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This study discusses the European Union’s proposal for a Regulation on Markets in Crypto-Assets, now subject to formal approval by the European Parliament. The objective is to explore whether it will positively impact the adoption of crypto-assets in the financial sector. The use of crypto-assets is growing. However, some stakeholders in the financial service sector remain skeptical and hesitant to adopt assets that are yet to be defined and have an unclear legal status. This regulatory uncertainty has been identified as the primary reason for the reluctant adoption. The proposed regulation (part of the EU’s Digital Finance Strategy) aims to provide this legal certainty for currently unregulated crypto-assets. This study investigates whether or not the proposed regulation can be expected to have the intended effect by reviewing the proposed regulation itself, the opinions and reactions of the various stakeholders, and secondary literature. Findings reveal that such regulation will most likely not accelerate the adoption of crypto-assets in the EU financial services sector, at least not sufficiently or as intended. Some suggestions are made to improve the proposal.

This article seeks to conduct a critical analysis of the place the EU currently occupies on the international scene and how it uses its central position to shape international politics in order to promote international peace and security. For this purpose, it will firstly provide the reader with a general overview of the CFSP and how the Lisbon treaty changed the EU’s functioning in this field. Secondly, taking the EU-Russia relations as a starting point, this paper will evaluate the means the EU employs to achieve its CFSP goals. Thirdly, it will seek to predict the possible future of the EU role as a unitary political actor in the global fora.

Ideally, online contracts are concluded by informed consumers. For 25 years the European Union is issuing an abundance of information requirements providers of online services have to comply with. We briefly touch upon the previously existing information requirements, and findings on the intersection of behavorial studies and consumer law, but primarily focus on new information requirements against the background of an online platform offering space for businesses to provide their service to consumers. We critically discuss new information requirements from the so-called Omnibus Directive 2019/2161 primarily regarding changes in Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights. Also, we analyze amendments to the Directive 2000/31/EC on e-commerce as proposed late 2020 in the Digital Services Act. We focus on what information should be communicated, how this information should be communicated, and at what moment. In our analysis our doubts about the value of all this information is apparent, and we question the need for and interest of consumers for all information. In the end we suggest of what we believe should be directly communicated to the consumer, and what could be available only to those consumers, probably quite few, who are really interested. Online platforms, consumer protection, information requirements, Digital Services Act

Complexity science permeates the policy spectrum but not antitrust. This is unfortunate. Complexity science provides a high-resolution screen on the empirical realities of markets. And it enables a rich understanding of competition, beyond the reductionist descriptions of markets and firms proposed by neoclassical models and their contemporary neo-Brandeisian critique. New insights arise from the key teachings of complexity science, like feedback loops and the role of uncertainty. The present article lays down the building blocks of a complexity-minded antitrust method.

The platform economy undoubtedly brings advantages, but also generates significant challenges for (local) government. National and local regulators seeking to address such challenges are confronted with limits imposed by EU law, which seemingly grants online platforms a wide degree of freedom to provide their services within the Union’s internal market. This article evaluates the room for national and local authorities to regulate platform-mediated services under the E-Commerce Directive and Services Directive after the “Airbnb cases” (Airbnb Ireland and Cali Apartments). Taking the short-term rental market as a case study, the article concludes that there is in fact considerable room to target both the intermediary services provided by the platforms (upstream), as well as the underlying services (downstream). A combination of upstream and downstream regulation is recommended for local enforcement to be effective, avoid further fragmentation from city to city and halt the trend towards ever-stricter regulation of the underlying services. E-Commerce, Services, EU Law, Platform Economy, Airbnb, Regulation, Short-Term Rental. Digital Services Act

