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This paper looks at cognition from the perspective of Yaśovijaya-sūri’s Jaina-tarka-bhāṣā. Considering the nature of sensory cognition (mati-jñāna), represented by the four stages (sensation, speculation, perceptual judgement, retention) and of verbal cognition (śruta-jñāna), it reflects on the form and rendering of the word as a raw, physical sound or the meaningful particle of language linked to an infinite number of other such particles, deeply rooted in reliance on linguistic convention. The author considers here what properties such cognition recognises and relates to them especially in light of the theory of viewpoints, providing a contribution to reflections on its meaning. The other questions posed in the article are: which prerequisites are met by people between whom this kind of communication takes place and what role do the scriptures play? Yaśovijaya-sūri’s thought is set in the broader context (Siddhasena Divākara, Jinabhadra Gaṇi, Vādideva-sūri, Dharmabhūṣana, Vinayavijaya Gaṇi), with emphasis of his sources of inspiration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout the centuries, Jaina authors actively engaged in producing their own versions of stories that were told in sources such as the Rāmāyaṇa, Mahābhārata, and the purāṇas. These authors self-consciously present themselves as correcting preceding narratives that they do not accept as credible. However, the question arises: what criteria determine the credibility of one version over another? This paper offers one possible answer as it appears in the Investigation of Dharma (Dharmaparīkṣā), a Jaina narrative that has been retold repeatedly in different languages throughout the second millennium. By examining its earliest available retellings—in Apabhramsha (988 CE) and Sanskrit (1014 CE)—I argue that this narrative traces the credibility of stories to the ideas of (1) coherence across textual boundaries and (2) correspondence with real-life experience. In this paper, I trace how these notions manifest in the Investigation and analyze the narrative's mechanism for training its audience to evaluate for themselves the credibility of stories. Through this analysis, the paper offers a fresh perspective on the motivations of premodern South Asian authors to retell existing narratives and sheds light on the reading practices they expect from their audience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Arti Dhand, it can be argued that all Indian ethics have been primarily virtue ethics. Many have indeed jumped on the virtue bandwagon, providing prima facie interpretations of Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist canons in virtue terms. Others have expressed firm skepticism, claiming that virtues are not proven to be grounded in the nature of things and that, ultimately, the appeal to virtue might just well be a mere façon de parler. In this paper, we aim to advance the discussion of Indian virtue ethics. Our intent is not to provide a catch‐all interpretation of the different Indian schools. Our goal is, more modestly, to offer a theory of virtues in Indian philosophies, as a framework for theorists and interpreters who see these diverse traditions as amenable to systematic virtue analysis. Our theory grounds virtues in the reality of genuine moral dispositions and in a system of beliefs where morality is understood as transformative in nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Public interest litigation (Nikhil Soni vs. Union of India & Ors. Civil Writ Petition No.7414/2006) contesting the legality of the Jain fast to death, known as sallekhanā or santhārā, was filed in 2006. In response, the Rajasthan High Court issued a ban of the practice in 2015 which was quickly stayed by the Indian Supreme Court, where the case awaits a final verdict. The rise of the case through the courts and its surrounding controversy occurred parallel to the rise in widespread use of social media and messaging apps, resulting in a magnification of discourse and activism and thrusting Jains into a defensive public position that demanded a coordinated communal response employing "visibility tactics." Widening the picture of public discourse about santhārā to include these spaces, this article will explore how the technological mediations of Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram form a context-specific multilingual archive that indexes Jain sociality around the fast, including resistance to criminalization, anxiety about surveillance and regulation, and local and internal disputes. Unlike printed patrikas (communal newsletters), the speed, frequency, and reach of online media traverse national, state, and social boundaries. The article also describes how women have meaningfully accessed and shaped these new discursive spheres, such as virtual svādhyāya (self-study) groups and Jain-specific mobile apps, facilitating and transforming the spread of Jain religiosity and reimagining Jain geography as multimodal following developments in santhārā's symbolic and social power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout the centuries, Jaina authors actively engaged in producing their own versions of stories that were told in sources such as the Rāmāyaṇa, Mahābhārata, and the purāṇas. These authors self-consciously present themselves as correcting preceding narratives that they do not accept as credible. However, the question arises: what criteria determine the credibility of one version over another? This paper offers one possible answer as it appears in the Investigation of Dharma (Dharmaparīkṣā), a Jaina narrative that has been retold repeatedly in different languages throughout the second millennium. By examining its earliest available retellings—in Apabhramsha (988 CE) and Sanskrit (1014 CE)—I argue that this narrative traces the credibility of stories to the ideas of (1) coherence across textual boundaries and (2) correspondence with real-life experience. In this paper, I trace how these notions manifest in the Investigation and analyze the narrative’s mechanism for training its audience to evaluate for themselves the credibility of stories. Through this analysis, the paper offers a fresh perspective on the motivations of premodern South Asian authors to retell existing narratives and sheds light on the reading practices they expect from their audience.

