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BackgroundLong non-coding RNAs (lncRNAs) play a variety of cellular roles, including regulation of transcription and translation, leading to alterations in gene expression. Some lncRNAs modulate the expression of chromosomally adjacent genes. Here, we assess the roles of the lncRNA CASC15 in regulation of a chromosomally nearby gene, SOX4, and its function in RUNX1/AML translocated leukemia.ResultsCASC15 is a conserved lncRNA that was upregulated in pediatric B-acute lymphoblastic leukemia (B-ALL) with t (12; 21) as well as pediatric acute myeloid leukemia (AML) with t (8; 21), both of which are associated with relatively better prognosis. Enforced expression of CASC15 led to a myeloid bias in development, and overall, decreased engraftment and colony formation. At the cellular level, CASC15 regulated cellular survival, proliferation, and the expression of its chromosomally adjacent gene, SOX4. Differentially regulated genes following CASC15 knockdown were enriched for predicted transcriptional targets of the Yin and Yang-1 (YY1) transcription factor. Interestingly, we found that CASC15 enhances YY1-mediated regulation of the SOX4 promoter.ConclusionsOur findings represent the first characterization of this CASC15 in RUNX1-translocated leukemia, and point towards a mechanistic basis for its action.

This study examines lawyers working in the federal appellate courts who represent immigrants seeking relief from deportation. By analyzing over 23,000 appellate cases during the Trump and Obama Administrations, the research here uncovers crucial findings. To begin, there was a statistically significant difference in the win rates of lawyers working pro bono and coming from the largest and most profitable corporate “Big Law” firms compared to lawyers based in other, typically more specialized immigration practice settings. Specifically, during the Trump Administration, Big Law lawyers won at nearly three times higher a rate than non-Big Law lawyers in the federal appellate courts. During the Obama Administration, Big Law lawyers won over three times more often. To supplement these quantitative results, interviews with Big Law and non-Big Law lawyers were conducted. As this study makes clear, it is not that those from Big Law firms are necessarily smarter or better at understanding immigration than non-Big Law practitioners. Indeed, there are certainly those lawyers in the latter cohort who do well in the appellate courts. Still, because of their enormous resource advantages, Big Law lawyers, on average, perform better because they have the luxury of selecting cases they believe are more likely to win. Additionally, Big Law firms have appellate specialists. They also have available personnel who can readily assist on these cases, as well as access to diverse research technologies and a keen familiarity with the federal courts’ norms—all of which are vital in preparing Big Law lawyers during the appeals process. Of course, Big Law firms are only involved in a fraction of federal appellate deportation cases. Nevertheless, their relatively high win rate, and the reasons behind it, have serious implications for how immigrants who do not have this type of representation are able to obtain justice. Otherwise put, Big Law’s greater success rates sadly perpetuate the already existing inequalities within our immigration system and highlight the unfortunate reality that firms with resources are able to procure advantages and benefits that others may not be able to enjoy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, in Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, the Supreme Court upheld 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2), a statutory provision placing restrictions on certain noncitizens from seeking habeas review in the federal judiciary. The Court focused on the Constitution's Suspension Clause, but it also discussed the Due Process Clause, declaring that there was no violation there either. One question which flows from this decision is whether the federal courts will soon be precluded from hearing other types of claims brought by noncitizens. Consider ineffective assistance of counsel petitions, which in the immigration law context are rooted in the Due Process Clause. Some circuit courts of appeals have held that a specific agency within the Department of Justice--the Board of Immigration Appeals--has the sole, final decision-making authority on these claims. Other circuit courts, in contrast, have stated that because IAC petitions are constitutional in nature, noncitizens are entitled to take BIA decisions to Article III appellate courts. As this study shows, statutory text, precedent, and the inscrutability of many of the BIA's rulings support the notion that the federal circuit courts should retain jurisdiction in these cases--even given Thuraissigiam. By creating a unique dataset containing 1,615 cases, this study empirically evaluates those publicly available ineffective assistance of counsel judgments delivered by the BIA. The results reveal that the BIA's holdings often are summarily issued and lack detailed explanation, with the government prevailing in most instances. With the stakes so high, it is imperative that Article III circuit courts are able to independently review these ineffective assistance cases, especially before the finality of a negative immigration order takes effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over thirty-five years ago, the city of Bhopal, India, witnessed a horrific gas leak that originated from a facility operated by Union Carbide India Limited ("UCIL"), which had as its parent company the American-based Union Carbide Corporation ("UCC"). Thousands were killed, with many more injured. One hundred forty-five cases were filed throughout various U.S. federal district courts on behalf of the victims asserting that UCIL and UCC were liable. Eventually, these cases were consolidated through the multi-district litigation ("MDL") process and placed onto the docket of federal Judge John Keenan. In 1986, Judge Keenan issued his famous forum non conveniens opinion, which stated that the Indian courts--and not the U.S. federal judiciary--were the proper venue for hearing these claims. Between 1986 and 1993, Judge Keenan dismissed all of the other MDL Bhopal cases he heard. Then, between 2000 and 2014 a set of distinct, non-MDL Bhopal matters appeared in front of Judge Keenan. In all of these too, he issued dismissals. Indeed, the original MDL process--coupled with the existence of internal federal courthouse rules--created a type of path dependence, allowing for all of the Bhopal-Union Carbide matters to come before Judge Keenan. The thesis here is that following the MDL consolidation, Judge Keenan became only more deeply wedded to the position he staked out back in 1986. Subsequent, non-MDL Bhopal plaintiffs, seeking an independent assessment of their claims, found themselves tethered to the initial MDL decision from years past. The broader lesson--beyond just this case study--is that in order for deserving plaintiffs to receive a fresh review in federal court, there needs to be an alternative imagination for how to deal with later cases that, although seemingly connected, are nevertheless distinct from the earlier MDL process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]