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The minority question has long been a hot topic in Central and Eastern Europe. Whereas most CEE countries guarantee the privileged position of the dominant nation, they also recognize the existence of national minorities and provide special rights for them. Hence there is an apparent contradiction between the values of the nation-states: unity and diversity. This article proposes that to resolve this contradiction, it is necessary to define the concept, scope and limitations of group-specific minority rights, as well as their relationship with other human rights and the nation-state. Constitutional courts are appropriate candidates for this task. However, based on our analysis of the relevant constitutional jurisprudence of five CEE countries – Croatia, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia – it seems that constitutional courts in the region have failed to properly conceptualize minority rights. Instead of developing appropriate tests for assessing the constitutionality of legal regulations, they have only superficially touched upon the conceptual issues of minority rights, using incidental, case-by-case arguments to justify the (un)constitutionality of the legal provisions. Therefore, this article also attempts to outline a constitutionality test that may be suitable for constitutional courts to consistently evaluate submissions that challenge the constitutionality of laws on minority rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: Dental and mucosal injuries from laryngoscopy in the peri-operative period are common medico-legal complaints. This study investigated lawsuits arising from laryngoscopy. Methods: Westlaw, a legal database containing trial records from across the USA, was retrospectively reviewed. Plaintiff and/or defendant characteristics, claimed injuries, legal outcomes and awards were extracted. Results: Of all laryngoscopy-related dental or mucosal injuries brought before a state or federal court, none (0 per cent) resulted in a defence verdict against the provider or monetary gain for the patient. Rulings in the patient's favour were observed only when laryngoscopy was found to be the proximate cause of multiple compounding complications that culminated in severe medical outcomes such as exsanguination, septic shock or cardiopulmonary arrest. Conclusion: Proper laryngoscopy technique and a robust informed-consent process that accurately sets patients' expectations reduces litigation risk. Future litigation pursuits should consider the low likelihood of malpractice allegation success at trial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the domain of legal analysis and its methodologies, emphasising the significance of generalisation in legal systems. It discusses the process of generalisation in relation to legal concepts and the development of ideal concepts that form the foundation of law. The article examines the role of logical induction and its similarities with semantic generalisation, highlighting their importance in legal decision-making. It also critiques the formal-deductive approach in legal practice and advocates for more adaptable models, incorporating fuzzy logic, non-monotonic defeasible reasoning, and artificial intelligence. The potential application of neural networks, specifically deep learning algorithms, in legal theory is also discussed. The article discusses how neural networks encode legal knowledge in their synaptic connections, while the syllogistic model condenses legal information into axioms. The article also highlights how neural networks assimilate novel experiences and exhibit evolutionary progression, unlike the deductive model of law. Additionally, the article examines the historical and theoretical foundations of jurisprudence that align with the basic principles of neural networks. It delves into the statistical analysis of legal phenomena and theories that view legal development as an evolutionary process. The article then explores Friedrich Hayek's theory of law as an autonomous self-organising system and its compatibility with neural network models. It concludes by discussing the implications of Hayek's theory on the role of a lawyer and the precision of neural networks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Classical logic is based on an underlying view of the world, according to which there are elementary facts and compound facts, which are logical combinations of these elementary facts. Sentences are true if they correspond to, in last instance, the elementary facts in the world. This world view has no place for rules, which exist as individuals in the world, and which create relations between the most elementary facts. As a result, classical logic is not suitable to deal with rules, and is therefore unsuitable to deal with legal reasoning. A logic that is more suitable should take into account that law is a part of social reality, in particular a part that consists of constructivist facts, and that rules play a central role in law. This article gives a superficial description of how social reality exists and of the place of law and legal rules in it. It uses this description to argue that traditional techniques to reason with and about legal rules provide a better logic for law than classical logic. These techniques can be accommodated in a logic that treats rules as logical individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Die Unternehmensbesteuerung (Ubg) is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses the jurisprudence of transcendentalism in Antebellum America by examining the works of transcendentalists like Henry David Thoreau, George Ripley, and Theodore Parker. Other topics include the jurisprudence's negativity regarding law and legal institutions, the transcendentalists' anger about slavery and Fugitive Slave Law, and the importance of local ordinances and state statutes during the period.

