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Criminal sentencing has grown into an increasingly interactive process featuring a multiplicity of potential actors—prosecution, defence, the individual convicted of the crime, probation officers and case workers, victims or their families, the police, community representatives, community workers, and even academics. The philosophical foundations of sentencing scholarship, however, regularly assume a model of judicial solitude in which sentencing judges are separate and apart from other actors. This article suggests the need to take sentencing’s interactivity and its politics seriously and draws on democratic theory to address this gap. Accordingly, it argues that listening—as conceived of by deliberative democrats—is essential to a relational ethic that ensures both the legitimacy and quality of sentencing decisions, particularly in cases involving marginalized communities. In doing so, it turns to judicial practice and highlights both the need and possibilities for listening to be taken up as an explicit feature of judicial ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Technologies that have emerged over the past five years are changing the way in which judges work. Some of the technologies can support judges and others have the potential to replace them. This article considers international developments in selected jurisdictions as well as barriers to the take-up of technology. From the use of supportive technologies including generative Al and videoconferencing, to the development of technologies that guide and monitor judges, there are differing ethical impacts as well as impacts on the role of judges as guardians of the court system and protectors of democratic arrangements. The impacts on the judiciary of these types of technologies are considered together with more future-focused options. For example, how might judges be "enhanced" in the future and what options could be available to enhance, rather than replace, judges with supportive technologies? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research investigates judicial ethics violations in Indonesia and suggests remedies for the problem. It aims to understand the types and causes of these violations and inform potential legislative changes. The research methodology employed is a combination of qualitative and descriptive approaches. The study analyzes judicial commission court decisions on ethics violations by judges and conducts interviews with officers of the Judicial Commission of Indonesia. This approach allows for a thorough examination of the trends in ethical violations and the contributing factors. The main findings of the paper highlight the various forms of ethical violations, including lack of professionalism, discipline, fairness, honesty, and integrity. The research identifies factors such as intervention by court leaders, a culture emphasizing authority, lack of independence in familyrelated cases, and inadequate knowledge and culture of upholding professional principles as contributing to these violations. The conclusion emphasizes the need to strengthen external supervision by the Judicial Commission and to require the Supreme Court to obtain recommendations from the Judicial Commission before promoting judges. The paper highlights the relevance of its findings in informing potential amendments to legislation and promoting transparency, accountability, and ethical conduct among judges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the role of judicial conduct commissions (JCCs) in maintaining public trust in the judiciary. Topics include the historical development of judicial ethics standards, the dual mission of JCCs to investigate misconduct while respecting judicial independence, and the need for proper resources and training to enhance the effectiveness of these commissions.

The article focuses on improving public trust in the judiciary by enhancing transparency and engagement. Topics include the judiciary's need for better public communication about court functions, the importance of receiving and utilizing feedback for improvement, and the benefits of remote access to court proceedings for increasing public confidence and accessibility.

The article focuses on the Supreme Court's response to calls for a binding Code of Conduct. Topics include the American Bar Association's Resolution 400 urging for a binding code, legislative efforts such as the SCEA and SCERT bills to enforce ethical standards, and the Supreme Court's adoption of a Code of Conduct without enforcement mechanisms.

The article focuses on the recent adoption of a formal Code of Conduct by the U.S. Supreme Court, highlighting its significance despite being less robust than other judicial frameworks. Topics include the need for specific and transparent ethical standards, the challenges of defining and addressing the appearance of impropriety, and the importance of aspirational goals in maintaining public trust and judicial integrity.

The article focuses on the evolution of judicial conduct codes in the United States, aimed at ensuring judicial independence and integrity. Topics include the historical origins of the judicial ethics codes in response to public scandals, the major revisions of these codes over time, and the recent adoption of a new ethics code by the Supreme Court of the United States to address modern concerns.

