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Autor rozpatruje model szwedzki z punktu widzenia jego ewolucji w czasie, a następnie dokonuje konfrontacji tego modelu z rzeczywistością ekonomiczną oraz ocenia oddziaływanie tego modelu na efektywność szwedzkiej gospodarki. Co się tyczy ewolucji modelu, autor zwraca uwagę na szczególne historyczne uwarunkowania: relacji władzy królewskiej i chłopstwa. Te relacje przyczyniły się do ukształtowania się demokratycznych i egalitarystycznych cech stosunków społeczno-politycznych i ułatwiły wprowadzenie przez socjaldemokrację tego modelu w czasach współczesnych. Autor podkreśla ideologiczne – kolektywistyczne – cechy modelu szwedzkiego i konsekwencje tejże ideologii. Ewolucja modelu rozpoczęła się po ostrym kryzysie pierwszej połowy lat 90. XX w., a jej w wyniku nastąpiła redukcja skali wydatków publicznych z ok. 70% PKB do 50% PKB obecnego. Po kryzysie model, umownie nazywany przez autora modelem 2.0, przestał być czymś unikalnym i stał się jednym z wariantów tak zwanego europejskiego modelu socjalnego. Autor negatywnie ocenia wpływ oryginalnego modelu szwedzkiego i jego współczesnych pozostałości na efektywność szwedzkiej gospodarki. Dowodem na to są między innymi wyższy wzrost wydajności i produktywności kapitału, szczególnie w przemyśle przetwórczym, po redukcji udziału wydatków publicznych w PKB oraz zwiększeniu zakresu wolności ekonomicznych i obywatelskich (ograniczenie państwa niańki). Nadal jednak gospodarka boryka się z niezdolnością tworzenia miejsc pracy – ich liczba nie rośnie od 1975 r. – oraz z niewysokim poziomem innowacyjności gospodarki (mimo bardzo wysokich wydatków na B+R). Autor formułuje więc tezę, że osiągnięcia szwedzkiej gospodarki mają dwa główne źródła. Pierwsze to historyczne tradycje (etyka protestancka) wpływające na wysoki poziom społecznej dyscypliny, ale słabnące z upływem kolejnych dziesięcioleci istnienia modelu szwedzkiego 1.0. Natomiast drugie to wcześniejsze osiągnięcia szwedzkiej gospodarki jej fazie liberalnej (1860-1950), kiedy rosła ona najszybciej na świecie. W innych warunkach erozja efektywności pod wpływem kolektywistycznych rozwiązań oryginalnego modelu szwedzkiego byłaby znacznie szybsza. ***The author looks at the emergence and evolution of the Swedish economic model (called herein: model 1.0) and confronts it with the performance of the economy. He stresses a particular feature of the Swedish history, namely the relation between the king and the peasantry, as the precondition for a successful introduction of the collectivist folkhemmet model, based on a large public (social) sector and egalitarian wages and income policies. This model was pursued determinedly (despite the slowly deteriorating performance of the economy) until the acute crisis of the early 1990s. Under its impact the model has been cut in size (from approx. 70% GDP to 50% GDP now) and modified in terms of access to various benefits (in order to reduce ‘free riding’). The modified model, called here: model 2.0, has few characteristics of the model 1.0 and is barely distinguishable from the more general European social model. The author evaluates the impact of the Swedish model (1.0) on the performance of the economy in negative terms. Partial evidence is supplied by improved performance after the crisis-generated reforms, with a faster growth of labour productivity, and greater international competitiveness of the Swedish manufacturing in the post mid-1990s period. These were spurred by the cuts in public expenditures and taxes (and resulting stronger incentives for individuals), as well as enhanced economic and civic freedoms. However, even the modified model 2.0 is still hobbled by the egalitarian wage structure, low R&D efficiency, with the resultant inability of the economy to create private sector jobs. Altogether, the author’s opinion is that whatever positive effects have been registered by the Swedish economic performance, they resulted from the impact of the history-shaped institutions (including the protestant ethics) and earlier successes of the liberal Swedish economy, which in the period of 1860-1950 grew the fastest in the world, preceding the expansion of the collectivist Swedish model.

A look at the Western debate about West’s problems reveals what the present writer regards in a large measure as an irritating superficiality. Nowhere is it better visible than in the mainstream discussions about the euro zone and its problems, where most debaters glide over the fundamentals of Europe’s long-term problems and concentrate on the superficial and short-term issues. The discussions on how to “save” the euro zone strangely forget the defects in its creation, glide over the lessons to be drawn from policies pursued during the past decade, and defend the virtue of maintaining its present membership. But the problems of Europe run much deeper than the survival or collapse of the monetary union. Even if we assume that the problems of confidence the member states have in each other’s behaviour are restored and the rest of the world regains confidence in the institutions of the monetary union, the fundamental problems will remain unsolved. A clue to the real long-term problems may be found in the answer to a rather simple question. It runs as follows: “Why is the large majority of European countries indebted to such an extent that any further increase in debt to GDP ratio generates panic reactions among potential lenders?”

