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The article explores the recent surge in debates over Supreme Court recusal and ethical conduct among Justices. It highlights notable instances where Justices faced public criticism for their involvement in cases related to personal interests or affiliations. Against the backdrop of heightened scrutiny, the absence of a formal ethics code for the Supreme Court is emphasized, leading to calls for reform from legislators and legal commentators.

As the spotlight on the Supreme Court shines brighter, the public has become increasingly aware of judicial misconduct and ethical issues. This increased awareness has also exposed the judiciary's less-than-stellar record on handling such issues. Of these ethical issues, recusal decisions are a prominent cause for concern--especially in today's hyper-politicized world. When or whether to recuse is a sensitive and important question most judges are bound to face. Although some statutory guidance exists, that guidance is far from a model of clarity. Even where statutory guidance is facially clear, recusal problems still persist due to benign and technological errors, or--in some cases--a fundamental misunderstanding of what the statutes require. Additionally, the rise of social media only complicates the vague statutory framework. And with more recent outspoken judges on the federal bench, new recusal questions emerge and unique recusal motions are sure to be filed. Recusal is not limited solely to judges but also affects judicial law clerks. That is, the actions of judicial law clerks affect the judges they clerk for. But guidance for judicial law clerks is varied and thin, which creates additional problems. Moreover, recusal has become increasingly weaponized and used for strategic advantage by all three branches of government. Each branch has ways to influence or dictate recusal decisions, all of which threaten the sanctity of the judiciary. What is a judge to do? This Article explores and highlights potential recusal-worthy issues for both judges and judicial law clerks. Further, it details how recusal has become weaponized and explains the dangers in permitting the proliferation of recusal weaponization. Finally, this Article proffers reforms to help prevent and curb recusal abuse by (1) changing the timing of appellate review of recusal decisions; (2) modifying the appellate standard of review for recusal decisions; and (3) suggesting methods to prevent recusal manipulation in the en banc process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

U.S. courts rely predominately on judicial self-recusal and incourt disclosure to address judicial conflicts of interest and maintain a critical perception of impartiality. But these approaches fail to account for the legal, institutional, and social dynamics that surround the relationship between judges, attorneys, and the adjudicative process. In reality, judges rarely use their discretion to disclose conflicts or recuse themselves, and attorneys do not ask them to do so. If we understand both the legal and extralegal incentives at play in these decisions, none of these outcomes should be surprising. The shortcomings of recusal and disclosure rules are particularly salient in the context of judicial campaign finance, where elected judges face the acute dilemma of being assigned to a case in which one of the parties or attorneys has made financial contributions to the judge's election campaign. To support these substantive claims, this Article features the results of a novel randomized field experiment--the first-ever blinded experiment conducted on judges in active cases. In the experiment, Wisconsin and Texas civil cases that feature donor attorneys are identified and a portion of the judges presiding over these cases are randomly assigned to receive a letter identifying the potential conflict and requesting recusal. Judicial and attorney behavior is then tracked over the life of the case to observe how often judges recuse, whether they disclose the conflict, how attorneys respond to those disclosures, and whether the intervention of a third party has any effect on these decisions. The experimental results provide much-needed empirical confirmation of growing skepticism surrounding judicial recusal and raise serious doubts that the most popular solution to the recusal problem--increased judicial disclosure--will do much to help at all. Building on these findings, I explore procedural and institutional alternatives that better account for the realities of judicial conflicts of interest and the incentives of court actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the recusal of judges in Louisiana's district courts. It emphasizes the importance of a fair and impartial judiciary for litigants and the potential hesitations they may have in filing a motion to recuse a judge. It further discusses the distinction between voluntary and involuntary recusal and highlights the ethical obligations of judges to preside over cases properly.

