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Value conflicts have been shown to impair negotiation behaviors and outcomes (Harinck & Ellemers, 2014). The present studies aim to replicate and extend this finding in a paradigm where the parties’ values were different, but not opposed. We hypothesized that activating values, rather than utilities, as motives in a negotiation would not only impair negotiation behavior and outcomes, but also subjective evaluations of the negotiated agreements. We further predicted that information provided about the counterparts’ priorities would be a less effective facilitator of integrative negotiating in value-driven than in utility-driven conflicts. Two preregistered experiments (N =176/310) confirm that a value motive leads to an increased aversion to trade-offs and to more compromise offers (Studies 1 and 2), and to lower individual and joint outcomes (Study 2). The results also show that the activation of value rather than utility motives in the parties trigger subjective perceptions of clashing values rather than conflicting interests, even though the values were not opposed. By triggering these perceptions, the value motives indirectly lead to worse subjective evaluations of the outcome, the process, the self, and (in Study 2) the relationship, even when controlling for objective outcomes. Providing information about the counterpart’s underlying motives did not produce conclusive differential effects on negotiation behaviors and outcomes, possibly because the shared information did not increase the perceived discrepancy between counterparts. Theoretical and practical implications of the results for value-driven conflicts are discussed. Value conflicts have been shown to impair negotiation behaviors and outcomes (Harinck & Ellemers, 2014). The present studies aim to replicate and extend this finding in a paradigm where the parties' values were different, but not opposed. We hypothesized that activating values, rather than utilities, as motives in a negotiation would not only impair negotiation behavior and outcomes, but also subjective evaluations of the negotiated agreements. We further predicted that information provided about the counterparts' priorities would be a less effective facilitator of integrative negotiating in value-driven than in utility-driven conflicts. Two preregistered experiments (N = 176/310) confirm that a value motive leads to an increased aversion to trade-offs and to more compromise offers (Studies 1 and 2), and to lower individual and joint outcomes (Study 2). The results also show that the activation of value rather than utility motives in the parties trigger subjective perceptions of clashing values rather than conflicting interests, even though the values were not opposed. By triggering these perceptions, the value motives indirectly lead to worse subjective evaluations of the outcome, the process, the self, and (in Study 2) the relationship, even when controlling for objective outcomes. Providing information about the counterpart's underlying motives did not produce conclusive differential effects on negotiation behaviors and outcomes, possibly because the shared information did not increase the perceived discrepancy between counterparts. Theoretical and practical implications of the results for value-driven conflicts are discussed.

Value conflicts have been shown to impair negotiation behavior and outcomes (Harinck & Ellemers, 2014). Positions on values may be perceived as more incompatible than positions interests in utility-driven conflicts because incompatible values typically induce identity threat and a trade-off aversion. In two preregistered experiments (N=176/310), we test whether value-driven versus utility-driven conflicts impact behaviors, outcomes, and subjective evaluations even in a setting in which the motives behind the positions (values or utility) are structurally similarly compatible. We further tested whether the provision of information (compared to no provision) about the counterpart’s motives would have opposite effects in value-driven and utility-driven conflicts. Our findings corroborate that a value motive leads to an increased aversion against trade-offs, to more compromise offers (Study 1 and 2), and to lower individual and joint outcomes (Study 2). Across multiple dimensions (i.e., instrumental outcome, process, relationship, and in Study 1, self), subjective evaluations were more negative in value-driven conflicts than in utility-driven conflicts. Contrary to our predictions, providing information about the counterpart’s motives did not affect behaviors, outcomes, or subjective evaluations, possibly because it neither improved objective understanding of the other nor increased perceived discrepancy between counterparts. The results are discussed regarding theoretical implications for value-driven conflicts, and practical implications for information exchange as a facilitator in integrative negotiations.

To avoid impasses and to reach mutually beneficial agreements in negotiation and mediation, parties need to overcome a multitude of pitfalls—both of psychological and structural nature. En route to facilitating beneficial agreements, mediators can build on negotiation theory, which provides a number of key insights into the psychological and structural backdrop of conflicts. Capitalizing on these insights may alter parties’ willingness to concede, their problem-solving behavior, and their ability to discover hidden resources. In this chapter, we review some influential theories, models, and concepts from the field of negotiation research and illustrate how these can help to better understand the pitfalls of workplace conflicts. We furthermore discuss a number of implications that negotiation theory has for successful mediation in the workplace.

Although abundant negotiation research has examined outcome frames, little is known about the procedural framing of negotiation proposals (i.e., offering my vs. requesting your resources). In a series of 8 experiments, we tested the prediction that negotiators would show a stronger concession aversion and attain better individual outcomes when their own resource, rather than the counterpart's, is the accentuated reference resource in a transaction. First, senders of proposals revealed a stronger concession aversion when they offered their own rather than requested the counterpart's resources- both in buyer-seller (Experiment 1a) and in classic transaction negotiations (Experiment 2a). Expectedly, this effect reversed for recipients: When receiving requests rather than offers, recipients experienced a stronger concession aversion in buyer-seller (Experiment 1b) and transaction negotiations (Experiment 2b). Experiments 3-5 investigated procedural frames in the interactive process of negotiations-with elementary schoolchildren (Experiment 3), in a buyer-seller context (Experiments 4a and 4b), and in a computer-mediated transaction negotiation void of buyer and seller roles (Experiment 5). In summary, 8 experiments showed that negotiators are more concession averse and claim more individual value when negotiation proposals are framed to highlight their own rather than the counterpart's resources. © 2015 American Psychological Association.