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Acting means changing the environment according to one's own goals, and this often requires bodily movements as responses. How these responses are selected is a central question in contemporary cognitive psychology. The ideomotor principle offers a simple answer based on two assumptions: An agent first learns an association between a response and its effects. Later, this association can be used in a reverse way: when the agent wants to achieve a desired effect and activates its representation, the associated response representation becomes activated as well. This reversed use of the learned association is considered the means to select the required response. In three experiments we addressed two questions related to the first assumption: First, we tested whether effect representations generalize to more abstract conceptual knowledge. This is important, because outside the laboratory and in novel situations, effects are variable and not always exactly identical, such that generalization is necessary for successful actions. Second, the nature of the response-effect relation has been debated recently, and more data are necessary to put theorizing on firm empirical ground. Results of our experiments suggest that (a) abstraction to conceptual knowledge seems to occur only under very restricted situations, and (b) it seems that no (implicit) associations between responses and effects are learned, but rather (explicit) propositional knowledge in the form of rules.

When simultaneously performing two tasks that share response properties, interference can occur. Besides general performance decrements, performance in the first task is worse when the second task requires a spatially incompatible response, known as the backward crosstalk effect (BCE). The size of this BCE, similar to congruency effects in conflict tasks, is subject to a sequential modulation, with a smaller BCE after incompatible compared to compatible trials. In the present study, we focus on a potential bidirectional interaction between crosstalk (and its resolution) at a lower level of task performance and higher-order processes of task organization. Two questions were of particular interest: First, do participants switch task order more frequently after a conflict-prone incompatible trial than after a compatible trial? Second, does changing task order influence the efficiency of conflict resolution, as indexed by the size of the sequential modulation of the BCE. Across four experiments, we only found marginal evidence for an influence of lower-level conflict on higher-order processes of task organization, with only one experiment revealing a tendency to repeat task order following conflict. Our results thus suggest practical independence between conflict and task-order control. When separating processes of task selection and task performance, the sequential modulation was generally diminished, suggesting that conflict resolution in dual-tasks can be disrupted by a deliberate decision about task order, or, alternatively, by a longer inter-trial interval. Finally, the study found a strong bias towards repeating the same task order across trials, suggesting that task-order sets not only impact task performance but also guide task selection., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

Ideomotor theory suggests that selecting a response is achieved by anticipating the consequences of that response. Evidence for this is the response-effect compatibility (REC) effect, that is, responding tends to be faster when the (anticipated) predictable consequences of a response (the action effects) are compatible rather than incompatible with the response. The present experiments investigated the extent to which the consequences must be exactly versus categorically predictable. According to the latter, an abstraction from particular instances to the categories of dimensional overlap might take place. For participants in one group of Experiment 1, left-hand and right-hand responses produced compatible or incompatible action effects in perfectly predictable positions to the left or right of fixation, and a standard REC effect was observed. For participants in another group of Experiment 1, as well as in Experiments 2 and 3, the responses also produced action effects to the left or right of fixation, but the eccentricity of the action effects (and thus their precise location) was unpredictable. On average, the data from the latter groups suggest that there is little, if any, tendency for participants to abstract the critical left/right features from spatially somewhat unpredictable action effects and use them for action selection, although there were large individual differences in these groups. Thus, at least on average across participants, it appears that the spatial locations of action effects must be perfectly predictable for these effects to have a strong influence on the response time., Competing Interests: Declaration of conflicting interestsThe author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

When two speeded tasks have spatially overlapping responses, preactivated Task 2 (T2) response information influences Task 1 (T1) response selection, a phenomenon known as the backward crosstalk effect (BCE). Current models of the BCE implicitly assume that T2 response information is equally present in trials requiring compatible or incompatible responses, such that T1 performance improves when T2 requires a compatible response and deteriorates when T2 requires an incompatible response. Thus, T2 response information should have a facilitatory and an interfering effect on T1. Interestingly, this hypothesis has never been tested, and the present study (conducted between 2021 and 2023) attempts to fill this gap by using neutral trials in which T2 responses did not spatially overlap with those in T1. The results suggest that the BCE (in T1) reflects both facilitation and interference effects of comparable magnitude, thus corroborating current conceptualizations of the BCE. We also observed an unexpected pattern of effects for T2, with only an interference effect, but no facilitation effect. Additional experiments led us to conclude that the T2 result was sensitive to the specific task characteristics. Conclusions about how the crosstalk transfers from T1 to T2 when switching tasks are therefore not possible. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Accounting for how the human mind represents the internal and external world is a crucial feature of many theories of human cognition. Central to this question is the distinction between modal as opposed to amodal representational formats. It has often been assumed that one but not both of these two types of representations underlie processing in specific domains of cognition (e.g., perception, mental imagery, and language). However, in this paper, we suggest that both formats play a major role in most cognitive domains. We believe that a comprehensive theory of cognition requires a solid understanding of these representational formats and their functional roles within and across different domains of cognition, the developmental trajectory of these representational formats, and their role in dysfunctional behavior. Here we sketch such an overarching perspective that brings together research from diverse subdisciplines of psychology on modal and amodal representational formats so as to unravel their functional principles and their interactions., (© 2023. The Author(s).)

