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L’afflux de réfugiés ukrainiens est inédit dans l’histoire de l’Europe depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Fin mars 2022, le Haut-Commissariat aux Réfugiés enregistre plus de 4 millions de réfugiés en provenance d’Ukraine. D’autres sources prédisent un total proche de 10 millions si la guerre perdure. Dans ce numéro de Regards économiques, nous discutons d’abord des potentielles conséquences économiques associées, avant de souligner l’importance d’une coordination renforcée entre pays de l’Union européenne. Le caractère historique de cet afflux de réfugiés ne doit pas faire oublier que la grande majorité des réfugiés continuera à résider dans des pays à faible ou moyen revenu, hors Union européenne. Une mise en perspective s’impose également quant à la capacité d’absorption des pays européens. Sans même évoquer les différences de richesse, le nombre de réfugiés ukrainiens représenterait à peine plus d’1% de la population européenne. Sans pour autant sous-estimer les défis liés à l’accueil des individus originaires d’Ukraine, la distribution des réfugiés au sein de l’Union européenne aura sans doute une incidence considérable sur les conséquences de cet épisode migratoire. La littérature économique nous montre qu’à terme la migration n’a pas d’effets néfastes sur les finances publiques ou sur le marché du travail. Au contraire, les réfugiés peuvent contribuer de manière positive à leur économie d’accueil en occupant, par exemple, des emplois en manque de main d’oeuvre, en créant eux-mêmes du travail pour la population du pays d’accueil, ou simplement en consommant ou en investissant dans le pays de destination. Toutefois, il faudra du temps pour voir se matérialiser de tels effets économiques et ceux-ci sont sans doute conditionnés à une réception et une intégration réussies des réfugiés ukrainiens à court terme. À cet égard, nous soutenons qu’une plus grande coordination entre pays de l’Union européenne est nécessaire. À l’aide de différentes clés de répartition, nous proposons certaines pistes pour déterminer une répartition plus équilibrée des réfugiés en fonction des capacités d’absorption de chaque pays. Un manque de coordination aboutirait certainement à une situation asymétrique où des pays comme l’Allemagne, la Pologne, la Tchéquie, la Hongrie et la Roumanie, caractérisés par une forte diaspora ukrainienne et proche géographiquement de l’Ukraine, accueilleraient la majorité des réfugiés. En supposant un rôle de soutien identique des réseaux ukrainiens entre les destinations, la Belgique en accueillerait moins de 40.000. Une entente sur la distribution des réfugiés ukrainiens à moyen terme, en fonction de critères comme la population, le PIB ou une combinaison des deux favoriserait une responsabilité partagée entre pays européens en fonction de leurs capacités d’absorption. Selon un scénario pessimiste de 10 millions de réfugiés ukrainiens, la Belgique devrait accueillir entre 259.000 et 305.000 individus.

We study the intergenerational transmission of health using registered data from China between 1789 and 1906. We first document the intergenerational correlations in lifespans, and we find much higher correlations for mothers, compared to fathers. We then compare children born from brother and twin fathers, and the intergenerational transmission from fathers becomes weaker and is likely to be mostly driven by genetic factors. On the contrary, our results suggest a strong role of women in affecting their children's health outcomes across generations in developing countries.

Research findings on the relationship between climate and conflict are diverse and contested. Here we assess the current understanding of the relationship between climate and conflict, based on the structured judgments of experts from diverse disciplines. These experts agree that climate has affected organized armed conflict within countries. However, other drivers, such as low socioeconomic development and low capabilities of the state, are judged to be substantially more influential, and the mechanisms of climate–conflict linkages remain a key uncertainty. Intensifying climate change is estimated to increase future risks of conflict. Climate has affected organized armed conflict within countries, and intensifying climate change is estimated to increase future risks of conflict, although other drivers are substantially more influential and the mechanisms of climate–conflict linkages remain uncertain.