Copyright of FinanzRundschau is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This interdisciplinary study, coupling philosophy of law with empirical cognitive science, presents preliminary insight into the role of emotion in criminalization decisions, for both laypeople and legal professionals. While the traditional approach in criminalization theory emphasizes the role of deliberative and reasoned argumentation, this study hypothesizes that affective and emotional processes (i.e., disgust, as indexed by a dispositional proneness to experience disgust) are also associated with the decision to criminalize behavior, in particular virtual child pornography. To test this empirically, an online study (N = 1402) was conducted in which laypeople and legal professionals provided criminalization ratings on four vignettes adapted from criminal law, in which harmfulness and disgustingness were varied orthogonally. They also completed the 25-item Disgust Scale-Revised (DS-R-NL). In line with the hypothesis, (a) the virtual child pornography vignette (characterized as low in harm, high in disgust) was criminalized more readily than the financial harm vignette (high in harm, low in disgust), and (b) disgust sensitivity was associated with the decision to criminalize behavior, especially virtual child pornography, among both lay participants and legal professionals. These findings suggest that emotion can be relevant in shaping criminalization decisions. Exploring this theoretically, the results could serve as a stepping stone towards a new perspective on criminalization, including a "criminalization bias". Study limitations and implications for legal theory and policymaking are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the Supreme Court's copyright cases spanning from 1978 to 2023, comparing them with patent cases and examining various aspects such as circuit court decisions, clustering of cases, different eras, citation metrics, and the role of the Solicitor General. It aims to provide insights into the Court's approach to copyright law and its implications for intellectual property jurisprudence.

This article traces the emergence of what is nowadays called "postsecular" religion from German-Jewish philosophy of the 1920s and 1930s. The three different cases of Franz Rosenzweig, Alexander Altmann, and Leo Strauss impel us to pay particular attention to a few recurring argumentative and rhetorical strategies. The emergence of postsecularism marks a shift in the epistemic foundations of Jewish religious thought, which had long been under pressure from secular European thought. Beginning with Rosenzweig, Jewish philosophy used secular categories of European philosophy to facilitate a return to the foundations of Judaism, eventually turning against what it sees as the epistemic weaknesses of secularism itself. This article traces the new phenomenon to Rosenzweig's evolving view of secularism, especially to his ridicule of Siegfried Kracauer's secular messianism, before examining a few key arguments in his book The Star of Redemption (1921). A brief discussion of Alexander Altmann's writings of the early 1930s provides that even modern Orthodox Jewish thought, which had never been "secular", used postsecular categories and arguments to make the philosophical case for orthodoxy. Leo Strauss's introduction to his Philosophy and Law (1935) provides a far more elaborated form of Rosenzweig's argument. As this article seeks to show, postsecular Jewish thought comes with a slight twist of epistemic relativism, particularly when it comes to the juxtaposition of the Biblical and scientific "world-views". But here it merely draws the full consequences of modern science, beating scientism with its own weapons. Furthermore, religious thought in the 20th century had no other option than to rebuild itself on postsecular grounds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the evolution of the mandamus jurisprudence and summary judgment procedure in the U.S. in the past 30 years as of April 2024 by analyzing the denial of summary judgment in the case In re Prudential. Other topics include appellate remedies, appellate rights, and the evidence to warrant a trial.

