Search

No Brasil as taxas de homicídios alcançaram índices alarmantes. A maioria das análises em Ciência Política negligencia a relação entre violência e qualidade da democracia. O Index of Democracy do The Economist Unit (2008) avaliou o Brasil como sendo um país de elevada pontuação no indicador de liberdades civis. Levou em consideração aspectos dos direitos civis que ignoram os homicídios. Isso fez com que a conceituada revista inglesa chegasse à equivocada conclusão que o Brasil teria níveis de direitos civis acima de países como os Estados Unidos e o Reino Unido. O cerne deste trabalho está em analisar a qualidade da democracia brasileira tendo como um de seus critérios avaliativos o indicador de homicídio. A variável dependente é a qualidade da democracia e a variável independente, as taxas de morte por agressão em Pernambuco. Para medir-se a democracia avaliou-se o papel de suas instituições coercitivas na falta de contenção de homicídios praticados em Pernambuco. O resultado da análise inferiu serem, os altos números de homicídios, um óbice à consolidação da democracia no Brasil. In Brazil homicide rates have reached alarming levels. Most of the analyses carried out within Political Science neglect the relationship between violence and the quality of democracy. The Economist Unit (2008)'s Index of Democracy evaluated Brazil as a country with high ratings for civil liberties. Yet it considered aspects of civil rights overlooking homicides. This led the prestigious English journal to arrive at the mistaken conclusion that Brazil fared better in terms of civil liberties that countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom. This paper seeks to analyze Brazilian democracy by incorporating this indicator (homicides) as well. Quality of democracy is our dependent variable and Pernambuco state death rates due to violence are taken as our independent variable. In order to measure democracy, we evaluate the role of coercive institutions and their inability to contain homicides within the state. Our results suggest that high death rates related to aggression may be seen as an obstacle to the consolidation of democracy in Brazil. Au Brésil, les taux d'homicides ont atteint des indicateurs alarmants. La majorité des analyses en Science Politique négligent la relation entre la violence et la qualité de la démocratie. L'Index of Democraty du The Economist Unit (2008) a évalué le Brésil comme étant un pays avec un niveau élevé dans l'indicateur de libertés civiles, en prenant en compte des aspects des droits civils qui ignorent les homicides. A cause de ça, la revue anglaise très réputée a tiré une mauvaise conclusion, selon laquelle le Brésil aurait des niveaux de droits civils au-dessus de ceux des pays comme les Etats-Unis et le Royaume-Uni. L'essentiel de cet article, c'est l'analyse de la qualité de la démocratie brésilienne en ayant comme un de ses critères évaluatifs, l'indicateur d'homicides. La variable dépendante, c'est la qualité de la démocratie; et la variable indépendante, c'est les taux de mortalité par agression à Pernambuco. Pour mesurer la démocratie, nous avons évalué le rôle de ses institutions coercitives en l'absence de moyens pour empêcher l'avance d'homicides pratiqués à Pernambuco. Comme conclusion de l'analyse, nous avons que le grand nombre d'homicides constitue un obstacle pour la consolidation de la démocratie au Brésil.

A violência homicida é crescente no Nordeste. De 1996 a 2008 o impacto percentual foi na ordem de 106% nos números absolutos, num crescimento linear na série histórica. O Nordeste é conhecido pela desigualdade e pela pobreza. O objetivo central deste trabalho é avaliar o grau de relação da desigualdade e da pobreza com a violência homicida. Os dados utilizados foram resgatados do Sistema de Informação de Mortalidade (SIM/SUS) e do IBGE/IPEADATA.No confronto dos dados de homicídios com as macrovariatas socioeconômicas utilizadas como proxy para desigualdade e pobreza, concluímos que não há relação entre as variáveis, ou seja, refutamos que, no Nordeste em geral, e em Pernambuco em particular, a violência homicida seja explicada (ou causada) pela desigualdade/pobreza. The murderous violence is increasing in the Northeast. From 1996 to 2008 the percentage impact was around 106% in absolute numbers, a linear increase in the series.The Northeast is knownfor inequality and poverty. The main purpose of this study is to assess the degree of relationship of inequality and poverty with homicidal violence.The data used were rescued from the Information System (SIM / SUS) and IBGE / IPEADATA. In the comparison of data with the homicide macrovariatas used as a proxy for socioeconomic inequality and poverty, we conclude that there is no relationship between variables. That is, we refute that in the Northeast in general and in Pernambuco, in particular, homicidal violence is explained (or caused) by the inequality / poverty.

