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In his annual birthday address to the nation on 4 December 2001, the Thai King adopted a sombre tone. He warned of ego and double standards, and national decline that threatened catastrophe. "The Prime Minister has a long face now after I mentioned catastrophe", said His Majesty. "But I'm telling the truth, because whatever we do, there seems to be big problems. The Prime Minister may appear to be happy, but deep down inside he's definitely not".1 The King's remarks were a reminder that Prime Minister Dr Thaksin Shinawatra's bold promises to fix the economy and accelerate political reform had encountered serious obstacles. Royal views mirrored a decline in public support for the government, though by year's end most Thais remained willing to give Thaksin a little longer to make amends.

To many observers, Malaysia at the beginning of 2000 appeared a rare case of stability in a turbulent region. Just a month earlier, Dr Mahathir Mohamad had led his government to secure 148 of 193 parliamentary seats in a general election. Political uncertainties had receded, declared a leading financial house.1 Government electoral success, however, came from the support of non Malays on the peninsula and indigenous groups in Sabah and Sarawak, while Malays deserted it in droves. The United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the dominant party in the governing Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition, had perhaps its worst election ever. Its parliamentary seats declined from 94 to 72. Four ministers and five deputy ministers were defeated, and many others experienced a massive reduction in their majorities. Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) was the main beneficiary, tripling its representation to 27 seats, becoming leader of the parliamentary opposition, and scoring massive majorities in Kelantan and Terengganu state assemblies. The new Parti keADILan Nasional (National Justice Party, or keADILan) led by Wan Azizah, wife of ousted former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, gained 5 seats and some 12 per cent of the vote. About half the Malay vote went to the opposition ? indeed, some UMNO leaders put the party's share at less than 40 per cent.2 That removed the basis of governmental legitimacy in Malaysia hitherto, which had rested on UMNO having overwhelming Malay support. What were the reasons for UMNO's setback? The main cause was the

(2000). Political reform in Thailand: Real or imagined? Asian Journal of Political Science: Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 89-108.

In December 1974 thousands of demonstrators in Kuala Lumpur were dispersed by baton-wielding police, aided by tear gas. Hundreds were arrested. Among those detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA) was youth leader Anwar Ibrahim, probably at the behest of Education Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad.1 In September 1998 the two key actors held different positions, but the scenes played out were much the same. September began with the unexpected imposition of currency controls on day one. More dramatically, on day two Prime Minister Mahathir sacked Anwar from the Deputy Prime Minister and Finance portfolios. In the early hours of day four Anwar was stripped of both the deputy leadership and even member ship in the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the dominant party in the ruling coalition. On 20 September balaclava-clad, M16-wielding police Special Forces broke down an open door and arrested Anwar, who was then held under the ISA for allegedly endangering public security. At the end of the month he was arraigned before the court, charged with five counts of corruption (abuse of power) and five of sodomy. The drama of September brought Malaysia unsought international promi nence, and opened up many questions. What went wrong between the Prime Minister and his designated heir? Did the fall-out from these events threaten Dr Mahathir's long rule? How strong was the movement for reformasi? Could Anwar make a comeback? Was this yet another power struggle between UMNO factions, or did it represent something more profound?

Thailand was the centre of international attention in 1997. No longer was it confused with Taiwan, or completely unrecognized, by journalists at interna tional fora.1 Unfortunately this was not a triumph of foreign policy, but a tragedy of financial mismanagement. Economic problems that led to the float ing of the baht in July triggered attacks on currencies and stock markets throughout much of Southeast Asia, then spread to East Asia and impacted on much of the world. This was not the type of recognition Thai leaders had sought. Early in his rule, Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh lamented that Thailand no longer played a leadership role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and pledged to correct this.2 After Chuan Leekpai became prime minister, the Nation newspaper declared that Thailand was "resuming its long-lost leading role in ASEAN affairs".3 New Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan asserted confi dently that Thailand had become the architect preparing ASEAN to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. These views all reflect a deep conviction among Thai leaders and foreign policy analysts that in the 1980s Thailand enjoyed a golden age of foreign policy when the rest of ASEAN followed its lead. In the 1990s others have taken the initiative.