Judges have a brand-new bag--an algorithmic accessory in criminal adjudication. It scores criminal defendants, aiming to inform judges which defendants are likely reoffenders or flight risks and which ones are not. The downsides, however, include that the algorithms score defendants primarily on the basis of other defendants' (mis)conduct and that certain races effectively score lower than other races. This article explores these algorithmic developments in criminal courts across the country and makes four contributions: (1) a survey and preliminary application of judicial ethics to this development; (2) a preliminary moral argument, informed by related judicial ethics and legal standards, suggesting that judges should use these algorithmic tools only to help, not hurt, individual defendants; (3) an approach to judicial decision-making in the shadow of structural injustice that promises to deal less algorithmic damage to defendants and their family members; and (4) a technical constraint on algorithmic design that ensures equal (indeed, better than equal) protection on the basis of race. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hierarchy in judiciaries can be a threat for judicial independence, especially when control of judicial behavior can be triggered by complaints and the influence of politics, directly or via appointments and promotions to the highest positions is likely. Such hierarchy enforces conformity in judges and prevents them from initiating cooperation and changes in the organizational functioning of the courts. In order to make a judiciary more resilient against such external pressures, the inevitable hierarchy should be complemented by different kinds of cooperation between judges in the courts. This cooperation can be about procedural guidelines, judicial ethics, quality standards, case law, etc. I illustrate this by describing several projects to improve the functioning of the courts in Greece, Ukraine and the Netherlands. One of the hypotheses I conclude this article with, is that when no initiatives are visible in the (lower) courts to improve the functioning of the judicial process or the court organization, that may be an indication that the effects of hierarchical controls prevent judges from cooperating on the shopfloor. Because in such hierarchies it is difficult for judges to know from each other how they manage and decide similar cases, society cannot rely on the courts to manage and decide cases predictably. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The integrity of the American legal system and, thereby, of our democracy rests on the shoulders of the judiciary. It is widely understood that the roles of jurist and advocate are incompatible and that the fairness and legitimacy of our court systems require maintaining clear boundaries between those roles. Accordingly, an essential feature of every state’s judicial conduct code is a prohibition on the practice of law by judges. However, many states have carved out exceptions to this prohibition to allow part-time judges sitting in low-level trial courts to supplement their modest judicial compensation by practicing law. The rationale for these exceptions neither cancels nor addresses the problems inherent in allowing judges to practice law. Rather, the real-world impact of the exceptions to the prohibition underscores the importance of the default restriction on law practice by judges. At a minimum, permitting the existence of lawyer-judges gives rise to potential conficts and practical challenges. Other consequences are more unsettling, as when a person holding both roles uses their judicial authority to beneft a private client or to gain other personal advantage. Aside from the potential impact of the dual role in particular cases, such permission creates awkwardness and uncertainty for the attorneys, judges, and litigants with whom the lawyer-judges interact, thereby undermining public confdence in the courts in which they appear as attorneys and sit as judges. Conversely, full-time judges, who do not have their attention, interests, and responsibilities divided by maintaining a separate law practice, can immerse fully in their judicial role. States that continue to allow law practice by judges should amend their respective judicial codes of conduct and, as needed, restructure their judiciary to eliminate any reliance on part-time judges. Such long overdue reforms are essential to protecting our courts, the litigants who appear before them, and the integrity and fairness of our justice system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court is one of our most precious institutions. However, for the lastfew years, American confidence in the Court has dropped to a new low. Less than 40% of Americans have confidence in the Court and its decisions. Recent revelations regarding luxury trips, gifs, and exclusive access for certain individuals to the Justices have raised questions about whether the Justices understand their basic ethical duties and can act in afair and impartial manner. As commentators have noted, the Supreme Court stood as the only court in America that was not governed by an ethical code. The question is why and whether that needed to change? Although there are many reasons for the Court to have adopted an ethical code, one stands out as particularly important--the needforjudicial humility. Since ancient times, humility has been a basic quality .for judges. It helps ensure that judges understand the need to act thirly and to be perceived as acting impartially. This Article discusses the needfor an enforceable ethical code. Despite thefact that the Supreme Court recently adopted what it labeled a "Code of Conduct for Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States," this code is more an outline of aspirational standards than an actual code of conduct. The so-called "code" lacks an enforcement mechanism. Thus, while it may be modeled on the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, without an enforcement mechanism, it is--at best--a recognition by the Court that it, too, should meet certain minimum ethical standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Judicial legitimacy not only depends on judges maintaining the high ethical standards imposed on them but also on the public believing judges will be held accountable when they break the rules. However, judges are often viewed as “getting away with it.” This Article focuses on how to improve this problematic perception of state judicial discipline systems (JDSs). Part of the answer is more exposure, including a social media presence, for judicial discipline commissions (JDCs), the bodies in each state responsible for resolving misconduct complaints and recommending or imposing sanctions, because the public and media have a similar flawed understanding of the high number of dismissals to preserve the necessary distinction between misconduct and appeals and seriousness of all public sanctions. But JDSs also have shortcomings. First, the foundational purposes identified for sanctions are incomplete due to courts’ repeated statements that punishment has no role to play. Such assertions are inaccurate and detrimental to the purposes that are acknowledged: deterring misconduct, recognizing the seriousness of the misconduct and communicating that to the public, and, especially, encouraging public confidence in JDSs. Moreover, while affirmative statements that sanctions are not meant to punish cannot be blamed for every sanction the public finds too lenient, they do encourage lighter sanctions, which is connected to the next JDS problem. Second, disproportionate sanctions thwart the aims of JDSs and further the harmful slap-on-the-wrist narrative, frustrating the public. While judges and JDSs characterize public censure as serious, the public and media view anything short of suspension as too light. Although this does not mean censures should be abandoned, sanctioning bodies should impose suspensions for significant misconduct and hold to the standard that has already been articulated―extreme misconduct equals removal. This is not always an easy line to draw, but there are plenty of recent examples where it should have been, including: (1) a judge ignoring the defendants’ request for counsel and then prosecuting the case himself and (2) a judge admitting criminal responsibility that necessitated prison time— but the first judge only received a censure and the second a suspension. Third, lengthy suspensions as sanctions should be abandoned because, without any additional benefit over a short suspension, they burden the court system, adding delay and creating additional work for other judges with dockets that are already too full and provide an out to JDCs and courts when removal would be more proportionate to the misconduct. Thus, suspensions should be limited to thirty days. Fourth, suspensions should result in lost time toward retirement vesting, and removal for any reason should equal automatic retirement benefit forfeiture. Fifth, JDCs and courts must have continuing jurisdiction over complaints made prior to judges leaving office with every sanction available to them, including removal for purposes of retirement benefit forfeiture. In sum, increasing judicial accountability by employing the steps this Article offers will not only increase JDS efficacy but also judicial legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the historical development and contemporary challenges of judicial ethics, particularly within the context of the U.S. Supreme Court. It examines the impact of public outcry on prompting ethical reforms and analyzes recent initiatives aimed at addressing ethical lapses within the judiciary. It underscores the ongoing need for effective ethical oversight and accountability mechanisms within the highest echelons of the American legal system.

