Search

We investigate the factors that influence adoption of competition law using a panel of countries from 1970 to 2015. We find that in addition to development level, trading arrangements and peer pressure have also influenced adoption. The spread of competition laws adopted from Western precedents left a question regarding the extent they have been tailored to the diverse circumstances of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations countries. We document the nature, structure, conduct and scope of competition laws by comparing and contrasting the experience of the Philippines and Thailand. Our descriptive analysis reveals that the force and influence of the law are not entirely dependent on early adoption.

As Ronald Coase and others have shown, deducing the appropriate role of the government in the economy requires a comparative institutions approach. Trying to generalize from oversimplified specifications regarding transaction costs, according to whether exclusion is possible or not, is a futile exercise. An alternative to the Ostrom matrix is to distinguish private, club, and collective consumption goods according to their technical characteristics, specifically their degree of congestabiilty. The other box of the Ostrom matrix, “common pool” resources, can also be usefully analyzed from a club perspective. Spillover goods are spatial clubs. Lastly, a version of the Coase theorem is offered, which provides the foundation of comparative institutional analysis.

The paper reviews the pros and cons of land reform with particular attention to the Philippines. We find a repeated theme in supporting arguments for land-to-the-tiller reform and the outlawing of share tenancy: that land reform will improve efficiency by lowering transaction costs. We show that this is logically incorrect and fails to draw appropriate lessons from the evidence. More generally, the arguments for land reform suffer from misplaced exogeneity, in particular by implicitly regarding farm size and organizational form as exogenous. JEL classification: O13, R52

We consider the prospects for sustainable growth using expected utility models of optimal investment under threat from natural disasters. Adoption of a continuous time, stochastic Ramsey growth model over an infinite time horizon permits the analysis of sustainability under uncertainty regarding adverse events, including both one-time and recurrent disasters. As appropriate to small economies, we consider adaptation to the risk of disaster. Natural disasters reduce capital stocks and disrupt the optimal consumption and felicity paths. While the time path of inter-temporal welfare might consequently shift downward, the path may still be non-decreasing over time, even without adding strong or weak sustainability constraints. Prudent disaster preparedness includes precautionary investment in productive capital, programs of adaptation to disaster risk, and avoiding distortionary policies undermining the prospects of optimality and sustainability.

The Philippines provides an extreme example of Rodrik’s observation that late developing countries experience deindustrialization at lower levels of per capita income than more advanced economies. Previous studies point to the role of protectionist policies, financial crises, and currency overvaluation as explanations for the shrinking share of the industry sector. We complement this literature by examining the role of power prices in the trajectory of industry share. We make use of data at the country level for 33 countries over the period 1980–2014 and at the Philippine regional level for 16 regions over the period 1990–2014. We find that higher power prices tend to amplify deindustrialization, causing industry share to turn downward at a lower peak and a lower per capita income, and to decline more steeply than otherwise. In a two-country comparison, we find that power intensive manufacturing subsectors have expanded more rapidly in Indonesia, where power prices have been low, whereas Philippine manufacturing has shifted toward less power intensive and more labor intensive subsectors in the face of high power prices.

Managing pollution in accordance with marginal abatement costs is optimal only if based on both direct (end-of-pipe) and indirect (input substitution and limitation) controls. Using the example of nitrogen pollution in groundwater, we show that the marginal abatement cost function for any given pollution source can be directly derived from a social-welfare maximization problem, wherein both direct controls and inputs to pollution-generating production of a good or service are included. The solution to the optimization model reveals that abatement instruments for each source should be used according to least-marginal-abatement-cost-first, and the sources should in turn abate in order of least cost. The least-cost result remains optimal, even when the abatement target is exogenously determined.

Among the ethical objections to intergenerational impartiality is the violation of consumer sovereignty given that individuals are impatient. We accommodate that concern by distinguishing intra- and inter-generational discounting in an OLG model suitable for analyzing sustainability issues. Under the assumption of constant elasticity of marginal felicity, the optimum trajectory of aggregate consumption is guided, via the Ramsey condition, by the intergenerational discount rate but not the personal discount rate. In an economy with produced capital and a renewable resource, intergenerational neutrality results in a sustained growth path, without the necessity of a sustainability constraint, even in the presence of intragenerational impatience. We also find that green net national product remains constant along the optimal approach path to golden rule consumption.

