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Principal issues in the 20th century development of the Balkan Peninsula are discussed in this introductory history text. Three themes--national rivalries, great power interference, and the economic, social, and political problems of modernization--are given special emphasis. An overview of 18th and 19th century history precedes the two major sections. Part 1, covering the years from 1887 to 1941, contains 6 chapters. The national monarchies of Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece are reviewed in chapter 1, with special consideration of the "Europeanization" of these states. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, respectively. Chapters 4 through 6 treat significant events from World War I to the outbreak of World War II. Both internal developments--social and political trends--and external influences--increasing Soviet and German pressure--are detailed. Part 2 examines World War II and the post-war period, emphasizing communist developments in the area. Chapter topics are: the Balkans in World War II, adjustments immediately following the war, a comparison of existing communist regimes, and an analysis of the Greek model of government. The book includes maps, a thirteen-page bibliography, and an index. (LP)

Designed as an introductory history, this book covers developments in the Balkan Peninsula from the 17th through the 19th centuries. Emphasis is placed on the process by which separate nationalities broke away from imperial rule, established independent states, and embarked on economic and social modernization. To establish perspective on the role of this area in world affairs, attention is directed to the interrelation of internal events and international conflicts. Following an introduction to major events through the 17th century are 2 parts, detailing historical developments in the 18th and 19th centuries. Part 1, subdivided into 3 chapters, covers the Balkans under the Ottoman empire, social and political events under the Hapsburgs, and a comparison of these 2 rules. Part 2 is divided into 4 chapters, each treating a particular stage in the 19th century development of national governments. These are: the first national revolutions; formation of governments in Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, the Danube, and Romania; events in areas still under Hapsburg domination; the wars of the latter part of the century; and an analysis of the overall movement. Numerous maps, illustrations, a 10-page bibliography, and an index are included. (LP)

In the previous pages the close relationship between tsarist Russia and the Danubian Principalities has been traced from the 1820s to the achievement of Romanian independence in 1878. The narrative has shown, on the one hand, the extreme difficulties that can be encountered by a great power in dealing with a small peripheral state occupying a strategical geographic position, whose policies might at times contain dangers for its large neighbor. On the other hand, the account has stressed the parallel problems met by a Balkan nation, with a highly conscious national leadership, in handling the great power whose attitude was critical for its political development. The support or at least the acquiescence of Russia was essential for the attainment of the major Romanian goals. The intervention of tsarist officials was thus often requested. Care had to be taken, however, that this assistance did not result in the complete domination of the country or in its annexation. The balance, as we have seen, was precarious. Romanian leaders usually followed a policy of seeking Russian aid against the Ottoman suzerain, but also of calling upon other governments to block a domination of their nation by Russia. Russian policies toward the Romanian national movement were similarly ambivalent. Although some plans were indeed made for the partition of the Balkan peninsula, with the Principalities as a part of their sphere, the majority of the Russian leaders, tsars and diplomats alike, favored an indirect approach. In fact, the preferred policy throughout much of the nineteenth century, exemplified by the Treaty of Unkiar Iskelesi, was the control of the central Ottoman government and thus of the entire empire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