Perceptions of judicial fairness for elected state judges were examined across a series of studies. Of particular interest was how campaign donations and types of cases affect perceptions that judges could be fair. In Study 1, participants (N = 120) rated the political orientation of 14 groups or companies known to provide campaign contributions and rated how fair judges could be if they received donations from these entities. In Study 2, participants read about a judge who received donations from a liberal or conservative political action committee (N = 190) or corporation (N = 188). Study 3 (N = 809) tested whether judicial recusal in conflicted cases could repair perceptions of judicial fairness. Individual differences in participant political orientation were also examined. Across all studies, participants rated judges as less fair when they received donations during their campaigns and later heard cases that were clearly related to donors' interests. Significant interactions between participant and donor political orientation were found. Generally, liberal participants thought judges would be less fair when donors were conservative, and conservative participants thought judges would be less fair when donors were liberal. Finally, judicial recusal led to higher future fairness ratings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the court case Jackson v. Valdez, wherein the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied the motion for recusal and dismissed municipal liability claim filed by a transgender inmate who was mistreated. It analyzes the judge's personal and political affiliation and impartiality, the conditions to consider that a municipal policy violates constitutional rights, and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ+) rights.

The challenges facing agency adjudication are a microcosm of those facing modern American government. Limited resources, shifting priorities, and overt politicization all contribute to perhaps the gravest threat to the longevity of our public institutions--diminished confidence in the integrity of agency action. Recusal--the removal of an adjudicator from a particular case--is a time-honored way of safeguarding the integrity of adjudicative proceedings, from traditional judicial proceedings to agency adjudications. Yet unlike judicial proceedings, there is no set standard for determining when an agency adjudicator must recuse. Agencies have been left to design their own recusal regimes for the dual purpose of promoting fairness to litigants and, just as importantly, public confidence in their proceedings. Until now, the nature and scope of agency recusal practices were largely a mystery. This Article, which is derived substantially from a recent report for the Administrative Conference of the United States, is the first to develop a comprehensive accounting and taxonomy of agency recusal standards. As such, it is also the first to offer a normative analysis of administrative recusal across all federal agencies. The result is a series of recommendations for how agencies can best develop their recusal practices to combat the ongoing cynicism and suspicion that threatens the efficacy of American government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reports results from a field experiment exploring how judicial behavior is affected by complaints about conflicts of interest. The conflicts of interest studied here arise in Wisconsin civil trial cases. Using public records, we identify instances in which one party's attorney contributed to the presiding judge's previous election campaign. We send a random subset of these judges a letter identifying the potential conflict and requesting recusal. We find that highlighting the potential conflict and asking judges to recuse sharply increases the rate at which judges disclose this relationship in court records but does not lead them to recuse. Furthermore, treated judges are no more likely to disclose or recuse in subsequent cases that present a similar conflict of interest. This experiment, which is the first to test possible remedies to judicial conflicts of interest, suggests that light touch interventions are insufficient to change judges' behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the evolution of the kinship recusal practice at the U.S. Supreme Court by citing the case of Justice William R. Day, who was appointed in the court in 1903. Other topics include the legal careers of Day's four sons, namely, Luther Day, William Louis Day, Stephen Albion Day and Rufus Spalding Day, and the recusal cases of Justices Rufus W. Peckham and John Marshall Harlan.