IntroductionDespite considerable improvements in vaccination coverage over the last decade, half of the world’s unvaccinated and undervaccinated children are located in Africa. The role of institutional trust in explaining vaccination gaps has been highlighted in several qualitative reports but so far has only been quantified in a small number of high-income countries.MethodsWe matched information on child vaccination status from the Demographic Health Surveys with information on institutional trust from the Afrobarometer surveys at the subnational level. A total of 166 953 children from 41 surveys administered in 22 African countries covering 216 subnational regions were used. Based on a principal component analysis, we constructed an institutional mistrust index that combined the level of mistrust in the head of state, parliament, electoral system, courts and local government. Associations between institutional mistrust and child vaccination uptake were assessed with multivariable fixed effects logistic regressions that controlled for time-invariant subnational region characteristics and various child, caregiver, household and community characteristics.ResultsA 1 SD increase in the institutional mistrust index was associated with a 10% (95% CI of ORs: 1.03 to 1.18) increase in the likelihood that a child had not received any of eight basic vaccines and with a 6% decrease in the likelihood a child had received all of the basic vaccines (95% CI: 0.92 to 0.97). Institutional mistrust was negatively associated with the likelihood that a child had received each of the eight basic vaccinations (pConclusionsChild vaccination rates in Africa are considerably lower in areas in which the local population displays high levels of mistrust towards local authorities. Institutional mistrust is an important dimension of vaccine hesitancy, considered as one of the most important threats to global health. Empowering local authorities with resources and communication strategies to address institutional mistrust may be needed to close the remaining vaccination gaps in Africa.

The objective of this study consists in analyzing the determinants of the internal mobility of refugees in Turkey. We track down this mobility relying on geolocalized mobile phone calls data and bring these measures to a micro-founded gravity model in order to estimate the main drivers of refugee mobility across 26 regions in 2017. Our results show that the movements of refugees are sensitive to income differentials and contribute therefore to a more efficient allocation of labor across space. Comparing these findings with those of individuals with a non-refugee status, we find that refugees are more sensitive to variations of income at origin and to distance, while less responsive to changes in income at destination. These findings are robust to the way mobility is inferred from phone data and to the choice of the geographical unit of investigation. Further, we provide evidence against some alternative explanations of mobility such as the propensity to leave refugee camps, transit through Turkey, social magnet effects and sensitivity to agricultural business cycles.

In this presentation, we report on a comprehensive and balanced assessment of the relationship between climate and conflict risks and its implications for future directions of research. Research fi...

Rule-based intergovernmental transfers are often presented as the panacea to avoid the manipulation of transfers for political motives. We question that assertion in the case of Nigeria, where these transfers are highly dependent on natural resources and likely to be subject to elite capture. In this article, we use oil windfalls as a source of exogenous variation in the political discretion an incumbent government can exert in rule-based transfers. Exploiting within-state variation between 2007 and 2015 in Nigeria, an increase in VAT transfers induced by higher oil windfalls is found to improve the electoral fortune of an incumbent government. Our results question the promotion of rule-based transfers as a one-fits-all institutional solution in resource-abundant countries with relatively weak institutions.

The potential links between climate and conflict are well studied, yet disagreement about the specific mechanisms and their significance for societies persists. Here, we build on assessment of the relationship between climate and organized armed conflict to define crosscutting priorities for future directions of research. They include (1) deepening insight into climate‐conflict linkages and conditions under which they manifest, (2) ambitiously integrating research designs, (3) systematically exploring future risks and response options, responsive to ongoing decision‐making, and (4) evaluating the effectiveness of interventions to manage climate‐conflict links. The implications of this expanding scientific domain unfold in real time., Key Points Disagreement about the relationship between climate and the risk of violent conflict persists, limiting societal management of the risksFuture directions for climate‐conflict research include deepening insight on what the links are, when they matter, and how they manifestCompelling opportunities necessitate integrating research designs, responsive to ongoing decision‐making and potential responses

