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Copyright of Journal of Babylon Center for Humanities Studies is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

AbstractThe research includes a study of the approach followed in monitoring the constitutionality of laws in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Republic of Iraq, by explaining the types of oversight of the constitutionality of laws, represented by judicial oversight and political oversight, and explaining the Jordanian Supreme Court’s oversight of the constitutionality of laws, the legal powers granted to it, and oversight of The constitutionality of laws from the Jordanian Constitutional Court, which was established pursuant to the constitutional amendments of 2011, based on Article (58) of the Jordanian Constitution, which led to the transfer of oversight from decentralized and indirect oversight by way of subsidiary payment to direct central oversight And the approach followed in monitoring the constitutionality of laws in the Republic of Iraq, which is a product of the post-2003 phase, as the Iraqi constitutions stipulated the establishment of courts whose mission is to monitor the constitutionality of laws and interpret the texts of the constitution, represented by the Basic Law issued in 1925, and the 1968 Constitution, which mentioned the establishment of the court. Supreme Constitutional.

Copyright of Amman Arab University Journal is the property of Amman Arab University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Direito GV is the property of Fundacao Getulio Vargas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Judicial oversight is essential in Criminal Investigation and Prosecution to protect individuals' rights and prevent the abuse of power. While Western countries and the International Criminal Court recognize its significance, laws in Iran and Syria lack proper distinction and definition of (especially ex-ante) oversight types and systems. This article aims to provide a comparative explanation of judicial oversight, distinguishing it from other forms of oversight. Using an analytical and descriptive approach, the study highlights the dynamic nature of oversight in criminal investigation and prosecution. The research emphasizes the need for explicit and precise classification of judicial oversight types in Syria, Iran, and legal doctrine. Such classification would enhance criminal justice, safeguard individual rights and freedoms, and prevent abuse of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal Law & Political Sciences (Arabic Version) is the property of Journal of Law & Political Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This Article argues that foreign affairs polarization in the United States is likely to result in increased judicial oversight in foreign affairs. The reasons are fivefold. First, increased polarization often leads to dramatic swings in foreign policy across electoral cycles, which is likely to disrupt the reliance interests of not only foreign states but also domestic private parties. Second, domestic private parties who can demonstrate that they have suffered concrete injuries to their reliance interests due to foreign policy instability may be more likely to overcome standing and other conventional obstacles to bringing claims. Third, in an era of polarization, government regimes may tend to encourage reliance by domestic private parties as a strategy to lock in policy and constrain the options of their successors. But when the government deliberately encourages reliance, it should bear the risks of foreign policy instability rather than domestic private parties. Fourth, courts are less likely to defer to presidential judgments in foreign affairs when they believe policy swings are motivated largely by partisan, rather than institutional, considerations. Fifth, on a more speculative note, there is a risk that the precedents and doctrines forged by courts in the resolution of low stakes private disputes involving reliance interests may then be deployed in cases where the stakes are much higher, such as controversies where parties are seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the President. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Guardianships allow court-appointed guardians to make decisions on behalf of persons who are incapable of caring for themselves. With their authority frequently extending over both the personal and the financial affairs of a ward, guardians sometimes abuse their extensive powers. Misuse of funds, excessive fees, and neglect of the ward's needs all have been seen in guardianship cases. As awareness of this problem has grown, innovative approaches have been developed to prevent and detect abuses, including mandatory certification, centralized audits, and visits to persons under guardianship to assess their status. Funding such efforts, however, remains a challenge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Al-Meezan for Law & Islamic Studies is the property of World Islamic Sciences & Education University (WISE) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Administrative decisions in Afghanistan are currently made without the support of written administrative laws or effective mechanisms for judicial oversight due to the national unstable situation from war. This article which is titled “Judicial Oversight on Administrative Decisions in Afghanistan” aims to investigate this issue and propose a dedicated mechanism for judicial oversight. This qualitative research was performed to answer a research question on administrative decisions and its judicial oversight. Desk review method was used, and interviews were conducted with academics in Administrative law. This article also explains the judicial oversight applied by other countries. The findings reveal that Afghanistan lacks an adequate mechanism for judicial oversight of administrative decisions, ruling out the feasibility of adopting models such as the administrative court system seen in France. Afghanistan needs to undergo significant reforms within the judicial system to effectively resolve administrative disputes. A crucial step is the urgent enactment of an Administrative Procedure Law tailored for the administrative court, aimed at streamlining investigation procedures, reducing court expenses, and improving citizen access to justice, thereby strengthening the rule of law in Afghanistan.