According to Jaina cosmology, the non-universe is a hollow sphere beyond and exists all round the universe, whose middle region is the horizontal universe resting on a circular disc. The Bhagavatī Sūtra and the Sthānāṅga Sūtra each mention that there is the core of the horizontal universe where a cube of eight space-points is and from those eight space-points ten directions originate. This paper presents a conjectural explanation for understanding that cube. The core of the non-universe is the core of a core-sphere when the core-sphere is formed using n core-circles such that they are stacked up and down in the same order from the nth core-circle to the first core-circle. The upper four points of the cube of eight points form the core of the horizontal universe and the cube of eight points is the core of the non-universe. The nth core-circle becomes the horizontal universe when n is innumerable and the nth core-sphere forms the non-universe when n approaches infinity. This paper also shows that the intermediate and cardinal directions are linear and planar respectively while the zenith and nadir ones are three-dimensional.

Kundakunda's handling of several basic ideas cannot be omitted when one deals with the following concepts in Jaina philosophy: 1. Syāt/siya, syādvāda or saptabhaṅgī. 2. Nayas, vyavahāra and niścaya nayas and nayavāda. 3. Sapta and Nava tattvas/padārtha and 4. Anekāntavāda. No doubt his dates are a major conundrum; recent research regards him to have lived around the fourth or fifth centuries (Brill's Encyclopedia of Jainism, BEJ: Brill's Encyclopedia of Jainism (Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 2 South Asia), edited by Knut Jacobsen, John A. Cort, Paul Dundas and Kristi L. Wiley. Leiden | Boston: Brill, 2020., p. 853). Moreover, it has been said that Kundakunda "thread a somewhat new path on which he virtually remained a lone traveller", evident by the fact that hardly, if any, Digambara or even Śvetāmbara scholar elaborates on his ideas, let alone crediting him for significant basic insights into Jaina philosophy. Moreover, it seems to be evident, as will be attempted to show, that some ideas appear to be taken over from Kundakunda. Together with Kundakunda's 'legacy', this article will highlight several conundrums regarding the philosophical impact of several concepts in his works that fortunately have not been relegated to oblivion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Jaina saptabhaṅgī (seven angles of analysis or types of sentences) has drawn the attention of non-classical logicians due to its unique use of negation, contradiction, and avaktavya ('unutterable'). In its most basic structure, the saptabhaṅgī appears as: (i) in a certain sense, P; (ii) in a certain sense, not P; (iii) in a certain sense, P and not P; (iv) in a certain sense, inexpressibility of P; (v) in a certain sense, P and inexpressibility of P; (vi) in a certain sense, not P and inexpressibility of P; (vii) in a certain sense, P, not P, and inexpressibility of P. This appearance has led many (e.g., Ganeri and Priest) to claim that the saptabhaṅgī supports non-classical systems of logic, but such a reading is contested by Balcerowicz. Focusing on Vādidevasūri's (12th c. CE) and Yaśovijaya's (17th c. CE) accounts of the saptabhaṅgī, this paper puts forward a formalization of the saptabhaṅgī that brings together the non-classical views and Balcerowicz's view through relating the saptabhaṅgī to the Buddhist unanswerable questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study presents a detailed analysis of the narrative of Goyama and the ascetics of Mount Aṭṭhāvaya in the Āvaśyaka Cūrṇi , including text and translation. By identifying a range of themes, intertexts and allusions in the narrative, a variety of Jain perspectives on the nature of asceticism are uncovered. Topics covered include the Āvaśyaka Cūrṇi as "commentary", the Āvaśyaka Niryukti background to the Āvaśyaka Cūrṇi narrative, some possible Śaiva allusions in the narrative, the significance of Goyama's physical appearance, Goyama's explanation of the canonical story of Puṃḍarīa, and Goyama's power of bestowing limitless food. In addition to the narrative told in the Āvaśyaka Cūrṇi , its earliest metrical version in the Uttarādhyayana Niryukti is discussed and translated as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The lay follower Citta's debate with Mahāvīra in the Nigaṇṭha