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There is growing concern that Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) vaccine fatigue will be a major obstacle in maintaining immunity in the general population. In this study, we assessed vaccine acceptance in future scenarios in two conjoint experiments, investigating determinants such as new vaccines, communication, costs/incentives and legal rules. The experiments were embedded in an online survey (n = 6,357 participants) conducted in two European countries (Austria and Italy). Our results suggest that vaccination campaigns should be tailored to subgroups based on their vaccination status. Among the unvaccinated, campaign messages conveying community spirit had a positive effect (0.343, confidence interval (CI) 0.019–0.666), whereas offering positive incentives, such as a cash reward (0.722, CI 0.429–1.014) or voucher (0.670, CI 0.373–0.967), was pivotal to the decision-making of those vaccinated once or twice. Among the triple vaccinated, vaccination readiness increased when adapted vaccines were offered (0.279, CI 0.182–0.377), but costs (−0.795, CI −0.935 to −0.654) and medical dissensus (−0.161, CI −0.293 to −0.030) reduced their likelihood to get vaccinated. We conclude that failing to mobilize the triple vaccinated is likely to result in booster vaccination rates falling short of expectations. For long-term success, measures fostering institutional trust should be considered. These results provide guidance to those responsible for future COVID-19 vaccination campaigns.

During the first year of the pandemic, many Austrians have turned to social media to inform themselves and engage in discussions about the COVID-19 pandemic. How ever, early on, the World Health Organisation, as well as the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior, raised serious concerns about an “infodemic” of misinformation spreading on the most commonly used social media platforms. Against this background, this study uses a cross-sectional survey design (n = 1,859) to explore if and to what extent citizens who nevertheless engaged in COVID-19-related information-seeking behaviours on social media during the first year of the crisis may have systematically different attitudes and beliefs related to the pandemic compared to citizens who did not. We found the most distinct patterns across platforms (i.e., Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, and WhatsApp) as well as across different activity types (i.e., reading, click speech, writing) when it comes to trust in institutions as well as COVID-19 conspiracy belief. Findings lead us to believe that the social media lens shows a stark imbalance that potentially makes (at least some of the) platforms a subpar and possibly seriously distorted source of information during an extreme health crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

Why do populist citizens oppose climate change? Thus far, data constraints limited the ability to test different theoretical mechanisms against each other. We argue that populist attitudes affect climate attitudes through two distinct channels, namely institutional trust and attitudes towards science. The former argument focuses on political institutions as the central actors in implementing climate policy. Individuals who distrust these institutions are more sceptical about climate change. The latter argument claims that populists deny climate change because they distrust the underlying climate science. According to this view, populists would view climate scientists as part of the self-serving elite that betrays the people. Utilising data from the Austrian National Election Study and structural equation modelling, we find strong support for the relationship of populism and climate attitudes via attitudes towards science and institutional trust. Populists systematically hold more negative attitudes towards science and political institutions, and consequently deny climate change.

COVID-19 vaccine fatigue is a major challenge in keeping the immunity in the general population up to date. Yet, not enough is known about how this problem can be overcome. We assessed vaccine acceptance in future scenarios in two conjoint experiments, manipulating factors such as new vaccines, communication, costs/incentives, and legal rules. The experiments were embedded in an online survey (N= 6,357 participants) conducted simultaneously in two European countries (Austria and Italy). The results show that adapted vaccines, their cost-free provision and expert consensus could help to counteract vaccine fatigue. To some extent, also positive incentives, celebrity endorsements, and knowledge about Long COVID may motivate citizens to get the vaccination. Motivational appeals mainly affected secondary outcomes such as the evaluation of vaccination campaigns. As the effect sizes of treatments were modest overall, vaccination campaigns should focus on mobilizing those with a general willingness to get vaccinated.

The policy of free movement—one of the core principles of the European Union—has become increasingly politicized. This makes it more important to understand how attitudes toward free movement are shaped, and the role of the media. The purpose of this study is therefore to investigate how news frames affect attitudes toward free movement, and whether education moderates framing effects. The findings from a survey experiment conducted in seven European countries show that the effects are few and inconsistent across countries. This suggest that these attitudes are not easily shifted by exposure to a single news frame.

Processes of coalition government formation have recently become subject to increasing delay across Europe. There also appears to be a concurrent surge in the success of ‘populist’ challengers, who tend to reject key features intrinsic to pluralism such as elite bargaining and compromise. Against this background, this article investigates for the first time citizen preferences for which party should get the mandate to form the government and which parties should definitely be excluded from government formation. We focus specifically on the effect that political knowledge and populist attitudes have on citizen preferences for government formation. We find that both political knowledge and populist attitudes are essential in explaining voters’ willingness or unwillingness to accept the fundamental prerequisite of coalition bargaining and political compromise. These findings have important implications for our understanding of citizens’ attitudes and political representation.