Big data affects the personal and professional life of every judge. A judge's travel time to work, creditworthiness, and chances of an IRS audit all depend on predictive algorithms interpreting big data. A client's choice of counsel, the precise wording of a litigant's motion, and the composition of the jury may be dictated by analytics. Touted as a means of bringing objectivity to judicial decision-making, judges have employed big data to determine sentences and to set the amount of restitution in class action cases. Unfortunately, the legal profession and big data proponents have ignored one perplexing problem begging for a big data solution--the arbitrary and inconsistent manner in which courts determine judicial recusal issues. Every jurisdiction disqualifies a judge when the fully-informed, reasonable, lay observer concludes that the judge's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Created by the American Bar Association in 1972 to bring uniformity and consistency to the disqualification process, this "objective" test has been a dismal failure. The ABA's goal, however, can be realized by infusing data analytics into the disqualification decision-making process. Part I of this Article identifies the serious shortcomings of an appearance-based disqualification standard. Part II explains how analysis of big data can correct the theoretical and practical problems plaguing the "might reasonably be questioned" standard. Part III applies the big data derived model to one type of disqualification motion--motions seeking a judge's removal from a case because of contributions made to the judge's election campaign by litigants, lawyers, or others connected with the litigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the appellate procedures used in judicial disqualification review in the U.S. and proposes some mechanisms to standardize appellate review in the U.S. Other topics include the history and constitutional basis of judicial disqualification in federal courts, discretionary appeals, collateral orders, abuse of discretion or De Novo review, and post-recusal appellate review.

The article addresses whether, and under what circumstances, a judge must, may, or cannot refer a motion to disqualify to another judge. Topics discussed include rationale for a judge's personal handling of recusal motions, legal source or authority used to decide whether recusal is necessary, and options of a judge in California in disposing of a motion for recusal.

The article discusses the relation of the common law rule of necessity to judicial recusal rules. Topics include a proposed Wisconsin constitutional amendment to create panels to assess judicial recusal cases, the U.S. Supreme Court case United States v. Will, and the relation of the creation of panels to federalism and issues of jurisdiction.

A review of the article "Catholic Judges in Capital Cases" by John H. Garvey and Amy V. Coney Barrett, which appears in a 1998 issue of the "Marquette Law Review," is presented, and it mentions catechisms, retribution, and the Catholic Church's teaching on the purpose of punishment.

The paper examines the concept of judicial impartiality in relation to the recusals sought in the case Republic v Chief Justice Sereno. It argues that the Philippine Supreme Court committed an error in denying the requests. The paper begins by providing the background to the case and outlines the attempts to oust Chief Justice Sereno, the events surrounding those proceedings, and the filing of the quo warranto petition itself. It then delves into the requests for recusal made by Sereno and how the Court resolved the issue. Next, the paper considers the concept of judicial independence in relation to the view of laws as 'social rules', along with authority of courts to adjudicate. It argues that lapses and questionable conduct and procedure tend to erode confidence on the judiciary. It questions the procedure in deciding cases of recusal that allows the very judge whose disqualification is sought to decide the propriety of his or her recusal. The paper next argues that it is not sufficient for judges to be impartial, they must also appear impartial, and analyses how courts approach the question of the appearance of bias. The paper presents the merits of the test of objective bias that lies in the relative objectivity of its application thereby making the assessment of impartiality more workable and less capricious. The paper examines the test employed by the Court that failed to account for the appearance of bias to a fair-minded observer, notwithstanding that this test had already been recognised in Philippine case law. Given these two problems, the paper notes that procedurally, the Court's approach failed to promote the standard that 'justice must not only be done but manifestly be seen to have been done'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Williams v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court established a new recusal rule, narrowly tailored to situations in which a judge previously participated as a prosecutor in the same case. In keeping with the Court's decisions in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal and In re Murchison, the Court correctly determined that such direct, prior involvement created an impermissible appearance of judicial bias, such that a judge must recuse himself or herself from the decision. Furthermore, the Court's recusal requirement is necessary in light of the ever-changing political environment and the public's growing distrust of the independence and neutrality of the judiciary. As a result of Williams, the Court may find itself turning inward tofurther examine its own recusal decisions, requiring greater attention to circumstances in which the Justices may have a personal connection to a case or controversy, such that it would create the appearance or existence of actual judicial bias. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Justice must both be done and be seen to be done. A legal principle designed to give effect to this fundamental proposition is that a judge must not sit to determine a dispute if he or she is biased, or if there exists a reasonable perception that he or she is biased. Across many common law jurisdictions – including the UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and many jurisdictions in the United States – the judge in question himself or herself is required to undertake the assessment of whether bias, or an apprehension of bias, exists. Drawing on insights from behavioural psychology and a series of case studies from across these jurisdictions, this paper offers an extended analysis of this practice and identifies and evaluates alternative proposals. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on the contemporary standards for judicial disqualification with the determination of judge's bias or lack of impartiality are based on standards adopted in the constitution and the Code of Judicial Conduct. It mentions that Judicial Code rules on impartiality, appearance of impropriety, and the like requires familiarity with the relevant Minnesota criminal appellate law. It also mentions that standards for the motions of judicial disqualification.

