-, and system-level factors associated with AChEI discontinuation (30-day or more gap in supply). Setting US Medicare-certified nursing homes (NHs). Participants Nonskilled NH residents, aged 65 years and older, with severe dementia receiving AChEIs within the first 14 days of an MDS assessment in 2016 (n = 37 106). Results The sample was primarily white (78.7%), female (75.5%), and aged 80 years or older (77.4%). The most commonly prescribed AChEIs were donepezil (77.8%), followed by transdermal rivastigmine (14.6%). The cumulative incidence of AChEI discontinuation was 29.7% at the end of follow-up (330 days), with mean follow-up times of 194 days for continuous users of AChEIs and 105 days for those who discontinued. Factors associated with increased likelihood of discontinuation were new admission, older age, difficulty being understood, aggressive behavior, poor appetite, weight loss, mechanically altered diet, limited prognosis designation, hospitalization in 90 days prior, and northeastern region. Factors associated with decreased likelihood of discontinuation included memantine use, use of strong anticholinergics, polypharmacy, rurality, and primary care prescriber vs geriatric specialist. Conclusion Among NH residents with severe dementia being treated with AChEIs, the cumulative incidence of AChEI discontinuation was just under 30% at 1 year of follow-up. Our findings provide insight into potential drivers of deprescribing AChEIs, identify system-level barriers to deprescribing, and help to inform covariates that are needed to address potential confounding in studies evaluating the potential risks and benefits associated with deprescribing. J Am Geriatr Soc 67:1871-1879, 2019.

Strenuous efforts by donors and lenders over four decades turned Mozambique from a socialist success story into a neoliberal capitalist one. The private sector dominates; a domestic elite dependent on foreign companies has been created. But a secret US$2 billion arms and fishing boat deal involving Swiss and Russian banks and Mozambican purchases from France, Germany, and Israel, with large profits on all sides, was a step too far down the donor’s capitalist road. The International Monetary Fund cut off its programme and western donors ended budget support.

This study considers the films and writings of Jorge Sanjines, an influential Latin American filmmaker and theorist known for the collaborative methods of filmmaking he and the Grupo Ukamau created working with indigenous Andean communities, in light of two interrelated but overlooked aspects of his theory and practice: the extent to which his theories intervened in European debates about politics and cinema during the period 1966-1989 (the release dates for his first and last significant features) and his experiments using cinematic form to create a language capable of communicating an alternative, nonwestern subjectivity. After reviewing the history of the Grupo Ukamau, including its most significant Bolivian precursors, Jorge Ruiz, Oscar Soria, and the Insituto Cinematografico Boliviano, as well as the group’s theories of spectatorship, form in revolutionary cinema, and the practice of making a cinema with the people, this dissertation turns to three topics key to understanding Sanjines in a properly transnational context: the importance of Bertolt Brecht’s theories for Sanjines, the sequence shot as the basis for his new cinematic language, and political parallels with other European filmmakers. Like several European political filmmakers of the period who experimented with rhetorical and non-realistic uses of the sequence shot, Sanjines was more inspired by Brecht’s theory of Epic Theater than Italian Neo-realism. Sanjines adapted these techniques both to communicate with his local indigenous audiences and intervene in European theory, a process described here as dialectical transculturation. To create what he called the “Andean sequence shot,” Sanjines adapted Jean-Luc Godard’s dialectical editing of long takes, Miklos Jancso’s portrayals of collective protagonists, and Theo Angelopoulos’ use of multiple temporalities within a single shot. The final section explores the parallels among Sanjines’ theory and practice and those of Pier Paolo Pasolini and Jean Rouch, two European filmmakers contemporaneously engaged in

Conflict over African land – between small holders and large industrial farmers and between domestic farmers and global agribusinesses – raises key questions about who will make the best use of African land and which farmers do most to decrease poverty and produce more food, industrial inputs, and exports. Zimbabwe has already gone through two major changes in land occupation, and thus provides an important test of what is the 'best' use of the land. Three measures of 'best' use have been cited in Zimbabwe: reward for military victory, poverty reduction, and agricultural production. Initial evidence indicates that commercial small holder production is a better use of the land than larger, more mechanised farming.