Comparative analysts argue that democracies spend less on military policies than authoritarian states, a claim that was applied to Brazilian electoral democracy by Hunter (1997). In fact, Brazil behaves as an outlier and military spending has continued to increase since 1995. Our explanation for this behavior relies on the idea of internal political governability risks faced by Brazilian presidents.They are continually threatened by leftist groups that have fragile commitments to liberal democracies and they rely on the military to strategically protect them.

Uma das tarefas políticas mais difíceis é controlar os serviços de inteligência; há uma inerente tensão entre democracia e tais serviços. Em uma democracia, a transparência sobre dados públicos e discussões sobre eles são valorizados; já a atividade de inteligência demanda sigilo. Se isso é árduo em democracias sólidas, é ainda mais em frágeis democracias como a brasileira. Nelas, quando decisões do poder civil porventura desagradam os militares, surgem pressões antidemocráticas que muitas vezes são negadas, mas que se insinuam. Em qualquer transição negociada espera-se que o novo governo democrático tenha de fazeralgumas concessões aos militares, no sentido da manutenção de algumas instituições autoritárias. É o preço da negociação, mas essas concessões devem ser temporárias. A Agência Brasileira de Inteligência (ABIN) é um típico exemplo de hibridismo institucional: ela apresenta tanto características de mudança democrática como de conservação autoritária. Com o passar dos anos, todavia, tem havido uma involuçãoinstitucional, de que sua militarização é a face mais evidente. É o que aqui pretendo demonstrar, acompanhando a criação da ABIN e sua trajetória institucional involuta ao longo dos governos Fernando Henrique Cardoso e Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Metodologicamente, farei uso de instrumentos baseados tanto na Teoria da Escolha Racional como na pesquisa etnográfica; subjacente está a premissa de que microdetalhes influenciam a evolução ou a involução institucional. Essa narrativa permite identificar problemas de ação coletiva, pontos de veto e a credibilidade de compromissos, assim como aspectos culturais dos indivíduos e/ou da sociedade que influenciam a formação das prioridades políticas. Controlling intelligence services is one of the most difficult political tasks at hand, since there is an inherent tension between such services and democracy. In a democracy, the transparency of public data and discussions around them are valued, while intelligence activity demands secrecy. If this is a difficult task in consolidated democracies, it can only be more so in the case of fragile democracies like the Brazilian one. Within the latter type, decisions made by civilian powers that upset the military stir up anti-democratic pressures which are often denied yet insinuated. Within any negotiated transition, the new democratic government is expected to make some concessions to the military, in the sense of preserving some authoritarian institutions. This is the price of negotiation, yet these concessions are supposed to be temporary. The Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Agência Brasileira de Inteligência - ABIN) is a typical example of institutional hybridism: it presents both characteristics of democratic change and authoritarian conservation. However, as time transpires, an institutional involution can be observed. Militarization is its most evident trait. This is what I intend to show in this paper as I look at the creation of the ABIN and its institutional trajectory over the course of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva administrations. My methodological option involves the use of instruments coming from Rational Choice Theory and ethnographic research. My underlying premise is that micro-details influence institutional evolution or involution. This narrative enables me to identify problems of collective action, veto power and credibility of commitments, as well as cultural aspects linked to individuals and/or society that influence the shaping of political priorities. L'une des tâches politiques les plus difficiles est celle de contrôler les services de renseignement ; il y a une tension sousjacente entre la démocratie et ces services. Dans une démocratie, la transparence à l'égard des données publiques et les débats sur elles sont valorisées ; tandis que l'activité de renseignement exige la confidentialité. Si cela est épineux dans des démocraties solides, il est encore plus dur dans des démocraties fragiles comme celle du Brésil. Dans ces cas, si par hasard des décisions du pouvoir civil ne plaisent pas aux militaires, des pressions antidémocratiques surviennent, ce qui est souvent nié, mais qui s'infiltrent quand même. Lors de transitions négociées on s'attend à ce que le nouveau gouvernement démocratique fasse des concessions aux militaires, en vue du maintien de certaines institutions autoritaires. C'est le prix de la négociation, mais ces concessions doivent être temporaires. L'Agence Brésilienne de Renseignement (ABIN) est un exemple d'hybridisme institutionnel : elle a aussi bien des caractéristiques de changement démocratique que de conservation autoritaire. Au fil des ans, cependant, il se produit une involution institutionnelle et la militarisation est son visage le plus visible. C'est ce que j'envisage de montrer, en suivant l'ABIN au long des gouvernements Fernando Henrique Cardoso et Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, c'est-à-dire depuis sa création jusqu'à sa trajectoire institutionnelle. Méthodologiquement, je ferai appel aux instruments basés aussi bien sur la Théorie du Choix Rationnel comme sur la recherche ethnographique ; sousjacente se trouve la prémisse selon laquelle des microdétails influencent l'évolution ou l'involution institutionnelle figée. Ce récit favorise l'identification des problèmes d'action collective, des poinst de veto et de la crédibilité des engagements, ainsi que des aspects culturels des individus et/ou de la société qui influencent la formation des priorités politiques.

