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It now seems technically feasible to culture human embryos beyond the “fourteen‐day limit,” which has the potential to increase scientific understanding of human development and perhaps improve infertility treatments. The fourteen‐day limit was adopted as a compromise but subsequently has been considered an ethical line. Does it remain relevant in light of technological advances permitting embryo maturation beyond it? Should it be changed and, if so, how and why? What justifications would be necessary to expand the limit, particularly given that doing so would violate some people's moral commitments regarding human embryos? Robust stakeholder engagement preceded adoption of the fourteen‐day limit and should arguably be part of efforts to reassess it. Such engagement could also consider the need for enhanced oversight of human embryo research. In the meantime, developing and implementing reliable oversight systems should help foster high‐quality research and public confidence in it.

Virtually all of the scholarly literature on responsible conduct in research (RCR) focuses on the integrity of scientists - including why scientists misbehave, and how to improve training and enhance compliance with institutional and federal policies and regulations to prevent research misconduct. What this literature does not yet address is the integrity of those responsible for research administration. This article explores the responsible conduct of research administration and the potential for administrative misconduct. I highlight ways in which a lack of integrity in research administration can jeopardize the progress of science, the careers of researchers, and the reputation of institutions just as much as research misconduct can. Accordingly, I call for policies and appropriate oversight of research administration that are on par with policies governing research misconduct by scientists.

In “Crossing Species Boundaries” (Robert and Baylis 2003), the authors explored the history, ethics, and prospective future of stem cell research involving chimeras made in part from human cells. They dismissed the various then-extant ethical objections to the creation of such chimeras, finding them all inadequate. In their stead, they sketched (but did not elaborate or defend) an alternative response—namely, that their creation would create a kind of inexorable moral confusion. Since then, a variety of alternative objections to—as well as justifications for—this research have emerged, alongside advances in the technologies for introducing genetic and cellular material across putative species boundaries. In this chapter, the authors revisit the notion of inexorable moral confusion, further specifying and elaborating the original concept in light of recent scientific and technical developments and ethical insights.

Biomedical research is at a critical juncture, with an aging population increasingly beset by chronic illness and prominent failures to translate research from “bench to bedside.” These challenges emerge on a background of increasing “silo-ing” of experiments (and experimenters)—many investigators produce and consume research conducted in 1, perhaps 2, species—and increasing pressure to reduce or eliminate research on so-called “higher” mammals. Such decisions to restrict species diversity in biomedical research have not been data-driven and increase the risk of translational failure. To illustrate this problem, we present a case study from neuroscience: cholinergic suppression in the cortex. In all mammals studied so far, acetylcholine reduces activity in some cortical neurons. Comparative anatomical studies have shown that the mechanism behind this suppression differs between species in a manner that would render drug treatments developed in nonprimate species entirely ineffective if applied to primates (including humans). Developing clinical interventions from basic research will always require translation, either between species (e.g., using a mouse model of a human disease) or within a species (using a subset of humans as a representative sample for all humans). We argue that successful translation will require that we 1) be data-driven in our selection of species for study; 2) use (with careful attention to welfare) animals that minimize the translation gap to humans; and 3) become agile at translation, by resisting the pressures to narrow our focus to a small number of organisms, instead using species diversity as an opportunity to practice translation.

As a concept and as a form of practice in the biomedical sciences, “translational research” is both everywhere and yet nowhere, and the challenges to translational success are significant. This essay introduces the notion of translational research in its contemporary sociopolitical context and proceeds to identify problems of communication at the core of translational research. Widely discussed and yet poorly understood, even by those who conduct it, translational research would benefit from the sustained attention of scholars working at the intersection of medical/health humanities and health communication studies.

What would it mean to take seriously a radically dynamic, life course approach to the epigenesis of obesity? This essay brings together concepts and perspectives from developmental systems theory, evolutionary developmental psychology, critical epidemiology, and public and population health into a complex systems framing of the problem of obesity. It begins with a survey of a variety of partial (reductionistic) approaches, and then synthesizes them more adequately and productively via the notion of biological embedding. As a hypothesis, biological embedding forces our attention toward the biology of embodiment, the pathways and mechanisms by which multilevel factors at multiple time scales constitute us even within our own skin. In this view, embryology, anthropology, urban planning, and geriatrics are as important to understanding obesity as nutritional science and health promotion. The essay concludes with reflections on this synthetic epigenetic approach in the quest for understanding human development, in sickness as in health.