Our research report employs the D4R data and combines it with several other sources to study one of the multiple aspects of integration of refugees, namely the mobility of refugees across provinces in Turkey. In particular, we employ a standard gravity model to empirically estimate a series of determinants of refugee movements. These include the standard determinants such as province characteristics, distances across provinces, levels of income, network effects as well as some refugee-specific determinants such as the presence of refugee camps and the intensity of phone call interaction among refugees. Importantly, we explore the effect of certain categories of news events, notably protests, violence, and asylum grants. Considering news as an indicator of policy implemented at the provincial level, we gain a better understanding as to how policy can facilitate refugee mobility and thus enhance integration. To benchmark our findings, we estimate the same model for the mobility of individuals with a non-refugee status.

While an emerging literature cites weather shocks as migration determinants, scant evidence exists on how such migration affects the markets of receiving communities in developing countries. We address this knowledge gap by investigating the impact of weather-driven internal migration on labor markets in Nepal. An increase of 1 percentage point in net migration reduces wages in the formal sector by 5.7%. A similar change in migration augments unemployment by 1 percentage point. The unskilled bear greater consequences. Understanding entrepreneurial constraints and drivers of labor market exits will inform pathways to resilience.

We investigate whether entrepreneurs in the network of refugees - from the same country of origin - help refugees enter the labor market by hiring them. We analyze the universe of refugee cases without U.S. ties who were resettled in the United States between 2005 and 2010. We address threats to identification due to refugees sorting into specific labor markets and to strategic placement by resettlement agencies. We find that the probability that refugees are employed 90 days after arrival is positively affected by the number of business owners in their network, but negatively affected by the number of those who are employees. This suggests that network members who are entrepreneurs hire refugees, while network members working as employees compete with them, which is consistent with refugees complementing the former and substituting for the latter. (C) 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V.

Most of the world's displaced people are hosted in low-income countries. Focusing on evidence from poor countries, we review the literature on the economic consequences of hosting refugees or internally displaced people. In the short run, violence, environmental degradation, and disease propagation are major risks to the host populations. In the long run, infrastructure, trade, and labor markets are key channels that determine the impacts on host communities. These impacts can be positive or negative and often unequally distributed among different hosts. We discuss policy options for building resilience in the light of this evidence. Investments in road infrastructure and deepening trade with refugees’ countries of origin are strategies worth exploring for enhancing resilience and transitioning from humanitarian assistance toward development. Finally, we identify key knowledge gaps in this literature and formulate a research agenda for the near future.

International audience; This paper documents the effects of the recent civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo on mortality both in utero and during the first year of life. It instruments for conflict intensity using a mineral price index, which exploits the exogenous variation in the potential value of mineral resources generated by changes in world mineral prices to predict the geographic distribution of the conflict. Using estimates of civil war exposure on mortality across male and female newborn to assess their relative health, it provides evidence of culling effect (in utero selection) as a consequence of in utero shocks.

The role of environmentally induced income variability as a determinant of migration has been studied little to none. We provide a theoretical discussion based on a ‘risk aversion channel’ and an overview of the empirical literature on this. We also extend a previous empirical study on 39 sub-Saharan African countries with yearly data from 1960 to 2000 by including income variability and its weather determinants. Our findings lead us to acknowledge that, based on our dataset and methodology, income variability is a negligible driver of migration decisions at the macroeconomic level.

Every year, thousands of refugees are forced to leave their countries of origin and are hosted by their neighboring countries. However, very little is known about the impact of these refugees on the local economy and its inhabitants. Based on a hypothesis formulated during a two-month iterative field research, a theoretical framework is used to understand how the refugee inflow would affect the good and labour markets of the local economy. We then test the theoretical predictions regarding the potential winners and losers among the refugee-hosting population, using household panel data collected in the region of Kagera in Tanzania. Our identification strategy exploits both time and spatial variations in the way households traced between 1991 and 2004 have been affected by the refugee inflows originating from Burundi (1993) and Rwanda (1994). Our results show that local hosts do not necessarily suffer from the refugee presence. Net economic benefits could even emerge provided a sufficient mass of refugees is gathered. Furthermore, the economic benefits appear to be unevenly distributed among the refugeehosting population. Agricultural workers are likely to suffer the most from an increase in competition on the labor markets and the surging prices of several goods. On the contrary, non-agricultural workers and self-employed farmers are in a better position to benefit from such a refugee inflow. We also conjecture that the welfare deterioration experienced by those involved into business could be explained a selection effect resulting from the reported entry of larger-scale entrepreneurs from other regions.

