The book represents a historical overview of the way the topic of gesture and sign language has been treated in (mainly) philosophical writers from Antiquity (Plato, Lucretius and Saint Augustine) to the early twentieth century (Merleau‑Ponty), with special attention to authors in eighteenth century France. Unlike most monographs written on the issue in question, the texts treated are grouped into several categories based on the view they present of deafness and gesture. While some of those texts (Aristotle, Hobbes and others) obviously view deafness and sign language in negative terms, i. e. as deficiency, others (Diderot, Desloges, and others) present deafness essentially as difference, i. e. as a set of competences that might provide some insights into how spoken language works. One of the key arguments of the book is that these two views of deafness and sign language, that can be traced back to Antiquity, still represent two dominant paradigms present in the current debates on the issue. The aim of the book, therefore, is not only to provide a historical overview but to trace what might be called a „history of the present“. In the introduction, the author tackles some methodological issues that such a project necessarily raises: namely, the question of a certain double bind between modern perspective (opened by gesture studies and sign language research conducted during the last decades) and the study of the historical materials, as well as the question of the complex relation between gesturing and signing which, in the framework of historical research, cannot be separated (despite the modern efforts to do so). The short following section concentrates on the work of Quintilian and Plato whose texts are used to clarify some common misunderstandings concerning gesturing and sign language (their imitative nature, their alleged universality) and to trace their possible historical origins. The first two chapters concentrate on two „paradigms“ of deafness, dominating the history of Western philosophical thought: deafness as deficiency and deafness as difference. The two chapters deal essentially with the 18th century French philosophy, but each of them is preceded by a historical excursion (Hobbes and St. Augustine) whose aim is to show that the two views of deafness have a considerably longer history and may be traced back to Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Nonetheless, it is especially the work of Condillac, Rousseau, Itard, Desloges, Diderot and E. Tylor that is examined in some detail. Their texts are read with regard to the specific context of the 18th century empiricism, but at the same time, the author attempts to stress some motifs that still seem relevant to the present day linguistics, psychology and research on gestures. In both cases, the aim is to show that the 18th century view of sign language and gesturing stems from a complicated historical and philosophical background that makes it rather difficult to judge or evaluate – in positive or negative terms, i. e. as „progressive“ or „conservative“ – from the modern perspective. Nonetheless, it may be argued that certain texts (Hobbes, Aristotle) treat the phenomenon of deafness essentially in negative terms, as a form of absence of something (sensory perception, abstract thought), while others (Augustine, Desloges, Diderot) view it in positive terms, as a presence of a different form of communication and different skills. The third chapter concentrates on language genealogies proposed by Condillac and Rousseau and examines the role of gesturing in the origin and genesis of language. We attempt to show – by examining especially the work of Bébian and Tylor – that the question of language origin is very closely related to the 18th century reflection on gesture and sign language. The final chapter deal with the philosophy of Maurice Merleau‑Ponty and with the role of gesture in his description of human linguistic behaviour: the author argues that Merleau‑Ponty's philosop