In the EU processing of personal data is subject to strict regulations that are laid out in the GDPR. The GDPR definition of personal data is: any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. Hence, if the definition applies, that data falls under the realm of the GDPR. If data is anonymised however, and as such does not constitute ‘personal data’, GDPR regulations are not applicable. This makes the definition of personal data very important. Or better yet, determining when, according to the GDPR, data should be seen as personal data. This approach of the GDPR, where data is either in scope of the regulation or not, can be considered a binary or ‘black and white’ approach to the applicability of the Regulation. This article describes the advances in technology of the big data era and how these advances make it impossible to adequately make the distinction between data and personal data. It focusses on the definition of personal data and discusses the shortcomings of the binary approach. Specific attention is paid to recital 26 GDPR, which provides some guidance to determine whether a natural person is identifiable. The difficulty of the binary approach in the definition of personal data is presented against the background of the technological developments of the last decades and in the years to come (the big data era), as these development challenge the adequate demarcation of personal data even further and demand for a better approach. The article concludes with reflections on what will be a sustainable approach for the demarcation of the scope of data protection and as such a maintainable and preferable basis for privacy protection in the future. A risk based approach is suggested in which different degrees of re-identifiability are recognized, as opposed as a too simplistic binary approach.

The near future will see a multitude of lunar missions through the efforts of both space agencies and commercial stakeholders. The current lack of coordination mechanisms for lunar activities presents a serious challenge to future missions and could lead to dangerous conflicts, especially in light of the increased global interest in specific areas like the lunar south pole. The need to preserve the peaceful uses of space, together with the desire to begin a new era of sustainable space exploration, urges the development of a common level playing field for upcoming lunar activities. A number of issues must be addressed to ensure sustainable lunar exploration and settlement in and around the Moon, including, for example, mitigating the creation of debris in lunar orbit, defining standards to enable interoperability, and regulating access to natural resources. In 2019, the Moon Village Association (MVA) created an international platform to address these critical issues with the goal of de-risking future lunar missions and increasing global cooperation for lunar exploration and settlement. The MVA decided to promote the development of a neutral forum for multi- stakeholder discussions on lunar exploration: the Global Expert Group on Sustainable Lunar Activities (GEGSLA), with the goal of de- risking future lunar missions and increasing global cooperation for lunar exploration and settlement. The primary goal of GEGSLA meetings is to stimulate informal discussions to prepare documents to be brought to the attention of UNCOPUOS for further discussion and deliberation. The Group started its work with the kick-off meeting on February 25, 2021, creating the basis for increasing global coordination for a new era of sustainable space exploration.

The classical “law & technology” approach focuses on harms created by technology. This approach seems to be common sense; after all, why be interested—from a legal standpoint—in situations where technology does not cause damage? On close inspection, another approach dubbed “law + technology” can better increase the common good. The “+” approach builds on complexity science to consider both the issues and positive contributions technology brings to society. The goal is to address the negative ramifications of technology while leveraging its positive regulatory power. Achieving this double objective requires policymakers and regulators to consider a range of intervention methods and choose the ones that are most suitable.

Legal communication and precontractual communication depend on a mutual understanding and acceptance by the participants. This chapter focuses on the role of empathy in the context of the regulation of artificial intelligence (AI) innovations, with a particular focus on intellectual property law and privacy laws. Interactions in law between human beings as well as between enterprises such as organisations and governments govern the realities and situations within society. The chapter addresses the challenge by analysing selected situations that are particularly relevant in the context of businesses and organisations. It presents the possible role of empathy in the context of AI developments to position the current discussions related to embedding empathy in AI technology. The chapter proposes how empathy could be better embedded in the regulation of both AI-generated works through copyright and the regulation of situations that are relevant to privacy laws.

This paper describes ongoing PhD research into decentralized governance. First the notion of governance is explained as necessarily underlying and enabling any human cooperation. Up till now, governance has always been the job of a group of people specifically appointed for that purpose. Acknowledging the fundamental tension between decentralization and governance, the possibility of decentralized governance is investigated as informed by established principles of good governance.