Expectations are high that transition in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen will bring about more freedom, justice, and economic opportunities. However, experiences from other world regions show that countries in transition are at high risk of entering conflicts, which often come at large economic, social and political costs. In order to identify options on how conflict may be prevented in Arab transition countries, this paper assesses the key global drivers of conflicts based on a dataset from 1960 to 2010 and improved cross-country regression techniques. Results show that unlike in other studies where per capita incomes, inequality, and poor governance, among other factors, emerge as the major determinants of conflict, food security at macro and household-levels emerges as the main cause of conflicts in the Arab World. The high exposure of Arab countries to global food price variations proves to be an important source of vulnerability for a peaceful Arab transition. If history is also a guide to the future, improving food security is not only important for improving the lives of rural and urban people; it is also likely to be the key for a peaceful transition. The paper concludes with a set of policy options on how to improve food security at macro and household-levels, including safeguard mechanisms against excessive price volatility, export-led and pro-poor growth, the creation/expansion of social safety nets and targeted nutrition programs.

We estimate the impact of geo-located mining concessions on the number of conflict events recorded in the Democratic Republic of the Congo between 1997 and 2007. Instrumenting the variable of interest with historical concessions interacted with changes in international prices of minerals, we unveil an ecological fallacy: whereas concessions have no effect on the number of conflicts at the territory level (lowest administrative unit), they do foster violence at the district level (higher administrative unit). We develop and validate empirically a theoretical model where the incentives of armed groups to exploit and protect mineral resources explain our empirical findings. © Oxford University Press 2013. All rights reserved. ispartof: OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES vol:66 issue:3 pages:721-749 ispartof: location:Wageningen University, Wageningen status: published

Climate change leads to more frequent and more intense droughts in Somalia. In a global context weather shocks have been found to perpetuate poverty and fuel civil conflict. By relating regional and temporal variations in violent conflict outbreaks and drought incidence and severity, we show that this causality is also valid for Somalia at the local level. We find that livestock price shocks drive drought-induced conflicts through reducing the opportunity costs of conflict participation. Our estimation results indicate that a temperature rise of around 3.2 degree Celcius—corresponding to the median IPCC scenario for Eastern Africa by the end of the century—would lower cattle prices by about 4 percent and, in turn, increase the number of violent conflict by about 58 percent. Hence climate change will further aggravate Somalia’s security challenges and calls for decisive action to strengthen both drought and conflict resilience, especially in pastoralist and agropastoralist livelihoods.

Climate change is threatening global food production and could potentially exacerbate food insecurity in many parts of the world. China is the second largest maize producer. Variations in maize yields in China are likely to have major implications for food security in the world. Based on longitudinal data of 4,861 households collected annually between 2004 and 2010, we assess the impact of weather variations on maize yields in the two main producing regions in China, the Northern spring maize zone and the Yellow-Huai Valley summer maize zone. We also explore the role of adaptation, by estimating the response of Chinese farmers in both regions, in particular in terms of income diversification. With the use of household and time fixed effects, our estimates relate within-household variations in household outcomes (maize yields, net income, land and input use) to within-location variations in weather conditions. Temperature, drought, wet conditions, and precipitations have detrimental effects on maize yields in the two maize zones. The impact is stronger in the Northern spring maize zone where one standard deviation in temperature and drought conditions decreases maize yields by 1.4% and 2.5%, respectively. Nonetheless, such impact does not seem to translate into a significant fall in total net income. Adaptation seems to be key in explaining such a contrast in the Northern spring maize zone where the largest impact is estimated. On the contrary, we nd a lower impact in the other region, the Yellow-Huai Valley summer maize zone but such impact is likely to intensify. The lack of adaptation observed in that region results into detrimental impacts on net farm and total income. Enhancing adaptative behaviors among Chinese farmers even further is likely to be key to future food security in China and in the rest of the world. ispartof: Global Environmental Change vol:42 pages:93-106 status: published