Private ordering – where private actors regulate, enforce, and resolve disputes on their own – has in recent years expanded across business, commercial, and financial sectors. Parties have economic and reputational incentives to take this approach over adjudication by the courts. Parties may prefer private ordering for reasons of process, substance, or both. Even when disputes come before them, courts often defer to parties' private ordering. Their rationale is that the parties possess a stronger understanding of their intentions than do the courts. This strong assumption, however, depends on parties' knowledge and relative bargaining strength. In many instances, parties operate under incomplete or imperfect information; additional information could allow parties to enter into more efficient and more fair agreements ex ante, while better informing courts' approach to adjudicating disputes arising from private ordering ex post. The emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) in legal technology – specifically, in its ability to analyse vast amounts of data – can help advance this augmented informational objective. If made broadly accessible, AI has the potential to equalize information and bargaining power between parties. An empirical evaluation of the validity of assumptions that underpin the general support for private ordering can also be instructive for judges. For this reason, courts have an important role to play in the evolution of private law. Their ability to understand and harness AI can lead in the short term to more effective judicial oversight with respect to private ordering. Over the long term, courts can empower parties to make more informed choices when interacting with one another, reducing inefficiencies and rents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes an independent framework for the monitoring, oversight and regulation of hacking techniques used by law enforcement at the international level. Such techniques exert a direct impact on the sovereignty and enforcement jurisdiction of other States, but are currently only subject to unilateral and purely local authorization. Constitutional law at the national level prescribes close judicial scrutiny, but similar controls are generally lacking in virtual space. This article is intended to promote discussion on an area of criminal justice that currently operates in the shadows, but which should be brought further into the light. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Private ordering – where private actors regulate, enforce, and resolve disputes on their own – has in recent years expanded across business, commercial, and financial sectors. Parties have economic and reputational incentives to take this approach over adjudication by the courts. Parties may prefer private ordering for reasons of process, substance, or both. Even when disputes come before them, courts often defer to parties' private ordering. Their rationale is that the parties possess a stronger understanding of their intentions than do the courts. This strong assumption, however, depends on parties' knowledge and relative bargaining strength. In many instances, parties operate under incomplete or imperfect information; additional information could allow parties to enter into more efficient and more fair agreements ex ante, while better informing courts' approach to adjudicating disputes arising from private ordering ex post. The emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) in legal technology – specifically, in its ability to analyse vast amounts of data – can help advance this augmented informational objective. If made broadly accessible, AI has the potential to equalize information and bargaining power between parties. An empirical evaluation of the validity of assumptions that underpin the general support for private ordering can also be instructive for judges. For this reason, courts have an important role to play in the evolution of private law. Their ability to understand and harness AI can lead in the short term to more effective judicial oversight with respect to private ordering. Over the long term, courts can empower parties to make more informed choices when interacting with one another, reducing inefficiencies and rents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The control over the constitutionality of laws in the tax field is one of the means to protect citizens in society from imposing a tax on them other than those provided for in the Constitution, which is different in quality from different legal systems, including the previous system of control over the constitutionality of laws. This is what follows the regime of subsequent control over the constitutionality of laws. The Palestinian legal system decided to subsequently monitor the constitutionality of laws, and this oversight does not achieve justice in the tax field, as it prejudices the two aspects of justice in the tax field, whether in terms of unjustly collecting tax from individuals, Or regarding the effect of the ruling on the unconstitutionality of the tax text, as the benefit from the unconstitutionality ruling is restricted to the taxpayer who is pleading in the constitutional case to the exclusion of other taxpayers. The peculiarity of this type of oversight also appears through the important role that constitutional control plays in rooting the principles of tax law and the distribution of tax powers among the different authorities, as well as the effect that constitutional oversight plays in preserving the rule of tax law, and this is what we will try to explain in precise detail through this search . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Debreceni Jogi Műhely is the property of University of Debrecen and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In a series ofrecent cases, police o#icers have mounted sophisticated surveillance cameras on telephone poles andpointed them at the homes ofpeople suspected ofa crime. These cameras often operatefor months or even years without judicial oversight, collecting vast quantities of video footage on suspects and their activities near the home. Pole camera surveillance raises important Fourth Amendment questions that have divided courts and puzzled scholars. These questions are complicated because Fourth Amendment law is complicated. This is especially the case today as Fourth Amendment law is in a transitional phase, caught between older and newer paradigms for determining the scope ofthe Amendment's power. This Symposium Article succinctly lays out the standards that govern modern Fourth Amendment search questions. It applies those standards to the pole camera issue-perhaps the most urgent and consequential issue in current Fourth Amendment law. The Article surveys the substantial body of caselaw addressing this question. It ojfers its own detailed analysis and grapples with variations in fact patterns that have confounded prior attempts to address the issue. Finally, it uses this analysis to draw vital lessonsjbr Fourth Amendment law more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Basra Studies Journal is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Economic Administrative & Legal Sciences is the property of Arab Journal of Sciences & Research Publishing (AJSRP) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of International Journal of Legal & Comparative Jurisprudence Studies (LCJS) / Mağallaẗ al-Duwaliyyaẗ Li-&-Dirāsāt al-Qānūniyyaẗ Wa-al-Fiqhiyyaẗ al-Muqāranaẗ is the property of Refaad for Studies, Research & Development and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

As it works to define the relationship between thefederal courts and the boards, commissions, and agencies that make up the administrative state, the Supreme Court has long distinguished between public and private rights. Dating from the decision in Murray Lessee, the public rights doctrine allows Congress to assign some matters either to the Article III judiciary or to non-Article III courts. Despite the doctrine's pedigree, however, courts and commentators disagree about what triggers its application. Only three years ago, in Oil States v . Greene ' s Energy, the Court upheld the patent board's power to review patent validity as a matter of public right. But a spirited dissent argued that patent validity contests require an Article III court. Similar disagreements have peppered the Court 's analysis of other public rights questions. This Article offers a new account of Murray ' s Lessee and a new synthesis of the public rights doctrine. Murray ' s Lessee did not turn on Congress's power to manage the government's immunity from suit or on the government's appearance as a party to the litigation (as many have mistakenly assumed). Instead, the Court drew on a distinction between the creation or constitution ofnew rights and the adjudication of disputes over existing rights. Nineteenth century jurists insisted on judicial control of adjudicatory matters, but deferred when Congress conferred discretionary authority on a board or commission or court to fashion new rights through the issuance of a constitutive decree or order. The distinction between the adjudicative resolution of disputes over existing rights and the issuance ofconstitutive orders to create new rights does much to explain Murray ' s Lessee and other controversial applications of the public rights doctrine. Applying this new understanding to Oil States, the Article concludes that although patents issue through a constitutive process, disputes over their validity present adjudicative issues that fall outside the public rights doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can the creation of court-mandated accountability institutions improve human rights? In this article, we investigate the extent to which court-ordered accountability institutions decrease government repression in the form of police violence. We argue that the creation of regional bodies to which citizens report allegations of police abuse provides "fire-alarm" oversight by which police officers can be monitored for abuses of power. To test the implications of our theory, we take advantage of variance in the implementation of Prakash Singh and Others v. Union of India and Others , a 2006 judgment by the Supreme Court of India requiring states and districts to establish local Police Complaints Authorities (PCAs). Using a difference-in-difference design, we show the implementation of state PCAs to be associated with statistically and substantively significant decreases