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Nicomachean Ethics 6.8 has been interpreted in a variety of ways. One dispute involves Aristotle's remarks about the relationship of phronēsis to politics: does Aristotle claim that phronēsis is foremost applicable to an individual's private life, to the political realm, or to some combination of the two? Two features of this dispute make it worthy of closer attention. First, the conflict of interpretations has not been documented as such. Second, I argue this contemporary conflict is a repetition of an ancient conflict about phronēsis that was being waged in 5th/4th century Athens. Phronēsis was a contested term alongside two related terms, apragmosynē (quietism) and polypragmosynē (meddlesomeness), and the construction of lines 1141b23–1142a12 enters into this historical debate to create a productive tension between two rival views. Aristotle heightens the tension between views represented by quietists and busybodies for his own purposes. In section 1, I surface the neglected historical frame of Nicomachean Ethics 6.8. In section 2, I turn to the contemporary conflict of interpretations, showing how it repeats the historical frame in many ways, and I provide a basic taxonomy of the views typically offered. In section 3, I bring the two debates – historical and contemporary – together and offer my own view of what Aristotle is up to in the passage. I argue that centering the historical frame in this passage highlights Aristotle's use of Isocratean-style phronēsis , while also transforming the concept by connecting it to a series of questions that go beyond Isocrates' view, thus preparing for a later exploration of the best forms of human living. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that despite Aristotle's criticism of him, Isocrates does not actually hold the belief that political science, or universal knowledge of practical affairs, is impossible. When he appears to express this view, he is using hyperbole to distinguish himself from his adversaries. In reality, while he certainly underscores the significance of particular cases and doxa , he also claims to possess insights into universal principles concerning politics. He does so on the ground of philosophical arguments characterized by their consistency, sophistication, and substantive nature. These arguments are robust enough to be structured into a coherent system of principles akin to a political science in the Aristotelian sense of the term – although Isocrates himself never elaborated this science in a clear and systematic manner. The objective of this article is twofold: first, to defend this unconventional interpretation of Isocrates' political speeches, and second, to offer a systematic analysis of the implicit political science within them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of the restoration of Athenian democracy in the 4th century BCE, Isocrates and Plato established two of the most prominent philosophical schools of antiquity and certainly the two most important ones of the Classical Period. To some extent influenced by Socratic morality focused on the debate of virtues, both were radical opponents of the sophists of their time and the previous century, who, according to them, promoted an eristic education that is sometimes immoral and sometimes flattering. With the aim of offering new pedagogical alternatives for the political formation of the youth, both Isocrates and Plato propose, under the label of philosophia, models of paideia oriented towards the common good, justice, and integrity. However, there is a fundamental ideological dispute surrounding each of these philosophies. In order to oppose sophistic rhetoric, the idealism of Platonic philosophy, as we know, employs the dialectical method so that true knowledge (episteme) of moral virtues can be attained, thus promoting justice and the common good of the polis. Isocratic pragmatism, on the other hand, outlines philosophy as a paideia of civic discourse (logoi politikoi), in which only good opinions (doxai) would be capable of better guiding the city with reasonableness for the actions to be taken, to the detriment of Platonic episteme which would serve no purpose for politics. Therefore, we will discuss these and other aspects of this ideological dispute between Isocrates and Plato, seeking to verify how this quarrel occurs throughout the texts attributed to them, as well as to point out to what extent the relationship between their philosophical doctrines was determinant for the contours of Philosophy and Rhetoric in posterity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Persuasive effect will always be an essential part of rhetoric studies, but it should not be either its ready shorthand, identifying trait, or lodestar. The decades-long momentum to move beyond the identification of rhetoric with the production and management of effects should be pointedly encouraged, with many new rhetorical imaginaries (invitational, dialogic, agonistic, ecologic, etc.) providing ample resources for doing so. This paper will describe the self-limiting nature of an effects frame, show that there have always been alternatives within rhetoric's traditions to move beyond it, outline the persistence of a first-order identification with persuasive effect in contemporary disciplinary history, and point to specific ways to put this habit in the rearview mirror. The rhetorical appropriation of Foucault's interpretation of parrhesia is explored as an example of a rhetorical practice that moves beyond the reductive straight-jacket of effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I analyze the role the household (oikos) plays in Isocrates through an exegesis of the author's letters to his erstwhile student and current monarch of Salamis of Cyprus, Nicocles. The monarch's household has a threefold role in the relationship between the elite ruler and his subjects. First, as the locus of his ancestors and their achievements, it offers competitors to Nicocles to be surpassed and a known standard for his subjects to judge their ruler. Second, as the source of the monarch's public outlay, the household is a means by which Nicocles can appear magnificent; at the same time, however, he should be wary lest his subjects judge him ostentatious. Third, Nicocles invites his subjects to judge his conjugal behavior, offering it as evidence of his moderation. I conclude my argument with a challenge to an interpretation of the relationship between the few and the many as a contract; rather, this relationship is better characterized through the metaphor of service (therapeia) drawn from the household. Isocratean political thought treats private and public domains as continuous with one another, regarding participation in political institutions as neither necessary nor sufficient to achieving good political judgment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I aim at presenting and commenting on a series of interesting ideas discovered in Isocrates' ancient discourses, precisely those ideas referring to the importance of language for man in general, seen as a social being. In this regard, one should notice the specific meaning he gave to the Old Greek term philosophia, understood as 'the culture of discourse'. In other words, I will try to prove that Isocrates' rhetorical work deserves more appreciation from the specialists or researchers who deal with linguistic ideas and problems of philosophy of language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article describes the conceptualizations of the term kairos, generally taken to mean "the opportune moment," by Isocrates. Though Isocrates was instrumental in developing kairos as a "quasi-technical" concept within the rhetorical art, his use of the word was highly nuanced and could be applied in one of three poles of meaning: (1) "circumstances"; (2) notions of the "appropriate"; and (3) "opportunity," an orientation of elements within a particular moment that either supplies or shuts off a path toward a strategic outcome. Furthermore, over half of Isocrates's eighty-five uses of the term and its variants have little to do with rhetorical theory per se but are simply incidental modifiers of matters under discussion. Accordingly, though kairos is an important term of art for Isocrates, only nuanced reading of the context can reveal his meaning for any given use of the word. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If truth is absolute, how is it possible that people can argue for or against it? If truth is not absolute, on what is our existence predicated? Plato and Isocrates, two contemporaries in Classical Athens, took very different stands on the age-old problem of truth and the rhetorical manipulation of it. A close examination of Platonic dialogues and Isocrates’ speeches reveals that they had different understandings of the concept and purpose of truth. This fundamental divergence caused Plato and Isocrates to have disparate notions of rhetoric and even “philosophy”. Accordingly, they devised drastically different educational programs suited to their respective visions of truth and rhetoric, attempting to realize their competing ideals by means of pedagogy.

