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This chapter by James Goldrick analyzes the Royal Navy's experiences in relation to the submarine force in the Far East during the interwar years. It argues that the story of submarine policy and operational plans for the Far East is a generally consistent one, with the Royal Navy maintaining a substantial commitment, which it nevertheless acknowledged internally being as less than desirable and reinforcing that commitment when it had the resources. It discusses why the activities of the submarine force did not feature significantly in much of the main stream of operational and tactical development. It argues that in fact there was a sustained effort to plan for the effective employment of the submarines and that there was a continuing debate as to the balance which should be struck between purely defensive operations and offensive patrols in Japanese waters, but at all times with recognition of the need to provide for the effective protection of the British facilities in the Far East in the "Period Before Relief."

This chapter by James Goldrick examines the creation of a sophisticated learning and training system for the anti-U-boat war, which is one of the most significant elements of the Atlantic campaign, critical to the effectiveness of the escort units of the RN and RCN. This system's development took place as both services were forced to adapt rapidly to profound changes in their operational environments. That development faced many challenges, not only from a scarcity of resources, but from the necessity to develop sufficient understanding of the problem. The "master-apprentice" culture of professionalization managed through long service would not serve under the pressure of the oceanic small-ship war. The effort had to be industrialized. Acceptable levels of collective efficiency only became possible when the right equipment and training assets, sufficiently – even if barely – experienced personnel, and proven tactical doctrine could be brought together to provide the necessary fidelity within the training experience. From the outset, this would always be a much more complex and resource-intensive operation than the straightforward working-up of individual units.

Jan Ruger has produced a history not so much of the little island group that guards the approaches to Germany’s North Sea coasts as of its role as a symbol of German nationalism and unity. Such sym...

Australia’s submarine acquisition programme is one of the most ambitious in the region. It is framed by the country’s relationship with Southeast Asia in an era of increased tension in the South China Sea and rising tension between China and the USA. Australia faces a considerable challenge in matching technological and industrial capability, competing demands on its economy, the domestic political scene and its operational requirements. This unique combination of challenges is compared with the experience of the smaller navies of Southeast Asia.

The changeover from coal to oil propulsion in the world’s navies in the period of the First World War has been treated by many historians largely as a straightforward efficiency exercise in adopting new technology. This article assesses the issues of coal through analysis of the problems related to ship operations which were encountered with manpower, ship design, and coal supply. It argues that the demise of coal became likely through the introduction of turbine propulsion, which gave warships for the first time real potential to achieve and maintain high speeds. It then became unavoidable when the limitations inherent in coal firing became obvious in the context of global, long-range operations and a threat environment that included the submarine and which required surface ships to maintain much higher speeds at sea for vastly more extended periods than they had prior to 1914.

The changes in Britain’s strategic situation, and thus defence and foreign policy, caused by the transition from coal to oil for were nothing short of profound. Before oil, Britain provided the glo...

The Royal Navy experienced many unpleasant surprises in the opening months of the First World War. Too many preconceptions were based upon the expectation of a short war, an outlook encouraged by the relative brevity of pre-war manoeuvres and a desire to avoid risk. The absence of a fleet-onfleet encounter in the opening days of the conflict soon created significant pressures on ships and people. The navy was not used to continuous high-speed steaming and the unremitting demands placed upon seagoing personnel, including the heavy labour of repeated coaling. For a fleet poorly provided with bases and repair facilities in the North Sea, the reality of the submarine threat was also very different to what had been expected. This paper analyses both the situation in which the British found themselves and the reasons behind it.

This is a very good book. It is a detailed study by two Australian historians of the development of Indonesia’s archipelagic regime concept, from the days of its inception to its formal acceptance ...

In early 1949, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) suffered a succession 'of mass insubordination'. A commission of inquiry followed, which produced an extraordinarily wide ranging assessment of the culture of the RCN and what needed to be done to improve the service. Much of what came to be called the 'Mainguy Report' was good, but it is clear in retrospect that many of its conclusions, were driven by the powerful influence of a French-Canadian naval volunteer reserve officer, Louis Audette. His personal perspective of war service and his own interactions with the British Royal Navy profoundly coloured his own outlook and progressively that of the commission, including Rear-Admiral Mainguy who was the chair. Audette was in civilian life a lawyer and on his own testimony, he put his skills of argument and persuasion to determined use to drive the commissioners to the conclusions he wanted. Keywords: British Royal Navy; Louis Audette; Mainguy Report; Rear-Admiral Mainguy; Royal Canadian Navy (RCN)

High Seas Buffer: The Taiwan Patrol Force, 1950–1979 by Bruce A. Elleman Naval War College Press, Newport RI, 2012, US$29 (pb) 171 pages, with 9 maps, 6 black-and-white illustrations, bibliography,...

This paper analyses the development of the navies of India and Pakistan in the first twenty-five years after independence. It argues that the two organisations refashioned themselves from their origins in the British Royal Navy into something more distinctly national in character. This change of identity was partly inevitable in itself, partly driven by strategic conditions and, finally, motivated by a developing recognition that survival depended upon each navy gaining external acceptance as a national organisation with a legitimate role in the defence of the state.1