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Literature on the role of observational or vicarious learning is extensive, but little research has focused on learning for entrepreneurs in a demanding, competitive context. This article investigates how different competent models influence the innovation behavior of entrepreneurs in the context of haute cuisine. Further, we evaluate how much these innovative choices influence the performance of the restaurants. A total of 55 gourmet restaurant chefs were sampled using two Gourmet Magazine rankings of the top 50 US restaurants. Multiple sources of archival data were coded: chefs' profiles for the observation of competent models; press articles for innovation (as novelty, product, process and service innovation); and the restaurant's position in the Gourmet ranking for performance. This paper makes two unique contributions: (1) Entrepreneurs learn to innovate vicariously through observing competent models (parents and mentors but not academic models); and (2) Innovation mediates the relationship between the observation of models and the performance.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to validate cognitive style (i.e. linear, nonlinear, and balanced thinking) with innovation intentions and behaviors. It was hypothesized that a balanced linear/nonlinear thinking style and the inclination toward more innovative intentions are strongly related. Design/methodology/approach – A survey questionnaire of business students in the USA and France was employed. Formally validated measures of thinking style and innovation were replicated in this project. Findings – The results of an analysis of 186 respondents found a significant, direct relationship between balanced thinking style and innovative intention and behavior measures. Research limitations/implications – The results demonstrate that cognitive style and innovation are related, but the direct validation of actual innovative behaviors, in situ, needs to be included in the next step of this research stream. Further, the composition of groups can also be evaluated using these measures. Practical implications – This is the first successful attempt to validate cognitive style measures with innovation outcome measures. These measures are now available for organizational testing, field research, and assessing team composition. Originality/value – This is one of the first criterion-validity assessments of a cognitive measure related to linear and nonlinear thinking style. There are two important implications of these results. First, the authors now have a better understanding of one the links between cognition and innovation. Second, the authors have established a solid base for future research on this subject, including the importance of this effect in practice.

The past several decades have witnessed the adoption and diffusion of open innovation processes across a variety of organizational and industry contexts. Despite significant scholarly investigation into open innovation's importance to firms' R&D strategies, a deep theoretical understanding of the open innovation framework remains elusive. This study contributes to this burgeoning literature by providing new theoretical and practical underpinnings of the open innovation framework. Specifically, we conduct a comparative case study of two global banks to articulate the theoretical underpinning of this approach in the micropractices and microfoundations of the two firms. Although all organizations practice some combination of internal and external sourcing of innovation, we find that there is a tendency for these practices to fall into two broad categories: inside-out open innovation and outside-in open innovation. Our comparative case study formalizes these two forms of open innovation as mechanisms to align...

Automotive assemblers and suppliers have employed a number of different strategies to deal with external uncertainty. These strategies have evolved relatively rapidly of late in part because of changes in the locus of innovation from OEMs to suppliers, changing market conditions, and the future regulations of greenhouse gases. This presents a unique challenge for the industry. Some auto firms have been more effective in dealing with market and regulatory uncertainty due to technology resource integration across platforms and integration between functions on the value added chain from suppliers to retailers.

This article describes how service and manufacturing firms are different when it comes to innovation, based on a survey of firms in both sectors. Overall, four of the five hypotheses developed for comparative study of new offerings were supported by the analyses of 38 new products and 29 new services. First and foremost, there appear to be real differences between how manufacturing and services approach the innovation process, primarily because of the way organizations formalize development of new offerings in these two sectors. Manufacturing is more likely to report the need for new strategies and structures when products are new to the industry or new to the firm. However, services are more likely to convert novelty into success. Services are significantly more likely to have a short beta testing process and to exploit general manager (internally sourced) ideas for new offerings as an alternative to formal innovation structures. However, manufacturing and services exhibit a similar tendency to exploit customer (externally sourced) ideas for new offerings. The potential contribution of this study is to point the direction for future work in the nascent research stream of service innovation, highlighting areas where there appear to be fundamental differences between the innovation process in services and other sectors of the economy. Key differences appear to be the alternative ways services formalize the innovative process, the unique way services test customer concepts, and the combined role of general managers and professionals in the development process. These differences have managerial implications. Working closely with customers, service managers should proceed with their own unique approach to the innovative process, especially with respect to prototyping and beta testing. Senior managers in service organizations should participate in the ideation process for successful new service offerings, as part of their strategy-making responsibilities.

This study examines the concept of intra-organizational links as a way for boundary spanners to bring into the project group the information needed to deal with task uncertainty. Several studies have shown that heterogeneous groups are superior to homogeneous groups when novel or creative solutions need to be developed to deal with tasks characterized by high task uncertainty. For boundary spanners in engineering project groups, it is proposed that cross-departmental technical advice links are another source of the information needed to deal with task uncertainty. An empirical test supports the proposition that for high-performing project groups, boundary-spanning technical advice links may compensate for a lack of internal group heterogeneity and vice versa. This is not the case for low-performing project groups. Implications of these finding are presented, including the direction that the open innovation research stream might take to address the findings of this study.