Sutta reflects not just simple polemic, but a fundamental epistemological division between Early Jains and Buddhists. A close reading of the Ācārāṅga Sūtra shows that the Jains see the truth as a property of the self-knowing purified soul that knows all things. For the Buddhists, consciousness is conditioned and dependent. If truth is a property or relation of consciousness, then it too is conditioned and dependent. In order to maintain that truth is the end of the Buddha's path, Buddhists sever the connection between consciousness and truth by formulating a negative definition of truth. Truth is that which lacks a deceptive nature and accordingly, Nirvāṇa is the ultimate truth. The Buddha's path culminates in the discovery of truth through the elimination of deception by the annihilation of consciousness, which the Jains hold is impossible because knowledge is essential to the soul. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assigning a date to Kumārila is notoriously difficult. Kumārila's dates are usually assigned through a relative chronology of Brahmanical and Buddhist philosophers with whom Kumārila engages or is engaged. This is a precarious method because the dates of these interlocutors are equally unstable. But what if in considering systematic dialogues (śāstra) to be the primary medium for interreligious philosophical debate we have missed a source that does engage with Kumārila, and that can be reliably dated? In this article, I turn to a religious group whom, it has been previously thought, did not respond to Kumārila until the eighth century—Jainas—as well as to a genre that is not typically viewed as a site of systematic philosophical dialogue—narrative. I argue that the Padmacarita, a Jaina Rāmāyaṇa composed by a Digambara writer called Raviṣeṇa, contains a narrative refutation of Kumārila's commentary to Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.2. By bringing to light this refutation, and explaining how Raviṣeṇa's Padmacarita can be reliably dated, I assign Kumārila's terminus ante quem to the date of the Padmacarita's composition, 676 CE. Finally, I suggest that Raviṣeṇa's Padmacarita is the earliest extant Jaina text to discuss Kumārila's claims, and that Jainas used narrative to reflect on Mīmāṃsā before they turned to śāstra as another medium for this dialogue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article based on review of literature obtained from various sources including web based platforms, electronic library information systems and Books from Library of International Islamic University Islamabad, University of Malakand and University of Swat Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In current research study the trends of Sufism in five major and important religions of the world namely; Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Jainism and Islam has been highlighted for better understanding of the concept is under consideration. Sufism is not the name of any religion, it’s the name of a particular philosophy, an attitude or a thought and view manifested by every religion in its own way. Hence, Sufism shows difference with religion that purely concerned with the concept of God in known religions of the world. Where they stated that God is the most powerful creator of the Universe and everything happens is his will irrespective of his relation to the Universe. Contrary to this concept according to Sufism almighty God, named Allah is enormously greater and transcendent from everything in the Universe. He is the only creator and powerful judge with strict rules but most kind toward admirers owing to their religious dedications. In addition, Sufism is stated that every single particle in this Universe is manifestation of Almighty Allah. In view of the above mentioned major religions of the world, ways for worship and remembrance of God are very similar to each other with some sort of differences in one or the other way. Thus a way of worship known as Sufism is found in all known religions with their own beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have traditionally approached Jain devotional practices, or bhakti, as a "borrowing" from Hindu traditions. John E. Cort (2002) argues that this formulation of bhakti limits our understanding of Jainism's role in the early development of bhakti within Indian religions. As the birthplace of bhakti, the literature of medieval Tamil Nadu offers rich evidence of how Jain and Hindu thinkers put their distinctive stamps on the emerging devotional landscape. This paper compares the role of bhakti in the fifth-century Jain narrative epic poems Cilappatikaram and Nilakeci as well as the sixth-century poetry of the Hindu poet-saint Karaikkal Ammaiyar. Drawing on the performance-centered approach to the study of religion described by Catherinethe Bell (1998), I argue that the Jain authors of Cilappatikaram and Nilakeci stress complex ritualistic actions as the correct performance of bhakti, while the poetry of Karaikkal Ammaiyar emphasizes a form of spontaneous and ecstatic devotion towards the Hindu god Shiva. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ancient India is famous as a home for the ethical concept of ahimsa , meaning 'non-violence'. Among other things, this moral principle demanded avoiding cruelty towards animals and led to the widespread adoption of vegetarianism. In this article, it is argued that the reasoning which led the ancient Indians to avoid violence towards animals might actually provide a more powerful rationale for vegetarianism than the utilitarian rationale that is more prevalent among animal rights activists nowadays. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent cognitive science research indicates that humans possess numerous biologically rooted religious and moral intuitions. The present article draws on this research to compare forms of religious morality in the Abrahamic traditions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) and the Indic traditions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism). Special attention is given to moral teachings on kindness, peace, and love, as well as related teachings on justice, violence, and hate. The article considers how moral intuitions shape Abrahamic/Indic moral teachings, which, in turn, impact: (1) Abrahamic/Indic doctrines concerning politics, law, and war; (2) Abrahamic/Indic doctrines concerning individual ethics, and moral behavior proper to monastics and laypersons; and (3) Abrahamic/Indic doctrines concerning theological matters, such as the nature of the universe, souls, and deities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debates on war and peace within Jain and Hindu traditions revolve around the fear of incurring individual bad karma from violence, potentially inhibiting the individual's journey to spiritual liberation. Generally, the religious culture of both Jain and Hindu traditions elevates nonviolence to one of the highest moral principles. Jainism embraces ahiṃsā (non-harming) as the central doctrine, and Hindu traditions exalt non-harming as one of the highest disciplines and virtues (dharma). However, a personal spiritual commitment to nonviolence creates tension with the humanistic value of striving for an ethic of social justice and peace. Maintaining social harmony sometimes requires confrontation or targeted violence. It is not surprising that while both traditions laud ahiṃsā for personal peace, they also deliberate on the challenge of using necessary violence to maintain an orderly society. Despite sanctioning limited violence (hiṃsā) in acute situations, various texts and myths express a general suspicion for using war or other aggressive methods to solve social and political problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jainism is a religious-philosophical system rooted in ancient India with diaspora communities around the world. One of the tradition’s hallmarks is the philosophical commitment of nonviolence (ahiṃsā) toward all living beings. In this study I explore how Jains enact new transnational modes of 'being Jain' in response to COVID-19. Drawing upon multimedia Jain resources created from March 2020 through July 2021, I argue that North American Jains approach the pandemic as an opportunity to reinterpret the 'practical' value of the Jain commitment to nonviolence by (1) giving epistemic primacy to medical knowledge, complemented with spiritualized narratives of healing; (2) admitting a diversity of Jain philosophical perspectives on the present pandemic; (3) identifying the positive potential of the pandemic for personal and social development; (4) promoting sectarian unity and intergenerational adaptability among Jains; and (5) fostering public service and charitable work as a form of transcultural social-political belonging. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]