Immediately after liberation from Japanese occupation, numerous experts were deployed from the United States to survey the postwar landscape of the Philippines. They were sent to collect images of and collect statistical information on the extent of damages to Philippine agricultural and manufacturing industry, transportation and shipping facilities, urban and village structures, and natural resources. This collection of information urgently framed the Philippine Islands as "utterly devastated." Within the U.S. congress, immediate calls were made not for short term relief, as originally thought, but rather for long term plans of rehabilitation and reconstruction in the Philippines. From 1945 to 1946 discussions of a Rehabilitation Act were steadily pursued. By 1946 the "original Rehabilitation Bill had been expanded, the kinds and amounts of claimants had been extended and definitions broadened, the amounts appropriated had been multiplied over five times." Bundled along with the disappointing Bell-Trade Act of 1946, the Rehabilitation Act still ushered in a sense of optimism in the immediate postwar Philippines. By the sheer amount of money it provided, numerous projects and institutions were planned to aid in gaining the newly independent Republic the international recognition it deserved. Yet at the same time, inhabiting the shadows of optimism was the anxiety of mismanagement of money. In 1947, one particular group, the Joint Philippine American Finance Commission made up of both Philippine and American members reported their findings and recommendations. Their findings conclude that the initial years of Philippine independence was of critical importance in the "economic development" and stable future of the nation. Chief in their concerns was the potential mishandling of rehabilitation loan money entering the young nation. In response the joint commission makes several recommendations. Of utmost importance is the principle proposal of a Central Bank. The establishment of the Central Bank of the Philippines, as the chief authority on national currency, can ensure that all of their other recommendations are followed. This paper thus proposes to look at the emergence of the Central Bank as an object produced out of the uncanny postwar discourses of economists. These postwar discourses center on the anxiety over the twofold possibilities of misrecognition of money as well as a collapse into a non-modern economy. In the imaginary of economists, the existence of a Central Bank guided by techno-knowledge and sound management, acts as the bulwark against such devastating possibilities. Furthermore, the potential success of the Central Bank is demonstrative of the potential success of a sovereign Philippine political economy. Yet in order to legitimate the existence of a Central Bank, this paper asserts that through disciplined economic research, a recurring non-modern economic world is created by economists. This non-modern economic world is then historically presented as inhabiting the present postwar space of the Philippines. Furthermore, it also threatens to subsume it. It does so in two interrelated ways. The first is the potential misrecognition of money as speaking a language other than the value of capital. The second is the discourse created by economists in order to produce uncanny effects through the economy. These two methods intertwine in order to combine, what they imagine as a chaotic and fragmented space of islands: peasants, rebellions, decrepit banks, atrophied agricultural industries, and other non-modern elements, into a unitary and coherent whole. The name of this object is the Philippine national economy. And like any object, once solid and tangible, it can be continuously manipulated, managed, and exploited by both state and international banking institutions... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]