Audience expectations of journalism are a crucial dimension not only to understand journalism’s public legitimacy and institutional character but also its economic foundations in terms of consumers’ prospects. Although we see a critically growing disconnect between the audience and journalism, we know little about what the audience actually expects from journalism and what explains audience expectations. Using data from an online survey among the audience ( n = 2775) as well as professional journalists ( n = 818), this study compares audience expectations of journalism with journalists’ role orientations in Austria. Furthermore, multivariate analyses particularly aim to explore the role of political parameters for the understanding of audience expectations of journalism. Results show both congruencies and discrepancies between citizens’ and journalists’ perception of specific functions of journalism and that – besides media use – political attitudes may very well play an important role.

Systematic and openly accessible data are vital to the scientific understanding of the social, political, and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. This article introduces the Austrian Corona Panel Project (ACPP), which has generated a unique, publicly available data set from late March 2020 onwards. ACPP has been designed to capture the social, political, and economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the Austrian population on a weekly basis. The thematic scope of the study covers several core dimensions related to the individual and societal impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The panel survey has a sample size of approximately 1500 respondents per wave. It contains questions that are asked every week, complemented by domain-specific modules to explore specific topics in more detail. The article presents details on the data collection process, data quality, the potential for analysis, and the modalities of data access pertaining to the first ten waves of the study.

In a time when freedom of movement is being challenged by an increasing number of European Union member states, and where immigration has been dominating public debate for years, this study investi...

Political communication has become one of the central arenas of innovation in the application of automated analysis approaches to ever-growing quantities of digitized texts. However, although resea...

In spite of broad interest in internal party dynamics, with previous literature relatedly demonstrating that voters are not oblivious to party infighting, very little attention has been paid to the antecedents of voter perceptions of intra-party conflict. This article addresses this research deficit with the support of empirical evidence gathered over the course of the 2017 Austrian national election campaign. The study examines variations in perceived intra-party conflict over time, both across parties and within the same party. We find that although voter perceptions largely mirror actual distinctions in intra-party fighting, conspicuous individual-level variations can also be identified owing to attention to the election campaign and motivated reasoning in information processing. These results have important consequences for our understanding of voter perceptions of intra-party conflict and the role of election campaigns, with potential implications for party strategies during election campaigns.

Despite scientific consensus regarding the dangers of SARS-CoV-2 as well as the safety and effectiveness of available vaccinations, public response to the COVID-19 pandemic has become increasingly politicised. We argue that the debate surrounding COVID-19 vaccines provided the basis for identity-based affective polarization, with positive social identities and negative out-group stereotyping developing around support or opposition to the vaccines. This study uses panel survey data to investigate the nature, origins, and consequences of COVID-19 vaccination-related affective polarization in Austria. The results show that vaccination identities are clearly identifiable and are related to extensive stereotyping of in- and out-group members. Moreover, vaccination identities are more strongly related to political orientations than the decision to get vaccinated itself. Importantly, vaccination identities help us understand downstream attitudes, preferences, and behaviours related to the pandemic, even when controlling for other important predictors such as partisanship for anti-vaccine parties and vaccination status.

Political actors play an increasingly important role in the dissemination of political information on social media. However, relatively little is known about the mechanisms why specific news items are shared with the support base instead of others. For a timespan between December 2017 and the end of 2018, we combine the analysis of Facebook content from 1,022 politicians associated with 20 political parties from Germany, Spain, and the UK, with an automated content analysis of media coverage from 22 major online news outlets, and survey data in a multilevel binomial regression approach. By comparing news items that have been shared by one or several political parties with news items that have not been shared by any of them, we overcome the selection biases of previous studies in the field of news dissemination. Findings show that a news item's likelihood to be shared by a politician increases (1) if that politician's party is mentioned in the news item, (2) the more salient their party's owned issues are in the news item, and (3) the more party supporters tend to read the news outlet in which the news item is published. We contextualize these findings in light of political actors’ multi-faceted motivations for news sharing on social media and discuss how this process potentially reinforces an information bias that may contribute to the polarization and fragmentation of audiences.

