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The reviewed books nicely expose several factors behind democratic “degeneration,” but they do not question the assumption that democracy is a matter for nation-states only. This is problematic because states’ ability to perform their traditional functions has been progressively eroded. The internet revolution, in particular, has accelerated social communication, economic transactions, and the process of unbounding with profound implications for democratic performance. Rather than cultivating nostalgia for the “glorious years” of democracy, we must think hard how to make democracy triumph in the digital era.

The article investigates the impact of direct subsidies on the budget of agricultural farms and the level of investment in the farms. A questionnaire survey was made among clients of a company which provides services in farming in Nidzicki District (powiat nidzicki). The respondents were farmers who benefit from direct subsidies to agricultural production. The research confirmed the research working hypotheses, in which the direct subsidies constitute 1/3 of the profit generated by agricultural farms and have a significant influence on the level of investment. The research aimed to determine the impact of direct subsidies on the budget of agricultural farms and their investment in fixed assets.

First published online: 02 July 2020 The essay explains the origin, scope and forms of the anti-liberal surge taking place in Central and Eastern Europe. Why have voters across the region deserted the liberal politicians who managed to secure peace and prosperity on the ashes of communism? : Does the erosion of democratic values and institutions lead to autocracy, or something novel? : Special attention will be devoted to the issue of order and chaos in the broader European setting. Can order be maintained without shared values across EU member states? : The conclusions will point to the variety of hybrid regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and assess their impact.

The outbreak of Covid-19 prompted the greatest political intervention in our lifetime. Governments around the world introduced measures that shattered our private life, brought economic life to a virtual standstill, and threw into question the value of international organizations. The article first shows how the political interventions undertaken throughout 2020 have crushed long standing equilibria on such fundamental issues as the notion of a common good, the limits of individual freedom, or the relationship between the state and markets. It then analyses the battle of power and minds between the main political protagonists. The following section scrutinizes the policies applied by these actors, and their implications for democracy. The final section tries to envisage a democratic politics suitable for the world of viruses, super-bugs, climate change, poverty and hyper-connectivity.

Populist politicians—a diverse bunch that include business tycoons, academics and even comedians—are winning elections in Europe and beyond. Jan Zielonka discusses the reasons underlying the rise of populism and how liberals must appeal to the younger generation and regain voters’ trust.

The article argues that it is impossible to explain the series of existential crises confronting present-day Europe without reference to the changing nature of borders. Unbounding and rebounding prompted by transnational and technological pressures reconfigures the relationship between territory, authority, and rights in Europe. It produces new winners and losers. It changes the geography of power and makes European institutions look inadequate if not obsolete. The article tries to utilize recent studies in the field of geography, economics, and communication to understand the evolution of European integration. Four spatial models or architectural designs are envisaged: variable geometry, ordo-liberal empire, functional networks, and cascading pluralism.

Die EU ist ein bemerkenswertes demokratisches Experiment Noch nie zuvor wurde ein ebenso ambitioniertes demokratisches Projekt uber den Nationalstaat hinaus versucht. Dieser Beitrag argumentiert allerdings, dass die Versuche der EU, eine funktionierende Demokratie aufzubauen, gescheitert sind. Dies wiederum erschwert es der EU, schmerzliche Eingriffe in politisch sensible funktionelle Bereiche zu legitimieren. Dass das demokratische Experiment der EU gescheitert ist, bedeutet jedoch nicht, dass wir einfach zu den Nationalstaaten mit ihren parlamentarischen Systemen zuruckkehren konnen. Europa ist ein hoch integriertes System, und wir werden unsere gemeinsamen Bemuhungen immer regulieren und legitimieren mussen. Nationale Demokratien sind fur den Umgang mit grenzuberschreitender Wirtschaft und Politik nicht gut geeignet. Da Europas erstes demokratisches Experiment gescheitert ist, mussen wir schnell ein anderes, hoffentlich besseres, konzipieren. Der Beitrag wird zwei mogliche Alternativen betrachten und prufen.

This article focuses on two cases of the European Union (EU)'s efforts to promote its values and norms in its immediate neighbourhood, first in central and eastern Europe after the fall of communism, and then in North Africa and the Middle East after the fall of oppressive regimes there. These two neighbourhoods are seen as the EU's peripheries that need to be taken care of lest they become a source of political or economic instability. This explains the use of the imperial paradigm for analysing the content of the EU's normative power discourse. The article shows numerous parallels between the rhetoric of EU officials and the writings of leading philosophers in the Enlightenment period. While there is little doubt that the imperial discourse helped the EU to legitimize its enlargement project in central and eastern Europe, the Arab world seems less eager to ‘import’ European norms for a variety of reasons analysed in the article.