As we reread Mary Shelley's Frankenstein at two hundred years, it is evident that Victor Frankenstein is both a mad scientist (fevered, obsessive) and a bad scientist (secretive, hubristic, irresponsible). He's also not a very nice person. He's a narcissist, a liar, and a bad "parent." But he is not genuinely evil. And yet when we reimagine him as evil-as an evil scientist and as an evil person-we can learn some important lessons about science and technology, our contemporary society, and ourselves.

Much has been said about the formative process that occurs via the “hidden curriculum” of medical education during which many students experience a disconnect between the professional values espoused within the formal curriculum and the implicit values communicated through interactions with peers and mentors. Less attention, however, has been paid to the formation of the future medical self that takes place during students’ premedical years, a time in which many undergraduate students seek out immersive clinical experiences —such as medical scribing— before applying to medical school. Despite the fact that medical scribes undoubtedly are affected by their clinical experiences, scribes are rarely offered opportunities to reflect on them. The authors contend that the developmental processes of medical scribes, especially those who intend on pursuing a career in the health professions, ought to be supported. This can be achieved, at least in part, through engaging in well-designed reflective sessions with other scribes. Encouraging students to reflect on their experiences can help them make sense of troubling events and give voice to the inconsistencies and value conflicts within medical practice that are so often ignored. The authors describe the development of their new Reflective Scribe program and offer suggestions for future directions.

Objective To explore the self-expressed desire for, envisioned reaction to, and basic understanding of presymptomatic Alzheimer disease (AD)–related genetic and biomarker tests. Patients and Methods The Alzheimer's Prevention Registry is an online community of people at least 18 years of age who are interested in AD prevention research for purely informational purposes or to be considered for possible research participation in future studies. Information about presymptomatic testing and an online multiple choice format survey were posted from November 1, 2012, through June 20, 2013, on the registry website. Results Of 4036 respondents, 80.8% (3195/3952) wanted genetic testing if paid by insurance and 58.7% (2261/3851) if it would cost them at least $100. A total of 80.2% (3112/3879) wanted biomarker testing. If at high risk for AD, 90.5% (3478/3841) endorsed that they would "pursue a healthier lifestyle," but 11.6% (427/3706) endorsed "seriously consider suicide." The implication of a positive genetic test result was incorrectly understood by 13.1% (500/3812) and 32.6% (1255/3848) failed to view a positive biomarker test result as evidence of increased risk for or the presence of AD. Conclusion Despite efforts to increase public awareness of AD, our survey results suggest that greater education of the public is needed. Interested patients should probably undergo psychological screening to identify those at high risk of adverse psychological outcomes, and disclosure of presymptomatic test results should be anchored to tangible constructive action plans, such as healthy lifestyle changes, long-term care planning, and, when available and appropriate, participation in research trials.

It has been argued that bioethicists too often tend to represent the interests of scientists and not of the broader polity. Indeed, bioethicists seem predisposed to discard the voices and viewpoints of all but the cognoscenti. Focusing particularly on human pluripotent stem cell research, this commentary explores a variety of characterizations of bioethics and bioethicists in relation to forbidding science. Rather than proselytizing or prohibiting, bioethicists should work in partnership with scientists and publics to craft scientifically well-informed and morally sophisticated debates about forbidding science.

An apparent consensus governs the management of carrier status information generated incidentally through newborn screening: results cannot be withheld from parents. This normative stance encodes the focus on autonomy and distaste for paternalism that characterize the principles of clinical bioethics. However, newborn screening is a classic public health intervention in which paternalism may trump autonomy and through which parents are—in effect—required to receive carrier information. In truth, the disposition of carrier results generates competing moral infringements: to withhold information or require its possession. Resolving this dilemma demands consideration of a distinctive body of public health ethics to highlight the moral imperatives associated with the exercise of collective authority in the pursuit of public health benefits.