We investigate user engagement with politicians’ migration discourses on social media. In particular, we study the effects of message framing and support base attitudes on interactions on Facebook and Twitter in five European countries. Enriching automated analysis of social media content with survey data in a multilevel negative binomial regression approach, findings show that migration-related messages tend to elicit more interactions than other kinds of messages. Furthermore, the presence of a security frame in a migration-related message positively relates to user engagement. However, additional analyses suggest that the relevance of these frames differ between different political parties. In fact, a message gets an even higher number of interactions, when the dimension of the migration issue included in those framed messages is perceived more negatively by a party’s support base. The findings have important implications for communication strategies of political actors and the state of migration discourses on social media.

In the context of decreasing media trust as well as the rise of populist movements in many Western Democracies, this study sets out to revisit the relationship between political preferences and perceived media bias. It investigates perceived bias of the entire media system, the perceived bias of individual outlets as well as perceived beneficiaries of this favorable coverage. Analyses are based on an online survey in Austria in 2015 (n ~ 1,679) and compare citizens’ perceived biases towards eight newspapers and television outlets. Results show that media system bias in Austria is strongly related to right-wing but not to left-wing extremism. Furthermore, there are not only differences between single outlets but also between media genres, as particularly tabloids are less afflicted by right-wing perceptions of bias. Finally, there is evidence of hostile media perceptions irrespective of actual media exposure.

To date, Austria is among the countries with the lowest coronavirus vaccination rates in Western Europe. It has announced the introduction of a general vaccine mandate but is experiencing an increasing societal polarization over this issue. We, therefore, aimed to provide evidence on the underlying motivations of vaccine hesitancy and evaluate what kinds of interventions - information, incentives, and rules - might increase vaccination readiness.We conducted a cross-sectional survey with a sample of 1,543 unvaccinated Austrian residents in October 2021, including two embedded conjoint experiments.We screened 8,190 individuals to recruit the sample matching the Austrian micro-census. In experiment 1, easing rather than tightening of societal restrictions, a fixed monetary reward compared to a lottery and physicians' recommendations were associated with significantly higher intentions to get vaccinated. In experiment 2, standard approval by European or national authorities and simple information had a significant positive effect on vaccination propensity. Among the unvaccinated, fear of side effects, beliefs that comorbidities or the desire to have children would not allow vaccination, the assumption that the own immune system would provide sufficient protection, conspirational thinking (e.g., the refusal to participate in a 'large genetic experiment'), low trust in societal institutions, and spiritual beliefs were very common.While many unvaccinated showed a low propensity to become vaccinated, we identified a cluster of 195 (23% of the participants without missing values) that could potentially be reached by information and incentives, including people with heightened comorbidity rates or a desire for children.Vienna Science and Technology Fund.

In communication research, topic modeling is primarily used for discovering systematic patterns in monolingual text corpora. To advance the usage, we provide an overview of recently presented strat...

Supplemental Material, sj-pdf-1-ppq-10.1177_1354068819827513 for ‘Not my government!’ The role of norms and populist attitudes on voter preferences for government formation after the election by Carolina Plescia and Jakob-Moritz Eberl in Party Politics

Die Nationalratswahl 2017 endete in einem Rechtsruck der osterreichischen Politik: Die Neue Volkspartei unter Sebastian Kurz und die rechtspopulistische FPO gewannen, wahrend die Sozialdemokraten sich nur durch das noch desolatere Abschneiden der Grunen in Folge der Abspaltung der Liste Pilz stabilisieren konnten. Nach der Wahl begaben sich Journalisten und politische Beobachter auf Ursachensuche fur das relativ schwache Abschneiden des linken Lagers. Eine besondere Rolle spielte dabei die Frage, inwiefern die Enthullungen um den fur Negativkampagnen bekannten Politikberater Tal Silberstein in der Schlussphase des Wahlkampfs der SPO und ihrem Spitzenkandidaten Christian Kern geschadet haben konnten. Oder war der Wahlsieg der rechten Parteien doch vorrangig der sogenannten europaischen Fluchtlingskrise und dem damit einhergehenden Bedeutungsgewinn des Immigrationsthemas geschuldet? Vor diesem Hintergrund untersucht der vorliegende Beitrag, in welchem Ausmas das Wahlergebnis der Nationalratswahl durch lang- und kurzfristige Entwicklungen gepragt war. Zu diesem Zweck verwenden wir Daten der AUTNES Online Panel Study 2017 sowie Inhaltsanalyse-Daten der Presseberichterstattung wahrend des Wahlkampfs. Die Analysen werden zeigen, inwiefern das Ergebnis der Nationalratswahl durch langfristige Trends sowie das Wahlkampfgeschehen gepragt war. Insgesamt bietet der Beitrag einen Uberblick zur Nationalratswahl 2017 und tragt zur Debatte uber die Rolle von Lang- und Kurzfristdeterminanten des Wahlens bei.