International politics based on law and norms has benefited European countries, and there is no reason to assume that other regions cannot benefit from it too.

This article considers whether an imperial paradigm is useful in aiding our understanding of the European Union (EU) and US today. It argues that empires are key units in today’s world, imposing considerable constraints on formally sovereign states, and that this cannot but change the nature of International Relations. The article compares some of the distinctive characteristics of the EU and US, and considers whether their structural features and imperial behaviours generate cooperation or conflict. It concludes that their competition for supremacy in Europe is potentially conflict-prone. The USA treats Europe as one of its vital peripheries and this is at odds with the EU’s own imperial ambitions.

It is often argued that the EU is a peculiar if not unique international actor. Unlike other major actors, it is a largely civilian power promoting universal norms in its vast neighbourhood and beyond. This article will test this proposition by comparing the EU's external policy to those of the United States, China and Russia. Five variables will be examined: (1) international aspirations and self-images; (2) governance form and structure; (3) means of governance; (4) borders and the scope of governance; and (5) centre-periphery relations. The article will conclude that all four actors share certain important characteristics. They all represent huge territorial units with sizable power resources across various fields. They all consciously apply these power resources to influence if not manipulate domestic politics in their respective peripheries. They all justify their power politics by reference to noble norms and values. But because of its peculiar governance system, fuzzy borders and predominantly civilian policy means, the EU practices its politics differently from the three other actors considered here.

In order to make it more effective as an actor on the international scene, the European Union is being urged to reverse its foreign policy priorities. EU enlargement policy has fallen out of grace and many want to see Europe acquire a “normal” foreign policy with a global rather than merely regional reach, significant military means and centralised governance. Management of various conflicts in Africa and Asia is also in vogue. Such a policy shift will define the nature of Europe's actorness. It is argued that, with all its defects, the EU performs quite well as a civilian regional power and efforts to transform it into a traditional military power with a global reach could make things worse rather than better.

The European Union (EU) spreads its norms and extends its power in various parts of the world in a truly imperial fashion. This is because the EU tries to impose domestic constraints on other actors through various forms of economic and political domination or even formal annexations. This effort has proved most successful in the EU's immediate neighbourhood where the Union has enormous political and economic leverage and where there has been a strong and ever-growing convergence of norms and values. However, in the global arena where actors do not share European norms and the EU has limited power, the results are limited. Consequently, it is not only Europe's ethical agenda that is in limbo; some basic social preferences across the EU seem also to be unsustainable. Can Europe maintain, let alone enhance, its environmental, labour or food safety norms without forcing global competitors to embrace them? The challenge lies not only in enhancing Europe's global power, but also primarily in exporting rules and norms for which there is more demand among existing and emerging global players. This means that Europe should engage in a dialogue that will help it to establish commonly shared rules of morality and global governance. Only then can Europe's exercise of power be seen as legitimate. It also means that Europe should try to become a ‘model power’ rather than a ‘superpower’, to use David Miliband's expression. The latter approach would imply the creation of a strong European centre able to impose economic pains on uncooperative actors. The former would imply showing other actors that European norms can also work for them and providing economic incentives for adopting these norms. To be successful in today's world, Europe needs to export its governance to other countries, but it can do it in a modest and novel way that will not provoke accusations of ‘regulatory imperialism’.

This article examines the impact of the recent EU enlargement on European governance. Enlargement is treated as a kind of external shock to the existing governance system, broadening and diversifying the European public space. The prevalent hierarchical mode of governance is increasingly inadequate under these new circumstances and the Union will have to embrace more flexible, decentralized and soft modes of governance.

Joining the European Union (EU) has changed the nature of democracy in the new member states. The EU's membership has complicated the structure of democratic decision making by making it more multilayered and multicentered. EU membership has enhanced the powers of nonmajoritarian institutions such as the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, and various regulatory agencies. National parliaments tend to be less powerful democratic players after a country joins the European Union—and even before, as the EU accession process has shown. EU membership has also broadened the democratic public space. As a consequence, democratic decision making within the European Union has to accommodate a more diversified set of interests and cultural orientations. Providing citizens with greater access to the European decision-making process seems to be most urgent in the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe, whose citizens feel particularly detached from this process. The article tries to suggest some ways of achieving this.

