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Quantum Communications is a field that promises advances in cryptography, quantum computing and clock synchronisation, among other potential applications. However, communication based on quantum phenomena requires an extreme level of isolation from external disturbances, making the transmission of quantum signals together with classical ones difficult. A range of techniques has been tested to introduce quantum communications in already deployed optical networks which also carry legacy traffic. This comes with challenges, not only at the physical layer but also at the operations and management layer. To achieve a broad acceptance among network operators, the joint management and operation of quantum and classical resources, compliance with standards, and quality and legal assurance need to be addressed. This article presents a detailed account of solutions to the above issues, deployed and evaluated in the MadQCI (Madrid Quantum Communication Infrastructure) testbed. This network is designed to integrate quantum communications in the telecommunications ecosystem by installing quantum-key-distribution modules from multiple providers in production nodes of two different operators. The modules were connected through an optical-switched network with more than 130 km of deployed optical fibre. The tests were done in compliance with strict service level agreements that protected the legacy traffic of the pre-existing classical network. The goal was to achieve full quantum-classical compatibility at all levels, while limiting the modifications of optical transport and encryption and complying with as many standards as possible. This effort was intended to serve as a blueprint, which can be used as the foundation of large-scale quantum network deployments. To demonstrate the capabilities of MadQCI, end-to-end encryption services were deployed and a variety of use-cases were showcased., Comment: 16 pages

There are different proposals in the literature on how to protect pedestrians using warning systems to alert drivers of their presence. They can be based on onboard perception systems or wireless communications. The evaluation of these systems has been focused on testing their ability to detect pedestrians. A problem that has received much less attention is the possibility of generating too many alerts in the warning systems. In this paper, we propose and analyze four different algorithms to take the decision on generating alerts in a warning system that is based on direct wireless communications between vehicles and pedestrians. With the algorithms, we explore different strategies to reduce unnecessary alerts. The feasibility of the implementation of the algorithms was evaluated with a deployment using real equipment, and tests were carried out to verify their behavior in real scenarios. The ability of each algorithm to reduce unnecessary alerts was evaluated with realistic simulations in an urban scenario, using a traffic simulator with vehicular and pedestrian flows. The results show the importance of tackling the problem of driver overload in warning systems, and that it is not straightforward to predict the load of alerts generated by an algorithm in a large-scale deployment, in which there are multiple interactions between vehicles and pedestrians.

We study the stability properties of a control system composed of a dynamical plant and a feedback controller, the latter generating control signals that can be compromised by a malicious attacker. We consider two classes of feedback controllers: a static output-feedback controller, and a dynamical gradient-flow controller that seeks to steer the output of the plant towards the solution of a convex optimization problem. In both cases, we analyze the stability properties of the closed-loop system under a class of switching attacks that persistently modify the control inputs generated by the controllers. Our stability analysis leverages the framework of hybrid dynamical systems, Lyapunov-based arguments for switching systems with unstable modes, and singular perturbation theory. Our results reveal that, under a suitable time-scale separation between plant and controllers, the stability of the interconnected system can be preserved when the attack occurs with "sufficiently low frequency" in any bounded time interval. We present simulation results in a power-grid example that corroborate the technical findings., Comment: Appeared in Nonlinear Analysis: Hybrid Systems, pp. 101152, vol. 44, may. 2022