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Cloud Research (N = 320) participants read a hypothetical description of an arson and police investigation. They were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions in a 2 (presence of alibi evidence) X 2 (presence of prosecution evidence) X 2 (presence of judicial alibi instructions) between-participants design. They completed alibi believability ratings, chose a verdict and evaluated the defendant’s character. Alibis were more believable in the absence of incriminating prosecution evidence and the presence of exonerating alibi evidence. Alibi evidence also led to more positive views of the defendant. The presence of judicial instructions decreased likelihood of guilt ratings. Most participants chose a not guilty verdict, yet guilty verdicts were more common when prosecution evidence was present. Scalar verdict-confidence ratings were higher when prosecution evidence was present and alibi evidence was absent. While participant recall on the judge’s instructions were poor, they performed well on two recognition questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two studies examined the effectiveness of the Unconscious Bias Juror (UBJ) video and instructions at reducing racial bias in Black and White mock-jurors' decisions, perceptions, and counterfactual endorsement in a murder (Study 1; N = 554) and battery (Study 2; N = 539) trial. Participants viewed the UBJ video or not, then read pretrial instructions (general or UBJ), a trial summary, and posttrial instructions (general or UBJ). In Study 1, juror race moderated the effect of defendant race on verdicts, culpability, and credibility. White, but not Black, jurors demonstrated greater leniency toward Black defendants for verdicts, culpability, and credibility. The UBJ video moderated the effect of defendant race on murder counterfactual endorsement. Only when the video was absent was jurors' counterfactual endorsement higher for the White versus Black defendant, which mediated the effect of defendant race on White jurors' verdicts. In Study 2, White jurors were more lenient regardless of defendant race. Instructions and juror race moderated the video's effect on credibility ratings. The video only influenced Black jurors' credibility ratings. In conclusion, the debiasing interventions were ineffective in reducing racial bias in jurors' verdicts. However, they do impact aspects of juror attribution and may be effective with modification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyzes judges' preliminary jury instruction in nine US federal civil trials. Following an overview of past and current jury instructing practices, including the role of pattern instructions, I describe the trial materials and introduce genre analysis and grounded practical theory, the two theoretical-methodological frames I use to analyze judges' instructing. Judges' preliminary instructions are shown to include the basic units identified in written pattern instructions. How they are performed reveals significant judge variation, and the variations make apparent difficulties built into the law that are backgrounded when solely written texts are studied. Some of these difficulties surface in judges' description of the case and law, in orientation to note-taking, and in discussion of what is evidence and how to assess it. In concluding I argue that conceiving of high-quality jury deliberation as centrally dependent on getting instructions more comprehensible fails to recognize the fundamental judgment task that juries have. Being a good juror involves navigating communication dilemmas. Attending to the judge's preliminary jury instructing, the paper argues, requires jurors honoring multiple principles that may be in tension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explored the role of affect in U.S. potential white jurors' experiences with implicit bias and how affect manifests in their sensemaking of jury instructions. Using interviews with 30 potential jurors from a Midwestern state, we found that implicit bias operates as a linguistic alibi that allows people to talk about racism while evading the accountability and intensity of the term. Further, when engaging in the linguistic proxy of implicit bias, participants use amplifying and tempering orientations to navigate affective intensities. These orientations inform how potential white jurors make sense of implicit bias instructions. We propose a framework to explain how people communicatively navigate intense topics that can serve as referent to engage in other affectively unpredictable terrains.. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the case of R v Smith, where the appellant and another man were convicted for joint enterprise murder, attempted murder, and possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life. The appeal was based on a reference from the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) under the Criminal Appeal Act 1995. The CCRC raised concerns about the jury directions and the circumstantial nature of the prosecution case, but the court ultimately dismissed the CCRC reference, stating that the jury had not been misled and that the case did not fall under the scope of the Jogee decision. The article also highlights the confusion surrounding the application of Jogee and the court's strict approach to proving substantial injustice in cases involving changes in the law. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses a case in which two appellants, who were 17 years old at the time of the appeal, were convicted of drug offenses and sentenced to Youth Rehabilitation Orders. They argued that they should be able to rely on the statutory defense provided in the Modern Slavery Act 2015, which states that a person under 18 does not commit an offense if they were a victim of slavery or exploitation and a reasonable person in the same situation would have done the same act. The trial judge incorrectly instructed the jury that compulsion needed to be established for the defense to apply. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals and quashed the convictions, stating that the defense does not require compulsion. The article highlights the importance of correctly explaining the elements of the defense to the jury and suggests that closer attention should be paid to the wording of the statute and guidance provided. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses the state of Idaho Jury Instructions, emphasizing the importance of practitioners confirming the validity of instructions before use. It focuses on the challenges posed by outdated instructions and the call for a more comprehensive update to benefit practitioners and Idaho's trial courts. It also addresses the need for additional instructions, especially in areas like employment law.