The article asserts that section 455 of the U.S. code is obsolete, vague and inapplicable in the face of recusal challenges and the current public concerns toward the federal judiciary, as of December 2015. Topics discussed include the history and purpose demonstrate that Congress should continue to refine the statutory guidelines and high standards that Americans expect from the federal judiciary; and role of the Constitution and judiciary's reputation in a clear recusal statute.

The article examines the need of a change in Arkansas's judicial recusal rules and procedures to provide a neutral review of denied recusal decisions in order to enhance and preserve that public confidence, as of September 2015.

The well-documented Wool Board Disestablishment Co v Saxmere Co litigation thrust the often dormant issue of conflicts of interest between a judge and a litigant into the limelight. Now that the dust has settled on the controversy that culminated in Wilson J's resignation, it is pertinent to question the status quo and investigate the potential cause of these events. More importantly, it is critical to consider whether measures need to be taken to prevent, or at least to reduce the likelihood of, another such occurrence. This article takes a principled approach to analysing judicial recusal law in New Zealand, with a particular focus on procedure. In doing so, a mismatch between process theory and the reality of haphazard self-regulation highlights the procedural shortcomings of the current judicial recusal paradigm. To remedy this, the author applies aspects of process theory to reform judicial recusal procedure and bring it in line with general civil litigation practice. The proposed reform instils some fundamental practices that are presently absent in recusal procedure. To contextualise the article's findings, the author revisits the Saxmere saga first to posit that a lack of procedural safeguards may have contributed to the saga and secondly, to suggest that, had the procedural safeguards proposed by this article been in place, the controversy could have been mitigated, if not avoided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the concepts of impartiality and independence governing judicial and other formal decision-makers. Earlier English decisions (including Dimes and Pinochet) treated the concepts as separate. A more recent decision of the High Court of Australia in Clenae (and some recent decisions in England) appear to subsume the two requirements and to treat them as conducing to a trial of manifest fairness. The author questions this analysis and explains why, in his opinion, each requirements is important. This is recognised by international and regional human rights law; earlier judicial analysis; and appropriate conceptualisation. Impartiality refers to what goes on, and appears to go on, in the mind of the decision maker. Independence concerns the relationship of the decision-maker to government, the parties and external influences. Dangers lie in merging or ignoring the dual requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the author argues that the recusal procedure used in the American courtrooms is unconstitutional and will demonstrate the violation of the Due Process Clause and highlights the substantive recusal standard, which was ignored by the scholars.

This paper revisits the controversy of Judge Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan's recusal from the South West Africa cases using new information from the National Archives in Australia, India, South Africa, and the United Kingdom, including an unpublished manuscript written by the Australian judge and the Court's President Sir Percy Spender. Sir Percy's manuscript, which addresses the “recusal” controversy and the 1966 Decision, raises uncomfortable questions about the politics of international law within the Court in the 1960s. In many ways, Judge Zafrulla's struggle with Sir Percy at the ICJ can be analogized to the struggle of non-European peoples to self-determination. The internal “legal” struggle within the Court paralleled the larger “political” struggle outside the Court. Zafrulla would win the struggle, however, when as President of the Court during the 1971 Advisory Opinion on Namibia he would contribute to decolonization, a possibility he foresaw when he was forced to recuse himself. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses similarity in world judicial recusal standards in the context of their aim to achieve judicial impartiality, use of challenged judge to review recusal motions, and decision maker's approach while employing recusal standard, citing the U.S. case Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.