One’s mastery of speech conventions is considered an essential qualification for an educated individual, especially a scholar of English. Teaching writing to non-native English majors, writing instructors feel the burden to adopt the Current-traditional pedagogy. It is a process that stresses students’ internalization of speech conventions and treats students as passive recipients. Current-traditional pedagogy is inadequate to foster future scholars. This article offers a plan for teaching freshman writing inspired by the ideas and values of Protagoras and Isocrates and identified as New Sophistic pedagogy. Good speech/logos lies on good reasoning defined by one’s knowing himself/herself and one’s sociopolitical awareness. Thus, the proposed pedagogy focuses on students’ intellectual and emotional maturity. The writing instructor understands his/her moral responsibility to guide his/her students, and the students realize their leading role in the learning process. It consists of three cycles of deliberative discourse: Monologic argument, Mediation, and Negotiation. Through the different argumentation types, students understand that speech/logos mirrors one’s mind, his/her true essence. Progressively, students prepare themselves as true scholars by cultivating personal and social identity and feeling empathy for the other.

In chapters 29-31 of the Philostratus’s Heroikos Agamemnon assumes a particularly positive characterization, different from the main tradition that refers to the Homeric poems. In the following pages I will propose to identify in the Panathenaicus of Isocrates a parallel motif and a possible source for the particular characterization of the king of the Achaeans. Indeed, Isocrates’ speech can be compared to the Heroikos for three reasons: in addition to the unusual praise of the Homeric hero, both authors refer to the importance of enslaving Troy and defeating the barbarians. These arguments allow us to identify a parallel in a precise point of the Panathenaicus of Isocrates: the excursus on Agamemnon in chapters 72-84.