For decades, a question has simmered in criminal procedure: Can the Fourth Amendment seizure analysis account for a suspect’s race? Scholars have long advocated for courts to consider race when resolving Fourth Amendment questions, but to date, the Supreme Court has not provided a definitive answer. The question has now bubbled to the surface. With calls for advocates to raise race when litigating Fourth Amendment questions, and with more and more advocates heeding those calls, courts are being asked to contemplate how race factors into deciding whether a person has been seized. When the question is explicitly asked, courts have answered differently, with many refusing to consider race as part of the seizure analysis. It is easy to think that it is only a matter of time before the Supreme Court holds that race has no place in the Fourth Amendment, especially given its muscular articulation of colorblindness in the recent affirmative action cases. Indeed, the lower courts that have held that race cannot be considered as part of a seizure analysis have couched their decisions in the same rhetoric and reasoning found in the Supreme Court’s colorblind rulings. As this Article explains, when scrutinized, colorblind constitutionalism is an illogical fit for the Fourth Amendment. In fact, the analytical underpinnings of colorblindness are consistent with race being considered as part of the seizure free-to-leave analysis. That race can be relevant to a seizure is reinforced when considered against the broader backdrop of Fourth Amendment law and all of the many ways it implicitly and explicitly recognizes race. This Article therefore clarifies that it is permissible to consider the racial identity of the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonable person.” But the insights of this Article extend beyond the Fourth Amendment, because at bottom, it is a warning against “case law creep” — where case law is imported from one context to another to advance a specific ideological mission without interrogating whether the case law supports the cause in that context. It is a reminder that the law should not be an unyielding wrecking ball that swings from jurisprudence to jurisprudence, smashing any hope of progress. Thus, ultimately, this Article seeds hope that the law can catch up to our pluralistic society and learn to recognize a multitude of experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The reflection seeks to offer alternative thoughts on a "search for the soul of Black preaching." Casual allusion is made to experience, music, Scripture, literature, scholarship, context, and jurisprudence, for clues as to how and where the soul of Black preaching might be found. A central suggestion is that "Black preaching" is not simply a contemporary racial or ethnic construct, but a timeless provisional and contextual divine warrant from the beginning of creation to proclaim liberation from chaos, profess divine truth to power, and offer enduring hope in light of historical injustices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research aims to identify the legislative directives in God’s speech to His Prophet by saying, O Prophet, through a jurisprudential interpretive study prepared by the researcher Abdulaziz Salem Ali Al-Khasrami, and to find out the sayings of the commentators and jurists in directing the command and prohibition directed to the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him peace, and to identify the implications of the command and noncommand sentences. Declarative, interrogative, and prohibitive sentences mentioned after God’s saying (O Prophet). This study combines rooting and application. It has been titled: Legislative directives in God’s speech to His Prophet by saying, O Prophet, a jurisprudential interpretive study. The researcher used the inductive and analytical approach that combines vision Theoretical and applied, in addition to following the fundamentalist vision, which came in an introduction and three sections, which are: • The first topic: The call to “O Prophet” in the Holy Qur’an. • The second topic: The interpretive vision of God’s speech to His Prophet by saying: (O Prophet). • The third topic: The jurisprudential vision of God’s speech to His Prophet by saying (O Prophet). This research has reached a number of results, including: The jurisprudential topics included in the call (O Prophet) are: issues related to conveying the message, issues related to piety and obedience, issues related to jihad, issues related to divorce, issues related to choice, and issues related to giving allegiance to the word. : (Ali is forbidden), and issues related to women’s clothing. The study recommends paying attention to the Holy Qur’an and the Noble Hadith as a lesson and research, and paying attention to the call to prayer and the commands and prohibitions that follow it in the Holy Qur’an through extraction, care, and research, and studying the method of the call in the Holy Qur’an as an interpretive jurisprudential study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the author discusses articles within the issue on topics including innovation and reform in the law of trusts, jurisprudence on statutory trusts, and reform of charitable trusts and corporations in England, Wales and Australia.