"Er komt een Europese digitale identiteit voor elke EU-burger, elke inwoner en elke onderneming in de EU die dat wil. Ze kunnen zich daarmee identificeren en kiezen welke persoonlijke gegevens ze willen delen, zowel online als offline, met zowel overheidsinstanties als bedrijven in de hele EU." Aldus de Europese Commissie.2 SSI is een manier om deze digitale identiteit vorm te geven. Dit artikel legt SSI uit, identificeert een aantal openliggende juridische vragen en roept juristen op om mee te denken.

In the first quarter of 2022, the Stanford Computational Antitrust project team invited the partnering antitrust agencies to share their advances in implementing computational tools. Here are the results of the survey.

[This paper is now published here: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2210666120. Please refer to and cite the published version. The preprint is not updated. ]When moderating content online, two key values may come into conflict: protecting freedom of expression and preventing harm. Robust rules based in part on how citizens think about these moral dilemmas are necessary to deal with the unprecedented scale and urgency of this conflict in a principled way. Yet little is known about people's judgments and preferences around content moderation. We examined such moral dilemmas in a conjoint survey experiment where respondents (N = 2,564) indicated whether they would remove problematic social media posts on election denial, anti-vaccination, Holocaust denial, and climate change denial and whether they would take punitive action against the accounts. Respondents were shown key information about the user and their post, as well as the consequences of the misinformation. The majority preferred quashing harmful misinformation over protecting free speech. Respondents were more likely to remove posts and suspend accounts if the consequences were severe and if it was a repeated offence. Features related to the account itself (the person behind the account, their partisanship, and number of followers) had little to no effect on respondents' decisions. Content moderation of harmful misinformation was a partisan issue: Across all four scenarios, Republicans were consistently less willing than Democrats or Independents to delete posts or penalize the accounts that posted them. Our results can inform the design of transparent rules of content moderation for human and algorithmic moderators.

Blockchain can be seen as one of the most significant inventions of humanity since the Internet. Its raison d’être originates from cyberlibertarianism and calls upon helping people to avoid the coercive power of a State. This technology is a decentralized, immutable, and highly transparent ledger, the initial objective of which was to create a trustworthy digital currency. However, blockchain is also used for other purposes, such as the design and the enforcement of smart contracts. Additionally, this technology has another crucial feature, namely its possibility to be forked. A blockchain fork represents a process when one blockchain network splits into two distinct ones due to either technical changes to its protocol or disagreements between the users regarding community rules. The forking process is innovative for two reasons. Firstly, it allows any participant to make their voice heard and to circumvent lengthy bureaucratic procedures when it comes to the implementation of a proposed change. Secondly, in case of a significant disagreement with the rules in place, forks allow any member of a blockchain community to easily establish a new entity without significant costs being involved.This being said, one can clearly see that blockchain significantly altered the way people organize themselves and interact with each other. Nevertheless, it also poses well-founded questions regarding the applicability of Article 101 TFEU to this technology in general and to the process of forking in particular. The reasoning behind this statement is twofold. Firstly, as blockchain does not have centralized top-down governance in its network, it does not fall within Coase's Theory of the Firm. Meanwhile, the current understating of which kind of entities should be considered an undertaking for the purpose of Article 101(1) TFEU is based on this theory. This further results in ambiguity regarding whether blockchain should be seen as an undertaking in the first place. Secondly, there are concerns around the question of liability, as it is unclear who should be held liable for a collusive practice if no specific user or group of users has direct control over the blockchain network’s activities. This regulatory loophole results in a scenario in which blockchain participants are left without any remedies if an anticompetitive practice is directed towards them. It is also the case when it comes to the activities of blockchain forks. Indeed, the recent Bitmain case has illustrated that a blockchain fork can engage in a potentially collusive practice with other entities to ensure its survival.Bearing in mind the regulatory loopholes around blockchain forks and the high relevance of this topic for society, this paper will seek to examine their implications for competition law. Accordingly, it does not support a complete ban of the forking process, as it would deprive blockchain of its central feature and decrease its added value for the population. By contrast, it will seek to outline a specific trajectory that competition authorities and courts can take while assessing the legality of blockchain forks in light of Article 101(1) TFEU.