This document is a transcript of a symposium presentation by attorney Ibiere Seck and Judge Kevin Brazile. Seck discusses the importance of telling the stories of those who have suffered human harms and losses, while also considering the personal experiences and biases of jurors. Judge Brazile emphasizes the value of learning from both wins and losses as a trial lawyer and encourages future lawyers to gain real experience in trying cases. The document provides tips on jury selection and trial preparation, including the use of jury questionnaires, mini openings, effective voir dire, jury consultants, and engaging presentation techniques such as PowerPoint, timelines, and video recordings. It concludes by highlighting the significance of preparation and teamwork in achieving success in the courtroom. [Extracted from the article]

Marcus Cicero used the phrase "[m]lore law, less justice" to describe how complex legal schemes interfere with the law's ability to protect people's rights.¹ While the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) went into effect centuries after Cicero's death, its habeas corpus provisions exemplify his principle by turning the writ of habeas corpus into a complex legal instrument that undermines the enforcement of constitutional rights. Indeed, one right that AEDPA has weakened is the very right that Cicero championed: the right to assert self-defense. As this Note will explain, AEDPA's procedural hurdles have forced federal district and circuit courts to sidestep the important question Of whether criminal defendants have a constitutional right to receive a self-defense jury instruction. Instead, AEDPA requires federal courts faced with that question to focus on a subordinate question: whether the United States Supreme Court has clearly established that right. With the detrimental effct of detracting from the constitutional question, courts have struggled to answer even this derivative, procedural question. Specifically, the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits are split about whether a federal court can grant a state petitioner habeas relief on the grounds that a state court's failure to charge the jury with a self-defense instruction violated clearly established law. The Second and Ninth Circuits have said yes, while the Sixth Circuit has said no. On the procedural question, Part II of this Note argues that the Sixth Circuit is correct. Since the Supreme Court has never "clearly established" a constitutional right to a self-defense jury instruction in state court, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief on that basis. But this Note recognizes that the Sixth Circuit's opinion stops short of addressing the primary issue: When, if ever, does a criminal defendant have a federal, constitutional right to a self-defense jury instruction in state court? Part III of this Note analyzes Supreme Court precedent and the original public meaning of the Sixth Amendment to reveal that the Constitution requires state judges to instruct juries on self-defense when: (1) a criminal defendant requests the instruction; and (2) a reasonable jury could find for the defendant on self-defense. This permissive standard requires a self-defense jury instruction in many homicide prosecutions. Part IV of this Note addresses the tension between these two findings. That the constitutional right to a self-defense jury instruction exists in many circumstances but that federal district and circuit courts cannot vindicate that right might seem fundamentally at odds with our country's principles Of justice. As a result, pointing fingers at AEDPA is a common and understandable response. But as this Note highlights, Congress has not rendered the Supreme Court helpless in giving effect to constitutional rights for criminal defendants who are tried in state courts. While it rarely exercises it, the Supreme Court has the power to grant petitions for certiorari in cases that allege violations Of a state criminal defendant's constitutional rights on direct appeal. Ultimately, this Note seeks to highlight the importance of the Supreme Court prioritizing direct, appellate review of criminal convictions that allege constitutional violations--and namely, the right to a self-defense jury instruction. While AEDPA may decrease the chances that federal remedies are available to vindicate a criminal defendant's constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has the power to make sure no fundamental right goes unprotected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In her book The Power of the Jury: Transforming Citizens into Jurors, Professor Nancy Marder describes how the trial process, beginning with the jury summons and ending with a post-verdict meeting with the judge, transforms citizens into jurors and then back into more fully engaged citizens. In each chapter, Marder offers suggestions for making the process more effective so that jurors are better prepared to fulfill their role in the American justice system. In some instances, Marder’s suggestions elevate the transformation from citizens to jurors over the actual task that jurors exist to perform—namely, to use their collective wisdom and community values to decide cases fairly and impartially. Overall, however, The Power of the Jury provides valuable insights into how citizens can be transformed into effective jurors and how this transformation can impact the legal system in the United States and society as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the shortcomings of the recklessness instruction in Idaho, where recklessness is treated as a degree of negligence rather than a separate tort. It is reported that despite being a factor in civil cases damage awards, recklessness lacks clear definition, leading to inconsistencies in jury instructions. It reviews relevant case law and legislative enactments, highlighting the challenges in determining what constitutes recklessness.