John Finnis's central role in Brexit was only the latest intervention in a long life of practical action that recommends a closer examination of the genesis of his distinctive philosophy. He always insisted that it was intended 'primarily to assist the practical reflections of those concerned to act, whether as judges or as statesmen or as citizens.' In this article, I argue that Finnis crafted his philosophy as a practical guide for conservative actors in the disenchanted Cold War world of the 1960–70s. My first aim is to excavate the theoretical foundations of his Thomist theory of natural law. While his turn to practical rather than speculative reason is well known, few if any appreciate how Finnis radically refounded Thomist natural law on an implicit theory of history. By accepting that the world was historically contingent and changing, he needed to show how we could know the timeless truth of practical reasonableness and the basic goods. In the final chapter of Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis introduced an 'abysmal' philosophy of history that explained how a spoudaios (wise man) could reason his way out of the historical contingency of the human world to access the timeless moral truths that transcended it. My second aim is to show how Finnis used his Thomist theory of natural law as a practical guide for action in our contingent world. He followed Eric Voegelin in describing humanity as two 'hostile camps' – the 'transcendental' Christians and their secular allies versus the 'immanentist' liberals, communists, and fascists all committed to 'consequentialist' ideologies. In this eternal battle of good versus evil, Finnis saw his philosophy as a practical guide for this 'creative minority' of transcendentalists for collective action against the heretical faith of immanentist movements aiming to perfect mankind and build heavens on earth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does time feature and function in juridical understandings of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment? With a view to international human rights adjudication, this article offers a kaleidoscopic reading of temporal logics (registers and reasoning) operating in the contemporary anti-torture cause and jurisprudence. Time, it is found, plays an important albeit at times implicit role in how judges imagine and evidence torturous harms brought before them. This article explicates and singles out time as a factor. It finds that, whilst indeterminacies and ambiguities persist, singular (and spectacular) or plural (and prolonged) harmful acts and impacts operate to serve adjudicators' reasoning, variably (and intuitively) to find violations or to divert from doing so. Time thus works as a device of inclusion and exclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article highlights the significance of judicious selection of optimal paradigmatic approach among the three renowned approaches, namely, disciplinary, multidisciplinary, or interdisciplinary, in investigating matters pertaining to Islamic studies and jurisprudence. It elucidates the pivotal role played by such careful selection in generating more precise and valid research outcomes. In situations where complex issues transcend the boundaries of a solitary discipline approach, and their resolution demands the integration of multiple scientific domains, the quest for an appropriate approach becomes imperative. Moreover, not every subject within the realm of Islamic studies or jurisprudence necessitates the utilisation of an interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary approach. The aim of this article is to develop a heightened awareness regarding the significance of carefully selecting the optimal approach and its profound implications in comprehending various issues within the domains of Islamic studies and jurisprudence. This article concludes that a single-disciplinary approach is employed in research pertaining to devotional matters that do not intersect with other scientific domains. Secondly, the multidisciplinary approach is applicable to address contemporary issues that fall outside the purview of the doctrines established by the four imams. Lastly, the interdisciplinary approach proves more appropriate when studying the jurisprudential heritage that conflicts with scientific realities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a difference of opinion among scholars of Islamic law on the validity of nikāḥ al-misyār (travellers’ marriages) where a woman consents to forego her immediate right to maintenance and cohabitation with her husband. The article examines misyār in traditional and contemporary Islamic jurisprudence to determine how jurists from both periods justified, debated, and rationalised this form of marriage and their legal intention when sanctioning it. Employing the methodology of an analytical description of travellers’ marriages and weighing the evidence provided by jurists to present their doctrines accurately, this article critically analyses the position of each juristic approach regarding misyār marriage to argue for its permissibility as it fulfils all the basic requirements of a marriage contract. The article concludes that social concerns, such as misyār being detrimental to women, are overstated. Of the reasons for this overstatement is because the idea of a misyār marriage shields women from sin and illegitimate relationships while enabling them to find a companion and live a decent life with their legal rights upheld. Following the presentation of religious jurisprudence, the article then concludes by uncovering this topic within the Personal Status Law of the United Arab Emirates. This demonstrates how the UAE’s legal system has actually accepted misyār, even though the relevant provisions of the