Forschungsdesigns erfordern Flexibilität. Wichtig ist aber, dass Anpassungen nicht immer ausschließlich mit Nachteilen verbunden sein müssen. In dieser Forschungsnotiz möchten wir unsere Überlegungen zu den Auswirkungen von COVID-19 auf die Durchführung von qualitativen Interviews mit irregulären Migrant*innen veranschaulichen. Die Ausführungen wurden in Anlehnung an eines unserer eigenen Projekte entwickelt, bei dem sich die Feldarbeit derzeit in der Planungsphase befindet. Aufgrund ihrer möglichen Relevanz für ähnliche Projekte möchten wir unsere methodischen Überlegungen teilen. Wir liefern Anmerkungen zur aktuellen Situation irregulärer Migrant*innen in verschiedenen (europäischen) Ländern sowie eine Einschätzung der methodischen Durchführbarkeit von qualitativen Face-to-Face-Interviews mit irregulären Migrant*innen und möglicher Alternativen zu dieser Methode (insbesondere verschiedener Formen von Ferninterviews). Abschließend kommen wir auf unsere Entscheidung zu sprechen, mit einem Mixed-Mode-Ansatz zu arbeiten, der es uns erlaubt, verschiedene Fernbefragungsmodi zu nutzen, und damit die nötige Flexibilität zur Anpassung an den Verlauf derartiger gesundheitlicher und gesellschaftlicher Krisen bietet., Research designs require flexibility, and adjustments made to the designs do not always have to lead exclusively to disadvantages. In this research note, we would like to share our reflections on the impact of COVID-19 on the conduct of qualitative interviews with irregular migrants. Since these considerations were developed in close connection with one of our own projects, in which fieldwork is currently in the planning phase, we believe they may be relevant to similar projects. We include a brief remark on the current situation of irregular migrants in different (European) countries, as well as an assessment of the methodological feasibility of qualitative face-to-face interviews with irregular migrants and possible alternatives to this method such as remote and online interview formats. We conclude with insights on our recommendation to rely on a mixed-mode approach, which allows us to use various remote interview modes, thus providing the necessary flexibility to adapt to profound health and social crises such as COVID-19.

Since 1970 televised debates have been a continuous feature of Austrian parliamentary election campaigns. Understood as Chancellor’s debates until the 1990s, an increasing number of parties and television channels led to a growth in the number of debates and formats. The 2019 election witnessed a historic peak of 43 one-on-one and group debates on seven television channels. While broadcasters regularly update their formats to adjust to the increasing number of debates, not all candidates keep up anymore and send substitutes or even skip individual shows. Viewership, however, remains high and mostly stable. In addition to a historical overview, this chapter explores the significance of debates for Austrian elections, elaborates on candidates’ attention-grabbing strategies such as the use of placards and the exchange of presents, and discusses why the synergies of social media are specific to commercial broadcasters. A short overview of other arrangements providing voters with televised debates, as well as closely related formats, leads us to ask the question of whether Austria may have reached peak television debate.

During recent years, worries about fake news have been a salient aspect of mediated debates. However, the ubiquitous and fuzzy usage of the term in news reporting has led more and more scholars and other public actors to call for its abandonment in public discourse altogether. Given this status as a controversial but arguably effective buzzword in news coverage, we know surprisingly little about exactly how journalists use the term in their reporting. By means of a quantitative content analysis, this study offers empirical evidence on this question. Using the case of Austria, where discussions around fake news have been ubiquitous during recent years, we analyzed all news articles mentioning the term “fake news” in major daily newspapers between 2015 and 2018 (N = 2,967). We find that journalistic reporting on fake news shifts over time from mainly describing the threat of disinformation online, to a more normalized and broad usage of the term in relation to attacks on legacy news media. Furthermore, news reports increasingly use the term in contexts completely unrelated to disinformation or media attacks. In using the term this way, journalists arguably contribute not only to term salience but also to a questionable normalization process.

With the explosive growth in research topics, communication science is said to be more fragmented and hyper-specialized than ever before, producing an increasing number of small, niche research topics that lack intellectual coherence as a whole. While such issues have been a central concern for the field, there has been a relative lack of systematic effort to map the topical interconnections among different communication science subfields, answering the question of how they remain empirically fragmented. Using full-texts of scholarly articles published in the top 20 communication science journals from 2010 to 2019, we provide systematic evidence to such claims in terms of their actual contents and their connectivity patterns. Drawing on extant works concerning the sociology of science and structures of scientific knowledge, as well as on topic modeling and simulation-based inferences on network topological features, we find that subdisciplinary linkage in communication is more frequent than we often think.