Financial ecosystems and their related transactions are increasingly relying on big tech payment service providers, such as ApplePay and WeChat. By offering these services, transacting in unregulated cryptocurrencies becomes easier. Consequently, big tech companies take a powerful position in the ecosystem, such dominance may be avoided by a decentralized ecosystem, in which decision making power is distributed over several actors. Emergence of several highly unregulated cryptocurrencies and increased reliance on big tech, motivates central banks to investigate alternatives, called Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) that can be subject to governance and rules. CBDC is specifically aimed to decrease dependency on largely uncontrolled big tech payment service providers and to limit the growth of unregulated cryptocurrencies. In this paper, we explore the key question of how to design a governance structure, we do that by applying the DECENT ontology and conceptual models to the real world use-case of CBDC.6

In dit artikel worden de (nood)maatregelen besproken, die als gevolg van de Covid-19-pandemie door overheden zijn ingevoerd of geactiveerd, en die (on)rechtmatig de fundamentele vrijheden van burgers beperken ter bestrijding van verdere verspreiding van het virus. In dit kader wordt vooral de schijnwerper gericht op de consequenties van de invoering van de volg- en contactidentificatie, op de “corona-melding applicatie”, gelegitimeerd als “afschalingsinstrument”, en op de aanbevelingen, richtlijnen en wetgeving die het gebruik van deze corona-app omringen

Personalised interaction between political parties and the electorate has existed since the emergence of modern elections. Nowadays, digital technology has moved the relationship between political candidates and voters to a more advanced level. Through collecting and analysing citizens’ personal data via digital means, politicians have the capacity to foresee the electorate’s political behaviour, its preferences, and the choices it is inclined to make. Such campaign strategy is known as ‘political micro-targeting’, and it has raised great interest in academia. One may consider it a panacea for political misinformation, given that political micro-targeting can increase the population’s participation in politics. Nonetheless, it can be argued that this phenomenon poses a long-term threat to democracy. Accordingly, due to the high engagement with personal data that political micro-targeting entails, the question of its compatibility with citizens’ voting rights arises. This thesis will explore the issue of online political micro-targeting and seek to conduct a comparative analysis between presidential election campaigns in three European states, namely France, Italy and the United Kingdom. Accordingly, current political micro-targeting practices in these legal systems, and how they can influence each other, will be illustrated. An important place will be devoted to the analysis of political micro-targeting’s interference with the electorate’s voting rights and its regulatory framework.

The Directive 2000/31/EC is usually called the e-commerce Directive, or the Directive on e-commerce. Although several other Directives deal solely, or at least for the greater part, with e-commerce topics (cf. the other chapters in this book), Directive 2000/31/EC regulates central issues regarding electronic commerce, e.g., commercial communications, formation of online contracts, and liability of intermediaries. Due to the coverage of e-commerce key issues the Directive is also known as the legal framework directive. All articles of the Directive are explained and commented upon.

This chapter argues that the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) radically reframed one of the corner stones of data protection: the purpose limitation principle. In short, the purpose limitation principle provides that personal data are not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with the purposes it was originally collected for. Under the Directive 95/46/EC (DPD) regime (supported by a wider regime of fundamental rights and case law), purpose limitation was considered the main rule, and exceptions were to be interpreted restrictively, thus only allowed on an individual and incidental basis. The GDPR (specifically Article 6(4)) has altered (or attempted to alter) this regime by changing the legal framework for purpose limitation, by allowing public administrative bodies to make collective and permanent exceptions to the purpose limitation principle, thus turning the exception into the rule. The chapter is divided in two sections. The first section provides a broad analysis of the purpose limitation principle, its functions, the restrictive interpretation, and the GDPR reframing. The second section establishes the connection between the relevant legislative amendments introduced in the GDPR and the Dutch 'big data' legislations known as the SyRI legislation and the WGS proposal.