The growth of interest in supply chain management continues unabated. Supply chain journals continue to climb in impact, and the importance of supply chains continues to bourgeon because of the con...

In spite of early contributions (Juran, 1951; Feigenbaum, 1956; Deming, 1950; Dodge, 1969), the quality movement has only been ablaze for slightly more than ten years in the United States (e.g., Crosby, 1979; Deming, 1986). Results have been mixed. Total Quality Management (TQM) has been practised since the 1980s in the US (Dean and Evans, 1994). Although quality levels have improved in selected industries such as automobiles, customer satisfaction is still higher with Japanese and European cars (Rechtin, 1994).

Most professionals, actively engaged in design, live in a world of trade-offs. The most typical compromise is that reducing the cost of design causes quality to suffer, but there are many others as well. This paper summarizes current use of one of the most popular approaches to improving the new offering development process: design reuse. In the present study 42 companies were surveyed, of which 23 were in manufacturing and 19 were in services—but all were actively engaged in technology and design reuse in new offerings. It was hypothesized that policies for design reuse and internal sourcing would promote the complexity and breadth of reuse (here the combination of modular and architectural substitution), which, in turn would dampen the percentage of substitution and reduce the negative impact on innovativeness of new offerings. These predictions were generally supported. Adoption of policies for encouragement or to mandate design reuse were significantly correlated with the extent of reuse (application of both architectural and modular design vs. just one or the other) among manufacturers but not services firms in the sample. Internal sourcing of ideas for design reuse was significantly correlated with extent of reuse for the total sample, and especially for services. Design reuse percentage and extent of design reuse were significantly and inversely associated for manufacturing, as predicted, but not for services. Novelty of new offerings was significantly and inversely related to percentage of reuse, as predicted, for manufacturing, but not for services. It was found that sector also makes a difference in likelihood of adopting higher levels of reuse with service company respondents reporting significantly higher levels (average of 42% reuse for services and 28% for manufacturing applications). Perhaps one of the most interesting preliminary findings to emerge was that the tipping point of negative impact from design reuse percentage on innovativeness for all firms in the sample of new offerings was 43%, beyond which novelty suffers. For manufacturing, the tipping point was lower: Novelty begins to suffer after 33% design reuse, which has important management implications. The conclusion was drawn, based on these preliminary results, that much can be done to relieve some of the negative consequences of the typical trade-offs commonly encountered in development programs for new offerings, especially when cost, timing, and innovation are the target goals. However, services and manufacturing are quite different in their approach to design reuse and substitution. Further development of the concept of design reuse strategy appears to be warranted based on these preliminary findings. The findings raise the distinct possibility that mesolevel strategic aggregation issues might lead research into areas that help explain how complex systems realize their full self-organizing potential and why corporate strategy considerations, alone, have failed to explain the success and failure of organizations coping in rugged landscapes.

OVERVIEW:Understanding communication flows in R&D laboratories for the last five decades has been enhanced by illuminating the role of R&D gatekeepers. Simply put, for applied projects (as opposed to basic or service R&D), the R&D gatekeeper—usually the first-line supervisor in a research group—was traditionally the primary reservoir of ideas for new and improved products. Add marketing and one has the balanced model of idea sourcing. Have things changed? Data from three studies conducted over 15 years on successful sourcing of ideas for new products and services, show that the profile for the R&D gatekeeper has evolved away from primary dependence on first-line supervisors. This role is now more broadly shared across several positions above (e.g., R&D middle management and VP of R&D) and below (e.g., engineering and R&D staff) the technical supervisor, especially in small- and mediumsized enterprises.

Empirical generalization continues to be a challenge in most applied fields that favor publication of original results. The purpose of this study was to report on a new product development exercise in one, controlled cultural setting, which replicates and extends Ettlie (2002). Results from four recent graduate business classes in Portugal show that the background of students—technical versus other or mixed—is a nearly perfect predictor of the average or central estimates the class makes tendency (median) of new product success in the exercise. Country matters little. These results have now persisted over nearly seven years, and implications are discussed concerning theory, practice, and future research.