Words judged for relevance in a survival situation are remembered better than words judged for relevance in a nonsurvival context. This survival processing effect has been explained by selective tuning of human memory during evolution to process and retain information specifically relevant for survival. According to the richness-of-encoding hypothesis the survival processing effect arises from a domain-general mechanism-namely, a particularly rich and distinct form of encoding. This form of information processing is effortful and requires limited cognitive capacities. In our experiment, we used the well-established psychological refractory period framework in conjunction with the effect propagation logic to assess the role of central cognitive resources for the survival processing effect. Our data demonstrate that the survival memory advantage indeed relies on the capacity-limited central stage of cognitive processing. Thus, rating words in the context of a survival scenario involves central processing resources to a greater amount than rating words in a nonsurvival control condition. We discuss implications for theories of the survival processing effect., (© 2023. The Author(s).)

In contrast to traditional dualistic views of cognition, visual stimulus processing appears not independent of bodily factors such as hand positioning. For example, reduced crosstalk between two temporally overlapping tasks has been observed when the hands are moved into the attentional window alongside their respective stimuli (i.e., establishing global stimulus-hand proximity). This result indicates that hand-specific attentional processing enhancements support a more serial rather than parallel processing of the two tasks. To further elucidate the nature of these processing modulations and their effect on multitasking performance, the present study consisted of three interrelated crosstalk experiments. Experiment 1 manipulated global stimulus-hand proximity and stimulus-effect proximity orthogonally, with results demonstrating that hand proximity rather than effect proximity drives the crosstalk reduction. Experiment 2 manipulated the physical distance between both hands (i.e., varying local stimulus-hand proximity), with results showing weak evidence of increased crosstalk when both hands are close to each other. Experiment 3 tested opposing influences of global and local stimulus-hand proximity as observed in Experiment 1 and 2 rigorously within one experiment, by employing an orthogonal manipulation of these two proximity measures. Again, we observed slightly increased crosstalk for hands close to each other (replicating Experiment 2); however, in contrast to Experiment 1, the effect of global stimulus-hand proximity on the observed crosstalk was not significant this time. Taken together, the experiments support the notion of hand-specific modulations of perception-action coupling, which can either lead to more or less interference in multitasking, depending on the exact arrangement of hands and stimuli., Competing Interests: Declaration of conflicting interestsThe author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

In the present study, we examined how the relevance of potentially distracting information modulates the interplay of target and distractor processing in conflict tasks. Specifically, we manipulated the degree to which distracting information is relevant for performing the overall task by varying the proportion of trials in which a response to the distractor(s) (Experiments 1a and 1b: location in a Simon task; Experiment 2: flankers in an Eriksen flanker task) instead of to the target was required. Across all experiments, the congruency effect on mean RT was larger with the increasing relevance of the distractor(s). Critically, the slopes of the delta plot were more strongly increasing when the distractors were potentially relevant (as opposed to completely irrelevant), suggesting that cognitive control affects the timing of suppressing distractor-based activation. In addition, delta plot and diffusion model analyses revealed that the strength of suppressing distractor processing and the efficiency of target processing were enhanced when the distractors were less relevant. Overall, the present study dissociated multiple and time-dependent adjustments of control processes (i.e., target processing enhancement plus timing and strength of distractor suppression) in environments that encourage either a more stable or more flexible processing mode. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

A common explanation for processing limitations in dual-tasking is the existence of a bottleneck during response selection, meaning that the selection of responses can only occur serially for different tasks. However, a large body of data shows that features of a (secondary) Task 2 can already influence the processing of a (primary) Task 1. Such effects are referred to as backward crosstalk effects (BCEs). In the present study, two types of such BCEs were investigated: the compatibility-based BCE, which depends on the dimensional (often spatial) overlap between task features, and a BCE based on a go/no-go task in Task 2 (no-go BCE). Joining a line of research that suggests different mechanisms for these two types of BCEs, we investigated them using a mouse-tracking setup. Time continuous analyses revealed that the compatibility-based BCE triggered a spatial activation of the Task 2 response early during Task 1 processing, whereas the no-go BCE triggered an inhibitory effect in the case of a no-go Task 2, which spills over to Task 1 execution. This occurred, however, earlier in the time course than expected. The results are discussed with regard to recent models of dual-task processing.

The a priori calculation of statistical power has become common practice in behavioral and social sciences to calculate the necessary sample size for detecting an expected effect size with a certain probability (i.e., power). In multi-factorial repeated measures ANOVA, these calculations can sometimes be cumbersome, especially for higher-order interactions. For designs that only involve factors with two levels each, the paired t test can be used for power calculations, but some pitfalls need to be avoided. In this tutorial, we provide practical advice on how to express main and interaction effects in repeated measures ANOVA as single difference variables. In particular, we demonstrate how to calculate the effect size Cohen's d of this difference variable either based on means, variances, and covariances of conditions or by transforming [Formula: see text] or [Formula: see text] from the ANOVA framework into d. With the effect size correctly specified, we then show how to use the t test for sample size considerations by means of an empirical example. The relevant R code is provided in an online repository for all example calculations covered in this article., (© 2022. The Author(s).)