The article explores the challenges faced by American judiciary due to biased judges, as of July 2015, and discusses the U.S. Supreme Court's cases including 'Republican Party of Minnesota v. White' and 'Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.' concerning judicial elections.

A speech on judicial responsibility delivered by Wendy Weiser, Director at Brennan Center for Justice at New York University (NYU), at the symposium "Courts, Campaigns, and Corruption: Judicial Recusal Five Years After Caperton" held on November 14, 2014 at NYU School of Law, is presented.

The article discusses the proposed reshaping of America's recusal procedures as of 2015, focusing on partiality problems involving U.S. judges and justices, as well as the efforts to eliminate decisionmaker bias and promote public confidence. The U.S. Constitution's Due Process Clause is mentioned, along with a non-constitutional disqualification law and various federal and state codes of judicial conduct in America. Self-disqualification and a Bias Blind Spot concept are also examined.

The article looks at the "Comer v. Murphy Oil USA Inc." case of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and discusses the voluntary recusal approach of federal judges in the U.S. without the issuance of a recusal statement. Topics discussed include privacy interests of individual federal judges in voluntary recusal, need of for mandatory judicial recusal statements in the country, and laws related to voluntary recusal in the U.S. federal system.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that death row inmates possess an Eighth Amendment right protecting them against execution methods posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Despite the clear existence of this liberty interest, lower federal courts have repeatedly denied inmates' requests to know important details of the lethal injection procedure the state plans to use. This Article argues that the Eighth Amendment includes an implicit due process right to know such information about the state's planned method of execution. Without this information, inmates cannot protect their Eighth Amendment right against an excruciating execution, because the state can conceal crucial details of its execution procedure, effectively insulating it from judicial review. As in other constitutional contexts, then, due process norms require that the government provide people with information necessary to protect their other constitutional rights. These norms similarly require courts, rather than administrative agencies, to judge the execution procedure's constitutionality. Judicial recognition of this due process right would both protect Eighth Amendment values and also encourage states to make their execution procedures more transparent and less dangerous. Just as importantly, judicial recognition would also discourage secretive governmental practices more generally, thereby promoting openness and fair process as important democratic values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When are U. S. Supreme Court justices more likely to recuse themselves from cases? This article proposes a strategic model of recusal behavior, hypothesizing that the justices balance statutory guidelines concerning recusals against other policy and institutional goals. Using data from the Supreme Court Database, I find evidence that recusal behavior is influenced by a combination of statutory, policy, and institutional considerations. Consistent with statutory explanations, which emphasize the elimination of bias or its appearance, justices are more likely to recuse themselves from cases when business interests are before the Court, when they have served for shorter terms, and when they have previously acted as Solicitor General. However, I also find that the justices are less likely to recuse themselves when cases are likely to be close or when the justices' policy goals are likely to be advanced by participating. These findings suggest that while the justices do follow statutory recusal guidelines, they also have other institutional and policy incentives that lead them to participate in cases despite their conflicts of interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses the principles on the recusal of judicial officers relative to the case of Moola v. Director of Public Prosecutions and others. It mentions that the case highlights some of the controversial aspects of the applications of recusal which include the procedures following the ascertainment and assessment of factual evidence and how an individual should be conceived of the notional reasonable person for the establishment of whether sufficient grounds for recusal are established.

The article focuses on the challenges faced by the U.S Supreme Court in relation to its judicial recusal process and the foreign law systems of recusal. Topics discussed include the U.S Supreme Court case Cheney v. United States District Court, the case National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, and recusal systems of constitutional courts of common law countries such as Great Britain Supreme Court and the High Court of Australia.