Myriad factors can lead to a high number of medications in older adults with heart failure (HF) which is concerning as taking at least 10 medications is associated with adverse outcomes. We aimed to examine patterns of polypharmacy among older adults hospitalized with HF. We examined adults aged

The label ‘poor governance’ throws together real evils such as corruption and rent-seeking with a new group of alleged evils which are actually good for development, including a role for the state in the economy and support for domestic capital. Successful development policies of Europe in the late nineteenth century and the Asian Tigers and Brazil in the second half of the twentieth century are now labelled as ‘poor governance.’ This is what Ha-Joon Chang described as ‘kicking away the ladder’ by which rich countries climbed to development, so that today’s poor countries cannot follow. Mozambique is cited as an example of how the good governance rhetoric has been misused to retard development and poverty reduction.

Despite rapid economic growth and massive inflows of aid, in Mozambique rural poverty is worsening. Agricultural production and productivity have not increased in the last decade. Use of chemical fertilisers and other modern technology is low and decreasing. The present development model emphasises that the government and donor role is to provide human capital and infrastructure, while the private sector is responsible for economic development and ending poverty. The most recent national surveys confirm what is being seen elsewhere in Africa, that this non-interventionist strategy does not raise agricultural productivity or reduce poverty. Of Mozambique’s population, 80 per cent is engaged in agriculture, but contributing only one fifth of the GDP. This suggests that investments in agriculture are likely to generate pro-poor growth, both to rural and urban dwellers. The policy failure is increasingly recognised, but donors and government have invested too much political capital in this policy to change easily

The South Korean or Asian Tiger model is no longer available to poor counties, because preference for local companies and elite businesspeople is now billed as "corrupt". The paper asks if Mozambique is trying to follow such a model covertly, by supporting the development of domestic capital allied to the ruling party, Frelimo.

Mozambique, an aid darling, poses some stark questions for development co-operation. Current economic management strategies mean that a growing group of young people are leaving school with a basic education but no economic prospects. Will ‘marginal’ youth in towns and cities pose a threat of political and criminal violence? Can peace be built on poverty and rising inequality? Are elections and expanded schooling enough when there are no jobs?

Mozambique's president Armando Guebuza was re-elected president on 28 October 2009 with a record vote of nearly 3 million. But the election was tainted by misconduct, unfairness, and secrecy that brought sharp criticism from domestic and international observers, and which seemed pointless and unnecessary.

Debt relief has focused on the borrower—debt is cancelled if a country is too poor to repay and now has acceptable policies. Iraq shifted the focus to the lender—debt should be cancelled because creditors should never have lent money to the repressive regime. This paper uses domestic and international law to establish the concept of ‘illegitimate debt’, which should not be repaid independent of the status of the borrower. The concept of ‘moral hazard’ is used to argue that non-payment of illegitimate debt is necessary to discipline lenders and to prevent future lending to oppressive dictators.

“In a very real sense, the conditions that spawned the war and inflicted gruesome casualties on Sierra Leone's citizens have not disappeared”, the International Crisis Group has warned. In this paper we argue that many of those conditions are being recreated. The same old men who were responsible for the war are still in power, both in government and in a reinstated chieftaincy system, and corruption is still endemic, while young people remain jobless and largely uneducated. Further, we argue that the policies of the international community are, perhaps inadvertently, promoting a return to pre-war conditions.

Donors inveigh against corruption, yet give more aid to corrupt governments. Debate continues on the causes of developing country corruption, but with little consideration of the possibility that the behaviour of donors may unintentionally promote corruption. This article looks at the example of Mozambique, where corruption grew rapidly in the 1990s. It argues that the donor community is prepared to tolerate quite blatant corruption if the elite rapidly puts into place ‘market‐friendly’ policy changes. The article notes that the Mozambican elite is divided, but the group which challenged high level corruption also criticised World Bank adjustment policies; donors opted for the corrupt faction that told the donors what they wanted. Donors try to avoid the issue by concentrating on institutional reform, which the corrupt faction has so far been able to bypass. The issue is compounded by Mozambique's reputation as one of the World Bank's few success stories in Africa, and donors are reluctant to besmirch tha...