ResumoParte relevante da literatura em Comunicação e Ciência Política sugere que a diversidade de fontes de informação seria condição necessária para a democracia. Em tese, quanto mais desconcentrada a Mídia, mais democrático o país. Diante disso, perguntamos: seria possível verificar empiricamente a existência de uma correlação negativa entre concentração de propriedade de Mídia e índice de democracia? Para oferecer uma resposta a esse questionamento, recorremos a métodos estatísticos, mais especificamente a ferramentas de estatística descritiva e de teste de correlação. O experimento confirmou a previsão teórica segundo a qual seria possível associar países mais democráticos a menor concentração de propriedade de meios de Comunicação.

O presente artigo apresenta os diversos momentos por que passou o Ministério da Defesa, desde sua criação no segundo mandato presidencial de Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1999-2002) até o atual governo de Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2006), com os respectivos ministros da Defesa. Visto como uma etapa importante na reconstitucionalização do país, na medida em que prevê a submissão dos comandantes das Forças Armadas a um ministro civil, e embora alguns analistas considerem que essa submissão de fato ocorre, procuramos indicar as resistências e as insubordinações militares ao poder civil, provenientes de um legado autoritário. Na medida em que o Ministério da Defesa não consegue implementar uma política própria, em que os militares seguiriam as orientações dos civis, o artigo conclui considerando a fragilidade política e institucional do Ministro da Defesa, civil, ante o os comandos militares, que conservam alto grau de autonomia decisória em relação à estrutura do Ministério. The present article presents different phases that the Brazilian Defense Ministry has passed through, since its inception during Fernando Henrique Cardoso's second presidential term (1999-2002) until the current administration of Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2006), under its respective ministers of Defense. It has been seen as one of the important stages in the re-constitutionalization of the country, insofar as it establishes the submission of Armed Forces commanders to a civilian minister, and although some analysts have considered that such submission is actually achieved, we point here to the military resistance and insubordination to civil power that are the result of an authoritarian legacy. To the extent that the Ministry of Defense is unable to implement its own policies in which the military would be required to follow civilian guidance, this article concludes with considerations on the civil Defense Ministry's political and institutional fragility vis-a-vis military command. The latter has been able to retain high levels of decision making autonomy in its relationship to the Ministry and its structure. Cet article présente non seulement les ministres de la Défense du Brésil, mais aussi les phases du Ministère de la Défense depuis sa création lors de la seconde mandature du Président Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1999-2002) jusqu'au gouvernement de Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2006). Considéré comme une étape importante de la reconstitutionnalisation du pays puisqu'il est prévu la sousmission des commandants des Forces Armées à um ministre civil et bien que certains soutiennent que cette sousmission est une réalité, nous cherchons à montrer ce qui résiste et ne se soumet pas au pouvoir civil chez les militaires en raison de l'héritage de l'esprit autoritaire. Comme le Ministère ne réussit pas à mettre en place sa propre politique obligeant les militaires à suivre les orientations des civils, l'article est arrivé à la conclusion que le Ministère de la Défense civil, est politiquement et institutionnellement fragile face aux autorités militaires qui gardent toujours un haut degré d'autonomie décisoire par rapport à la structure de ce Ministère.

A transição do autoritarismo para a democracia no Brasil deve procurar minimizar o poder militar. O que se observa, contudo, é que os militares vão ocupando novos espaços na segurança pública. O artigo procura mostrar de que modo isso vem ocorrendo ao longo dos dois mandatos do presidente Fernando Henrique Cardoso.

The literature on democratic consolidation has devoted considerable attention to civil-military relations at the elite level and such matters as the preservation of military coup attempts and the reduction of military autonomy. In general, however, there is insufficient attention in the literature to the issue of the demo cratic control of everyday forms of state coercion. By "everyday forms of state coercion" I mean routine policing, intelligence work, and military operations that do not involve the seizure of the executive or the shutting down of other branches of government. Over time, changes in practice in these realms have the potential for the "hollowing out" of the democratic regimes from within, through the gradual expansion of the budgets, functions, and autonomy of the coercive institutions that engage in them.