law do not specifically mention it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Arab Civil Laws that are mostly influenced by Islamic jurisprudence are the Iraqi and Jordanian Civil Codes as well as the UAE and Omani Civil Transaction Laws. These laws have adopted the contract hierarchy as stipulated by Islamic jurisprudence, includes the non-binding contract according to which any of the two parties can terminate the contract unilaterally without the consent of the other party. Such a contract is deemed non-compulsory due to the options enforced on the contract. Some of these options are consensual and established with a condition stated in the contract. Others, however, are implied and legally enforced without express condition, i.e., by the force of law. Comparing the laws of selected jurisprudence and placing those laws within the purview of Islamic jurisprudence, this article argues that these options play an essential role in protecting the consent of the contracting parties as they enable the option holder to carefully investigate the terms and conditions before being permanently obligated to the contract. The article finds that the implied option is similar to that of a consumer who can quit the contract within a specific period after its formation without bearing any condition or extra expense, exactly as determined and applied by modern laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Babylon Center for Humanities Studies is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Limiting the duration of the criminal trial was one of the essential objectives of the criminal trial model thought by the legislator of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, who, under the pressure also of the European jurisprudence against Romania on the line of finding non-compliance with the reasonable term of the cases, expressly dedicated a special procedure to this problematic. In order to facilitate the transparency of the judicial act and help the judge in this endeavour, in the content of the procedure (unlike the corresponding institution in the Code of Civil Procedure) a series of express assessment criteria were regulated, in relation to which the conclusion can be reached whether in a specific case the reasonable term of resolution was specifically violated. The newness of the institution and the need to corroborate it with the source of inspiration - the jurisprudence of the ECHR Court, determined the national courts to develop important nuances, in some places still divergent, regarding the conditions of the procedure, the greater relevance presenting the perception of judges in the real practice of analyzing the criteria for verifying the reasonableness of the duration of the criminal trial, a fact that also determined the need to develop the present study. In essence, the judgment refers to all the criteria established by the law, but, concretely, any of them can acquire greater importance in the conclusion of „violation/non-violation", with direct influence also on the terms that will be set by the judge to speed up the resolution of the case, respectively after which a new appeal can no longer be initiated. On another level, the present analysis also reflects part of the legislative transition that continued punctually after the entry into force of the new Code, both as a result of the intervention of the legislator and of the Constitutional Court of Romania, both influenced by changes in the legislative and social paradigm, after year 2014. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For critical legal scholars, the ongoing far-right assault upon the liberal status quo poses a distinct dilemma. On the one hand, the desire to condemn the far-right is overwhelming. On the other hand, such condemnations are susceptible to being appropriated as a validation of the very liberalism that critical theorists have long questioned. In seeking to transcend this dilemma, my focus is on the discourse of 'white genocide' — a commonplace belief amongst the far-right/white nationalists that 'whites', as a discrete group, are facing demographic destruction as a result of deliberate policy choices. Such a belief has motivated acts of extreme violence. While libel to dismissal by experts on mainstream understandings of genocide, namely international criminal lawyers, I argue that this 'white genocide' discourse deserves careful scrutiny as a jurisprudential and socio-legal phenomenon that reveals key weaknesses in present modalities of liberal justification. Drawing upon an array of recent critical theories, I show how a liberalism unable to face its own decline enables the very far-right assertions it purports to oppose. Thus, given liberalism's failure to act as a neutral arbiter, an alternative approach for those opposing the far-right is to develop a vision of politics and society that confront believers in 'white genocide' on a more substantive level. This, I argue, forces the far-right's opponents to disavow liberal scepticism towards utopian transformation as well as the juridical understandings and institutions that allow this scepticism to durably persist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Larq Journal for Philosophy, Linguistics & Social Sciences is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A small body of research spanning more than a decade finds that survivors of human trafficking may not want to prosecute their traffickers for myriad reasons. An integrated framework combining principles of therapeutic jurisprudence, survivor centered practice, anti-oppressive practice and restorative justice provides an important theoretical lens for examining and offering alternatives to traditional prosecution in human trafficking cases. Specifically, this theoretical essay aims to draw attention to