The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is a constitutional requirement in U.S. criminal cases, but jury instructions on "reasonable doubt" vary across jurisdictions. We use a controlled experiment to analyze the relationship between the definition of reasonable doubt and juror decisions. In our novel (pre-registered) experiment, we vary the definition of reasonable doubt between subjects and elicit the level of evidence required for subjects to convict a defendant. We analyze juror decisions under two state definitions that are markedly different (Wisconsin and West Virginia) and analyze juror decisions when reasonable doubt is not explicitly defined. We find similar behavior in each treatment. We ran three additional treatments to determine why behavior does not seem to vary across definitions. Our data is consistent with subjects having pre-conceived notions of reasonable doubt that are not affected by jury instructions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

High-profile jury trials have catapulted concerns about jury fairness to the center of public consciousness. The public demands--and deserves--fairness from its juries. Despite the jury's sound performance in most cases, we can do better. The groundwork for the jury's capacity for fairness is laid long before prospective jurors enter the courtroom. It is further shaped by processes that occur during jury selection, throughout the trial, and in the course of jury deliberations. Most of these influences are not immediately visible to the public. In this Article, we provide a comprehensive examination of the phases of the jury trial that are critical to achieving fair juries. We describe how problems at each stage of the jury trial can undermine performance and we propose a set of important empirically-grounded reforms that will strengthen jury selection and trial procedures, optimizing fair juries now and into the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Note will examine the inconsistencies in the treatment of mothers diagnosed with postpartum psychosis who claim the insanity defense in cases of infanticide and/or child abuse. The defense of not guilty by reason of insanity is treated inconsistently throughout the U.S. court system, especially in cases involving a defendant suffering from postpartum psychosis. This Note proposes specific jury instructions for cases involving a defendant diagnosed with postpartum psychosis and introduces a new criminal charge of infanticide so that defendants do not have to rely on proving insanity alone. Key points for the family court community: As many as 50%–75% of new mothers experience a change in their emotions called the "baby blues" after delivery.Approximately two dozen countries have "infanticide laws" that are designed to allow for more lenient penalties in cases where a court determines the postpartum mother suffers from mental illness.Postpartum psychosis is much less common than other postpartum mood disorders—occurring in just 1 or 2 out of every 1000 births—about 3.8 million births were recorded in the United States in 2018.Medical researchers estimate that untreated postpartum psychosis leads to an estimated 4% risk of infanticide, and a 5% risk of suicide.Historically, states have used one of the following tests to determine whether a defendant was legally insane during the commission of a crime: the M'Naughten (Common Law) test, the "irresistible impulse" test, the Durham or "product" test, and the model penal code test. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine a new paradigm for jury instructions regarding eyewitness testimony, in which the judge provides concise reasons why jurors should discount an eyewitness's courtroom confidence and instead focus on the eyewitness's confidence at the time of a police lineup. In Study 1, 1,614 participants ("mock jurors"), representative of the U.S. population, viewed videos of eyewitness testimony and judicial instructions. We found that instructions using the reason-based paradigm reduced guilty votes. Study 2 (N = 2,911) examined whether reason-based instructions sensitized jurors to weak (low initial confidence) versus strong (high initial confidence) eyewitness identifications, and whether the instructions needed to be directive ("You should consider ..."). Jurors who heard the instructive, reason-based instructions better differentiated between more and less reliable eyewitnesses relative to the other instruction conditions. These results suggest that reason-based jury instructions can increase discriminability among laypersons, and that judges should be mindful in phrasing and communicating such instructions. General Audience Summary: Eyewitnesses who are highly confident when they pick someone from a lineup are more likely to be accurate than eyewitnesses who have low confidence in their decisions. However, this confidence-to-accuracy relationship breaks down by the time an eyewitness testifies at trial; that is, an eyewitness's confidence on the stand is not indicative of accuracy. Unfortunately, an eyewitness's confidence can increase over time even though their memory does not get more accurate, a phenomenon known as "confidence inflation." Confidence inflation is a large problem for the criminal legal system, as jurors find highly confident eyewitnesses very persuasive. Indeed, many wrongful convictions happen because an inaccurate eyewitness testified with high confidence at trial. Jury