Purpose: The aim of the study was to evaluate the mobility of the cervical spine, pain and function according to Neck Disability Index (NDI) scores among dental assistants and hygienists. Comparison between dental professionals and a control group was also performed., Methods: In the study, 338 dental assistants and hygienists with a mean age of 35.8 were evaluated. Of these, 195 were measured with the CROM 3 device, and 143 with a classic tape measure, for the range of motion of their cervical spine. A non-dental professional group consisting of 60 women (whose work was not related to repetitive movements of cervical spine) was also tested, 30 with the CROM 3 device, and 30 with a classic tape measure. The dental and control groups were also surveyed with the NDI questionnaire and Visual Analogue Scale (VAS)., Results: Dental assistants and hygienists had significantly reduced functional ROM in all directions in comparison to the control group. Among the 338 volunteers form the study group the VAS pain score was higher than in the control group. NDI scores were also worse in the study group, compared to the control group. Functional results in all subgroups of the NDI questionnaire were better in the control group. Among dental workers the cervical spine typically demonstrated significantly greater mobility in right-rotation, resulting from the position occupied at the unit at which they work., Conclusions: Our findings confirm a decrease in the mobility of the cervical spine, lower functional scores involving various everyday activities and greater intensity of pain among dental assistants and hygienists in comparison to participants whose work does not involve cervical spine overuse., Competing Interests: Absent., (© 2023 Institute of Psychiatry and Neurology. Production and hosting by Termedia sp. z o.o.)

The Theory of Event Coding (TEC) has influenced research on action and perception across the past two decades. It integrates several seminal empirical phenomena and it has continued to stimulate novel experimental approaches on the representational foundations of action control and perceptual experience. Yet, many of the most notable results surrounding TEC originate from an era of psychological research that relied on rather small sample sizes as judged by today's standards. This state hampers future research aiming to build on previous phenomena. We, therefore, provide a multi-lab re-assessment of the following six classical observations: response-effect compatibility, action-induced blindness, response-effect learning, stimulus-response binding, code occupation, and short-term response-effect binding. Our major goal is to provide precise estimates of corresponding effect sizes to facilitate future scientific endeavors. These effect sizes turned out to be considerably smaller than in the original reports, thus allowing for informed decisions on how to address each phenomenon in future work. Of note, the most relevant results of the original observations were consistently obtained in the present experiments as well., (© 2022. The Author(s).)

Condition-specific speed-accuracy trade-offs (SATs) are a pervasive issue in experimental psychology, because they sometimes render impossible an unambiguous interpretation of experimental effects on either mean response times (mean RT) or percentage of correct responses (PC). For between-participants designs, we have recently validated a measure (Balanced Integration Score, BIS) that integrates standardized mean RT and standardized PC and thereby controls for cross-group variation in SAT. Another related measure (Linear Integrated Speed-Accuracy Score, LISAS) did not fulfill this specific purpose in our previous simulation study. Given the widespread and seemingly interchangeable use of the two measures, we here illustrate the crucial differences between LISAS and BIS related to their respective choice of standardization variance. We also disconfirm the recently articulated hypothesis that the differences in the behavior of the two combined performance measures observed in our previous simulation study were due to our choice of a between-participants design and we demonstrate why a previous attempt to validate BIS (and LISAS) for within-participants designs has failed, pointing out several consequential issues in the respective simulations and analyses. In sum, the present study clarifies the differences between LISAS and BIS, demonstrates that the choice of the variance used for standardization is crucial, provides further guidance on the calculation and use of BIS, and refutes the claim that BIS is not useful for attenuating condition-specific SATs in within-participants designs., (© 2022. The Author(s).)

This study reports the results of 4 experiments that addressed whether the domains of deictic time and number exert a cross-domain link. Such a link would be consistent with A Theory of Magnitude (i.e., ATOM). In contrast, no link between the two domains would support the conceptual metaphor theory (CMT), which assumes that each domain is only linked to space. In Experiment 1, participants made speeded decisions about temporal stimuli referring either to the past or to the future (e.g., tomorrow). In the spatial response condition, they vocally responded either with the word "left" or "right," whereas, in the number response condition, they responded with the word " 1 " or " 9 ". A strong congruency effect was observed with spatial responses, but only a small one (in error rates) concerning number responses. In Experiment 2, the stimuli were the numbers 1 and 9 . In the spatial response condition, participants responded again with the words "left" or "right," whereas, in the deictic time condition, they responded with "past" and "future." As before, a strong congruency effect was observed for the spatial condition; no or even a reversed congruency effect was obtained for the deictic time condition. Experiment 3 replicated this unexpected result, and Experiment 4 assessed whether this reversed congruency effect in the deictic time condition of Experiments 2 and 3 could be attributed to short versus long utterance duration. It is concluded that CMT provides the most parsimonious account for the obtained pattern of results, suggesting no direct link between deictic time and number processing. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Cognitive conflict is regarded as a crucial factor in triggering subsequent adjustments in cognitive control. Recent studies have suggested that the implementation of control following conflict detection might be domain-general in that conflict experienced in the language domain recruits control processes that deal with conflict experienced in non-linguistic domains. During language comprehension, humans often have to recover from conflicting interpretations as quickly and accurately as possible. In this study, we investigate how people adapt to conflict experienced during processing semantically ambiguous sentences. Experiments 1 to 3 investigated whether such semantic conflict produces the congruency sequence effect (CSE) within a subsequent manual Stroop task and whether Stroop conflict leads to adjustments in semantic processing. Experiments 4 to 6 investigated whether semantic conflict results in conflict adaptation in subsequent sentence processing. Although processing conflict was consistently experienced during sentence reading and in the Stroop task, we did not observe any within-task or cross-task adaptation effects. Specifically, there were no cross-task CSEs from the linguistic task to the Stroop task and vice versa (experiments 1-3)-speaking against the assumption of domain-general control mechanisms. Moreover, experiencing conflict within a semantically ambiguous sentence did not ease the processing of a subsequent ambiguous sentence (experiments 4-6). Implications of these findings will be discussed.