prosecutorial challenges in human trafficking cases and argues for an alternative or enhancement to traditional prosecution. Alternatives that are discussed emphasize the following: mitigating revictimization; supporting survivors' input, aims and goals; providing opportunities for therapeutic moments, repairing harm, and restitution; and incorporating cultural humility and cultural competency in the prosecution process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John Finnis's central role in Brexit was only the latest intervention in a long life of practical action that recommends a closer examination of the genesis of his distinctive philosophy. He always insisted that it was intended 'primarily to assist the practical reflections of those concerned to act, whether as judges or as statesmen or as citizens.' In this article, I argue that Finnis crafted his philosophy as a practical guide for conservative actors in the disenchanted Cold War world of the 1960–70s. My first aim is to excavate the theoretical foundations of his Thomist theory of natural law. While his turn to practical rather than speculative reason is well known, few if any appreciate how Finnis radically refounded Thomist natural law on an implicit theory of history. By accepting that the world was historically contingent and changing, he needed to show how we could know the timeless truth of practical reasonableness and the basic goods. In the final chapter of Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis introduced an 'abysmal' philosophy of history that explained how a spoudaios (wise man) could reason his way out of the historical contingency of the human world to access the timeless moral truths that transcended it. My second aim is to show how Finnis used his Thomist theory of natural law as a practical guide for action in our contingent world. He followed Eric Voegelin in describing humanity as two 'hostile camps' – the 'transcendental' Christians and their secular allies versus the 'immanentist' liberals, communists, and fascists all committed to 'consequentialist' ideologies. In this eternal battle of good versus evil, Finnis saw his philosophy as a practical guide for this 'creative minority' of transcendentalists for collective action against the heretical faith of immanentist movements aiming to perfect mankind and build heavens on earth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This technical note reviews the plethora of concentration units used to report blood‐alcohol concentration (BAC) and breath‐alcohol concentrations (BrAC) for legal purposes in different countries. The choice of units sometimes causes confusion when scientific papers originating from a certain country might be introduced into evidence via expert testimony, such as when alcohol‐related crimes are prosecuted. The concentration units are also important to consider when blood/breath ratios (BBRs) of alcohol are calculated and compared between countries. Statutory BAC limits for driving in most nations are reported in mass/volume (m/v) units, such as g/100 mL (g%) in the United States, mg/100 mL (mg%) in the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland, or g/L (mg/mL) in many EU nations. By contrast, Germany and the Nordic countries report BAC as mass/mass (m/m) units, hence g/kg or mg/g, which are ~5.5% lower than m/v units, because whole blood has an average density of 1.055 g/mL. There are historical reasons for reporting BAC in mass/mass units because the aliquots of blood analyzed were measured by weight rather than volume. The difference between m/m and m/v is also important in postmortem toxicology, such as when distribution ratios of ethanol between blood and other biological specimens, such as urine, vitreous humor, and cerebrospinal fluid, are reported. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The anthology Collective Action, Philosophy and Law brings together two key strands of philosophical inquiry: social ontology and jurisprudence. Most of the papers use collective agency as a starting point to get a better grasp on collective entities and activities in the legal domain, but others reverse the approach and use legal examples to refine theories of collective agency. The introduction provides a comprehensive overview of the literature on collective agency, emphasizing issues in jurisprudence and legal practices where collective agency plays a central role. It also offers a detailed overview of the anthology’s structure and contents. With thirteen papers organized into four parts, the anthology covers a broad spectrum of topics. While each paper deserves in-depth exploration, this review will provide a brief summary of all the papers, followed by concise discussions of the contributions of Sara Rachel Chant and Bill Wringe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study aims to know the ruling on forced divorce in Islamic jurisprudence, compared to the personal status system. To reveal his choices and goals. The descriptive and analytical approach was adopted to explain its effect on the occurrence of divorce, the extent of the judiciary’s authority to impose it, and when it is classified as an annulment in jurisprudence compared to the system. The researcher concluded that the Maliki school of thought is the least restrictive of the judge’s authority to effect divorce. As for the Shafi’is and Hanbalis, they restrict its authority to its rhythm, and prefer the side of annulment. To avoid wasting the husband’s credit and violating his private right to it. The system chose jurisprudence that prevents the judge from divorce at all, and distinguished between his authority and the husband’s authority, taking into account what is best for the spouses. The husband is not considered a divorce that he did not consent to, and the wife