instructions, which are read to the jury at the end of a trial to inform them how they might weigh different pieces of evidence, have largely been unsuccessful in changing how jurors view eyewitness evidence, and have never explained confidence inflation. We draw on psychological research that finds providing an explanation, or reason, is the most effective way to convince people to rely on one piece of information (lineup confidence) over another (courtroom confidence). Thus, we crafted "reason-based instructions" that briefly explain the memorial processes that lead to confidence inflation and emphasize considering lineup confidence over courtroom confidence. In two experiments, we presented a video of an eyewitness giving testimony, a video of a judge giving our novel reason-based instructions or control instructions, and then asked the participants to serve as mock jurors by voting "guilty" or "not guilty." We found reason-based instructions decreased guilty votes, relative to non-reason-based instructions, for weak eyewitness evidence. Additionally, reason-based instructions that directed jurors on how to weigh confidence decreased guilty votes for weak eyewitness evidence, but not strong eyewitness evidence—an ideal instruction for use in the real courtrooms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides a summary of pending cases across various categories such as civil appeals, criminal appeals, and administrative appeals as of April 2024. It outlines the key legal issues and questions at stake in each case, ranging from matters of arbitration, divorce, and guardianship to issues concerning double jeopardy, evidence, and jury instructions in criminal cases.

Luke sets up Jesus as an example of spirituality in Luke-Acts. In Luke, Jesus does not simply tell his disciples to adopt spiritual practices; he models them, inviting readers to imitate him as well. The first century world was familiar with the power of example. Leaders in Luke's literary world were often idealized because they taught or legislated not just through words, but through the virtuous example of their lives. In the Gospel of Luke, Jesus invites his followers to follow him on the pathway to prayer and simplicity in a similar manner. Like the Lukan Jesus, Numa and Lycurgus, Plutarch's legendary kings, legislate piety and simplicity through their own lifestyles during their lifetimes. Plutarch devotes significant attention to the issue of their influence after their deaths. Luke's authorial audience also might have wondered how the powerful effect of Jesus' exemplary instruction might be sustained after his crucifixion and ascension. In Acts, we see that Jesus' followers have internalized his instruction and example of prayer and simplicity through the power of the Holy Spirit, adopting Jesus' spiritual patterns as their own. Early receptions of Lukan texts on prayer and simplicity in Luke-Acts show that the early church continues to follow this practice, looking to Jesus as a model of spirituality for their own lives and the lives of their communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the oldest myths to confound the achievement of justice for victims of sexual violence is that 'genuine' rape victims complain immediately, loudly and officially. Dismantling this myth—or at least banishing it from the court room—has been a high priority of the modern era of rape/sexual assault law reform. How successful has this attempt been? This article reports on the initial findings of a transcript analysis study of more than 30 rape trials finalised in the County Court of Victoria between 2013 and 2020. We discuss the multiple variations on 'delay' that continue to feature prominently in the cross-examination of complainants in rape trials. We also examine the operation of s 52 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) which provides for a mandatory direction if, at any point during the trial, the judge considers that there is evidence suggestive of delay. Ostensibly one of the strongest corrective mechanisms currently operating in sexual offence trials in Australia, we discuss the unevenness of s 52's operation, and consider the implications for reliance on jury directions more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Simpler and safer" as it was put, to leave the case on the prosecution's basis of case, that B wielded the knife encouraged by Khan and if the jury did not so find, then acquittals would follow. Keywords: Prosecution burden; proof of case; summing up alternate verdicts EN Prosecution burden proof of case summing up alternate verdicts 492 495 4 12/06/22 20221201 NES 221201 On 21 July 2022 the Court of Appeal (Crim. (At [88]) In I Coutts i , as in I Khan i , the prosecution had firmly resisted the judge leaving manslaughter on the basis that this would leave the case to the jury on a basis wholly different to that opened and contended for by the prosecution. He argued that the judge was correct and that the case must be left so as to allow the jury to depart the prosecution case but still convict Khan. [Extracted from the article]

The case study discusses the appeal of R v Gill, who was convicted of wounding with intent during a police raid at his home. The appellant claimed self-defense, stating he believed the officers entering were involved in criminal activity. The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's directions to the jury were contrary to law and ordered a re-trial, emphasizing the importance of considering the defendant's subjective belief in assessing reasonable force. The case highlights the distinction between householder and non-householder defenses under the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. [Extracted from the article]