Human actions are suspect to various compatibility phenomena. For example, responding is faster to the side where a stimulus appears than to the opposite side, referred to as stimulus-response (S-R) compatibility. This is even true, if the response is given to a different stimulus feature, while location itself is irrelevant (Simon compatibility). In addition, responses typically produce perceivable effects on the environment. If they do so in a predictable way, responses are faster if they produce a (e.g., spatially) compatible effect on the same side than on the other side. That it, a left response is produced faster if it results predictably in a left effect than in a right effect. This effect is called response-effect (R-E) compatibility. Finally, compatibility could also exist between stimuli and the effects, which is accordingly called stimulus-effect (S-E) compatibility. Such compatibility phenomena are also relevant for applied purposes, be it in laparoscopic surgery or aviation. The present study investigates Simon and R-E compatibility for touchless gesture interactions. In line with a recent study, no effect of R-E compatibility was observed, yet irrelevant stimulus location yielded a large Simon effect. Touchless gestures thus seem to behave differently with regard to compatibility phenomena than interactions via (other) tools such as levers., (© 2023. The Author(s).)

In conflict tasks, such as the Simon, Eriksen flanker, or Stroop task, the congruency effect is often reduced after an incongruent compared to a congruent trial: the congruency sequence effect (CSE). It was suggested that the CSE may reflect increased processing of task-relevant information and/or suppression of task-irrelevant information after experiencing an incongruent relative to a congruent trial. In the present study, we contribute to this discussion by applying the Diffusion Model for Conflict tasks (DMC) framework in the context of CSEs to flanker and Simon tasks. We argue that DMC independently models the task-relevant and task-irrelevant information and thus is a first good candidate for disentangling their unique contributions. As a first approach, we fitted DMC conjointly or separately to previously congruent or incongruent trials, using four empirical flanker and two Simon data sets. For the flanker task, we fitted the classical DMC version. For the Simon task, we fitted a generalized DMC version which allows the task-irrelevant information to undershoot when swinging back to zero. After considering the model fits, we present a second approach, where we implemented a cognitive control mechanism to simulate the influence of increased processing of task-relevant information or increased suppression of task-irrelevant information. Both approaches demonstrate that the suppression of task-irrelevant information is essential to create the typical CSE pattern. Increased processing of task-relevant information, however, could rarely describe the CSE accurately., Competing Interests: Declaration of Competing Interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

In dual-task experiments, overlapping response characteristics of two subsequently performed tasks may not only affect performance in Task 2 but also in Task 1. This phenomenon is often explained through activated Task 2 response information influencing Task 1 response selection, which then possibly propagates again into Task 2. So far, however, only little is known about (a) the time course of this Task 2 response activation and (b) possible transmission/propagation mechanisms. The present study addressed both issues by testing 10 plausible drift-diffusion models with 5 data sets from dual-task experiments. To this end, we first examined if the temporal course of the response activation is linearly increasing or pulse like. The pulse-like model turned out to be superior, but the corresponding dynamics of the response activation often described a monotonically increasing function that reached its peak late during Task 1 processing. By extending the pulse-like model with an additional diffusion process, we then examined whether and how the Task 2 response information could affect subsequent Task 2 response selection. Concerning the transmission mechanisms, none of the assumed models proved to be entirely satisfactory. However, additional simulations suggest that Task 2 response activation-transmission does not occur at all. Instead, a model in which Task 2 started with a trace of the previous Task 1 response (i.e., irrespective of the preexisting Task 2 activation) turned out to be the most promising account. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Ideomotor theory is an influential approach to understand goal-directed behavior. In this framework, response-effect (R-E) learning is assumed as a prerequisite for voluntary action: Once associations between motor actions and their effects in the environment have been formed, the anticipation of these effects will automatically activate the associated motor pattern. R-E learning is typically investigated with (induction) experiments that comprise an acquisition phase, where R-E associations are presumably learned, and a subsequent test phase, where the previous effects serve as stimuli for a response. While most studies used stimuli in the test phase that were identical to the effects in the acquisition phase, one study reported generalization from exemplars to their superordinate category (Hommel et al., Vis Cogn 10:965-986, 2003, Exp. 1). However, studies on so-called R-E compatibility did not report such generalization. We aimed to conceptually replicate Experiment 1 of Hommel et al. (Vis Cogn 10:965-986, 2003) with a free-choice test phase. While we did observe effects consistent with R-E learning when the effects in the acquisition phase were identical to the stimuli in the test phase, we did not observe evidence for generalization. We discuss this with regard to recent studies suggesting that individual response biases might rather reflect rapidly inferred propositional knowledge instead of learned R-E associations., (© 2022. The Author(s).)