The main thesis of the article is that the Eurozone (EMU) crisis is not the main problem of Europe, or the West, but the long-term decline in economic growth. Institutional and policy distortions of the EMU only accelerated the day of reckoning, when the inevitable cuts to the oversized public (mostly welfare) expenditures will have to made. They will be even more necessary given demographic changes. The process of adjustment has encountered a lot of political and social resistance that is going to increase further in the years to come. These difficulties stem largely from the psychological consequences of the prolonged lack of linkages between efforts and results in the welfare state as perceived by its beneficiaries. The resulting learned helplessness syndrome makes it very difficult to proceed with the necessary downward adjustment — an absolute “must” if the West is going to reaccelerate economic growth and come out of the present quagmire relatively unscathed. The economic future of the West thus raises many question marks.

This article looks at the prospects of two emerging economic powers, Russia and China, to become major players in the world economy. The main economic thesis formulated by the author is that economies not only grow, but also undergo structural change. And to successfully accomplish second structural change – from the industry-driven to human capital-intensive services driven economy – it is not enough to increase economic freedom. Civic and even political freedom must emerge or increase to stand a chance to pass the ‘Great Wall’. Russia and China are, then, analyzed from the foregoing perspective. Additionally, many structural and economic policy distortions are pointed at in the case of both countries. Moreover, in the case of Russia, it is stressed that it is not so much an emerging power, but the failed superpower of the past.

This article looks at the BRIC countries with the understanding that countries not only grow, but also undergo structural change. Industrialisation first and the shift from industry to human capital intensive-services economy later. Moreover, it is stressed that the latter transformation requires not only more economic, but also civic and political freedom. From that perspective the ‘tectonic shifts’ in the global economy, predicted by many, are more doubtful than many protagonists of ‘China as the No. 1’ idea would be ready to admit. Especially Russia and China present themselves as countries with a serious problem to overcome. And the assessment excludes a lot of problems all countries of the BRIC group will be facing in the years and decades to come.

This article deals with a specific legacy, concerning the labour force, with which transition countries have been burdened while instituting systemic change. The majority of authors have concentrated on what this author calls transition cyclical unemployment, resulting from the permanent excess demand and the lack of penalty for financial failure under the communist economic system. However, another, more pernicious legacy has been the distorted skill structure in communist economies. This article explains the sources of a bias in favour of low-skilled workers in the past. In consequence, when transition began, these economies were faced with heavy excess supply of low-skilled and high demand for better skilled workers. The latter stemmed from normal requirements of economic development, that is, the need for continuous output quality improvement, technological upgrading and change in the portfolio of goods and services produced. Among the consequences of the sharp downward change in demand for low-skille...

The article looks from an institutional perspective at the process of catching up by poorer countries with the level of development already achieved by the richer ones. The author stresses that resources are of secondary importance, relative to the institutional framework conducive to or discouraging economic development. It is from such a perspective that the present writer approaches post‐communist transition, noting the existence of leaders and laggards in the process. Differences in outcomes are ascribed, unsurprisingly, to differences in institution‐building (both general and specific rules) and, even more importantly, to differences in what the author calls “civilisational fundamentals” of liberty, law and order, and trust. The main thesis is that the fundamentals in question are the heritage of pre‐communist past. Therefore, it is the pre‐communist heritage, the presence or absence of the fundamentals in question, which largely determine the transition's success or failure.

The early (drastic) output fall has been the major bone of contention among theorists in the early years of transition. This author looks at the issue from the vantage point of the communist economic legacy, i.e. so-called 'pure socialist production', unneeded under a less wasteful economic system. Excessive inputs, excessive investments, excessive armaments, as well as some other excesses disappeared in the early phase of a shift to the market (and democracy). Likewise disappeared trade with the former 'fraternal' countries, which also began restoring economic sanity and did not need 'pure socialist production' anymore. The article reviews the most often found explanations of the output fall in early transition and finds them much less satisfactory than the elimination of the 'pure socialist production' of the past.

WHILE CONSIDERING THE DEVELOPMENTS and characteristics of the Polish generic private sector, or to put it differently, Polish de novo firms that were private already at the moment of establishment, it is worthwhile to remind the reader that there is a difference between privatising a firm and privatising the economy. In the case of the former it means change in the ownership form: from a state-owned (or publicly owned) firm to a privately owned firm in one or another form typical for private ownership. Whenever we talk about 'privatisation', there is a high probability that a large majority have in mind precisely the change in the form of ownership and nothing else. However, as some have noted already long ago, privatisation of the economy means something else, namely change in the share of the private sector in the aggregate output, GDP, employment etc. The change-in fact increase-in the share can be achieved basically in two ways. The first is what is colloquially called 'privatisation'; the second is the increase in the share of the generic private sector. This author called the former process privatisation 'from above' and the latter privatisation 'from below' (Gruszecki & Winiecki, 1991). These two processes, privatisation 'from above' and 'from below', are never alternatives in privatising the economy. Each process contributes to a greater or smaller extent to the rising share of the private sector in the economy. And here comes the first distinguishing characteristic between Poland and other post-communist countries in transition. The share of the generic private sector in the Polish economy is much larger than in other transition economies, whether regarded as success stories, such as the Czech Republic and Hungary, or less successful countries. In fact, the generic private sector numerically dominates the private sector-and the country's economy. What should be noted at the start of the analysis pursued here is, unfortunately, the ad hoc nature of the statistical foundations for the study of the generic private sector