Previous research has demonstrated that judicial instructions are not well understood by jurors tasked with returning informative verdicts, and explanatory strategies can facilitate juror's comprehension of law-related contents. Unlike a great deal of research on legal-lay interactions in a jury trial, most of which is based on English-language materials, the present article uncovers how Russian judges communicate law-related information to the jury. The study was motivated by the lack of guidance on interactions with the jury and the challenges faced by the latter in attempting to understand technical concepts. Through quantitative and qualitative analyses of 18 jury instructions, the paper demonstrates that Russian judges work toward the achievement of a goal of recontextualizing law-related information and making legal concepts comprehensible to a lay audience using a wide repertoire of popularization tools, including definitions, descriptions, illustrations, paraphrases and metaphors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Opening the Door to Vindication: Reviewing the Evidential Bases for the "Householder Defence": R v Magson [2022] EWCA Crim 1064 Keywords: Householder defence; self-defence; murder; summing up; evidential basis; householder; trespasser EN Householder defence self-defence murder summing up evidential basis householder trespasser 372 376 5 10/12/22 20221001 NES 221001 Section 76 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act (CJIA) 2008, as amended by s 43 Crime and Courts Act 2013, introduced the so-called "householder case" into our domestic law. Lord Burnett CJ at [23] does make reference to the fact that the householder defence was not raised by the defence or trial judges: That, no doubt, explains why the point did not occur to two separate experienced and skilled criminal defence teams nor to two experienced trial judges. [Extracted from the article]

Forensic science is routinely used in the service of the United States' criminal legal system. In such cases, lawyers, judges, and jurors each have distinct competencies. Trial judges must determine the admissibility of expert evidence and deliver jury instructions; lawyers must select, present, and challenge the evidence; and jurors must determine the weight of the evidence. As they discharge these competencies, each agent might need to engage with the often unfamiliar methods introduced and discussed by a forensic science expert. These activities represent an intersection between law and science--two culturally divergent disciplines--where it is recognized science literacy--"the disposition and knowledge needed to engage with science"--for legal professionals and jurors is important to serving justice. There are limitations, however, in the current provision for supporting legal professionals to develop their science literacy, which is foundational to optimizing the carrying out of juror competencies. Despite this, the criminal legal system is organized in such a way as to routinely defer to the decision-making competencies of lawyers, judges, and jurors. Through a content analysis of case law referencing the National Academy of Sciences' (NAS) forensic science report portfolio in criminal proceedings--which is positioned as a case study--this paper demonstrates how this systemic practice--driven by the legal system's fidelity to factors associated with the legal process vision--should motivate stakeholders to prioritize delivery of a meaningful science literacy provision for lawyers. Part I broadly outlines the roles of lawyers, judges, and jurors in criminal legal proceedings involving forensic science evidence, explaining this interaction as an intersection of law and science. Part II describes our research design, including the rationale for selecting case law referencing the NAS' forensic science report portfolio as a case study. Part III presents our findings in three thematic areas: (1) deference to lawyers' strategic decisions, particularly in the context of cross-examination; (2) deference to the gatekeeping function of trial judges and the role of precedent; and (3) deference to the jury's fact-finding role. It concludes that these findings, coupled with the reality that an institutional overhaul is unlikely, should focus minds on supporting--as a priority--lawyers to develop their science literacy, and that conceptualizing 'science literacy' for lawyers is a necessary step in moving towards that goal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research into juror perceptions regarding the impact of intoxication on eyewitness memory and credibility is scarce for substances other than alcohol. However, jurors are frequently told to draw on their personal beliefs and experience with intoxicating substances to infer their impact on the case. It is therefore important to investigate laypeople's perceptions regarding witness and victim intoxication across a range of substances, and whether these perceptions are associated with substance familiarity. Participants (n = 470) completed a survey assessing familiarity and use of different substances, as well as perceptions regarding effects on the memory and credibility of intoxicated victims and witnesses. While participants most frequently reported believing that alcohol, hallucinogens, and polysubstance use of alcohol and cannabis have large negative effects on memory, they more frequently reported that they do not know the extent to which cannabis and cocaine affect memory. In addition, attitudes were found to vary based on substance familiarity. Differences with respect to the perceived impact on memory and credibility of various substances can have relevance to court proceedings, particularly in terms of voir dire procedures, jury instructions, and whether an expert witness is required to educate the court on the impacts of different forms of intoxication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