THE CATARGIU GOVERNMENT: THE FIRST PERIOD With the successful conclusion for Russia of the London Conference and the establishment of the government of Lascăr Catargiu, a period of comparative calm that was to last until the spring of 1876 was introduced in the foreign policies of both Russia and Romania. General European diplomatic affairs remained in a similar condition. Like the other European states, both the Russian and the Romanian governments had to adjust to the new diplomatic balance that had come about with the unifications of Germany and Italy, the reorganization of the Habsburg Monarchy, and the weakening of France. For Romania the elimination of France as a major element in Eastern diplomacy was to be of prime significance for the future. Although relations had not always been smooth, this power had contributed more to Romanian national development than any other state. Since the two countries were geographically separated, France could never pose the same threat to Romanian territory as had the neighboring Habsburg Monarchy, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia at different periods. The new Germany was not to be a substitute despite Charles's Hohenzollern family ties. Bismarck was to prove particularly difficult, as would be shown in the negotiations over the controversial Strousberg railroad concession. He was also a man to hold a grudge. In May, in a conversation with Peter P. Carp, he complained about the Romanian attitude during the Franco-Prussian War, the comments in the press, and other incidents that had occurred and concluded: “We are the friends of our friends and the enemies of our enemies.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The double election of Alexander Cuza, an action that was in opposition to the clear intention of the protecting powers, was to bring a profound change in the relationship of the Principalities and their guardians. Although the alteration was not at once recognized, from this time forward Romanian interests were to be represented by a national leadership that rested usually on a strong domestic foundation. Moreover, although Cuza and his successors were to face continual opposition from various political opponents, neither these groups nor the princes themselves were henceforth dependent upon the favor of the Porte or another outside power. The change in the relationship with Constantinople and St. Petersburg was particularly striking. The subservient position of the former hospodars and caimacams contrasted sharply with the relatively independent stance of the new prince. This condition was brought about, at least in part, by the able and clever manner with which Cuza usually handled the great powers. The new prince, as we have seen, was not well known to the European representatives. He had, nevertheless, previously enjoyed a moderately successful career in public service and commerce. Born in March 1820 in a Moldavian boyar family, he had received an excellent secondary and university education in France. While a student in Paris he moved in the same circles as did the leaders of the revolutions of 1848 whom we have met before, among others the Golescu brothers and Ion Ghica. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Treaty of Paris opened a new era in European diplomacy, one that was to be characterized by victories for the German and Italian, as well as for the Romanian, national movements. Since there was as yet no representative Romanian administration, the fate of the country lay primarily in the hands of the great powers. The decisions were to be made no longer by one power, in collaboration with the Porte, but by a concert of the seven signatories of the treaty. The rivalry among these governments was to be a great advantage for the Romanian leadership over the next years. The Crimean disaster compelled a change of policy in the Russian relationship with the Principalities, as well as in other areas of international relations. The humiliation of the defeat and the dangers that had arisen during the war forced the Russian government to consider radically different courses of action. Alexander II regarded the treaty as a national humiliation and a stain on his personal honor. The breaking of the terms of the agreement that were damaging to Russia thus had first priority for the future. Four aspects of the settlement, in particular, had profoundly altered the Russian diplomatic position in the Near East: the neutralization of the Black Sea, the cession of the three districts of southern Bessarabia, the loss of a special position in relation to Constantinople, and the assumption by the powers of additional guarantees for the Porte. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the establishment of peace in 1815 the Russian government had occasion to be well satisfied with European conditions. After the menace of French aggression and French-supported revolutionary upheaval was suppressed, Russia emerged as the predominant Continental military power. Joined in close alignment with the Habsburg Monarchy and Prussia, a combination usually referred to as the Holy Alliance, the Russian government was a part of the most important European alliance system. With the acquisition of the major share of Poland, it also had no more territorial claims in the West. Weary of war and revolutionary upheaval, and with few pressing foreign policy objectives, Russia became the principal supporter of the status quo in European politics. Russia's relations with the Ottoman Empire could be viewed with similar satisfaction. If the Porte kept its treaty obligations, the Russian government was in a position to dominate the internal politics of the Principalities and to play a major role in the relations of the Ottoman government with its Orthodox subjects. During the eighteenth century, as we have seen, Russia waged repeated campaigns with the aim of attaining certain territorial objectives. This direction of policy was, at least temporarily, to be reversed. The Russian government now wished to maintain the status quo in the Near East as well as in Europe. With the achievement of the Pruth boundary, the Russian leaders recognized that they had little more to gain by an aggressive policy in either area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although Russian influence over political life in the Principalities did not become firmly established until the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji in 1774, Russian actions were already playing an important role in their internal development at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The main direction of the policy of Peter the Great was toward the Baltic rather than the Black Sea, but he had early in his career also shown an interest in expansion southward toward the Black Sea and, in particular, in the acquisition of Azov. The entire question of Russian relations with the Ottoman Empire became especially acute when in 1709, after his defeat at Poltava, Charles XII of Sweden fled to Constantinople and there, with French assistance, attempted to stir the Porte into action. His efforts met with success, and in 1711 the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia. Within the Principalities the Russian victory over the Swedish king made a deep impression. The temptation was strong to enter into relations with the Russian court in an attempt to break the Ottoman control over the Principalities. Accordingly, both Constantine Brincoveanu, the prince of Wallachia, and Dimitrie Cantemir, the ruler of Moldavia, opened negotiations with Peter. In April 1711 Cantemir and Peter concluded the Treaty of Luck. This pact of mutual assistance placed Moldavia under Russian political control; the terms stated that Cantemir, the boyars, and all of the Romanian population would henceforth be considered the Russian ruler's faithful subjects. Other sections of the treaty guaranteed Cantemir's personal and political future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this narrative is twofold: on the one hand, to examine the role played by tsarist Russia in the formation of an independent Romanian state, and on the other, to study the reaction of a Balkan nationality to the influence of a neighboring great power that was both a protector and a menace. The period of emphasis is the years from 1821, when a revolt with both Romanian and Greek leadership occurred in the Danubian Principalities, to 1878, when Romanian independence was accepted by the powers in the Treaty of Berlin. All of the events pertaining to Russian–Romanian relations do not receive equal attention; the weight is placed on those episodes that were crucial to the formation of the modern Romanian state and its leadership: the establishment of the Russian protectorate, the revolution of 1848, the reorganization of the Principalities after 1856, the double election of Alexander Cuza and his subsequent unification of the administrations and legislatures of the Principalities, the advent of Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen in 1866, and, finally, the Balkan crisis of 1875–1878. The relationship of Russia and the Romanian Principalities involved far more than the issues common in diplomatic history. The conservative nature of Russian autocracy and the basically liberal stance of the Romanian national leadership after 1848 made political ideology a major cause of friction. The Russian government was always deeply concerned about the political institutions established in the Principalities. In addition, two related questions, the revolutionary movements and the status of Orthodox institutions, played a major role in the mutual relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In considering the history of the Habsburg Empire after 1867, it is important to emphasize that the state had in fact three governments. At the top stood the joint Austro-Hungarian administration with the common ministries for foreign affairs, war, and finance. In addition, separate governments existed for Austria and for Hungary. The major unifying figure in this arrangement was Franz Joseph, who was emperor in Austria and king in Hungary. A constitutional monarch throughout his realm, he nevertheless had different powers in each half. In practice, his influence on military affairs and foreign policy was strong, but he could not effectively control domestic events in any part of his domain. A further unifying element was provided by the fact that delegations of sixty members each from the Austrian Reichsrat and the Hungarian parliament met alternately in Vienna and Budapest to handle certain common problems. However, for the majority of the Habsburg population, the decisions of the separate Austrian and Hungarian governments were more important than the work of the joint institutions. It will be remembered that Austria was assigned Bukovina, Dalmatia, and the Slovenian lands; the great majority of the Habsburg Croats, Serbs, and Romanians, however, lived in the Hungarian crownlands (see Map 2). Although this narrative deals primarily with the South Slav and Romanian populations, their specific problems did not dominate the political life of the monarchy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]