This paper analyzes the effects of weather anomalies on migration in sub-Saharan Africa. We present a theoretical model that demonstrates how weather anomalies induce rural-urban migration that subsequently triggers international migration. We distinguish two transmission channels, an amenity channel and an economic geography channel. Based on annual, cross-country panel data for sub-Saharan Africa, we present an empirical model that suggests that weather anomalies increased internal and international migration through both channels. We estimate that temperature and rainfall anomalies caused a total net displacement of 5 million people during the period 1960-2000, i.e. a minimum of 128,000 people every year. Based on medium UN population and IPCC climate change projections, we expect future weather anomalies to lead to an additional annual displacement of 11.8 million people by the end of the 21st century. © 2012 Elsevier Inc.

Most reports on refugees deal with the immediate needs of displaced people. This paper seeks to go beyond the emergency phase and explore the challenges surrounding protracted refugee situations. The paper examines the refugee situation in Sub-Saharan Africa from a long-term angle, from the perspective of refugees' own agency as well as from the perspective of the host community. The paper aims to shed light on the economic lives of refugees in their host communities. Starting with an overview of the situation of refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa, the paper draws on findings from the literature to debunk some entrenched beliefs about refugees. The discussion of refugee crises in Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda draws some lessons. The decision to return is discussed and it is argued that the decision depends on the socioeconomic condition in the host country versus the country of refuge, integration versus return policies in place, the individual set of skills of each refugee, and his or her subjective perception of the political climate in both countries.

Weather shocks and natural disasters, it has been argued, represent a major threat to national and international security. Our paper contributes to the emerging micro-level strand of the literature on the link between local variations in weather shocks and conflict by focusing on a pixel-level analysis for North and South Sudan at different geographical and time scales between 1997 and 2009. Temperature anomalies are found to strongly affect the risk of conflict. Compared to the baseline, in the future the risk is expected to magnify in a range of 21 to 30 percent under a median scenario - taking into account uncertainties in both the climate projection and the estimate of the response of violence to temperature variations. Extreme temperature shocks are found to strongly affect the likelihood of violence as well, but the predictive power is hindered by substantial uncertainty. Our paper also sheds light on the vulnerability of areas with particular biophysical characteristics or with vulnerable populations.

De nouvelles initiatives de micro-finance emergent dans des pays aux marches bancaires et financiers pourtant tres developpes. Au Nord, la micro-finance est percue comme un nouveau moyen de resoudre la contrainte de financement des micro-entreprises et d’offrir aux individus les moyens de leur propre developpement. Nous sommes ainsi amenes a nous interroger sur l’applicabilite des mecanismes du Sud. Cet apprentissage Sud-Nord implique d’analyser les differences de contexte qui font que tant les objectifs que les instruments ne peuvent pas etre exactement les memes. Nous defendons la these selon laquelle les institutions de micro-finance au Nord ont sans doute un role a jouer en tant que politique active d’emploi et de promotion de l’entrepreneuriat, a condition qu’elles s’inscrivent dans une strategie de developpement local. Trois pistes d’action publique sont alors envisagees afin de soutenir le developpement des institutions de micro-finance dans ce contexte particulier.