False confessions are a leading cause of wrongful convictions in the American legal system. Jury instructions have been identified as an effective judicial safeguard in an effort to prevent wrongful convictions and allow jurors to better comprehend confession evidence in the courtroom. The purpose of this study was to determine whether the modification of standard jury instructions would influence juror verdicts, confession identifications, and overall juror decision-making. It was hypothesized that participants given modified jury instructions would have the highest correct verdict determinations and confession recognitions with both the coerced and voluntary trial transcripts. Participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk, and they were randomly assigned into an experimental group. Participants read a trial transcript and completed a questionnaire. Descriptive statistics were calculated, and logistic regression tests determined statistical significance. The use of modified instructions displayed a statistically significant effect on both verdict determinations and confession identifications, Wald Χ² (4, N=180) =6.786, p<0.05 and Wald Χ² (4, N=180) =6.749, p<0.05, respectively. The interaction effects between modified instructions and the coerced confession transcript were also shown to be statistically significant. The results demonstrated that participants who were given modified jury instructions had the highest percentages of correct verdict determinations and confession recognitions compared to participants who were given standard instructions or no instructions. Participants given modified instructions were also more aware of factors such as interrogation coercion. Further research should be conducted to maximize the potential of jury instructions and other safeguards in a criminal trial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The federal courts' current approach to character evidence is widely recognized as problematic. Although Rule 404(b)(1) categorically prohibits the use of character evidence, Rule 404(b)(2) presents a list of examples of permitted purposes that has tempted courts to view the admission of other-acts evidence as proper so long as the evidence is merely relevant to a non-character purpose. Additionally, courts have misconstrued the inclusive structure of Rule 404(b) as creating a presumption in favor of admissibility. Recent efforts to correct this mistakenly permissive view include decisions by several of the federal circuit courts of appeals recognizing that Rule 404(b) requires a more careful approach, as well as a revision to Rule 404(b) itself. Despite these efforts, some federal circuit court opinions continue to mistakenly regard Rule 404(b) as nothing more than a minor impediment to the admission of other-acts evidence--a speed bump rather than a roadblock. The recent opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case United States v. Lague is an unfortunate example of this approach. This opinion makes both of the typical Rule 404(b) mistakes--it allows mere relevance to a non-character purpose to substitute for careful analysis, and it uses the rule's inclusive structure to justify the lack of careful analysis. Additionally, the published opinion contributes to a disagreement among several of the federal circuit courts of appeals regarding the admissibility of practice-wide data in prosecutions for unlawfully prescribing controlled substances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the other hand, finding D2 and D3 guilty of manslaughter means the jury was satisfied that D2 and D3 were involved in an unlawful act, but was unsure as to whether they had the intent to cause at least grievous bodily harm. D1 was unanimously convicted of murder (Count 1); D2 and D3 were acquitted of murder but unanimously convicted of the alternative count of manslaughter. Keywords: Joint enterprise; basic joint enterprise; accessorial liability; secondary liability; Hong Kong EN Joint enterprise basic joint enterprise accessorial liability secondary liability Hong Kong 156 158 3 05/09/23 20230401 NES 230401 In I HKSAR v Tsang Cheung Yan i [2022] 1 HKLRD 167, three defendants (D1-D3) were jointly charged with murder (Count 1) before a jury, to which they all pleaded not guilty. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses rule changes ordered by the Supreme Court of Missouri as of March 2023. Topics explored include the repeal of a subdivision of Rule 24 which involves arraignment and proceedings before trial of misdemeanors or felonies, the revision of Missouri Approved Jury Instructions (MAI), and the correction made to a rule concerning public access to judicial department records.