The article focuses on the constitutional regulation of the U.S Supreme Court's decision in judicial recusals by the U.S Congress. Topics discussed include the doctrine of inherent judicial powers, the separation of powers that may restrict Congress from applying substantive rules on the judges' recusal decisions, and the constitutional right of the Court regarding self-autonomy in its decision-making.

The article discusses the shortcomings in the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct with regard to ex parte communications according to the approach set forth in the American Bar Association's 2007 Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Topics discussed include community-based treatment plans for each defendant, criteria defining a participant's completion of the program, and proposal for the revisions to the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct related to disqualifications or recusals.

The decision to recuse presents Supreme Court justices with a no-win choice between preserving legitimacy and risking the possibility of an evenly divided vote. A recent proposal would allow retired justices to serve when a justice is absent to help alleviate this tension. Here, we examine the potential implications of this proposal using more than 60 years of unique counterfactual data. Our results suggest that replacement justices could have changed the policy set by the Court in only a small subset of cases and, more importantly, could have helped the Court avoid more than a quarter of their even divisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the American judiciary system, it is imperative that judges act free of bias. Although this seems to be an easy-enough-to- understand theory, its practical application is not always so simple. As a result, there have been wide-ranging, unpredictable, and sometimes undesirable results. Others have noted the need for clearer recusal rules and guidelines. There have been various suggestions for how to improve or reform recusal rules, all of which note that there is a lack of standardized and predictable rules for when judges are required to recuse themselves. These previous suggestions have correctly identified the root of the problem and provided practical solutions to the problem of judges improperly refusing to recuse themselves, but they have also ignored a significant problem with the current landscape of recusal law: an equal need of standardized guidance for when not to recuse, an area not adequately considered to this point. This is not just a hypothetical problem. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in Comer v. Murphy Oil shows, a judge's decision to recuse can be just as detrimental, if not more so, than a judge's decision not to recuse. This Article first briefly outlines the historical background of and purpose behind recusals. It then discusses the odd--but certainly potentially repeatable--procedural path of Murphy Oil, which ultimately led to the dismissal of an appellant's victory as if no appeal had ever taken place, explaining why this decision was not only unsound but also symptomatic of a much larger recusal problem. It next describes alternatives available to the Fifth Circuit, including following the decision of the Fourth Circuit in a similar case; although there were better options, the Fifth Circuit's course of action was perfectly permissible under the law. Finally, this Article explains why these conflicting decisions illustrate the need for better recusal standards, including standards not only for when judges must recuse themselves, but also for when judges must not recuse themselves. Others have theorized that recusal statutes and procedures are "systematically underused and underenforced." It is not just underuse, however, that poses a problem. Although underuse can deprive litigants of an impartial forum, overuse can be even more problematic as it can deprive litigants not just of an impartial forum, but any forum at all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA) in South Africa. Topics covered include the provisions under the CPA that prevent the injudicious exercise of the power to search and seize, the circumstance necessitating the presiding officer's duty of recusal, and the petition for leave to appeal under the CPA.

In this article, the authors share their views on the issue of judicial disqualification in context to the U.S. Supreme Court decision of 2009 in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. Smith mentioned that Caperton case supported the judicial recusal matters and in the findings of impartiality under the application of the Due Process Clause and the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct. Robert discusses the motion to recuse in the recusal of judges.

The article offers information on the significance of friendship or personal relationship of judges with attorneys in the judicial disqualification process in the U.S. legal system. It informs that the U.S. Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee while addressing the issue of judicial rescual mentioned that the social interaction and relationship must not effect the professional environment. It recommends that judges should not be friends with attorneys in social media like Facebook.

The article offers information on the history and development of the judicial disqualification in the U.S. It informs that in ancient times Judaism and Roman law, judges were rescued or disqualified on the grounds of impartiality in delivery of judgment. It explores that the common law judicial disqualification standard was developed by Henry Bracton, an English jurist, who proved a basis for judicial disqualification.