While an emerging literature cites weather shocks as major determinants of migration, scant evidence exists on how such migration impacts the labor markets of receiving communities in developing countries. We address this knowledge gap by investigating the impact of weather-driven internal migration on labor markets in a post-conflict country, Nepal, using household survey data in 2003 and 2010. In this period, 3 percent of individuals moved out of their district of origin during the four years preceding each survey round. Contrary to the conventional narrative, we find prevailing environmental and conflict factors entice workers with positively selected attributes (such as education and skill) to migrate. Marked skill differences between migrants and the native population render wage effects in the formal sector: an increase of 1 percentage point in migration reduces wages in the formal sector by 4.8 percentage points. The absence of wage effects in the informal sector is consistent with the exit of low-skilled native workers from the labor market. To inform pathways to labor market resilience, future research is needed to understand the constraints migrants face in starting their own enterprises and the drivers of labor market exits among the low-skilled natives.

Every year, thousands of people flee their country of origin to seek protection mainly in neighboring countries. Understanding better the consequences of temporary population shocks on hosting economies should help to guide policies to enhance resilience in emergency situations. This study exploits a 1991–2010 Tanzanian household panel to assess the effects of the temporary refugee inflows originating from Burundi (1993) and Rwanda (1994). We find that the refugee presence has had a persistent and positive impact on the welfare of the local population. We investigate the possible channels of transmission, underscoring the importance of a decrease in transport costs as a key driver of this persistent change in welfare. We interpret these findings as the ability of a temporary shock to induce a persistent shift in the equilibrium through subsequent investments rather than a switch to a new equilibrium in a multiple-equilibrium setting.

Climate change leads to more frequent and more intense droughts in Somalia. In a global context, weather shocks have been found to perpetuate poverty and fuel civil conflict. By relating regional and temporal variations in violent conflict outbreaks with drought incidence and severity, we show that this causality is valid also for Somalia at the local level. We find that livestock price shocks drive drought-induced conflicts through reducing the opportunity costs of conflict participation. Our estimation results indicate that a temperature rise of around 3.2 degrees Celsius — corresponding to the median Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change scenario for eastern Africa by the end of the century — would lower cattle prices by about 4 percent and, in turn, increase the incidence of violent conflict by about 58 percent. Hence, climate change will further aggravate Somalia’s security challenges, and calls for decisive action to strengthen both drought and conflict resilience, especially in pastoralist and agro-pastoralist livelihoods.

This paper analyzes the effects of weather anomalies on migration in sub-Saharan Africa. Theoretically, we show how weather anomalies induce rural-urban migration that subsequently triggers international migration. We distinguish two transmission channels, an amenity and an economic geography channel. Empirically, based on annual, cross-country panel data for sub-Saharan Africa, our results suggest that weather anomalies increased internal and international migration through both channels. We estimate that temperature and rainfall anomalies caused a total displacement of 5 million people in net terms during the period 1960-2000, i.e. a minimum of 130’000 people every year. Further weather anomalies, based on IPCC projections on climate change, could lead to an additional annual displacement of 11 million people by the end of the 21st century.

Since Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004), it has been supported that inequality, measured at national level, does not affect the risk of conflict. Such a result has been much debated in the literature. Based on a revisited theoretical framework, the purpose of the paper is to explore the role of inequality in localized conflicts. We argue that previous findings might be biased by the myopic nature of cross-country analysis. Consistently with the model, Probit estimations indicate that income inequality measured at municipal level was significant in motivating people to support the rebellion in South Mexico. At this geographical level, we also find an increase in income per capita could exacerbate the risk of conflict in a situation where the rebel leader would have greater incentives to loot the local production compared to the opportunity cost associated with fighting for the worker.

Since Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004), it has been supported that inequality, measured at national level, does not affect the risk of conflict. Based on a renewed theoretical framework, the purpose of the paper is to explore the role of inequality in localized conflicts. We argue that previous findings might be biased by the myopic nature of cross-country analysis. Consistently with the model, Probit estimations indicate that income inequality measured at municipal level was significant in motivating people to support the rebellion in South Mexico. At this geographical level, we also find an increase in income per capita could exacerbate the risk of conflict in a situation where the rebel leader would have greater incentives to loot the local production compared to the opportunity cost associated with fighting for the worker.