In multitasking research, a central question revolves around whether humans can process tasks in parallel. What "in parallel" refers to, however, differs between research perspectives and experimental approaches. From a task-level perspective , parallel processing can be conceived as to whether complete tasks are processed in an overlapping manner and how this impacts task performance. In contrast, a large body of literature solely focuses on the central stage of response-selection and whether it can run in parallel with other processing stages, an approach we refer to as the stage-level perspective . Importantly, although each perspective addresses related topics and highlights interindividual differences, they evolved through independent lines of research. In 2 experiments, we have taken a first step to investigate if individuals' tendencies for an overlapping versus serial processing mode on the task level are related to vulnerabilities for task interference on the stage level. Individual preferences for either task processing mode were assessed in the task switching with preview (TSWP) paradigm. Individuals' vulnerability for task interference was assessed with the backward crosstalk effect (BCE) in a classical dual task. Our results suggest that individuals who prefer overlapping relative to serial task processing at the task level are less vulnerable to task interference during response selection, indicated by a smaller BCE. This difference, however, only emerged in the second experiment with an increased sample size and with task-stimuli that facilitate a bottom-up separation of tasks in the dual-task. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Which task is easier, doing arithmetic problems of specified form for some specified duration, or carrying a bucket of specified weight over some specified distance? If it is possible to choose between the "more cognitive" task and the "more physical" task, how are the difficulty levels of the tasks compared? We conducted two experiments in which participants chose the easier of two tasks, one that involved solving addition or multiplication problems (Experiment 1) or addition problems with different numbers of addends (Experiment 2) for varying amounts of time (in both experiments), and one that involved carrying a bucket of different weights over a fixed distance (in both experiments). We found that the probability of choosing to do the bucket task was higher when the bucket was empty than when it was weighted, and increased when the cognitive task was harder and its duration grew. We could account for the choice probabilities by mapping the independent variables onto one abstract variable, Φ. The functional identity of Φ remains to be determined. It could be interpreted as an inferred effort variable, subjective duration, or an abstract, amodal common code for difficulty., (© 2021. The Author(s).)

Performing coordinated bimanual movements, that is, movements with two hands simultaneously, is a requirement in many activities. At the same time, these movements are subject to temporal and spatial constraints. Here, we focus on the constraints that become observable when pointing movements of different (asymmetric) rather than same (symmetric) amplitudes have to be executed ("spatial interference effect"). The respective performance costs are larger when the stimuli used to indicate the movement targets are symbolic compared with when the endpoints of the movements are cued directly. Previous studies have thus concluded that the source of spatial interference is both 'cognitive' and 'motoric', or more precisely occurs during response selection as well as motor programming. We here asked whether the contribution from motor programming is motoric in the sense as envisaged in dual-task models, that is, whether it can run in parallel to, and interference-free with, other processing stages. In two PRP experiments, Task 1 was bimanual pointing and Task 2 was auditory pitch-discrimination. Based on the effect propagation-logic, the results suggest that the motor programming contribution to bimanual interference also taps into capacity-limited resources and cannot be construed as running in parallel as assumed for the motor stage in dual-task models., (Copyright © 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

A frequent observation in dual-tasking is that spatially or conceptually (in)compatible Task 2 response features can interfere with responses in Task 1 (backward crosstalk effect; BCE). Such between-task interference is, at least to some degree, under strategic control. It has been shown that the size of the BCE can be modulated by instructions, contextual regularities, recent experience of conflict, and motivational factors. Especially large temporal task overlap (i.e., short stimulus onset asynchrony, SOA) represents a condition of potentially high levels of between-task interference. Accordingly, Fischer and Dreisbach (2015) showed that specific stimuli, associated with mostly short SOAs, were able to reduce the size of the BCE. In the present study, we investigated whether a regular sequence of SOAs can also be used for contextual regulation of the BCE. In a dual-task with spatially (in)compatible hand- and foot-responses, we implemented a repeating sequence of three SOAs. If participants learned this sequence and used it for task shielding, the BCE should decrease over time in the sequence blocks, but should increase in a subsequent random block. However, this prediction was not supported in two experiments (N = 32 each). Instead, the size of the BCE was constant across all blocks (BFs 10  < 1 for the respective interactions). This is an important result, as it points at the necessity to discover the appropriate conditions allowing implicit SOA sequence learning and to further investigate whether or how the resulting implicit sequence knowledge can serve shielding against between-task interference., (Copyright © 2021. Published by Elsevier B.V.)

In dual tasking, two different kinds of between-task conflict occur. Because in both cases, Task 2 characteristics affect Task 1 performance, they are commonly referred to as backward crosstalk effects (BCE): One with a conflict at the response selection stage when Task 1 and Task 2 have dimensional overlap (the compatibility-based BCE) and one with a conflict at the motor execution stage when response inhibition resulting from a Task 2 no-go-trial interferes with simultaneous response execution in Task 1 (the no-go BCE). Recent research suggests that these BCEs differ not only in their underlying cognitive processes, but also in how cognitive control is regulated. Here, we investigated whether both can be produced in a single dual-task set up and whether they trigger their respective processing adjustments (i.e., a sequential modulation). In three experiments, participants categorized numbers as smaller or larger than 5 in Task 1. In Experiments 1 and 2, numbers were responded to irrespective of numerical size (go-response) as Task 2. Further, dimensional overlap was provided by (non)corresponding size information in both stimuli, which was strengthened in Experiment 2 by presenting S1 and S2 in the same/different color in compatible/incompatible trials, respectively. In Experiment 3, participants were required to perform a number-size categorization also in Task 2, establishing strong dimensional overlap by activating the same or different response categories in both tasks. In all three experiments, the number 5 served as the no-go stimulus in Task 2 to induce a no-go BCE on Task 1. By and large, our results show that both types of between-task conflicts not only occur within the same type of BCE, but they also trigger their respective sequential modulation., (Copyright © 2021. Published by Elsevier B.V.)

