The concept of groupthink has received a lot of attention in various academic disciplines such as psychology, business adminstration, political science, and communication since Janis coined the term in 1972. However, this theory has undergone a lot of scrutiny over the last 34 years because of a number of flaws within the framework. One of the areas that needs further research is the conditions in which groupthink is most likely to appear. Janis claims that this phenomenon occurs due to three factors: group cohesiveness, a flawed group structure, and a provocative situational context, which lead to concurrence seeking. Of the three causal factors, the only one that systematically appears to be an important predictor is the flawed group structure. Although group cohesiveness appears in most cases of groupthink, it is also present in cases in which this phenomenon did not occur. The situational variables on the other hand appear in some cases, but are not present in others. This paper argues that one of the reasons situational contexts do not appear to be significant is because groupthink can occur in a number of very different conditions. Although the ultimate outcome increases the likelihood of concurrence-seeking behavior, the cases differ in stress level, amount of time exposed to the problem, amount of perceived losses (or gains), and/or levels of responsibility seeking. This essay uses literatures on groupthink, escalation of commitment, prospect theory, and the role of stress in decision-making to explain different situations that increase the likelihood of concurrence seeking which, together with certain problems with the group structure, can lead to groupthink. Examining which situational factors are conducive to concurrence seeking is not only important because it helps streamline the framework. It will also aid in identifying more cases of groupthink, which will be less focused on fiascos, and can help policy-makers notice when this phenomenon might occur. Based on the current state of the groupthink framework, cases of this phenomenon were mainly identified through the analysis of the symptoms, and then evaluating which antecedent factors could be observed. One of the reasons this happens is because the framework is very unclear as to what conditions can cause groupthink, and the variables that have been demonstrated to be important are not easily identified because they occur within a small group of high-level decision makers. This meant that if the outcome were not an extreme case, it would probably go unnoticed. Because scholars were forced to rely on the dependent variable to identify cases, they most often focused on the most obvious cases: fiascos. However, groupthink does not always have to lead to suboptimal outcomes, let alone fiascoes (‘t Hart: 1990: xi). On the other hand, good decision-making also does not always lead to optimal outcomes. Another indicator of the problem with identifying cases of groupthink is the small number of specific situations in which groupthink has been identified. In 1998, Esser demonstrated that there are only 10 clear cases of groupthink, and five vigilant cases. Given the problem with identifying cases, it is important to find a way to locate cases of groupthink based on their antecedents, instead of their symptoms. Discovering specific conditions in which concurrence seeking is most likely by drawing on the literatures in social psychology, public administration, and foreign policy analysis, increases the likelihood that cases of groupthink will be found. According to the groupthink framework, when certain provocative situational factors are present, combined with a cohesive group with certain structural flaws, concurrence seeking will occur, which leads to groupthink. Identifying more concrete situations in which groupthink is possible can also have significant policy implications... ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