This chapter discusses the so-called filtering obligation in Article 17 of the new EU copyright directive (2019/790), an obligation that has been heavily debated since it was first introduced. A copyright filter depends on the recognition of copyright-protected work through the automatic processing of data and blocks the uploading of this content. The filter establishes the boundaries between authorised and unauthorised communications and executes decisions regarding individual upload without the intervention of a human agent. It follows that the use of an automated process raises questions about the filtering obligation’s relationship with Article 22(1) of the GDPR (stating that the ‘data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing’), and as the European Commission has recognised, the filtering obligation itself raises questions about its compatibility with respect for fundamental rights, particularly the right to freedom of expression.

Artificial intelligence (AI) can create a vast number of physical and intangible systems even today. Increasingly, tasks and jobs traditionally done by natural persons in various fields will be fulfilled by these non-human entities. In turn, these automated activities have vast financial and legal consequences, which points to the fact that the less meaningful human control is, the greater the need will be to regulate AI entities. In this regard, a key question relates to the legal nature of these non-human actors. By placing our analysis in the specific industry context of entertainment and the media and in relation to the legal framework of IPR, this Chapter investigates the need to regulate AI actors as legal subjects. This encompasses taking a critical look as to the feasibility of recognizing AI entities and systems as legal persons for IPR purposes, as well as the possible need to create a new sui generis legal subjectivity for independently functioning AI entities and systems.

Tina van der Linden betoogt dat we beter het bestaande recht (bestuursrecht, non-discriminatierecht, gegevensbeschermingsrecht) kunnen omarmen en toepassen, dan nieuwe regels maken voor AI, zoals recent door de EU voorgesteld. Zij illustreert dit aan de hand van de toeslagenaffaire.

The ODR regulation established an ODR platform, a clearing house where consumers can file complaints against traders that should be consecutively taken up by an ADR provider complying with the ADR Directive. However, the EU ODR platform has not really been a success. Websites should refer to the platform, but are not obliged to submit to an ADR scheme. Lack of awareness is another reason for the lack of success of the ODR platform. Information society service providers are required to refer to the platform, but hardly any do. Among the top 100 e-commerce websites in some countries, not a single one referred to the platform, and even in the best scoring countries fewer than 20 out of 100 websites referred to the platform.5 If you ask an audience6 if anyone is familiar with the EU ODR platform, at best one or two will be. The failure of the ODR platform means we must continue to wait to experience successful uptake of ODR. The PSD2 Directive, however, may lead to more use of ADR and ODR, for it is obligatory for payment service providers to apply ADR. This is the main difference from the PSD. If we compare Article 83 PSD with Article 102 PSD2, apart from different terminology the articles are largely the same, but a very important difference is that it is compulsory for payment service providers to use ADR. The other major difference is Article 101 on dispute resolution, which is totally new – there is no similar Article in the PSD. Articles 80 and 81 PSD are almost identical to Article 99 and 103. Finally, Article 82 is largely similar to Article 100, expect that Article 100 has some additional subparagraphs. The additions are not very interesting, though: Article 100(2) determines that competent authorities should possess powers and resources, Article 100(3) that they should act in accordance with national law and Article 100(5) that the Commission should be notified of the designated competent authorities. Article 100(6) is the most interesting, requiring the EBA to issue guidelines.

GNSS offer solutions for many sectors, from road traffic, aviation, emergency-response services, civil engineering and agriculture. Due to the latest technological developments, GNSS, including Galileo, are also being integrated as an essential component of AI systems with various automation levels, such as self-driving vehicles, drones, lane keeping systems on highways etc. Despite their numerous benefits, GNSS are not risk-free. Even though it is unlikely that a loss of signal will lead to an accident caused by an AI system, this scenario cannot be totally ignored. Recent incidents revealed a series of vulnerabilities that need to be addressed before more AI systems using GNSS signals can become active participants in our societies. In this context, it becomes clear that the most pressing issue is the one related to liability: who will be liable in case an accident is caused by an AI system due to an absent or inaccurate GNSS signal at a critical point during navigation? Taking into consideration the debates concerning Galileo’s potential acceptance of liability, this paper investigates if international space law is able to prevent potential liability gaps, thus avoiding situations where incidents occur and liability cannot be attributed.