I argue that the roots of an adequate integration of evolution into psychology are not to be found in evolutionary psychology, but rather in evolutionary developmental biology (evo–devo). To this end, I provide an overview of evo–devo and explore the limited role that behavioral sciences have played in its genesis. I then motivate an evo–devo approach to psychobiology, and sketch desiderata for the success of this enterprise. In particular, I elucidate what it means to take both development and evolution seriously, and argue for the primacy of developmental analysis in the exploration of (human) behavior and its evolution.

Model organismism—the over-reliance on model organisms without sufficient attention to the adequacy of the models—continues to hobble our understanding of human brains and behaviors. I outline the ...

Many research ethics guidelines now oblige researchers to offer research participants the results of research in which they participated. This practice is intended to uphold respect for persons and ensure that participants are not treated as mere means to an end. Yet some scholars have begun to question a generalised duty to disclose research results, highlighting the potential harms arising from disclosure and questioning the ethical justification for a duty to disclose, especially with respect to individual results. In support of this view, we argue that current rationales for a duty of disclosure do not form an adequate basis for an ethical imperative. We review policy guidance and scholarly commentary regarding the duty to communicate the results of biomedical, epidemiological and genetic research to research participants and show that there is wide variation in opinion regarding what should be disclosed and under what circumstance. Moreover, we argue that there is fundamental confusion about the notion of “research results,” specifically regarding three core concepts: the distinction between aggregate and individual results, amongst different types of research, and across different degrees of result veracity. Even where policy guidance and scholarly commentary have been most forceful in support of an ethical imperative to disclose research results, ambiguity regarding what is to be disclosed confounds ethical action.

If the therapeutic potential of stem cell-based therapies is ever realized, demand for stem cells and derivative tissues will be tremendous and will create new challenges for health care systems, especially publicly funded health care systems. We propose a framework for the ethical analysis of stem cell research and development that considers the welfare of communities, tissue recipients, and cell sources in relation to a range of stem cell production and distribution options. Ethical desiderata include: equitable access, maximized potential therapeutic benefit across demographic and disease groups, and reasonable cost. Other ethical priorities include the minimization of stem cell line and tissue wastage, risk of immune rejection, risk of transmitting diseases, the use of human embryos, and risk to those contributing source cells. We array plausible sources of stem cells and distribution strategies to characterize 12 potential models for producing and distributing cells and tissues in the future. We describe "personalized", "matched", and "universalized" models, and compare the ethical acceptability of these models. Popular and scientific discourses about stem cells typically emphasize personalized or matched stem cell distribution models. We show that universalized models may ultimately best serve the interest of taxpayers, communities and patients who hold high stakes in the therapeutic success of stem cell science. They are therefore highly worthy of scientific pursuit. This conclusion is provisional and the framework must be reapplied as scientific knowledge, technological capacity and ethical mores evolve.

In the Spring of 2003, as the first article on the ethics of grafting human stem cells or their derivatives into non-human embryos was going to press (Robert and Baylis 2003), we hosted a small inv...

The complexities of modern science are not adequately reflected in many bioethical discussions. This is especially problematic in highly contested cases where there is significant pressure to generate clinical applications fast, as in stem cell research. In those cases a more integrated approach to bioethics, which we call systems bioethics, can provide a useful framework to address ethical and policy issues. Much as systems biology brings together different experimental and methodological approaches in an integrative way, systems bioethics integrates aspects of the history and philosophy of science, social and political theory, and normative analysis with the science in question. In this paper we outline how a careful analysis of the science of stem cell research can help to refocus the discussions related to the clinical applications of stem cells. We show how inaccurate or inadequate scientific assumptions help to create a set of unrealistic expectations and badly inform ethical deliberations and policy development. Systems bioethics offers resources for moving beyond the current impasse.

The National Academy of Sciences recently issued voluntary guidelines to govern human embryonic stem cell research. Among other restrictions, these guidelines prohibit certain kinds of combinations of human and nonhuman animal cells, and call for ethics review and oversight of any protocol involving the transfer of human embryonic stem cells into nonhuman animals. In this essay, I discuss the history of and scientific rationales for combining human cells with cells of nonhuman animals, and critically assess the most recent attempts to limit such research on moral grounds--and find them lacking. Nonetheless, as I show, this research remains scientifically and morally contested. I then explore whether and how the NAS's recommended Embryonic Stem Cell Research and Oversight committees will allow for scientifically well-informed moral assessment of this controversial, but possibly important, research.