The present study investigated how listeners understand and process the definite and the indefinite determiner. While the definite determiner clearly conveys a uniqueness presupposition, the status of the anti-uniqueness inference associated with the indefinite determiner is less clear. In a forced choice production task, we observed that participants make use of the information about number usually associated with the two determiners to convey a message. In a subsequent mouse-tracking task, participants had to select one of two potential referents presented on screen according to an auditorily presented stimulus sentence. The data revealed that participants use the information about uniqueness or anti-uniqueness encoded in determiners to disambiguate sentence meaning as early as possible, but only when they are exclusively faced with felicitous uses of determiners.

The present study investigated participants' ability to introspect about the effect of between-task crosstalk in dual tasks. In two experiments, participants performed a compatibility-based backward crosstalk dual task, and additionally provided estimates of their RTs (introspective reaction times, IRTs) after each trial (Experiment 1) or after each pair of prime and test trials (Experiment 2). In both experiments, the objective performance showed the typical backward crosstalk effect and its sequential modulation depending on compatibility in the previous trial. Very similar patterns were observed in IRTs, despite the typical unawareness of the PRP effect. In sum, these results demonstrate the reliability of between-task crosstalk in dual tasks and that people's introspection about the temporal processing demands in this complex dual-task situation is intriguingly accurate and severely limited at the same time.

Definite determiners trigger existence- and uniqueness-presuppositions, that is, the speaker assumes that it is taken for granted that there exists exactly one of the mentioned object in the relevant discourse. Indefinite determiners are associated with anti-uniqueness, that is, that there are several of the mentioned object. Applying the Maximize Presupposition principle, this additional meaning component arises as an anti-presupposition and involves first considering the definite determiner's uniqueness-presupposition and then its negation. We here investigate processing of the two determiners in more detail and ask whether this processing is automatic or requires limited central capacities. To do so, we employed the Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) approach and the locus of slack-logic. We observed more difficult processing for the indefinite compared to the definite determiner in felicitous sentences, and also in infelicitous compared to felicitous sentences. Further, immediate processing of the indefinite determiner appears capacity-limited. These results support the Maximize Presupposition principle and are an important step forward toward understanding cognitive processing of presuppositions., (Copyright © 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

In many if not all situations humans are engaged in more than one activity at the same time, that is, they multitask. In laboratory situations, even the combination of two simple motor tasks generally yields performance decrements in one or both tasks, compared with corresponding single task conditions. In contemporary models of dual tasking, these dual task costs are attributed to a capacity-limited stage of mentally specifying required responses. Ideomotor theory suggests that the generation of responses is a process of specifying goals, that is, desired future perceptual states (= effect anticipation ). Based on this, we argue that effect anticipation is the process responsible for dual task costs. We substantiate this suggestion with results from several lines of research, showing that (a) effect anticipation coincides with a capacity-limited process in dual task experiments, (b) no dual task costs arise if no effects are to be anticipated in one of the tasks, (c) dual task costs vary as a function of a how well effects from two tasks fit together, and (d) monitoring the occurrence of effects also adds additional costs. These results are discussed in a common framework and in relation to other observations and fields. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

A frequent observation in dual-task experiments is that performance in Task 1 is influenced by conceptual or spatial overlap with features of Task 2. Such compatibility-based backward crosstalk effects (BCEs) can occur when overlap exists between the responses of two tasks-the R1-R2 BCE-or between the stimulus in Task 1 and the response in Task 2-the S1-R2 BCE. The present study investigated whether the S1-R2 BCE has a perceptual locus, and by implication, whether the two BCEs have a common processing locus or different ones. To this end, we applied the additive factors logic and manipulated the duration of the Task 1 perceptual stage. The results argue against a perceptual locus for both BCEs. As a possible explanation, we suggest that the R1-R2 BCE and the S1-R2 BCE have their locus within a capacity-limited central stage, but that they arise from different processes within this stage. The R1-R2 BCE influences Task 1 response selection, whereas the S1-R2 BCE influences Task 1 stimulus classification. A plausible though post-hoc model is presented within the Discussion., Competing Interests: The authors have no competing interests to declare., (Copyright: © 2020 The Author(s).)

A long-standing debate revolves around which mental codes allow humans to control behavior. The internal stimulus model (going back to Rudolf Hermann Lotze) proposes that behavior is controlled by codes of stimuli that had previously preceded corresponding motor activities. The internal effect model (going back to Emil Harleß) proposes that behavior is controlled by codes of perceptual effects that had previously resulted from corresponding motor activities. Here, we present a test of these two control models. We observed evidence for both models with stronger evidence for the internal stimulus model. We suggest that the proposed experimental setup might be a useful tool to study the relative strengths of stimulus control and effect control of behavior in various contexts.