Working against the recent arguments against Plato’s authorship of the Seventh Letter in the Anglophone scholarship, this paper demonstrates the historical possibility that Plato wrote his letters for philosophical purposes, most likely in competition with Isocrates, who skilfully used the literary genre of letters for his rhetorical and philosophical purposes. Because Isocrates and Plato experimented with various writing styles in response to each other, letters and autobiographies may well have been their common devices. The paper concludes that we should respect the tradition that had included and respected the Seventh Letter as Plato’s own writing.

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Isócrates es comúnmente recordado como logógrafo o como un distinguido maestro de oratoria, pero nunca como filósofo, si bien persista en presentarse como tal. Sin duda, esto se debe en gran parte a las críticas de Platón, que que influyeron significativamente en la forma en que aún lo juzgamos. Según Platón, Isócrates, que promueve un tipo de filosofía sin consideración a la verdad sino solo a la opinión, no merece ser visto como un genuino filósofo. A pesar de sus afirmaciones, Isócrates no se distinguiría de otros sofistas, con quienes no desearía se le confundiese. En este artículo quiero liberar a Isócrates de la visión despectiva de Platón, al mostrar qué tipo de filosofía afirmaba enseñar Isócrates.

Isocr. 18 could have hired Isocrates, and the speaker of Lys. 21 and Eryximachus could have hired Lysias as speechwriters for their rhetorical skills. However, it is probable that Isocrates’ choice to criticize the former colleagues of Isocr. 18 in his speech could have led the other two trierarchs to ask for Lysias’ help. This fact highlights the tensions between the elite when Athens was defeated in the Peloponnesian War. This antagonism between the trierarchs could be the beginning of the logographic competition between Lysias and Isocrates.

The descent of Spartan kings from Heracles is considered to be the secondary myth interpretation about the Return of the Heracledae. It was associated with Dorian conquest of the Peloponnese in the ancient tradition (Tyrtaeus, Pindar, Herodotus, Isocrates, Ephor). The myth of the Return of the Heracledae is known to be one of the genealogical fiction what was invented in Argos and developed further in Sparta. There was a powerful argument for inheritance the rights of the royal title and performing the functions of the high priest in the community if the person was known as the descendant of Heracles belonging to the royal dynasties (Agiades and Euripontides). Apart from that, the power of Spartan kings outside Sparta could be justified if they were related to Heracles. In addition, this belonging to the descendants of Heraclides was above everything. It was one of the most important propaganda arguments to substantiate the legitimacy of the possession of conquered lands in Laconia and Messenia and provide pro-Achaean policy by the authorities of Sparta. However, the image of Heracles and his cult did not have the essential meaning in the religious life of the Spartan polis. The heavenly patrons of the kings were divine twins - the Dioscuri (Tindaridae). To conclude, it seems to be very controversial that the philosophical and ethical image of Heracles (as the main cynic hero) had a great influence on the representatives of the royal diarchy of the late classical and hellenistic periods.

The political outlook of the so-called 'Anonymus Iamblichi' (DK 89) has been a subject of controversy in the scholarly literature, with some commentators judging him to be a committed democrat, while others see in him a partisan of aristocracy or even oligarchy. This disagreement is not surprising, for the text contains passages that seem to pull in opposite directions. The article suggests that we move beyond the one-dimensional oligarch-or-democrat model traditionally employed and instead approach the issue from a fresh angle, applying the more nuanced typology for understanding ancient social criticism ('rejectionist' vs 'immanent') developed by Josiah Ober. The article begins by situating the author within the social landscape of classical Athens. The resulting characterization presents the author as a representative of a distinctive social type: the Athenian 'rich quietist', who prefers private economic endeavours to engagement in public affairs, and who is ideologically committed to democratic government but also highly critical of how democratic society treats its wealthy citizens. This characterization helps make better sense of the seemingly contradictory political indications in the text. In particular, fragments 6 and 7 should be read as a single line of argument, which takes the form of an 'immanent critique' of contemporary Athenian democracy. According to 'Anonymus Iamblichi', democratic society rightly praises the rule of law as a distinctive democratic value, but it falls disappointingly short of that ideal in its treatment of its own wealthy elite citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers a longstanding problem: what does the word τύραννος mean? And if it means 'bad / tyrannical ruler', why are good rulers called tyrants? The solution proposed here is that tyranny is not a fixed state of being, or not being, but instead a gradual process of development. To be called a tyrant, a ruler need not embody all the stereotypical traits of tyranny. If tyranny is, by definition, unconstitutional and illegitimate rule, then there may be no clear moment at which one ceases to be a general or king and becomes a tyrant, only a process by which the tyrant gradually strengthens his rule and develops the negative attributes associated with absolute and illegitimate power. A strong trend in not only the political theory of Plato and Aristotle, but also Greek poetry and historiography in general, is to trace the decline of tyrannies from initially good and popular governments to ones that are despotic and unpopular: the tyrant's progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