in human rights violations by Indian police officers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mobile phones are more than just telephonic devices; they have the capability to store, retrieve and access potentially endless meta-data, including the personal information of an individual and his or her associates. In a landmark decision of 2014, the United States Supreme Court unanimously deemed unconstitutional the warrantless search and seizure of the digital contents of a mobile phone during an arrest. Five years on, in Queensland, the warrantless search by the police of a detained person's mobile phone can be considered standard investigative procedure. This article examines the legitimacy of existing Queensland police powers to conduct a physical search of a detained person's mobile phone. The core argument advanced is that, on a spectrum of property capable of being searched, a mobile phone should be considered more akin to a person's private home than their handbag or wallet. The article highlights the hazards of police searches of mobile phones that are conducted in the absence of an adequate framework of legal control and judicial oversight, and it recommends greater legal safeguards to govern existing police powers to search mobile phones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reflections on the Charlie Gard litigation suggest that procedural regulation is important to prevent tragic cases becoming 'tragedies'; where well-intentioned but overconfident doctors and parents conflict in ways that are deeply destructive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modern bankruptcy practice under Chapter 11 presumptively excludes the large and publicly-traded corporate debtor's shareholders from the negotiation table based on a longstanding assumption that they have no economic interest to protect because most bankrupt companies are insolvent. But bankruptcy practice overlooks a shareholder's most important economic interest: the right to enjoy the reorganized firm's unlimited upside potential after all creditor claims are satisfied. This interest, which is essentially an option right, is totally ignored in the debtor's hypothetical liquidation analysis. In a similar way, the debtor's upside potential is not fully captured by prevailing enterprise valuation techniques. Of course, the economic uncertainties that drive companies into bankruptcy - as well as the risks that accompany most reorganization plans - also drive down the value of equity's option right. In many cases, the benefits to all other stakeholders of an efficient reorganization will far outweigh the negligible value of the upside rights. But in the case of commodity-based firms that pursue bankruptcy reorganization in declining or bearish price markets (what I call "bearish bankruptcies"), economic theory suggests that the upside potential is likely to be substantial. I argue that by excluding shareholders from the negotiation table, modern bankruptcy practice effectively severs equity's option right at the outset of the case. Then, bearish debtors use a variety of complex and understudied commercial instruments to eliminate uncertainty and convert, in the earliest days of the case and with minimal judicial oversight, certain creditors' limited and fixed rights into unlimited upside rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most widely-endorsed norms in Australian politics is the requirement for bipartisanship in the management of defence and security policy. This norm is assumed to lead to good policy creation, foster political unity, and protect those who implement national policy (particularly the military). The paper argues that evidence for all three of these claims is overstated. In addition, the effects of the norm are often counter-productive and even harmful to the conduct and management of Australian policy. The paper concludes by arguing that the norm of bipartisanship for Australian defence and security policy should be abandoned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As part of the Florida State University College of Law's Environmental Law Without Courts Conference, this Essay examines two ways administrative law operates with little, if any, judicial oversight: Federal agencies play a substantial role in drafting the legislation that empowers them to regulate, and agencies then typically have broad discretion within that congressionally delegated authority to choose how to regulate. The former legislative-drafting activity fully escapes judicial review, and the agency choices made in the latter rulemaking activity are usually only reviewed by courts for reasonableness. In other words, a vast amount of agency lawmaking escapes judicial review, which suggests that it is all the more important to understand the key players within the agency that engage in these legislative and regulatory activities. Part I of this Essay briefly outlines these two types of agency lawmaking activity and how they are insulated from judicial review. Part II explores how agency design may matter in both lawmaking activities -- with a particular emphasis on the agency general counsel office -- by discussing the various agency organizational models identified in the author's prior study for the Administrative