A common observation in dual tasking is a performance decrement in one or both tasks compared with single tasking. Besides, more specific interference occurs depending on certain characteristics of the two tasks. In particular, even Task 1 performance is often improved when responses in both tasks are compatible (e.g., both require left responses) compared to when they are incompatible: the compatibility-based backward crosstalk effect (BCE). Similar to what is observed for conflict tasks, the BCE is sequentially modulated: It is larger following compatible than following incompatible trials. Previous work has attributed this observation to adaptation effects triggered by response conflict arising during incompatible trials. In two experiments, we assessed sequential modulations following trials with different degrees of such a response conflict. In contrast to our expectations, a clear and sizeable sequential modulation was observed even under conditions where no BCE, and thus no empirical sign of an objective response conflict, was present in the previous trial. Therefore, our results show sequential modulations even without prior response conflict, which is not the (sole) trigger of sequential modulations accordingly. We discuss these results with regard to other potential triggers such as the subjective experience of conflict or difficulty, episodic retrieval, and repetitions of response combinations.

Informally speaking, presuppositions are meaning components which are part of the common ground for speakers in a conversation, that is, background information which is taken for granted by interlocutors. The current literature suggests an immediate processing of presuppositions, starting directly on the word triggering the presupposition. In the present paper, we focused on two presupposition triggers in German, the definite determiner the (German der) and the iterative particle again (German wieder). Experiment 1 replicates the immediate effects which were previously observed in a self-paced reading study. Experiment 2 then investigates whether this immediate processing of presuppositions is automatic or capacity-limited by employing the psychological refractory period approach and the locus of slack-logic, which have been successfully employed for this reason in various fields of cognitive psychology. The results argue against automatic processing, but rather suggest that the immediate processing of presuppositions is capacity-limited. This potentially helps specifying the nature of the involved processes; for example, a memory search for a potential referent.

A presupposition is a condition that has to be met in order for a linguistic expression to be appropriate. The definite determiner (as in the banana) triggers the uniqueness-presupposition that there is a uniquely identifiable banana in the relevant discourse context. The indefinite determiner (as in a banana) is similarly associated with anti-uniqueness (that there are several bananas). Application of the Maximize Presupposition principle to the indefinite determiner suggests that this latter effect results indirectly as an anti-presupposition from considering the uniqueness-presupposition of the definite determiner, which is then negated. This results in increased processing difficulty. We utilized mouse-tracking to compare processing of definite and indefinite determiners when used felicitously and infelicitously in a particular context. First, processing of the indefinite determiner was associated with more processing difficulties compared with the definite determiner. Second, we also observed evidence for an initial temporary activation and evaluation of the uniqueness-presupposition, just as derived from anti-presupposition theory and the Maximize Presupposition principle., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Objective: To determine whether response-effect (R-E) compatibility or stimulus-response (S-R) compatibility is more critical for touchless gesture responses., Background: Content on displays can be moved in the same direction (S-R incompatible but R-E compatible) or opposite direction (S-R compatible but R-E incompatible) as the touchless gesture that produces the movement. Previous studies suggested that it is easier to produce a button-press response when it is R-E compatible (and S-R incompatible). However, whether this R-E compatibility effect also occurs for touchless gesture responses is unknown., Method: Experiments 1 and 2 employed an R-E compatibility manipulation in which participants made responses with an upward or downward touchless gesture that resulted in the display content moving in the same (compatible) or opposite (incompatible) direction. Experiment 3 employed an S-R compatibility manipulation in which the stimulus occurred at the upper or lower location on the screen., Results: Overall, only negligible influences of R-E compatibility on performing the touchless gestures were observed (in contrast to button-press responses), whereas S-R compatibility heavily affected the gestural responses., Conclusion: The R-E compatibility obtained in many previous studies with various types of responses appears not to hold for touchless gestures as responses., Application: The results suggest that in the design of touchless interfaces, unique factors may contribute to determining which mappings of gesture and display movements are preferred by users.

It is unusual for very little to be known about a highly influential psychological scientist, but that is the case for the individual responsible for promoting one of the most influential laws of the field, the Power Law of Learning, as well as a seminal model of aiming performance. The individual, who published as E. R. F. W. Crossman, is shrouded in mystery. The authors of the present article sought to find out who Crossman is or was. We discuss the scholarly context for Crossman's work, including the classroom event at which we resolved to find out more about Crossman. In the course of our investigation, which took quite a bit of detective work, we learned that many other psychological scientists have been curious about Crossman as well. Rather than resolve the mystery in this abstract, we leave the reader in the state we were in at first, wanting to satisfy our curiosity and, finally, feeling we had learned important things, not only about the individual at the heart of the investigation, but also about our field in general.