About the book: This volume presents a state-of-the-art debate on the controversial topic of development aid. For several decades, the need to provide aid to low income countries, in order to stimulate and promote their economic and social development, was widely accepted. In recent years, however, the issue of aid and the question of its role in development have become matters of controversy. In this collection of essays, development aid is put under the microscope, as the contributors examine its history, its rationale, and its effectiveness, and reach some quite different conclusions as to the part it plays in catalysing, or indeed in stifling, development. While some argue that aid remains vital, and must be maintained or increased, others are more sceptical, and fear that it may even prolong underdevelopment in certain circumstances. These essays, from a select group of commentators representing different analytical perspectives, first appeared as an academic debate in the journal Development and Change, in response to an article by Jan Pronk, former Minister for Development Co-operation of the Netherlands.

Three people have been murdered for investigating corruption in the Mozambican banking system and the loss of more than $400 million. All countries use banks politically, and in Mozambique, the banks were first used to build socialism, then to keep the country running during the war, and finally in the new capitalist era to promote local entrepreneurs and keep the economy out of foreign hands. But the nature of socialist banking and the process of transition combined to create the conditions under which powerful individuals could use the banking system for accumulation. But this has been contested, and there is an ongoing struggle within the elite between those groups which back what Peter Evans calls the 'predatory' and 'developmental' states. The recent murders suggest this contest is becoming more acute. Finally, we note that a key role has been played by the international financial institutions, which in their doctrinaire opposition to any serious role for the state chose to back the predatory state faction.

A criminal slander action brought by the son of the president of Mozambique against a journalist and the children of an assassinated editor have brought to the surface debates on race, development strategy and the role of the press. These are taking place in the shadow of Zimbabwe and in the context of international donors wanting to give more money to Mozambique because it is seen as a success story of World Bank and IMF policies.

The 3-5 December 1999 election was closer than expected, with Frelimo head Joaquim Chissano being re-elected president with 52.3 per cent of the vote against Renamo head Afonso Dhlakama. The election was approved and generally praised by international and domestic observers, but there was a very high error rate in the filling out of forms by polling station staff, which led to thousands of votes being excluded. Private estimates and extrapolations suggest that Chissano would have probably gained about 51.3 per cent and Dhlakama 48.7 per cent, if there had been a full national recount (Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, Maputo & Amsterdam, January 2000).

Mozambique's cashew nut production failed to recover after the 1982–92 war, with serious implications for peasant producers and workers in the country's single largest industry. Cashew has the potential to regain its role as a major sector of the Mozambican economy, and this article looks at the fundamental problems relating to the growing and processing of cashew. Next, the article shows how contradictory World Bank‐imposed policies prevented Mozambique from resolving these problems. Cashew shows that World Bank staff sometimes have unchecked power to impose policies on poor countries, with no need to justify their actions. The article concludes by asking if the World Bank can be sole judge of the success of its policies.

Developing country debt now exceeds 2.4 trillion dollars and has become a major international political and economic issue for debtor governments, creditor governments, the IMF and World Bank, and campaigning organizations such as Jubilee 2000. For the poorest countries, debt has become unpayable and debt service an obstacle to development. This paper argues that debt crises and substantial debt cancellation are part of the normal economic cycle, and that an unusual aspect of this cycle has been the unwillingness to cancel debt. Recent historic precedent suggest that at least 1 trillion dollars in debt would need to be cancelled. The paper then uses a rights-based approach to development to estimate that more than 600 billion dollars in debt must be cancelled to release sufficient funds to meet internationally agreed development targets and thus satisfy human rights. Finally, the paper argues that lenders must take responsibility for illegitimate, corrupt and odious loans. Debt cancellation is the norm, not the exception, and the only question is how much.

But debt relief is calculated in secret. Executive directors of the IMF and World Bank who approved the package on 7 April were not told what the actual debt relief would be, and had to accept claims from officials that Mozambique would receive a good deal. In fact, Mozambique gained almost nothing; debt service postHIPC will be little less than it was before. More than $2bn in debt HAS been written off. But it was debt that Mozambique would never have paid.