The purpose of this research was to explore the nature of the Stage-Gate®process in the context of innovative projects that not only vary in new product technology (i.e., radical versus incremental technology) but that also involve significant new product development technology (i.e., new virtual teaming hardware-software systems). Results indicate that firms modify their formal development regimes to improve the efficiency of this process while not significantly sacrificing product novelty (i.e., the degree to which new technology is incorporated in the new offering). Four hypotheses were developed and probed using 72 automotive engineering managers involved in supervision of the new product development process. There was substantial evidence to creatively replicate results from previous benchmarking studies; for example, 48.6% of respondents say their companies used a traditional Stage-Gate®process, and 60% of these new products were considered to be a commercial success. About a third of respondents said their companies are now using a modified Stage-Gate®process for new product development. Auto companies that have modified their Stage-Gate®procedures are also significantly more likely to report (1) use of virtual teams; (2) adoption of collaborative and virtual new product development software supporting tools; (3) having formalized strategies in place specifically to guide the new product development process; and (4) having adopted structured processes used to guide the new product development process. It was found that the most significant difference in use of phases or gates in the new product development process with radical new technology occurs when informal and formal phasing processes are compared, with normal Stage-Gate®usage scoring highest for technology departures in new products. Modified Stage-Gate®had a significant, indirect impact on organizational effectiveness. These findings, taken together, suggest companies optimize trade-offs between cost and quality after they graduate from more typical stage-process management to modified regimes. Implications for future research and management of this challenging process are discussed. In general, it was found that the long-standing goal of 50% reduction in product development time without sacrificing other development goals (e.g., quality, novelty) is finally within practical reach of many firms. Innovative firms are not just those with new products but also those that can modify their formal development process to accelerate change.

Organizations routinely innovate service and production operations for greater efficiency by introducing new tools, technologies, devices, and knowledge. We focus on process innovation in manufacturing (service innovation). In the first half of our article, we discuss flexible operations and developments in mass customization, or, more accurately, dealing with flexible demand. The second half is dedicated to organizational changes to capture benefits from process innovation. Synchronous innovations thatemphasize the organizational innovations needed to realize the benefits of process innovations, such as adoption of advanced manufacturing technologies (AMT), are vital. Finally, we discuss various organizational innovations such as changes in organizational strategy, structure, culture, and human resource management (HRM) practices. Keywords: process innovation; innovation; flexible operations; flexible demand; mass customization; synchronous innovation; advanced manufacturing technologies; manufacturing; organizational culture

Hypotheses were developed to capture the dynamic capabilities that result from interfirm partnerships during the joint new product development (NPD) process—the ability to build, integrate, and reconfigure existing resources to adapt to rapidly changing environments. These capabilities, in turn, were proposed to have a positive impact on NPD performance outcomes: (a) proportion of new product success and (b) superior new product commercialization. In contexts where the locus of innovation is rapidly changing, the impact of interfirm NPD dynamic capabilities was hypothesized to be diminished in high-technology contexts, especially for buyers (original equipment manufacturers) and to a lesser extent for suppliers. Still, technology-based interfirm NPD partnerships were predicted to ultimately outperform low-technology ones in both NPD performance outcomes. Finally, information technology (IT) support for NPD was hypothesized to influence the interfirm NPD partnership's dynamic capabilities. Using survey data from 72 auto company managers and their suppliers, the proposed model in which IT support for NPD influences the success of interfirm NPD partnerships through the mediating role of interfirm NPD partnership dynamic capabilities in high- and low-technology contexts was generally supported. The results shed light on the nature of technology-based interfirm NPD partnerships and have implications for their success. Theoretical and managerial implications are discussed.

PurposeThe delivered wisdom to date has enterprise system purchase and implementation as one of the most hazardous projects any organization can undertake. The aim was to reduce this risk by both theoretically and empirically finding those key predictors of a successful enterprise system deployment.Design/methodology/approachA representative sample of 60 firms drawn from the Fortune 1000 that had recently (1999‐2000) adopted enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems was used to test a model of adoption performance with significant results.FindingsLeadership (social learning theory), business process re‐engineering (change the company not the technology) and acquisition strategy (buy, do not make) were found to be significant predictors of adoption performance (final model R2=43 percent, F=5.5, ppOriginality/valueThe “four factor” model we validate is a robust predictor of ERP adoption success and can be used by any organization to audit plans and progress for this undertaking.

There has been a considerable amount of effort and writing devoted to improving the new product development process during the last two decades. Although there have been some surprises in this literature and in reports from the field on how to manage this complex business process, we now have a good view of the state-of-the-art practices that work and do not work to accelerate commercial success of new ventures. We know much less about how firms change their strategies for new product development. In this article, we report on a study to investigate how companies change the way they originate and develop new products in manufacturing. We made no prior assumptions about what best practices might be for changing the direction of the new product development process, but we reasonably were sure there would be trends in how companies were attempting to create this strategic change. Even though one size does not fit all, there were significant trends in our findings. We studied eight manufacturing firms using in-depth, open-ended interviews and were surprised to find that most of these companies are beginning to develop products that are new to the firm, industry, and the world (nearly half, or 10 of 21 new product projects), where they had not been eager for radical change in the past. These newer products likely are to be driven by a combination of market and technology forces, with general requirements being directed by internal forces: middle and top management. Results also indicate significantly that being able to marshal resources and capabilities is easier if change is less demanding and less radical, but when middle managers are driving the conversion of general requirements into specifications, resource issues have yet to be resolved. Implications of these findings are discussed for companies aspiring to change the entire process of new product development in their firms based on these significant results.