Bij overeenkomsten op afstand en overeenkomsten gesloten buiten een verkoopruimte heeft een consument in beginsel een bedenktijd van 14 kalenderdagen. Dit betekent dat de consument de overeenkomst gedurende die periode zonder opgave van redenen mag ontbinden. Deze bijdrage zet uiteen hoe de bedenktijd geregeld is voor overeenkomsten met betrekking tot digitale producten, zoals games, muziek of films die door middel van een download of streaming worden geleverd. Er wordt onder meer ingegaan op de wijzigingen die als gevolg van de Omnibus Richtlijn zullen worden aangebracht. Voor de toepassing van de regels is van belang of het gaat om een overeenkomst tot levering van digitale inhoud of om de levering van een digitale dienst. Naar voren komt (onder meer) dat het onderscheid tussen digitale inhoud en digitale diensten niet goed te hanteren is bij de toepassing van de regels met betrekking tot de bedenktijd.

This innovative and original book explores the relationship between blockchain and antitrust, highlighting the mutual benefits that stem from cooperation between the two and providing a unique perspective on how law and technology could cooperate.

For many people and companies, being banned from a social media platform can have a major impact, in terms of reputation, relationships and financially. So, is it possible to use Online Dispute Resolution to help parties negotiate disputes relating to social media bans? By investigating issues of free speech and a model for intelligent online dispute resolution, we propose a platform for helping resolve social media bans.

Self-determination in controlling your personal data The central theme of this dissertation is self-determination, or our individual control over the processing of our personal data and the protection of our privacy. The hypothesis is that the inadequate legal privacy protection can be improved with the help of business and technology principles and initiatives, with legal support (business-technology-legal or btl). The focus is on this triangle, based on the continuous human weighing up of advantages and disadvantages in a 'privacy market'. This approach is partly based on the theory of legal philosopher Richard Posner who viewed privacy from the perspective of individual and social costs and benefits. The main question is how individuals can obtain meaningful control over their personal data, on the one hand in markets in which they acquire valuable services in exchange for making these data available, and on the other in contexts in which data are exchanged for collective, social purposes. Self-determination over personal data is researched theoretically from a variety of perspectives: legal-historical and new legislation (Chapter 2); the right to be forgotten and reputation (Chapter 3); possible ownership over data (Chapter 4); in exchange for attention (Chapter 5); in possible trade in data (Chapter 6); and in behavioural research on data protection (Chapter 7). Individuals, it turns out, use self-determination over their personal data and privacy for optimal benefit, rather than for protection in principle; while there is also 'self-infringement', a hitherto legally unrecognised phenomenon. Traditional media also contribute to the invasion of privacy. The current 'payment' of indispensable digital services with personal data from self-determination appears to offer little protection as a result of an insufficient balance of power in the market in which consumers make themselves dependent on dominant companies. All this forms the starting point for extensive practical research into the ideological, operational-technical, economic and legal aspects of offering new systems, concepts and services for personal data management (pdm) in order to improve the self-determination of personal data (Chapter 8).Separate attention is paid to self-determination over personal data in the Netherlands in the medical sector (MedMij), finance (under PSD2 legislation), and governments (Chapter 9). The conclusion is that personal data management does not yet lead, or hardly leads to more meaningful self-determination, barring exceptions. Further research is necessary into the precise interaction of business, technological and legal conditions under which personal data management may nevertheless be feasible. All the more so if the starting point is the benefit for the individual and society, for example for an adequate digital management of personal life and collective yield via cooperative communities, under the control of algorithms.