According to the metaphoric mapping hypothesis, people code time in terms of space. Consistent with this hypothesis, several reaction time studies have demonstrated that participants respond faster with a left (right) response to stimuli that convey temporal information about the past (future) than when this stimulus-response mapping is reversed (past → right, future → left). The present experiment examines whether the side of the response key or of the (visual) action effect elicited by the response is the crucial factor of this space-time congruency effect. In a response-effect (R-E) compatible group, a response to a temporal stimulus produced a visual action effect on the same side as the response location (left response → left action effect, right response → right action effect). In an R-E incompatible group, however, response and action effect occurred on opposite sides (left response → right action effect, right response → left action effect). A typical space-time congruency effect was obtained in the R-E compatible group, but the congruency effect interacted with group and was descriptively reversed in the R-E incompatible group. This result pattern suggests that the typical congruency effect is determined by the location of the action consequences rather than the location of the response key. Based on this result, we suggest that the space-time congruency effect is based on an abstract spatial mental representation that embraces action events in the external space., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Self-related information is under many circumstances processed in a preferred and biased way, leading to what has been termed the self-prioritisation effect (SPE). The SPE has been demonstrated with arbitrary stimuli assigned to self and others, thereby controlling the influence of familiarity, and originally been attributed to facilitated perceptual processing of self-related stimuli. Subsequent studies, however, casted doubts on this interpretation and suggested further possible sources for the SPE. In the present four experiments, we used the well-established psychological refractory period paradigm together with the locus of slack and the effect propagation logic to pinpoint the source of the SPE. The data consistently demonstrated the SPE across all experiments. More important, the results converge on the notion that the SPE has its source in a capacity-limited stage of central processing. The implications of these results are discussed in light of possible candidate processes as sources for the SPE, such as memory-related processing.

In dual tasking, the no-go backward crosstalk effect (BCE) means that processing of Task 1 takes longer when Task 2 does not require a response (no-go trial) than when it requires a response (go trial). Thus, contrary to the usual observation, giving two successive responses counterintuitively reduces instead of increases performance costs for Task 1. Results from recent studies are in line with the notion that the no-go BCE reflects response inhibition, which is required to overcome an already prepared go response in Task 2, but which also spills over to motor execution in Task 1. No direct test of this hypothesis, however, has been carried out so far, and hence the present study was designed to fill this gap. The result of this study with n = 48 participants revealed that a no-go Task 2 impeded Task 1 performance when preparation of the Task 2 response was encouraged, but facilitated Task 1 performance when preparation of the Task 2 response was not encouraged.

In multitasking, the backward crosstalk effect (BCE) means that Task 1 performance is influenced by characteristics of Task 2. For example, (1) RT1 is shorter when the two responses are given on the same (compatible trial) compared with opposite sides (incompatible conflict-trial; compatibility-based BCE), and (2) RT1 is longer when Task 2 is a no-go relative to a go task (no-go BCE). We investigated the impact of recently experienced trial and conflict history on the size of such BCEs. Similar to the Gratton effect in standard conflict tasks, clear sequential modulations were observed for the two kinds of BCEs, which were present following (1) compatible trials and (2) go-trials and inverted following (1) incompatible and (2) no-go trials. Furthermore, recent evidence from mental chronometry studies suggests that the compatibility-based BCE is located inside the response selection stage, while the no-go-based BCE arises in motor execution. Against this background, a diffusion model analysis was carried out to reveal the reason(s) for the sequential modulations. As expected, for the compatibility-based BCE, changes in drift rate explain the sequential modulations, but for the no-go BCE changes in non-decision time are important. The present results indicate that both BCEs not only differ fundamentally in their underlying processes, but also in the way cognitive control is adjusted., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

The idea that conflict detection triggers control adjustments has been considered a basic principle of cognitive control. So far, this "conflict-control loop" has mainly been investigated in the context of response conflicts in single tasks. In this theoretical position paper, we explore whether, and how, this principle might be involved in multitasking performance, as well. We argue that several kinds of conflict-control loops can be identified in multitasking at multiple levels (e.g., the response level and the task level), and we provide a selective review of empirical observations. We present examples of conflict monitoring and control adjustments in dual-task and task-switching paradigms, followed by a section on error monitoring and posterror adjustments in multitasking. We conclude by outlining future research questions regarding monitoring and control in multitasking, including the potential roles of affect and associative learning for conflict-control loops in multitasking.

In dual-task situations, mutual interference phenomena are often observed. One particularly interesting example of such phenomena is that even Task 1 performance is improved if Task 2 requires a compatible (e.g., both responses are given on the left side) instead of an incompatible response (e.g., one response is given on the right side, and the other on the left side). This is called the compatibility-based backward crosstalk effect (BCE). In a previous paper, we observed support for a critical role of stimulus-response (S-R) links in causing this effect: The BCE was smaller when one of the two tasks was a free choice task. However, an alternative explanation for this observation is that free choice tasks lead to immediate conflict adaptation, thereby reducing the interference from the other task. In the present two experiments, we tested this explanation by varying the amount of conflict assumed to be induced by a free choice task either sequentially (Exp. 1) or block-wise (Exp. 2). While we replicated a sequential modulation of the BCE with two forced choice tasks, we observed (1) no reduction of the BCE induced by (compatible) free choice trials nor (2) an effect of block-wise manipulations of the frequency of free choice trials on the size of the BCE. Thus, while the BCE is sensitive to sequential modulations induced by the (in)compatibility of two forced choice responses, which might point to conflict adaptation, the reduced BCE in dual-task situations involving a free choice task is likely due to its weaker S-R links.