Despite the economic concerns of those opposed to the eastward expansion of the European Union, the small economies of the new member states should pose few problems; fears of a cultural gap between "old" and OnewO Europe are likewise misguided, as are charges that the entrance of the members will paralyze EU decision making. Enlargement reduces the chances of constructing a pan-European state, but it will put the EU under extra pressure to offer citizens meaningful forms of democratic participation. For all the changes that the entrance of postcommunist states will bring to the UnionNand for all the democratic challenges in particularNthe benefits of enlargement for Europe as a whole will clearly exceed the costs.

It is now taken as given that the European Union will be a much more diversified entity following its planned eastward enlargement. But precisely how much diversity will there be, and what are its implications? These questions are addressed in this article, as well as in the broader collection of essays which it introduces. By introducing a broad range of empirical evidence, we seek to challenge many of the theoretical assumptions about the scope, form and meaning of diversity in the process of European integration, and especially in the context of the forthcoming eastward enlargement. In fact, the map of unity and diversity in the enlarged EU proves to be extremely complex, and does not simply correspond to the old East-West divide. We also suggest that much of this diversity should be seen as welcome rather than as threatening for the Union, and that the enlargement process constitutes an important factor generating adaptation and accommodation.

(2000). Transatlantic Relations Beyond the CFSP. The International Spectator: Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 27-40.

Summary This paper examines the European Union's policy on eastward enlargement. It focuses on the aims, schedule, and institutional implications of the enlargement policy. The admission criteria for Central and East European applicant countries are analysed, and the relationship between the enlargement of NATO and that of the EU is examined. The evidence presented shows that behind the EU's projected image of having a well‐designed blueprint for enlargement, there is a considerable degree of uncertainty and ambiguity. The Union has been unable to develop a strategic design for European policy and as a consequence its enlargement policy is primarily accidental. Ambiguity makes it difficult for the Union's policy makers to garner sufficient public support for the enlargement project. Ambiguity also facilitates the assertion of parochial and sectarian interests over broader strategic considerations. Moreover, it hampers communication between the Union and the applicant countries. As a result the enlargement...

The countries of East-Central Europe (ECE) embarked on a democratic transition in 1989 were proclaimed consolidated democracies when they joined the European Union (EU) in 2004. Today most of the new democracies are experiencing “democratic fatigue” and some seem vulnerable to an authoritarian turn. The EU, seen as the guarantor of the post-1989 democratic changes, is experiencing an unprecedented economic, financial, and democratic crisis with the combined challenges of technocracy and populism. The article explores the different approaches to the study of democracies in ECE, their specific features and vulnerabilities, and tries to provide an interpretation of the premature crisis of democracy in ECE in a broader transeuropean context.

Jan Zielonka was born and educated in Poland. Since 1984 he has been associate professor of political science at Leiden UniversiO' in the Netherlands, and is currently on leave at St. Antony's College, O.~ford. His English-language publications include Political Ideas in Contemporary Poland (1989) and Security in Central Europe (1992). Setting the new rules of political bargaining is the essence of democratic consolidation. This especially involves defining the functions and procedures of democracy's three institutional pillars: the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. Unless these institutions enjoy stability, coherence, and autonomy, democracy cannot work. In the postcommunist countries, however, the entire institutional framework is now in flux, causing chaos, friction, and inefficiency. State institutions are assuming new roles and prerogatives under conditions of intense political struggle, rapid social change, and enormous legal confusion. The core rules of institutional bargaining are constantly being rearticulated and renegotiated. Institutions find it hard to acquire the public support and professional skills (to say nothing of internal coherence and adaptability) that they need to cope with the complex challenges that they face. At the same time, they often clash agonizingly among themselves over prestige, authority, and procedures. The problem has been especially acute in Russia, where institutional rivalries led to the all-out violence of October 1993 and threatened to undo democracy. But protracted and more or less intense conflict concerning the division of powers among the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary is a prominent theme of political life throughout the postcommunist world. This does not mean that no democratic progress is taking place. Despite the many problems discussed below, democratic consolidation is occurring, and existing institutions are performing their basic functions. Parliaments in each country issue hundreds of laws per year that undo the communist past and lay down foundations for a new