Search

Dr Phil Johnstone and Prof Andy Stirling, University of Sussex, examine the entanglements between Britain's civilian and military nuclear programmes and ask, would the UK be building new nuclear power stations if it weren't for pressure from the military lobby?

This paper explores in what ways the two world wars influenced the development of sociotechnical systems underpinning the culmination of the first deep transition. The role of war is an underexplored aspect in both the Techno-Economic Paradigms (TEP) approach and the Multi-level perspective (MLP) which form the two key conceptual building blocks of the Deep Transitions (DT) framework. Thus, we develop a conceptual approach tailored to this particular topic which integrates accounts of total war and mechanisms of war from historical studies and imprinting from organisational studies with the DT framework’s attention towards rules and meta-rules. We explore in what ways the three sociotechnical systems of energy, food, and transport were affected by the emergence of new demand pressures and logistical challenges during conditions of total war; how war impacted the directionality of sociotechnical systems; the extent to which new national and international policy capacities emerged during wartime in the energy, food, and transport systems; and the extent to which these systems were influenced by cooperation and shared sacrifice under wartime conditions. We then explore what lasting changes were influenced by the two wars in the energy, food, and transport systems across the transatlantic zone. This paper seeks to open up a hitherto neglected area in analysis on sociotechnical transitions and we discuss the importance of further research that is attentive towards entanglements of warfare and the military particularly in the field of sustainability transitions.

The energy sector plays a significant role in reaching the ambitious climate policy target of limiting the global temperature increase to well below 2 °C. To this end, technological change has to be redirected and accelerated in the direction of zero-carbon solutions. Given the urgency and magnitude of the climate change challenge it has been argued that this calls for a policy mix which simultaneously supports low-carbon solutions and also deliberately drives the discontinuation of the established technological regime. Yet, the effect of such phase-out policies on the development and diffusion of low-carbon technologies has received little attention in empirical research so far. This paper addresses this gap by taking the case of the transition of the German electricity system towards renewable energies - the so-called Energiewende. Based on a survey of innovation activities of German manufacturers of renewable power generation technologies conducted in 2014 it explores the impact such destabilization policies - most prominently Germany's nuclear phase-out policy - may have on technological change in renewable energies. By drawing on descriptive statistics and combining insights from earlier regression analyses we find evidence that Germany's nuclear phase-out policy had a positive influence on manufacturers' innovation expenditures for renewable energies and was seen as the by far most influential policy instrument for the further expansion of renewable energies in Germany. The insights resulting from our explorative analysis have important implications for the literature on policy mixes and sustainability transitions regarding the 'flip sides' to innovation and the crucial importance of destabilization policies for unleashing 'destructive creation'. We close by discussing policy repercussions for ongoing debates on policies for accelerating the phase-out of coal to meet climate change targets.

The UK Government has long been planning to build up to 16 GWe of new nuclear power – a proportional level of\ud support unparalleled in other liberalised energy markets. Despite many challenging developments, these general\ud nuclear attachments show no sign of easing. With many viable alternative strategies for efficient, secure, low-carbon energy services, it is difficult to explain these commitments solely in terms of officially-declared policy rationales. A variety of possible reasons are suggested for the persistent intensity of UK attachments to civil nuclear power. Each is taken here as a basis for systematic hypothesis testing. And one additional hypothesis is also interrogated that has hitherto been virtually entirely neglected – about maintaining national capabilities to build and operate nuclear propelled submarines. To explore and test this idea, this paper analyses linkages between UK military and civilian nuclear sectors in terms of high-level policy processes around supply chains, skills and expertise. Especially interesting is the critical juncture between 2003-2006, when stated policy moved radically from nuclear power as ‘unattractive’ to calls for a ‘nuclear renaissance’. In this period, especially intense activity can be observed around UK nuclear submarine capabilities. Among many factors, we conclude it is difficult fully to comprehend the persistent intensity of official UK attachments to nuclear power, without also considering aims to maintain nuclear submarine capabilities. Yet this aspect is entirely undocumented anywhere in UK energy policy literatures. To acknowledge this, is not to entertain a conspiracy theory. It can be understood instead, in terms of more distributed and relational dynamics of power. Building on literatures in political science, we refer to this as a ‘deep incumbency complex’. Such an evidently under-visible phenomenon would hold important mplications not only for UK nuclear strategies, but also the wider state of British democracy.