Social protection programs, especially cash transfer programs, have spread across low- and middle-income countries since the beginning of the millennium, and are increasingly part of national development strategies to assist the poor and particularly the poorest. This chapter lays out a wide range of debates about the specific goals, targets, and conditions of social protection and cash transfers. While there is no single best program option, the authors identified five overriding principles for effective efforts. Thus social protection programs and cash transfers work best when they are: fair, assured, practical, large enough to impact household income, and popular. These principles need interpretation at the national level, because no model can be automatically transferred from one country to another.

[About the book]\ud \ud The Africa Yearbook covers major domestic political developments, the foreign policy and socio-economic trends in sub-Sahara Africa – all related to developments in one calendar year. The Yearbook contains articles on all sub-Saharan states, each of the four sub-regions (West, Central, Eastern, Southern Africa) focusing on major cross-border developments and sub-regional organizations as well as one article on continental developments and one on African-European relations.

The paper presents a wide range of data on Mozambique and examines what this shows about changes to poverty and income levels over the past decade. The authors point to the lack of changes in farming practice which is contributing to the persistence of poverty and consider cash income and the poverty trap in Mozambique. The paper goes on to discuss the failure of donor-led development models and looks at Mozambique and other countries for alternative policies that might reduce poverty and raise agricultural production. Finally, the paper considers the arguments for and against a change of policy in the future.

Mozambique's elite has responded to five decades of rapid change and international pressure by staying united and steering a course that tried to balance the conflicting pressures of national development, self-interest, and the demands of the international community. This paper argues that after a period of donor-supported corruption, crude rent-seeking and unsuccessful Washington Consensus policies, the elite has shifted into using the state to promote the creation of business groups that could be large enough and dynamic enough to follow a development model with some similarities to the Asian Tigers, industrial development in Latin America, or Volkskapitalisme in apartheid South Africa.

Without sanctions, Nelson Mandela would not yet be free. Without sanctions, Namibia would not yet be independent. Sanctions were not the most important reason for either event, but sanctions were crucial in providing an extra push. They sped up the events leading to the release of Mandela and the independence of Namibia. And sanctions will continue to play an important role in accelerating progress toward genuine majority rule in South Africa. In this Briefing, I will first look in detail at sanctions and the Namibia independence process, and consider other experiences of sanctions to show why South Africa is vulnerable to them; secondly, discuss the role of sanctions, and ask how they have affected South Africa and briefly look at the impact of sanctions on the SADCC states. Finally, I will look at the role of sanctions in the coming negotiations in South Africa.

The 2004 Presidential Election in Mozambique was marred by allegations of fraud. We assess the validity of these allegations by testing whether or not qualitative descriptions of the methods and locations of misconduct are consistent with a series of simple quantitative tests. Most studies of electoral misconduct are based on ecological regression analysis or on comparing a different data set with the electoral data in question – past elections, exit polls, etc. In the case of Mozambique this is impossible due to data restrictions. Instead we use qualitative evidence to inform a quantitative identification strategy. The concordance between specific complaints and the statistical evidence suggests that ballot box stuffing, improper ballot nullification, and (intentional) organisational failure took place. While the overall election result was unaffected by the fraud, our analysis demonstrates a method of assessing allegations of misconduct and points to areas of concern for those managing or observing future elections in Mozambique and elsewhere.

This chapter addresses the questions: why should poor countries be expected to repay the debts imposed upon them by unelected and repressive governments? Who should shoulder the burden of repaying the billions of dollars stolen by the likes of Mobutu, Marcos, and Saddam Hussein? How can creditors expect South Africans to pay for loans taken out during the apartheid regime and at that time used as a means of oppression? It argues that loans to certain borrowers or for certain purposes are prima facie illegitimate. This category includes loans to dictators, odious debt (debt used for repression), and extortionate loans. Second, certain types of behavior by lenders can also make a loan illegitimate: usury, money laundering, and gross negligence in lending. When these conditions are met, responsibility for repayment cannot be properly placed on the borrower.