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Nonprofit hospital chief executive officer (CEO) compensation has received considerable attention in light of nonprofits' tax-favored status as well as the high costs of hospital care. Past studies have found that hospital financial performance is a significant determinant of CEO pay but nonprofit performance, including quality and charity care, are not. Using post-ACA data, we re-examine whether a variety of hospital performance measures are important determinants of nonprofit hospital CEO compensation. We found mixed evidence with respect to the significance of the association between financial performance and uncompensated care and CEO compensation. Among the other nonprofit performance measures, patient satisfaction was significantly associated with CEO compensation, but other measures were not significant determinants of CEO compensation. Our results suggest nonprofit hospitals balance their financial health against their mission when setting CEO incentives. Additional policy targeting transparency in hospital CEO compensation may be warranted to help policymakers understand the specific factors used by hospital boards to incentivize CEOs., Competing Interests: The authors have received funding from the California Hospital Association, and John Romley receives funding from Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, both outside of the submitted work. This does not alter our adherence to PLOS ONE policies on sharing data and materials.

Chief executive officer (CEO) compensation is highly scrutinized, with nonprofit organizations often receiving additional attention due to their tax-exempt status. Understanding hospital CEO compensation is of increasing importance as health care costs remain high and strong leadership is required to implement new health policies. This study documents CEO compensation at nonprofit hospitals in the United States for 2010 and 2015. We compare hospital CEO compensation with CEO compensation in other institution types, including nonhospital health care. We also explore changes in hospital CEO compensation over time and differences across states. We find CEOs at hospitals earn substantially less than CEOs of publicly traded companies though more than presidents of nonprofit institutions of higher education. Additionally, we find that the relationship between CEO compensation and hospital size was weaker in 2015 than in 2010, and substantial variation in CEO compensation exists across states.

Natural variation in monospore lines of Koji-molds (Asp. oryzae and Asp. sojae), isolated from commercial Koji material or soil and from laboratory stock cultures, has been observed. We can divide the 58 strains of Koji-molds investigated into two groups; one group consists of inconstant strains which are very liable to produce natural variants, and the other consists of strains which remain constant through successive single spore culture. The inconstant strains develop colonies bearing various proportions of conidia and aerial mycelium (X-type). They generally form large conidia (Asp. oryzae var. magnasporus) but sometimes medium sized conidia (Asp. oryzae s. str.), which produce large conidia occasionally. The colonies of the constant strains show abundant conidial formation and smooth surfaces (C-type). The conidia are mostly small (Asp. oryzae var. microsporus) but sometimes medium in size (Asp. oryzae s. str.). The colony types of the variants are as follows: C (Conidial type, whole colony covered with conidia), M (mycelial type), R (restricted in growth rate), St (sterile type, little sporulation on all media tested), Nit (requiring reduced nitrate, very faint growth on Czapek's agar), and LS (semi lethal, growth cease immediately after germination). Pedigree cultures of the 8 inconstant strains have been made, but no definite segregation ratios for each variant type have been recognized through successive generations. The LS and N types commonly occur spontaneously from the M-type.