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Perspektive Bibliothek, Bd. 9 Nr. 1 (2020)

In this paper I offer an appraisal of James Bogen and James Woodward’s distinction between data and phenomena which pursues two objectives. First, I aim to clarify the notion of a scientific phenomenon. Such a clarification is required because despite its intuitive plausibility it is not exactly clear how Bogen and Woodward’s distinction has to be understood. I reject one common interpretation of the distinction, endorsed for example by James McAllister and Bruce Glymour, which identifies phenomena with patterns in data sets. Furthermore, I point out that other interpretations of Bogen and Woodward’s distinction do not specify the relationship between phenomena and theories in a satisfying manner. In order to avoid this problem I propose a contextual understanding of scientific phenomena according to which phenomena are states of affairs which play specific roles in scientific practice and to which we adopt a special epistemic attitude. Second, I evaluate the epistemological significance of Bogen and Woodward’s distinction with respect to the debate between scientific realists and constructive empiricists. Contrary to what Bogen and Woodward claim, I argue that the distinction does not provide a convincing argument against constructive empiricism.

The international symposium "Data Phenomena Theories: What's the notion of a scientific phenomenon good for? took place at the University of Heidelberg from 1 lth to 13th of September 2008. The symposium was organized by the research group "Causality, Cognition and the Constitution of Scientific Phenomena" (Jochen Apel, Monika Dullstein and Pavel Radchenko) in cooperation with the Philosophy Department in Heidelberg (Peter McLaughlin, Andreas Kemmerling) and the IWH Heidelberg. The aim of the symposium was to illuminate the notion of a scientific phenomenon a notion that is common in science, but, with a few exceptions in the 1980s, has not been systematically discussed in philosophy of science. The symposium also commemorated the late Daniela Bailer-Jones, a philosopher of science who had initiated and directed the research group in its work on scientific phenomena. The conference focused on a proposal put forward by Jim Bogen and Jim Woodward in a series of papers in the 1980s. Rejecting the empiricist notion of scientific phenomena as observable facts, they had suggested taking scientific phenomena to be non-observable patterns that can be inferred from data and should be explained by scientific theories. The talks given at the conference can be aligned in four broad topics

Assessment of research and acquisition of research information has become an integral part of university business. The motivation for obtaining such data can be ascribed to both internal and external demands. However, this raises questions about common standards and efforts for data capture, storage and provision. This paper aims at giving insight into some general framework conditions of data science and research assessment, along with the transfer of outcomes into the daily business of science support. Examples from Heidelberg University are presented.

Neue Geschaftsmodelle entstehen immer dann, wenn alte Geschaftsmodell nicht mehr funktionieren. Konvergenz schafft neue Geschaftsmodelle. Das heist, bringt man das Eine mit dem Anderen zusammen bekommt man am Ende des Prozesses einen neuen Service oder eine neue Applikation mit der man am Markt, vielleicht in einer veranderten Wertschopfungskette, wieder erfolgreich sein kann.