No general agreement has yet been reached about the meaning and purpose of Plato's Menexenus. Two mutually exclusive readings have generally been given: Socrates' funeral oration could be either a parody and a satire of Athens' funeral speeches or an example of better, idealistic, maybe even philosophically grounded rhetoric. However, the problem does not only come from the dichotomy present in most scholars' works. It lies, instead, in the ambiguity of the text itself. This paper aims to clarify the serious implications that parody can have. Exemplarity and parody, irony and seriousness should not be considered as mutually exclusive because an imitation that seriously demonstrates how easy it is to write a good epitaph can be understood as a form of parody. In fact, Plato's Menexenus seems to be a school manifesto: it recalls Callicles' charges against the educational value of philosophical practices (Grg. 484c-485d). Therefore, it may be directed against Isocrates' conception of rhetoric as related to education and politics. The mention of the Peace of Antalcidas (245c) will then prove the topical and thus political character of this work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although different scholars have noticed the adscription of the geographer Strabo to the artistic and ideological movements of atticism and classicism, we offer a more deeper analysis of this issue, with special attention to some points that, according to us, have not been examined enough, like the relation of classicism with the fact that Strabo adopted Polybius as his direct predecessor, his positive vision of Homer or the constant references to Isocrates’ pedagogical and panhellenic ideas. We provide numerous details that, according to us, prove these facts throughout his geographical work.

Copyright of Agora (0211-6642) is the property of Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, Servicio de Publicaciones and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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The article examines the passages in Isocrates' Corpus containing a description and a critique of a new type of sophistic called "eristic". Based on the chronology of Isocrates' discourses and the description he gave, the author shows that the majority of these passages could not have aimed at Plato as its sole or principal target. However, it should not be excluded that Isocrates' criticism of eristics was directed against various members of the Socratic circle, a heterogeneous group in which Plato was comprised. The article shows that although a feud between Plato and Isocrates is not an acceptable premise, a possible rivalry between both men may have been possible. Nonetheless, such a rivalry does not allow one to assimilate Plato with an eristic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Rónai - Revista de Estudos Classicos e Tradutorios is the property of Ronai - Revista de Estudos Classicos e Tradutorios and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Istraživanja: Journal of Historical Researches is the property of Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Gorgias, the teacher of Isocrates, is rarely mentioned in Isocrates’ works and never in a flattering way. He is also presented, among other masters and poets, on Isocrates’ grave in a way that appears to be consistent with his pupil’s thought. Thus, the author of the iconographic plan of the grave may have been either Isocrates himself or someone who suffi­ciently knew his works and properly understood his tempestuous rela­tionship with his master.

Logos in Greek culture is language that stakes a claim on the attention of its addressee. It therefore implies a question as to the authority of the utterer. This article investigates how the basis of that authority was distributed between utterer, audience, and the sense that the utterance makes, as well as how that distribution changed over time.The basic development from archaic to classical culture in the sphere of logos is this: whereas in archaic culture the speaking-position and the position of authority are united in the same person or group, in classical culture they become separated. This occurs in the context both of the lawcourts and of political assemblies. The judging, articulate, authoritative kings and elders of Homer and Hesiod are replaced in court by the silent Athenian jury and in the Assembly by a popular audience, who are spectators of others’ speeches. When authority rests with the judges or voters, but these constitute the audience rather than the speakers, speaking becomes the principal means by which the ambitious could obtain authority for themselves — in effect, taking it over from those in whom it ultimately resided. Skillful public speaking was no longer primarily a professional calling with a special group definition and social place (e.g. that of poetry), but the all-purpose tool by which a man could make something of himself in society.A man's logos had become, quite generally, his virtue; nevertheless, logos had maintained its traditional affiliation with deception. Paradoxically, the practice by which a man gained virtue and status in the eyes of its arbiters came itself to seem dangerously amoral, as shown both by hostile witnesses such as Aristophanes and Plato, and the efforts of friendly reformers such as Isocrates.The article concludes by extending this pattern to two further contexts: resistance to the new technology of writing, which was seen as embodying the disconnection of logos from authority; and the attempt made by philosophers to transcend the pattern by becoming their own judges, thereby occupying the position both of speaker and of audience.

