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This thesis considers the relationship between practices, communities and continuity in intermittent organisational arrangements. Cultural festivals are argued to offer one such particularly rich and nuanced research context; within this study their potential to transcend intermittent enactment emerged as a significant avenue of enquiry. The engagement of organisation studies with theories of practice has produced a rich practice-based corpus, diverse in both theoretical concerns and empirical approaches to the study of practice. Nevertheless, continuity presents an, as yet, under-theorised aspect of this field. Thus, the central questions of this thesis concern: the practices that underpin the enactment of festivals; the themes emerging from these practices for further consideration; and relationships between festivals and the wider context within which they are enacted. These issues were explored empirically through a qualitative study of the enactment of a community-centred film festival. Following from the adoption of a ‘practice-lens approach', this study yielded forty-eight practices, through which to explore five themes emerging from analysis: Safeguarding, Legitimising, Gatekeeping, Connecting and Negotiating Boundaries. This study revealed an aspect of the wider field of practice that has not yet been fully examined by practice-based studies: the cementing or anchoring mechanisms that contribute to temporal continuity in intermittent, temporary or project-based organisations. The findings of this thesis suggest a processual model, which collectively reinforces an organisational memory that survives periods of latency and facilitates the re-emergence of practice, thus potentially enabling organisations to endure across intermittent enactment and, ultimately, transcend temporality and ephemerality. The themes examined and insights offered in this thesis seek to contribute to: practice-based studies and film-festival studies; forging a new path linking these two disciplines; and generating both theoretical and practical insights of interest to festival organisers and stakeholders of project-based, temporary or intermittent organisational arrangements.

While the search for scientific measures, models and explanations of consciousness is currently a growing area of research, this thesis identifies a series of methodological problems with the field that suggest that ‘consciousness’ is not in fact a viable scientific concept. This eliminativist stance is supported by assessing the current theories and methods of consciousness science on their own grounds, and by applying frameworks and criteria for ‘good’ scientific practice from philosophy of science. A central problem consists in the way that qualitative difference and dissociation paradigms are misused in order to identify measures of consciousness. Another problem concerns the wide range of experimental protocols used to operationalise consciousness and the implications this has on the findings of integrative approaches across behavioural and neurophysiological research. Following from this the way that mechanisms of consciousness have been inadequately demarcated, and how this affects whether ‘consciousness’ refers to any scientific kinds, is discussed. A final problem is the significant mismatch that exists between the common intuitions and phenomenological claims about the content of consciousness that motivate much current consciousness science, and the properties of neural processes that underlie sensory and cognitive phenomena. It is argued that the failure of these methods to be appropriately applied to the concept of consciousness, both in particular cases, and in the way that these methods fail to fulfil their crucial heuristic role in the practise of science, suggests that the concept of ‘consciousness’ should be eliminated from scientific discourse. Aside from the purely negative claim found in eliminativist accounts, the strong empirical grounding of this eliminativist claim also allows positive characterisations to be made about the products of the current science of consciousness, to (re-)identify real target phenomena and valid research questions for the mind sciences, and to suggest how the intuitions that ground the confused research program on consciousness result from real features of our cognitive architecture.