The article delves into the systemic shortcomings within the realm of Supreme Court judicial ethics, underscoring the necessity for a comprehensive code of conduct complemented by robust enforcement measures. It elucidates how the erosion of public trust and the legitimacy of the Court stem from these deficiencies. It emphasizes the imperative of preserving the perception of impartiality, the discussion transcends partisan divides.

A permanent condition for the justice and effectiveness of the domestic judiciary composes the observance of the constitutional principles of its implementation, mainly the principle of independence, both in the aspect of the judicial system and in relation to the legal profession. The principle of independence of judges should be considered as a mega-principle that has its demonstration in legal, ideological, economic, social, and other aspects. It is through the prism of the first two of the notable ones that the work examines the principle of independence. Having analyzed the legislative regulation and scientific approaches to the disclosure of the principle of independence, its dual nature is reasoned, the content of which is revealed through such a status of judges and the state of the judiciary as a whole, which provides for the implementation of judicial activity without any illegal influence, pressure or interference, but guided by the rule of law. It has been proven that the submission of judges to the rule of law acts as an additional guarantee of their independence and a reasonable limitation aimed at avoiding lawlessness and arbitrariness. Having revealed the meaning of the constitutional principle of independence of judges, the publication draws attention to the deontological principles of judicial activity, it is substantiated that the internal imperatives of judicial ethics, the basis of which is the demand for independence, determine the main vectors of building relations between the judge and other participants in the judiciary, ensure his resistance to various temptations to depart from impartiality in the case in their own interests or the interests of other subjects. It has been proven that internal independence is an individual duty of each judge, which comes from the moral and ethical qualities of a specific person and forms necessary potential for the effectiveness of his activity. After analyzing the legal regulation, including the principles of moral culture of judges at the level of the Constitution, a conclusion was formulated regarding the need for legislative consolidation of the fundamental moral qualities of a candidate for the position of judge and their main characteristics, as well as the development of clear methods of their verification for the proper formation of the judicial corps and the effective implementation of the judiciary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a critical analysis of a fundamental judicial ethic, the appearance of impartiality, an increasingly important public issue that is poorly understood and woefully underexamined in jurisprudence and academic literature. The ethic is pivotal to the determination of judicial disqualification, a/k/a recusal, and the public's fragile trust in the rule of law. The article explains how a mysterious metaphorical device, the "reasonable observer" (a descendant of the common law's "reasonable man") has been subjectively applied in a confusing and inconsistent manner in judicial disqualification cases. The unexamined approach has unwittingly undermined the plain text and the mandatory ethical obligation of recusal (i.e., a judge must disqualify when his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned). The discussion: (a) analyzes the theoretical underpinnings of the reasonable person-observer analytical tool ("heuristic"); (b) explains how American jurisprudence has glibly transmogrified the appearance-recusal precept; (c) provides a unique and starkly contrasting analytical perspective demonstrating how select common law-based jurisdictions (Australia, Canada, Singapore, South Africa, United Kingdom) have painstakingly examined and applied the widely-recognized norm of appearance-based impartiality; and (d) synthesizes the preceding theoretical and jurisprudential information to support a proposal for a recalibrated metric and a pragmatic, clarifying heuristic. The article concludes with a model provision, in the form of a guiding "commentary," that summarizes the essential aspects of the appearance of bias precept. The article provides an interpretative approach that attempts to be faithful to the letter and spirit of the foundational judicial ethic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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It is not easy to find a fair balance between inappropriate speech on the one hand and the appearance of constraint and inaccessibility on the other. Also judges must deal with this difficult task. They must take care not to endanger values that are protected to secure the functionality of justice. This article deals with questions of why and how judges can fulfil this task and what might happen if they fail to do so. The article argues in favour of temperate speech using arguments from the fields of judicial ethics and normative ethics. It also offers examples of intemperate speech that