hastens to remove the harm from her with an irrevocable annulment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Article 36(2) of the International Law Commission's Article on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) provides that the responsible state shall compensate for all financially assessable damage. However, ARSIWA provides no guidance as to how such a broad rule should be applied in practice, which creates significant ambiguities for adjudicators in charge of adjudicating compensation claims in international law. In the past decade, the International Court of Justice has adjudicated three important compensation cases wherein it has exhibited a visible turn to equitable considerations in compensation determination. This article conducts an analysis of such an emerging equitable approach to compensation and argues that it is a welcome development, given the flexibility it provides to the Court for balancing different factors, with the aim of achieving an equitable determination of compensation. This article also addresses the justifications and predictability concerns of this approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

References to the European Convention on Human Rights by Israeli courts – the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights as sources of comparative law – comparative law as technique of legitimation – content analysis of use by domestic courts of European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence – European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence and deference to state [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ijtihād is an important term of Islamic Shari'ah. Deducing practical rulings and duties from jurisprudential sources with specific conditions is called Ijtihād. Collective Ijtihād refers to a group of jurists using their abilities to search for a Shariah ruling through inference and then reaching a consensus on a Shariah ruling on a problem after mutual consultation is called collective ijtihad. He handled thought and opened new doors of ijtihad with his knowledge and grace and introduced the Muslim Ummah to a new dimension of thought. During the Khilaphat e Rashidah, the jurists of the Companions of the Prophet (peace be upon him) spread to the major Islamic cities and established academic councils and educational circles there. The number of followers who benefited from these Companions was very large and these followers took over the post of teaching and teaching in these cities after the death of the Companions. Until the era of Hazrat Abu Bakr and Hazrat Umar, the institution of collective and advisory ijtihād continued to develop well. But during the era of Hazrat Uthmān and Hazrat Ali (RA), due to some political and intellectual differences and mutual wars and conflicts, the community of Muslims became a victim of chaos, which had an impact on various sub- institutions of the Islamic State. Therefore, the institution of collective ijtihad, which we see at its peak during the time of Hazrat Umar, began to decline in the last part of the Caliphate during the reign of Hazrat Usman Ghani. By the time of the Tabi'in, mutual conflicts had come under control to some extent, but the foundations of intellectual and political differences had become very deep, so many new differences had also emerged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is now over ten years since the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Court) first established that asylum seekers are inherently and particularly vulnerable on account of their very situation as asylum seekers. This occurred in its Grand Chamber judgment in the case of M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece. This article critically examines the Court's subsequent asylum jurisprudence through the lens of vulnerability. The analysis reveals that the Court has engaged in 'vulnerability backsliding'. Specifically, it traces the ways in which the Court has surreptitiously reversed the very principle of asylum vulnerability it itself established in M.S.S. The consequence of this backsliding is not only that the judicially recognised concept of asylum vulnerability is undermined, but that some of the most vulnerable applicants that come before the Court suffer renewed marginalisation, and, in some circumstances, exclusion from the 'special protection' to which they were previously afforded courtesy of M.S. S. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In August 2022, the Association of Social Work Boards released a long called for pass rate analysis that revealed significant disparities. While many states look to cease the requirement of the Bachelors, Masters, and Advanced Generalist exams in their licensure process, status quo bias leads to hesitancy to remove the requirement of the Clinical exam. A critical review was undertaken to identify possible alternatives to the current multiple-choice competency-based exam which yielded three assessment formats (oral exams, portfolios, and performance assessment/simulations) and two alternatives (jurisprudence exams and provisional licensure). Informed by an Afrocentric lens, we undertook a social and racial policy analysis to examine alternative pathways for licensure from the perspective of a social work board member. We centered our analysis on the impacts on (1) Black social workers, who currently have the highest pass-rate disparities; (2) social workers whose primary language is not English, and (3) social workers with disabilities who have anecdotally reported difficulty with getting testing accommodations. We rated each alternative on four social equity analysis criteria of procedural fairness, access, quality, and outcomes. These ratings were computed into an overall rating for each alternative