Conference of the United States. In particular, the combined legislation and regulation legal office has the virtue of ensuring that those agency lawyers who help draft the legislation can fully leverage the agency's experience and expertise in implementing the legislation, and vice versa. This Part also flags a number of best practices for agency general counsel offices to consider short of consolidating legislative and regulatory counsel in one office. This Essay is by no means a comprehensive take on how agency design choices can affect agency lawmaking. Instead, the objective here is to call attention to the topic and sketch out potential avenues for further research and discussion. Such further exploration is particularly important with respect to agency lawmaking that is insulated from judicial review. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts review and set aside agency action that is "arbitrary [and] capricious." In a common formulation of rationality review, courts must either take a "hard look" at the rationality of agency decisionmaking, or at least ensure that agencies themselves have taken a hard look. We will propose a much less demanding and intrusive interpretation of rationality review-a thin version. Under a robust range of conditions, rational agencies have good reason to decide in a manner that is inaccurate, nonrational, or arbitrary. Although this claim is seemingly paradoxical or internally inconsistent, it simply rests on an appreciation of the limits of reason, especially in administrative policymaking. Agency decisionmaking is nonideal decisionmaking; what would be rational under ideal conditions is rarely a relevant question for agencies. Rather, agencies make decisions under constraints of scarce time, information, and resources. Those constraints imply that agencies will frequently have excellent reasons to depart from idealized first-order conceptions of administrative rationality. Thin rationality review describes the law in action. Administrative law textbooks typically suggest that the State Farm decision in 1983 inaugurated an era of stringent judicial review of agency decisionmaking for rationality. That is flatly wrong at the level of the Supreme Court, where agencies have won no less than 92 percent of the sixty-four arbitrariness challenges decided on the merits since the 1982 Term. The Court's precedent embodies an approach to rationality review that is highly tolerant of the inescapable limits of agency rationality when making decisions under uncertainty. State Farm is not representative of the law; beloved of law professors, and frequently cited in rote fashion by judges, State Farm nonetheless lies well outside the mainstream of the Supreme Court's precedent. To encapsulate the Court's approach to rationality review, the best choice would be the powerfully deferential opinion in Baltimore Gas, decided in the same Term as State Farm. Plausibly, rather than living in the era of hard look review or the State Farm era, we live in the era of Baltimore Gas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the lack of judicial oversight over the enforcement of law on police officials, highlighting the lack of professionalism and deterrents, and aggression of officials. It also presents cases of officials including Randall Kerrick, Lisa Mearkle, and Dominique Perez. Suggestion for standardization of reasoning provided by officials during such cases.

In the wake of the Watergate Scandal, which exposed a variety of corporate as well as political abuses, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) discovered that a staggering number of large corporations had made questionable or illegal payments exceeding $300 million to foreign government officials, politicians, and political parties. In 1977, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) to curb the negative impact of these corrupt payments on United States foreign policy objectives regarding the promotion of democracy and the free market system. In the decades since the passage of the FCPA, the government has expanded the use of the statute beyond its original target (large corporations) to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which often lack the resources and international business sophistication to guard against bribery and extortion in all its forms and thus avoid liability. Additionally, the government's enforcement regime exists largely outside the courts. As a result, the investigative tactics and settlement agreements are overly harsh on SMEs, exceed statutorily proscribed penalties, and discourage utilization and litigation of a variety of statutory provisions designed to protect businesses from liability. This Comment argues that the FCPA should be amended to provide SMEs proper defenses against liability through the mental state provisions for domestic concerns and require more judicial oversight of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the SEC enforcement policies. These changes will encourage SMEs to enter the international marketplace and protect SMEs from investigative costs and settlement penalties that do serious harm to their financial situation and are often disproportionate to the alleged wrongdoing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]