To meet the growing demand for freshwater, many regions have increased groundwater pumping in recent years, resulting in declining groundwater levels worldwide. A promising development to address these declines is technical change regarding groundwater substitutes such as desalination and wastewater recycling. However, because these technologies are energy intensive, optimal implementation also depends on future energy price trends. We provide an operational model for the case of reverse-osmosis seawater desalination. In an application to the Pearl Harbor Aquifer in Hawaii, we find that allowing the cost of desalination to increase at an average annual rate of 2.4% over the next century results in a substantially steeper efficiency price path for water. The higher prices decrease optimal groundwater extraction and induce a slower head drawdown over a longer period of time, thereby delaying the transition to desalination by over 30 years. Because the rise in energy costs exacerbates efficiency losses from under-pricing, any delay in implementing efficiency pricing will cause either a greater future increase in prices or the need for rationing. Reforming prices sooner rather than later may be more politically feasible, given that consumers may be more amenable to a gradual rise in prices today than a sudden doubling or tripling of prices ten years from now. Using this as a foundation, we outline a research agenda for extending the framework to other groundwater substitutes and for adapting to climate change.

A theory of payment for ecosystem services (PES) pricing consistent with dynamic efficiency and sustainable income requires optimized shadow prices. Since ecosystem services are generally interdependent, this requires joint optimization across multiple resource stocks. We develop such a theory in the context of watershed conservation and groundwater extraction. The optimal program can be implemented with a decentralized system of ecosystem payments to private watershed landowners, financed by efficiency prices of groundwater set by a public utility. The theory is extended to cases where land is publicly owned, conservation instruments exhibit non-convexities on private land, or the size of a conservation project is exogenous. In these cases, conservation investment can be financed from benefit taxation of groundwater consumers. While volumetric conservation surcharges induce inefficient water use, a dynamic lump-sum tax finances investment without distorting incentives. Since the optimal level of conservation is generated as long as payments are correct at the margin, any surplus can be returned to consumers through appropriate block pricing. The present value gain in consumer surplus generated by the conservation-induced reduction in groundwater scarcity serves as a lower bound to the benefits of conservation without explicit measurement of other benefits such as recreation, biodiversity, and cultural values.

Optimal sequencing of resource extraction is typically studied for nonrenewable resources. We provide conditions for optimal use of multiple sources of a renewable resource and characterize the resulting extraction sequence, resource scarcity values, and (single) efficiency price path for two groundwater aquifers and an abundant alternative resource. Even with one demand, the optimal sequence depends on the differential opportunity costs of the two renewables. A numerical simulation for the South O‘ahu aquifer system, which also allows for different distribution costs, illustrates the case of using the “leakier” aquifer first and then switching to simultaneous use of both resources. The welfare gain from specialization relative to independent management is $4.7 billion.

This paper develops a two-stage model for the optimal management of a potential invasive species. The arrival of an invasive species is modeled as an irreversible event with an uncertain arrival time. The model is solved in two stages, beginning with the post-invasion stage. Once the arrival occurs, the optimal path of species removal is that which minimizes the present value of damage and removal costs plus the expected present value of prevention costs. An expenditure-dependent, conditional hazard rate describing species arrival is developed based on discussions with natural resource managers. We solve for the optimal sequence of prevention expenditures, given the minimum invasion penalty as just described. For the case of the Brown Tree Snake potentially invading Hawaii, we find that pre-invasion expenditures on prevention are inverse U-shaped in the hazard rate. Efficient prevention should be approximately $2.9 million today and held constant until invasion. Once invasion occurs, optimal prevention requires $3.1 million annually and $1.6 million per year on species removal to keep the population at its steady state level, due to high search costs at very small population levels.