Political participation and the public education that have always been deployed to support the incipient progress of the civic life are revived in the modern political discourses. It has been believed that the age of pre-Socrates was the age of the Sophists whose acrid fallacy works occupied the political sphere, a malaise in government. However, speaking non-traditionally in the modern pedagogical system, there were some pre-Socratic thinkers and political philosophers/orators who’s works are the backbone of modern discourse on this matter. It will be examined whether any part of the classical rhetoric apparatus can be recovered and put to a good practice in the modern education and modern political participation. This point will be illustrated, furthermore, in this paper by alleging the importance of rhetoric, its role in Ancient Greek Democracy, and its influence on the modern concepts of power and democracy, as a continual element in a historical-political life. The further consideration is whether there was any democratic Polis existed in Ancient Athens and then, if there was, what characteristics it consisted of. Moreover, whether such concept can or should be considered in modern political discourses. In this sense, the liberal, non-dogmatic strain of the sophistry of Isocrates tradition urges us to indicate that the findings of this educational principles are, if not necessary, but adjutant complementary metes to our modern political knowledge of the states. In the end, it is inquired to see comparatively that how the tradition of rhetorical art and the concept of power in the Ancient Greek society have pertained to the modern democratic elements and whether we are able to empower this influential element in modern states.

The following article studies the connections between Isocrates's idea of phronesis (pragmatic wisdom) and the early-modern Jesuit notions of rhetoric and prudence. The article develops previous research on Cicero's influence on early Jesuits by emphasizing Isocrates's importance in the history of rhetoric and civic philosophy. Cicero himself was influenced by Isocrates and, more to the point, Isocrates's writings were widely read and taught by early-modern Jesuits. The article demonstrates that Isocrates and early Jesuits had much in common with regard to their views on rhetoric and pragmatic wisdom. In so doing, the article contributes to our understanding of the early Jesuits' views on rhetoric, ethics and civic life. Generally speaking, the article points towards compatibility between civic and Christian values and explores the reception of Isocrates and Greco-Roman ideas in early-modern Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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While Isocrates regarded rhetoric not as a rigid discipline, but as a creative and pliable art, it is not possible to standardize art. According to his point of view (Against the sophists 13.13), good speech depends on certain principles: opportunity (kairos); suitability (to prepon) and novelty (kainos). The sophists, according to Isocrates, did not pay attention to these principles, and that was their main mistake. The problem was, however, that it was difficult to teach these principles to the disciples, precisely because rhetoric was a flexible art. Still, although it is not possible to provide fixed rules concerning rhetorical principles, the ancient rhetor provided some useful suggestions in his works which make it possible to reconstruct the nature of these principles.

Resumo O artigo apresenta o magistério de Isócrates (436-338 a.C.), autor ateniense contemporâneo de Platão, e suas concepções acerca da forma e dos propósitos da paideía ou educação, que ele denominava, em seu conjunto, philosophía. Para tanto, descrevem-se o rol dos alunos que Isócrates teria tido, a popularidade de sua escola e o testemunho, por outros autores da Antiguidade, de sua influência educativa. Em seguida, discute-se a definição isocrática de philosophía, apresentada, por vezes, como um empenho intelectual conjugado à experiência; em outros momentos, como a cultura ou paideía criada por Atenas, cidade em que o lógos, em seu duplo sentido de razão e discurso, ocupava lugar de excepcional importância. Por fim, passa-se dessa definição geral de philosophía para aquela que a apresenta como um procedimento educativo deliberado, sendo que o professado por Isócrates em sua escola seria, segundo ele, o único a merecer, de todo direito, o título de philosophía. Descreve-se, então, a philosophía de Isócrates, com seus princípios mais importantes, a dóxa, ou opinião; a empeiría, ou experiência, e o kairós, ou ocasião, indicando as justificativas para essa opção e os resultados esperados de tal programa educativo, e de que modo tais princípios estariam presentes no que chamaríamos de seus métodos pedagógicos, dos quais se destaca a prática de Isócrates de submeter suas próprias obras à crítica de seus alunos, em um formato de discussão ou debate próximo do que denominaríamos, hoje, de seminário.