from equitable to inequitable. We found jurisprudence exams and provisional licensure have the best possibility of being equitable pathways to licensure, with potential impacts on the regulation of supervision and continuing education. Anti-racism and social justice as praxis require social work as a profession to divest from competency-based testing to eliminate racism in our own professional policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When we seek a fuller understanding of individual liberty including its relational character, we confront a conundrum. The evident advantages of a single individual possessing liberty cannot be simply transferred to a greater number of beneficiaries. This conundrum is confronted with the resources of Hohfeld's analytical framework, developed specifically to elucidate the practical outworkings of interpersonal relations within the law. Attention is also paid to concerns expressed by von Wright over a representation of liberty (permission) within the resources of standard deontic logic which fails to address its social aspect. The aggregate level of the Hohfeldian scheme is employed to represent a complete picture of liberty, but one that cannot guarantee benefits for a plurality of holders. The conclusion is reached that in order to extend the advantages of individual liberty to all, something other than liberty is required. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores both the reasons for, and the potential impact of, the current level of disenfranchisement in Scotland. First, we scrutinise Scottish legal provisions for their compatibility with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)'s jurisprudence, which require disenfranchisement's aims to be clarified and delimited. Second, we examine where disenfranchisement sits within the wider context of Scottish penal values, and what principles underlie its imposition. Finally, we turn to a discussion of whether and how dis/enfranchisement aligns with the Scottish Government's commitments to the rehabilitation and reintegration of people who have been in prison, and to related empirical evidence about desistance from crime. The limited enfranchisement of prisoners established by the Scottish Government in 2020 avoided these core questions and this article aims to help address this neglect and to open up dialogue on these issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Arbitration has become a popular method for resolving disputes in Jordan due to its flexibility, confidentiality, and efficiency. However, the validity of an arbitration award depends on several factors, including the adequacy of the award's reasoning. This case report from Jordan highlights the importance of adequate reasoning in arbitral awards and the consequences of its absence. The report analyzes a recent court ruling that annulled an arbitration award due to the lack of reasoning and examines the criteria that arbitration jurisprudence has set for appropriate reasoning. The report concludes that an arbitration award without adequate reasoning is tainted by a flaw where the reasoning behind a decision is not provided or is insufficient, leading to its invalidity/annulment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I argue that Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir and his book, 'Issues in the jurisprudence of jihad' (Masāʾil fī fiqh al-jihād), has likely been a major source of influence on the formation of the jurisprudential aspect of a new form of the Jihadi Salafi ideology which was epitomized by the practices of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the first place and of ISIS afterwards. I point out the similarities between al-Muhajir's ideas and fatwas issued in his book and ISIS's views and actions espoused and enacted later on in order to demonstrate how the book contributed to the making of the jurisprudential aspect of ISIS's ideology. I pick three main themes, which I deemed to be representative of ISIS's traits, to that purpose. The suicide attacks and civilian casualties that showed a dramatic rise after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 make up the first. The second one is the anti-Shia sentiment and attacks as they follow from it. The last one, maybe an ISIS signature among various intellectual lines and currents of Jihadi Salafism, consists of 'savage' or 'brutal' acts. Based on these three main themes, I aim to display the influence of al-Muhajir's standpoints on ISIS's ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Irish judges have tended to 'jealously guard' the judicial power, vested as it is by Article 34.1 of the Constitution in the courts alone. And they have jealously guarded their control over the articulation of public law norms. It is they who get to decide what counts as fair procedure in this or that non‐judicial body – not the non‐judicial actors operating at the coalface. But in Zalewski v Workplace Relations Commission a majority of the Supreme Court has signaled a shift away from the rigid judicial 'centralism' that has prevailed for a century in the Irish legal system. The judges have departed from the formulaic approach to assessing what counts as judicial power, preferring instead a purposive approach more in line with comparator countries. They have revived a 'saver' provision of the Constitution (Article 37.1) expressly providing for 'the exercise of limited functions and powers of a judicial nature' by bodies other than courts. And they have indicated that courts and lawyers do not have a monopoly on authority in respect of public law norms. Things remain in flux, however, because there are conflicting messages in the majority judgment in respect of this more 'pluralist' conception of public law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]