We investigate the effects of sentiment and issue salience on emotionally labeled responses to posts from political actors on Facebook (i.e., Reactions). We use an automated content analysis of Fac...

Past research has shown that media coverage during election campaigns influences citizen preferences and expectations about parties and political candidates. Very little is known, however, about the effect of media coverage on post-electoral coalition preferences and expectations. This is surprising, given that speculations about post-electoral coalition building are an essential part of election campaigns in all multiparty systems. This paper investigates the consequences that coalitions' media saliency and tone have on voter preferences and expectations about these potential coalitions. Using media and panel data from the 2013 German and Austrian election campaigns, we find that media coverage has substantial effects on voter perceptions although the effects differ in strength between the two countries. These findings have important implications for our understanding of media effects, voter expectations and campaign strategies.

Media coverage can influence how citizens think about their political leaders. This study explores how three types of media bias (visibility bias, tonality bias, and agenda bias) affect voter assessments of politicians’ traits. Bias effects should be stronger for political traits (such as competence) than for nonpolitical traits (such as likability). Biases may also interact in their effects: Specifically, visibility bias should moderate the impact of tonality bias. Combining media, party, and survey data through manual content analysis of newspaper coverage ( N = 2,680) and party press releases ( N = 1,794), as well as a three-wave voter survey ( n = 927) during the 2013 Austrian election campaign, we find substantial effects of tonality bias and agenda bias on political trait perceptions. The effects are less clear for nonpolitical trait perceptions. Although visibility bias has no direct impact, there is evidence that it moderates effects of tonality bias on candidate perceptions.

Journalists increasingly fear that their work may be influenced by advertisers’ interests. While studies have found that commercial advertisers exert pressure on news producers, equivalent research on political advertising is scarce. Using a rigorous methodological approach, we investigate whether party advertising led to three different forms of media bias in newspaper coverage of the Austrian general election in 2013. We combine data on party newspaper advertising (N≈1300), party press releases (N≈1900) and coverage in seven newspapers (N≈4200). There are no statistically significant effects of party advertising on media bias, though there is indicative evidence of differences between media genres. Our findings advance the study of advertiser pressure in the field of political journalism and political communication and clarify a heated public debate.

Supporting_Material_RandR2 for ‘Not my government!’ The role of norms and populist attitudes on voter preferences for government formation after the election by Carolina Plescia, and Jakob-Moritz Eberl in Party Politics

Migration has been dominating media and political discourses in Europe in recent years. Previous studies have mainly mapped migration discourses in traditional media or conventional channels of par...

The complexity and duration of the so-called ‘European refugee crisis’ created a climate of uncertainty, which left ample room for mass media to shape citizens’ understanding of what the arrival of these refugees meant for their respective country. This study analyses the national media discourses in Hungary, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Spain for this time period. Applying Latent Dirichlet Allocation topic modelling in five languages and based on N = 130,042 articles from 24 news outlets, we reveal country-specific media frames to track the overall course of the refugee debate and to uncover dynamics and shifts in discourses. While results show similarities across countries, due to media coverage responding to real-world developments, there are differences in media framing as well. Possible sources of these differences such as countries’ geographic location or status as receiving country are discussed.

Motivated partly by descriptive representation concerns, political scientists have become increasingly interested in voters' preferences over the social class of their representatives. Whereas existing research focuses mainly on preferences concerning politicians' own immediate class markers, we argue that voters may also care about politician class roots - the social class of the household in which a politician grew up. Drawing on conjoint experiments fielded in Austria, Germany, and Britain, we show that in the latter two cases voters do care about class roots, displaying an average preference for politicians with more humble class roots. In follow-up experiments testing different explanations for this preference we find little evidence that voters treat humble roots as a signal of social mobility and therefore politician quality. Rather, preferences over class roots appear to be driven by class affinity biases. Our findings have implications for debates concerning the descriptive underrepresentation of the working classes.

To understand public opinion about immigration in Europe, one has to understand the media’s role in it. We present a literature review on research on media discourse on immigration and their effects. Despite differences in the way immigration and migrant groups are represented in European media, we can observe common patterns. Migrants are generally under-represented and shown as delinquents or criminals. Although, media framing differs based on specific migrant groups the discourse is focusing on, immigration coverage is often negative and conflict-centred. Frequent exposure to such media messages leads to negative attitudes towards migration, may activate stereotypical cognitions of migrant groups, and even influence vote choice. In addition to discussing these issues in depth, the present review also focuses on comparative findings.

The abstract is available here: https://uscholar.univie.ac.at/o:1074891