With climate change exacerbating over-exploitation, groundwater scarcity looms as an increasingly critical issue worldwide. Minimizing the adverse effects of scarcity requires optimal as well as sustainable patterns of groundwater management. We review the many sustainable paths for groundwater extraction from a coastal aquifer and show how to find the particular sustainable path that is welfare maximizing. In some cases the optimal path converges to the maximum sustainable yield. For sufficiently convex extraction costs, the extraction path converges to an internal steady state above the level of maximum sustainable yield. We describe the challenges facing groundwater managers faced with multiple aquifers, the prospect of using recycled water, and the interdependence with watershed management. The integrated water management thus described results in less water scarcity and higher total welfare gains from groundwater use. The framework also can be applied to climate-change specifications about the frequency, duration, and intensity of precipitation by comparing before and after optimal management. For the case of South Oahu in Hawaii, the prospect of climate change increases the gains of integrated groundwater management.

We model coastal groundwater management and its effects on submarine groundwater discharge, nearshore marine water quality, and marine biota. Incorporating the stock externality effects on nearshore resources increases the optimal sustainable steady-state levels of both the aquifer head and the stock of a keystone native algae species. Numerical simulations are illustrated using data from the Kuki’o region on the Island of Hawaii. Two different approaches for incorporating the nearshore resource are examined. Including algae's market value in the objective function results in only slightly lower rates of groundwater extraction. When a minimum constraint is placed on the stock of the keystone species, however, greater conservation may be indicated. The constraint also results in non-monotonic paths of water extraction, head level, and marginal opportunity cost of water in the optimal solution.

Dr. Naya has been one of only two instructors of a course unique to the University of Hawaii called, “The Economics of Cooperation.” He was an early observer of deliberation councils and other institutions whereby the investment coordination problem was partly solved by extra-market cooperation in the East Asian “miracle” countries. These insights contributed to The Economics of Cooperation (1992), which featured the role of government as facilitator—a theme of Hawaii State Development Planning when Dr. Naya served on the Governor’s cabinet. Reconsidering government as a facilitator, and not as a replacement for markets, is one of the primary contributions of the New Institutional Economics (NIE). This paper extends and applies the facilitation perspective to the problem of agricultural development. Policy failures are detailed and sourced to the fallacy of misplaced exogeneity. In contrast, the method of fundamental explanation, inherent in NIE, acts as a corrective to misguided interventionism that has prevented pro-poor rural development from taking place.

We develop an integrated model for the prevention and control of an invasive species. The generality of the model allows its use for both existing and potential threats to the system of interest. The deterministic nature of arrivals in the model enables clear examination of the tradeoffs inherent when choosing between prevention and control strategies. We illuminate how optimal expenditure paths change in response to various biological and economic parameters for the case of the Brown Tree Snake in Hawaii. Results suggest that it is more advantageous to spend money finding the small population of snakes as they occur than attempting to prevent all future introductions. Like the drunk that looks for his keys only where the light is, public policy may fail to look “beyond the lamppost” for snakes that have already arrived but have not yet been detected. Actively searching for a potential population of snakes rather than waiting for an accidental discovery may save Hawaii tens to hundreds of millions of dollars in future damages, interdiction expenditures, and control costs.

The optimal size and location of an invasive species population depend upon spatially differentiated biological growth, economic costs, and damages. Although largely absent from most economic models, spatial considerations matter because the likelihood and magnitude of the invasion vary spatially and the threatened assets may be unevenly distributed across space. We map the current and future populations of an invasive species, Miconia calvescens, on Oahu, Hawaii, and the potential damages to water quantity, quality, and endangered-species habitat, and weigh these against treatment costs. We find that optimal densities vary from approximately 1% to 18% cover throughout the island.

Once established, invasive species can rapidly and irreversibly alter ecosystems and degrade the value of ecosystem services. Optimal control of an unwanted species solves for a trajectory of removals that minimizes the present value of removal costs and residual damages from the remaining population. The shrubby tree, Miconia calvescens, is used to illustrate dynamic policy options for a forest invader. Potential damages to Hawaii's forest ecosystems are related to decreased aquifer recharge, biodiversity, and other ecosystem values. We find that population reduction is the optimal management policy for the islands of Oahu, Maui, and Hawaii. On the island of Kauai, where tree density is lower and search costs higher, optimal policy calls for deferring removal expenditures until the steady state population is reached.