Keywords: insanity; M'Naghten; choice; delusions; wrongdoing; morality EN insanity M'Naghten choice delusions wrongdoing morality 130 133 4 05/19/22 20220401 NES 220401 The M'Naghten Rules have governed the law's approach to the question of a defendant's insanity at trial since the mid nineteenth century. In conclusion, Lord Burnett CJ took the view that the jury were correctly directed; the issue of whether the defendant knew that his conduct was "wrong" was a matter for them, and they were satisfied that the defendant did know that what he was doing was wrong. [Extracted from the article]

We present the first analysis of the effect of grade retention on adult criminal convictions, exploiting test cutoffs for ninth-grade promotion in Louisiana. Eighth-grade retention increases the likelihood of violent crime conviction by 1.05 percentage points (58.44%) and increases the number of violent crime convictions at first conviction. The effects are likely driven by declines in high school peer quality and reduced educational investments that result in lower noncognitive skill acquisition. Extrapolating effects away from the cutoff shows that our results are generalizable to a larger group of low-performing students and are evident for both property and drug crimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The Effectiveness of Dhikr and Prayer Guidance on Peace of Mind and Blood Pressure Control. WHO data (2015) indicate the 1.13 billion people worldwide with hypertension. The purpose of this study is to know the effectiveness of dhikr and prayer guidance on peace of mind and blood pressure control in the elderly with hypertension. Methods: The research design was a quasi-experiment with a pretest-posttest approach. The samples are 24 respondents. Results: The results showed that the pvalue0.036 <0.05 means no significant effect on the peace of mind of the elderly with hypertension in the intervention group who given dhikr and prayer guidance. Pre and post blood pressure tests in the intervention group obtained pvalue0.000 <0.05, which means that there is an effect of the intervention group variable (systole) on blood pressure. Conclusion: Dhikr and prayer instructions can be a complementary therapy in overcoming mental calm and blood pressure in the elderly with hypertension. We hope that the results of this study can be used as a reference material in providing therapy to patients with hypertension in order to help lower blood pressure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court has gone to great lengths to prevent jurors from holding defendants’ silence against them. In a trilogy of opinions, the Court concluded that when a defendant refrains from testifying, (1) the prosecutor and judge cannot make adverse comments about that decision; (2) the judge can give a “no adverse inference” instruction even over a defense objection; and (3) the judge must give a “no adverse inference” instruction upon a defense request. Conversely, the Court has never ruled that jurors can impeach their verdict based upon jurors holding a defendant’s silence against him, and lower courts have ruled against recognizing such a right to jury impeachment. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of juror racial bias in reverse. In 2017, the Court ruled in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado that jurors must be allowed to impeach their verdict based on jurors holding a defendant’s race against him. But the Court has never held that there is a right to an implicit bias jury instruction, and no lower court has ever recognized such a right. In Pena-Rodriguez, however, the Supreme Court recognized that the right to an impartial jury not only addresses “unique historical, constitutional, and institutional concerns,” but also requires “[a] constitutional rule.” Specifically, the Pena-Rodriguez Court concluded that “[a] constitutional rule that racial bias in the justice system must be addressed—including, in some instances, after the verdict has been entered—is necessary to prevent a systemic loss of confidence in jury verdicts, a confidence that is a central premise of the Sixth Amendment trial right.” This Article contends that this rule must go further and address juror racial bias on both the back end and the front end. For the same reasons that the Supreme Court created the right to a jury instruction that jurors must not hold a defendant’s silence against him, it should recognize the constitutional right to a jury instruction that jurors must not hold a defendant’s race against him. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court created the Allen Charge in its 1896 ruling Allen v. United States as American Bar Association (ABA) hoped to remedy these concerns upon release of its model jury instructions in 1968. It mentions ABA's model Allen Charge instruction and the implementation of the instruction into state practice. It also mentions court ruled that the presiding judge properly instructed the jurors in the minority.

A causation requirement would absolve an accessory of liability if the offence would have been committed with or without his assistance or encouragement, and this is, rightly or wrongly, plainly not the law, as the Supreme Court confirmed in I Jogee i . An accessory might intend, rather than merely foresee, the infliction of serious harm by way of a knife or a baseball bat, and might, rightly, be convicted of being an accessory to murder if that harm results in death. On one view OSA is an emaciated remoteness principle: mere lack of foreseeability will not do, what is required is a radical fissure between the accessory's involvement and the ensuing offence. [Extracted from the article]