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What brings competing parties to coalesce into new entities? I present a model of electoral competition in which parties can form alliances and decide how binding these should be. Parties face a dynamic trade-off between insuring themselves against significant shifts in public opinion and allowing flexibility to respond to future electoral changes. The model shows that more binding alliances such as mergers emerge in equilibrium when electoral volatility is high; instead, when voters are predictable (e.g., highly partisan), parties either run alone or form more flexible preelectoral coalitions. When the electorate is sufficiently volatile, a risk-averse centrist party might prefer to merge with an ideologically extreme party than with a moderate one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do political parties share power internally? We study the internal organization of political parties as the solution of a moral hazard problem between a party conference and its factions. Factions' mobilization efforts benefit the party electorally, but can only be imperfectly monitored. In contrast with the logic of Michel's Iron Law, we provide a functionalist rationale for intraparty power sharing: We show that internal power sharing can enhance a party's electoral performance. This effect is stronger in settings that award more resources to election winners: Low interparty power sharing produces high intraparty power sharing. We also show that intraparty power sharing should be more frequent within smaller parties, when monitoring of factional effort is more precise (e.g., preferential voting systems), and when factions' ideological disagreements span multiple dimensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent political developments worldwide have focused attention on the fraying of political norms, often understood as informal restraints on opportunistic behavior. We present a model to study how norms of restraint interact with institutional checks and balances. In the model, an election determines which party holds office in each period over an infinite horizon. Each period presents the majority party with an opportunity to modify a status quo policy. However, informal norms and formal institutional barriers limit its ability to do so by providing soft and hard constraints to policymaking, respectively. We show that political cooperation can be easier to sustain in political systems with fewer checks and balances, when political norms are sufficiently stringent. Under optimal norms, increasing polarization makes norms easier to uphold, while also reducing welfare. Finally, norms maintained by minority parties are less sustainable, and voter optimal norms require minority concessions to achieve greater electoral competitiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does exposure to conspiracy theories affects voters' political attitudes? Using an online experiment among US subjects, we show that exposure to conspiracy theories decreases voters' trust in the domestic informational environment. Subjects were exposed to conspiracy theories that are entirely unrelated to American domestic politics, which further underscores such narratives' danger. However, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that voters do not weigh unrelated conspiracies in their evaluation of politicians' performance and domestic political institutions. Overall, our findings illustrate that an informational environment permeated by conspiracy theories could impede the functioning of democracy by eroding trust in information providers and undermining the credibility of political information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intra‐party competition is widespread and affects political parties' strength. This article presents a model of elections in which intra‐party factions can devote resources to campaigning for the party or undermining competing factions to obtain more power. The model shows that inter‐ and intra‐party competition are substitutes: Internal competition increases when the electoral stakes are low – for example, in consensus democracies granting power to losing parties – because the incentives to focus on the fight for internal power increase. Similarly, an increase in party polarization incentivizes factions to campaign to avoid a more costly electoral loss. Factions in the moderate party campaign more than those in the extreme party; conversely, when factions in the same party are ideologically divided, extreme factions campaign more. Finally, the model studies how internal rules affect intra‐party competition, showing how parties design internal contests among factions to maximize campaigning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The HER-2/neu proto-oncogene is overexpressed in 2030% of human breast cancers and is associated with high recurrence risk. The oncogenic potential of HER-2/neu, together with its elevated expression in tumors, cell surface localization, and immunogenicity in some patients, make this oncoprotein an ideal target for immunotherapeutic approaches. To test the efficacy of immune-based strategies in eliciting an antitumor response, we used the N#202 transgenic mouse model engineered to overexpress the rat neu proto-oncogene under the control of the mouse mammary tumor virus promoter; females of this line develop spontaneous focal mammary tumors by 6 months of age. Transgenic mice immunized intramuscularly with a HER-2 cDNA ligated into the VR1012 (VICAL) expression vector under the control of the cytomegalovirus promoter developed significantly fewer spontaneous tumors as compared with mice injected with the empty vector (P < 0.0001) or not injected (P = 0.0006). However, this protection was observed only when immunization was started in 3-month-old but not in 6month-old mice. These data suggest that the xenogeneic HER-2 DNA sequence can break immune tolerance to rat neu in transgenic N#202 mice and induce protective immunity that impairs the neu oncogene-driven progression of mammary carcinogenesis. The preventive effect achieved by our immunological approach appeared not to be based on anti-neu specific B and T cell immune attacks but was more possibly based on different mechanisms including aspecific and inflammatory immunological responses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fibulin-1 (Fbln-1) is an extracellular matrix (ECM) and plasma glycoprotein. Considering the growing evidence indicating that Fbln-1 plays a role in cancer we sought to develop monospecific antibodies to better facilitate further studies of the function of Fbln-1 in breast cancer. Using a plasmid expression vector encoding full-length human Fbln-1D as an immunogen and CpG oligodeoxyribonucleotides as adjuvant a monoclonal antibody (MAb) against Fbln-1 was produced. This MAb, designated MEM-2 was of IgM isotype and reacted with bacterially expressed Fbln-1. Furthermore, MEM-2 reacted with Fbln-1 expressed in the ECM released by cultured human breast carcinoma SKBR-3 cells in ELISA, and also with Fbln-1 present in SKBR-3 cell extract in immunoprecipitation and Western blotting. MEM-2 also reacted with Fbln-1 in human breast carcinoma specimens. These findings illustrate the utility of genetic immunization as a means of generating monoclonal antibodies to tumor-related ECM proteins. MEM-2 represents a useful new tool for the study of Fbln-1 in breast cancer., (Copyright 2003 Wiley-Liss, Inc.)