This article is based on research conducted in the archives of the Auditoria Militar do Estado de Pernambuco. It substantiates the violation of the basic principle of equality before the law resulting from the existence in Brazil of two different court systems—one civil and the other military—with varying legal proceedings and sentences for similar crimes committed by civilian police and military police. The article reviews how the authoritarian regime enlarged the scope of military jurisdiction, a situation little changed more than a decade after the authoritarian regime ended. The article also shows that the Justiça Militar do Estado de Pernambuco functions in a hybrid manner. It is an agency of the civil judicial branch, but most of the judges are military, while the lawyers are civilians and the trials are conducted by the Ministério Público. Thus the military police can influence the outcome of judgments without having to assume the burden of rendering decisions because the final responsibility rests with the civil judicial branch. Finally, the article highlights the incompatibility between the continuation of this kind of military justice and a democracy seeking consolidation.

The state of civil–military relations in the world, especially in the Third World, is very well summed up by Mosca's statement that civilian control over the military ‘is a most fortunate exception in human history’.All over the globe, the armed forces have frequently preserved their autonomous power vis-à-vis civilians. They have also succeeded in maintaining their tutelage over some of the political regimes that have arisen from the process of transition from military to democratic governments, as in Argentina and Brazil. Spain is a remarkable exception. Today, Spain, despite its authoritarian legacy, is a democratic country. The constituted civil hierarchy has been institutionalised, military áutonomy weakened, and civilian control over the military has emerged. Spain's newly founded democracy now appears quite similar to the older European democracies.

Este artigo mostra os três grandes modelos de Ouvidoria existentes atualmente, das mais às menos autônomas. Realça a importância de a Ouvidoria ser vista não apenas como locus para censurar o policial mas, também, para defendê-lo. Finaliza, evidenciando a fragilidade do desenho institucional da Ouvidora da Secretaria de Defesa Social de Pernambuco, criado no Governo passado e mantido no atual Governo. This article examines the three main models of ombudsman existing today, from most to least autonomous. It emphasizes how important it is for the ombudsman to be seen not only as a locus to criticize the police but also to defend it. To conclude, the article highlights the fragility of the institutional design of the Ombudsman of Pernambuco's Social Defense Secretary, which was created during the previous administration and maintained by the current government.

The present article presents different phases that the Brazilian Defense Ministry has passed through, since its inception during Fernando Henrique Cardoso's second presidential term (1999-2002) until the current administration of Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2006), under its respective ministers of Defense. It has been seen as one of the important stages in the re-constitutionalization of the country, insofar as it establishes the submission of Armed Forces commanders to a civilian minister, and although some analysts have considered that such submission is actually achieved, we point here to the military resistance and insubordination to civil power that are the result of an authoritarian legacy. To the extent that the Ministry of Defense is unable to implement its own policies in which the military would be required to follow civilian guidance, this article concludes with considerations on the civil Defense Ministry's political and institutional fragility vis-a-vis military command. The latter has been able to retain high levels of decision making autonomy in its relationship to the Ministry and its structure.

This article aims to demonstrate how the Brazilian Superior Military Court of today (just as under the former military regime) continues to primarily defend what it considers the most important assets under its tutelage: hierarchy, discipline, and military duty. The Court has hybrid characteristics, displaying traits both from the authoritarian regime as well as from Brazil's current fledgling democracy. It is no coincidence that the Court has maintained its structure, functioning, and recruitment criteria virtually unaltered. The article contends that this institutional hybridism can only be overcome when effective democratic civilian oversight of the military is achieved. Dans cet article, on cherche à montrer que, comme pendant les années du régime militaire, le Tribunal Militaire Supérieur continue à défendre, avant tout, les intérêts constitutionnels de l'Armée ayant rapport aux biens placés sous sa tutelle qui leur semblent importants: hiérarchie, discipline et devoir militaire. Le Tribunal Militaire Supérieur est un tribunal à caractères hybrides, présentant des traits issus non seulement du régime autoritaire mais aussi de la fragile démocratie brésilienne. Ce n'est pas un hasard si la Cour en a conservé pratiquement inchangés la structure, le fonctionnement et les critères de recrutement de ses membres. On suggère que le dépassement de cet hybridisme institutionnel n'aura lieu que si, effectivement, on réussit à établir un contrôle civil démocratique sur les militaires.