might be dangerous to justice. Last but not least, the article mentions the relevance of judicial temperate speech for the concept of open justice thanks to which the judiciary might seek public confidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Justices of the Supreme Court increasingly claim to be originalists. Yet close examination reveals that the Court's actual reliance on originalist analysis is highly selective. In large swathes of cases, the avowedly originalist Justices make little or no effort to justify their rulings by reference to original constitutional meanings. Nor do most of them show much disposition to grant certiorari in many cases that might enable them to overrule past, nonoriginalist decisions. This Article defines and documents the phenomenon of selective originalism. Having done so, the Article explores the cultural and jurisprudential conditions in which selective originalism, which typically abets substantively conservative decisionmaking, has developed and now flourishes. The doctrine of stare decisis, the Article argues, plays an important role in enabling selective originalism. Because it seldom either requires or forbids precedent-based decisionmaking by the Supreme Court, it allows the Court to be originalist when it chooses but not to be originalist when it chooses. In light of this appraisal of the significance of stare decisis in the Supreme Court, the Article criticizes the practice of selective originalism for its inconsistency and disingenuousness. But the Article also explores the obvious question that criticisms frame: Why do the selectively originalist Justices not respond by articulating a more complex doctrine that would seek to justify their only-selective reliance on originalist premises? We would misunderstand selective originalism, the Article argues. if we derided its misleading pretensions and probed no further. The self-avowed originalist Justices almost certainly experience themselves as duty-bound to overturn nonoriginalist holdings in some cases, though not in all, even when the doctrine of stare decisis is too weak to dictate their conclusions as a strict matter of law. And the reasons why, I argue, contain lessons for originalists and nonoriginalists alike: A clear-eyed appraisal of the Justices'functions should inspire the conclusion that the Supreme Court, unlike other courts, is a predominantly lawmaking tribunal that must bear responsibility for the practical and moral desirability of changes that it effects in the fabric of constitutional law. In light Of the Court's distinctive junctions, conclusions about what the Justices ought to do, and indeed have obligations to do, are often best understood as embodying judgments about judicial role morality in addition to law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the spotlight on the Supreme Court shines brighter, the public has become increasingly aware of judicial misconduct and ethical issues. This increased awareness has also exposed the judiciary's less-than-stellar record on handling such issues. Of these ethical issues, recusal decisions are a prominent cause for concern--especially in today's hyper-politicized world. When or whether to recuse is a sensitive and important question most judges are bound to face. Although some statutory guidance exists, that guidance is far from a model of clarity. Even where statutory guidance is facially clear, recusal problems still persist due to benign and technological errors, or--in some cases--a fundamental misunderstanding of what the statutes require. Additionally, the rise of social media only complicates the vague statutory framework. And with more recent outspoken judges on the federal bench, new recusal questions emerge and unique recusal motions are sure to be filed. Recusal is not limited solely to judges but also affects judicial law clerks. That is, the actions of judicial law clerks affect the judges they clerk for. But guidance for judicial law clerks is varied and thin, which creates additional problems. Moreover, recusal has become increasingly weaponized and used for strategic advantage by all three branches of government. Each branch has ways to influence or dictate recusal decisions, all of which threaten the sanctity of the judiciary. What is a judge to do? This Article explores and highlights potential recusal-worthy issues for both judges and judicial law clerks. Further, it details how recusal has become weaponized and explains the dangers in permitting the proliferation of recusal weaponization. Finally, this Article proffers reforms to help prevent and curb recusal abuse by (1) changing the timing of appellate review of recusal decisions; (2) modifying the appellate standard of review for recusal decisions; and (3) suggesting methods to prevent recusal manipulation in the en banc process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses how moral principles may influence the legal decision-making process of judges, in response to the 2022 book "Common Good Constitutionalism," by law professor Adrian Vermeule. Topics discussed include the theory of constitutional thought of Vermeule compared to the legal principles of originalism and progressivism, the constitutional interpretation and nature of law theories of philosopher Ronald Dworkin, and the exercise of moral justification by judges.