This article looks at the issue — largely neglected in the transition literature — of the relative weights of the privatized sector and the generic private sector (of de novo private firms) in the emerging private sector of post-communist economies in transition. The present writer posits that the relative weight of each in the aggregate share of a private sector (generally expanding over time as transition progresses) strongly influences economic performance, both during correctional recession and during recovery and expansion period. Another, interrelated issue considered here is the interaction between the evolving institutional framework and the expansion of the generic private sector, that is the most dynamic one in the transition economy. It is true that the interaction between institutions and performance has been a staple of a very large number of books, articles, and papers. However, this article concentrates on one component of a private sector only, that is the generic private sector. But at the same time it looks beyond the ‘Holy Trinity’ of transition (stabilization, liberalization, and privatization) towards a wider institutional framework of political liberty, law and order. The foregoing wider framework, and the emerging general trust, matters as much — if not more — for the present writer as the standard transition program. It is the relative dynamics of both components of the private sector, affected by both standard transition programs and the above-mentioned wider institutional framework, that is of primary importance for the economic performance in post-communist transition. In the last part of the article I will try also to answer, tentatively, the question under which circumstances the wider institutional framework may emerge in the transition process.

This article deals with the foreign trade of East-Central European countries in post-communist transition. It is primarily concerned with explaining certain early transition developments, unexpected and often neglected by policy makers and experts alike. The contribution of foreign trade to the generally unexpected steep output fall registered by each of these countries is discussed, stressing the inevitability of the disappearance of distorted demand patterns with the fall of communism and explaining why distorted demand was bound to affect not only the level of domestic output but also imports associated with the distorted demand. Exports to other former CMEA countries therefore fell precipitously. Other issues analysed in the article concern causes and beneficial effects of the rapid Westward reorientation of foreign trade, as well as the disappearance of another legacy of the communist past, East-Central European Countries', that is dual export structure.

The shift from a command economy to a market economy is not only a question of following appropriate macro-economic policies but also a matter of instilling a market ethic in the minds of people who had been socialized and rewarded in a non-market command economy. In that system, many concentrated on technical rules of survival. The lumpenproletariat in favoured industries were rewarded even when they shirked or pilfered from state enterprises. The ethics of the lumpenintelligentsia reflected Communist party values, as professional associations were under party control. The maintenance of such attitudes creates substantial resistance to the transformation of the economy, because a Weberian protestant ethic is lacking. Transition does occur, but the legacy of the old ethic imposes high transaction costs, inefficiencies and inhibits forward direct investment. After the collapse of communism, post-communist societies, as well as those in the West interested in their transition to normality, went through a brief period of unbounded optimism. The systemic change of epic proportions, from communism to liberal democracy and from socialist centrally planned to capitalist market economy, seemed to many not only within reach but almost effortlessly within reach. Once problems of transformation -the terms: 'transition', 'systemic change', and 'transformation' are used here as substitutes-turned out to be more difficult to cope with, as well as requiring more time, pessi

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe provide unique examples of large-scale relatively highly developed centrally planned economies. In the 1980s economists in both the East and West began to focus with increasingly critical attention on the economies of the Soviet Bloc, in an attempt to explain why they were performing so poorly in comparison with the economies of the Western powers and the capitalist countries of South-East Asia. First published in 1988 this substantial and innovative contribution to the critical literature on the economies of the former Soviet bloc is unusual in that its author is equally familiar with both Western and Eastern sources. It highlights, in particular, a discrepancy between the behaviour of individuals in Soviet-style economies and that expected of agents in a market system. It proceeds to outline how the consequent discordance between microeconomic practice and macroeconomic planning generates fundamental economic distortions.

Contents: Preface: A Few Words About the Book Part I: Global Challenges: Irrelevant? Imaginary? Immaterial? 1. Anti-globalists: Funny Children of Marx and Coca-Cola 2. The World is Running Out of Resources (Once Again) 3. Climate Alarmists, Climate Skeptics and the Politics and Economics of Global Warming Part II: The BRIC Countries and Global Economic Shifts: Projections and Realities 4. The Uneven Quality of the BRIC Countries: Russia and Brazil as the Weaker Half 5. China and India: Competitors for Future Leadership in the Global Economy Part III: The West in Decline - and Still (Largely) in Denial 6. The Global Financial Crisis as an Accelerator of Damaging Long-term Trends 7. Intra-European Divergences at the Time of the Crumbling Welfare State 8. How Much of US Exceptionalism is Still Left in the 'Europeanized' USA? 9. Underpinnings for Scenario A Postscript: Back to the Future Index

Articolo originariamente pubblicato in Moneta e Credito, vol. 49 n. 196, dicembre 1996, pp. 509-528.