Interest in supply chain management has been escalating during the last decade. Using a large sample of durable goods firms located in all major regions of the world, we extend two theoretical perspectives, namely the resource‐based view and the transaction cost economics view of the firm, to better understand the issues behind global sourcing. Both theory extensions were supported in separate by statistically significant regression results. Then, pooling predictors to represent both models together, these measures independently increase the odds of predicting global sourcing. For example, building of a firm’s technological capabilities that was captured through the levels of its R&D intensity, and percentage of revenue it generated from its new products was directly related to the increased levels of a firm’s global sourcing. Transaction costs (e.g. vertical integration, inversely related; length of frozen schedules, directly related) also emerged as a significant predictor of the level of global sourcing undertaken by a firm. This suggests that firms have two alternative ways to globalize operations supply, and raises the interesting question of whether or not these two strategies might operate simultaneously.

A representative sample of 60 firms drawn from the Fortune 1000 that had recently adopted Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems were used to test a model of weak appropriation with significant results. Leadership (social learning theory), business process reengineering (change the company not the technology) and acquisition strategy (buy, don't make), controlling for EDI (electronic data interchange), when the project was begun, industry (manufacturing versus service) and scale (sales) and were found to be significant predictors of adoption performance (final model R-square=43%, F=5.5, p

This research examines the relative importance that customers place on product reliability, or things-gone-wrong, and customization, or things-gone-right, across a range of industrial settings. We integrate an evolutionary theory of technology with a dynamic theory of competition to predict that: (1) when technological intensity is relatively low or high, customers place greater value on customization and (2) when technological intensity is more intermediate, product reliability and customization are more equally important. The predictions are tested and supported using data from the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) survey.

This article, based on a chapter in a forthcoming book, starts by outlining the strengths and weaknesses of US manufacturing processes by comparison with the international competition. It then goes on to discuss the lessons which emerging theory and practice can offer managers in their efforts to improve competitiveness.

Do integrated approaches to design promote the commercial success of new products? Data from 126 U.S. manufacturers were used to test five hypotheses in a structural model of integrated design approaches which go beyond concurrent engineering. New product success was significantly associated with market need understanding which incorporates information, significantly, from integrated design into new product development. Integrated design was found to be significantly associated with early-mover strategy, benchmarking best practices and, to a lesser extent, customized or proprietary hardware-software systems.

The article reviews the book “The Perpetual Enterprise Machine: Seven Keys to Corporate Renewal Through Successful Product and Process Development,” by Kent Bowman.

In a comparative study of 208 US and 109 Swedish durable goods firms, and their practices for promoting design-manufacturing integration, greatest convergence was found for the adoption of manufacturing sign-off of product plans. Sign-off was also the most widespread practice, currently being used by about 75% of all companies in both countries. The US and Swedish firms were also similar, but not identical, in their promotion of mobility among engineers across functions. Permanent moves occur in about half these firms in both countries, but the details, such as which positions are involved, were not available. New structures to promote design-manufacturing integration mere adopted by about 60-65% of all Swedish firms and the larger US companies (1991), but 46% for small US firms (1993). Both countries report the widespread use of teams. There appears to be considerable difference between the two countries in adoption of design training. In 1992 the Swedish adoption rate of DFM (Design for Manufacturing) training was about 20% which is nearly the same as the US large firm adoption rate of 18% in 1987. The larger firm US adoption rate was nearly 56% in 1991 (41% for smaller firms in 1993) but institutional factors such as engineering education have not been controlled. The widest divergence between Swedish and US policies and practices for design-manufacturing integration concerns job rotation. Correlation results indicate convergence of adoption practices in the area of DFM training and manufacturing sign-off for Sweden and the US. >

Organizations vary greatly in their approaches and success in the introduction of new products and services. In this study, it was proposed that much of this variance can be captured by understanding the extend to which product design and process design are integrated in new program launches. A mailed survey of 43 domestic firms was used to test four propositions concerning product-process development practices. Significantly, it was found that firms using the more rare design-manufacturing personnel integrating mechanisms (engineering job rotation and mobility) have higher sales per employee. Results of a discriminant analysis show that firms benchmarking on product development practices, as contrasted with performance benchmarks, were significantly more likely to use both the rare and the more common forms of design-manufacturing integration (i.e., train personnel in new design, methods, have manufacturing sign-off on design reviews, and restructure, e.g., use teams). Significantly, these firms also report a greater proportion of degreed manufacturing engineers. Not surprisingly, larger firms and business units were found to take longer to develop new products.