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Inflation targeting has become the monetary policy framework of the nineties. At the other extreme, several central banks have recently adopted key elements of the inflation targeter's toolkit, but at the same time they have made formal declarations that they are not inflation targeters. Such a position may appear surprising. It indirectly suggests that a reneging strategy is beneficial for some. The paper considers reasons why it may be advantageous for some central banks to distinguish themselves from the inflation targeting strategy. Most importantly, we argue that explicit inflation targets can potentially undermine the goal independence of a central bank.

This paper analyzes forward-looking rules for Swiss monetary policy in a small structural VAR model consisting of four variables taking into account data revisions for GDP. First, the paper develops an analytical method to analyze the effect of data revision errors in GDP on the ex ante or conditional inflation-output-growth volatility trade-off and applies it to Swiss data. Second, the effects of different targets in a forward-looking monetary policy on ex post or unconditional volatility of inflation and output growth is explored by a simulation exercise. In general, the results obtained suggest that focusing monetary policy on GDP growth instead on inflation may lead to an inefficient policy with both increased medium term inflation and GDP growth volatility in the presence of GDP data revisions.

This paper analyzes forward-looking rules for Swiss monetary policy in a small structural VAR consisting of four variables. First, the paper looks at the ex ante inflation-output-growth volatility trade-off for a forward-looking policy aiming at a convex combination of a strict inflation and output growth targeting rule implied by this SVAR model. Thereby the paper introduces a new analytical method. Second, the paper considers the effect of measurement errors in GDP on this inflation-output-growth volatility trade-off. Third, the paper works at the impact of changing beliefs about the potential growth rate on the variability of output growth and inflation. Finally the effects of different targets in a forward-looking monetary policy on ex post or unconditional volatility of inflation and output growth is explored by a simulation exercise.

The monetary debate in Switzerland about joining the European Monetary Union (EMU) has primarily focused on the gains in terms of transaction costs and lower uncertainty from using a common currency versus the sacrifice of giving up an independent monetary policy. This Paper considers an additional factor in this debate, namely the decrease of seigniorage for Switzerland in the case of joining EMU. Our calculations reveal that this loss of revenues is not trivial. Swiss currency holdings per capita are among the largest in the world. They are estimated to be 5'000 Swiss francs per capita in 2002. If Switzerland joined EMU at that time, about half of the seigniorage stemming from the previous Swiss franc currency circulation would be redistributed among the EMU member countries in the worst case. Our results indicate that Switzerland would be the third largest contributor of seigniorage in absolute terms after Germany and Spain. In relative terms, the Swiss per capita contribution would be more than four times as high as the German contribution.