Volgens de Rechtbank Amsterdam is Airbnb een bemiddelaar in de zin van artikel 7:425 BW en moet Airbnb op grond van artikel 7:427 jo 7:417 lid 4 BW de servicekosten die een huurder had betaald, terugbetalen. Bij het opstellen van de bepalingen van Boek 7 BW die zien op bemiddelen zal niet gedacht zijn aan de dienstverlening van online platformen zoals Airbnb. Dat roept de vraag op of die bepalingen op Airbnb van toepassing zijn, en zo ja, of dat terecht is in het licht van de doelen van de regels. In deze bijdrage wordt betoogd dat de doelstelling van artikel 7:417 lid 4 BW rechtvaardigt dat deze bepaling op Airbnb wordt toegepast.

Deze bijdrage belicht enkele aspecten van twee nieuwe richtlijnen op het terrein van consumentenbescherming, te weten Richtlijn (EU)2019/770 (Richtlijn digitale inhoud) en Richtlijn (EU) 2019/771(nieuwe Richtlijn consumentenkoop). Deze richtlijnen voorzien onder meer in regels die specifiek zijn toegesneden op digitale producten en goederen met digitale elementen.

In 2017, the Dutch alternative dispute resolution (ADR) initiative e-Court handled 20,000 debt collection claims via an online arbitration procedure, and this number was expected to double in 2018. In September of that same year, the Chairman for the Council of the Judiciary, Frits Bakker, argued on the Day for the Judiciary that in the future most lawsuits can be handled automatically and that a robot judge could work fast, efficiently and cheaply. However, in January 2018, Frits Bakker seemed to have changed his mind and criticized e-Court for its lack of impartiality, lack of transparency, unlawfully denying people the right to a state Court, and for being a ‘robot judge’. Ultimately, all criticism boiled down to one issue: that the defendant’s right to a fair trial was not sufficiently protected in e-Court’s procedure. This accusation led to a huge media outcry, and as a result Courts were no longer willing to grant an exequatur to e-Court’s arbitral awards until the Supreme Court had given its approval. This forced e-Court to temporarily halt its services. Questions such as ‘is arbitration desirable in the case of bulk debt collection procedures?’ and ‘are arbitration agreements in standard terms of consumer contracts desirable?’ are relevant and important, but inherently political. In this article, we argue that the conclusion of the judiciary and media that e-Court’s procedure is in breach of the right to a fair trial is not substantiated by convincing legal arguments. Our aim is not to evaluate whether online arbitration is the best solution to the debt collection claim congestion of Courts in the Netherlands, but instead to assess e-Court’s procedure in the light of Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights. The conclusion is that e-Court’s procedure sufficiently guarantees the right to a fair trial and thus that the criticism expressed was of a political rather than legal nature.

Technological advancement influences all trias politica branches, including judiciary. Courts are undergoing the digitalization process to become more efficient. When it comes to adjudication matters, there have been plans in several States to incorporate AI-based algorithms replacing human judges. Such initiatives have raised interest among academics regarding their compatibility with the right to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR. Specifically, the establishment of an AI-based tribunal is controversial when it comes to the criminal justice system as it deals with particularly serious crimes and penalties. Due to the complexity of criminal cases, it is debatable whether their adjudication can be left to automated machines. Accordingly, this article will answer this research question: to what extent does the employment of AI-based robot judges in criminal courts contradict Article 6(1) ECHR. The scope of this work will be limited to the requirements of independence and impartiality of the tribunal. Firstly, this article will discuss how these standards are perceived by the ECtHR in its case law. Secondly, it will address how an AI-based algorithm can replace human judges and benefits it brings to criminal justice system. Thirdly, this article will analyze key drawbacks AI-based criminal tribunals have regarding their independence and impartiality. As this article supports the idea of AI-based criminal judges, it will suggest possible safeguards for their compliance with these standards.

Computational antitrust is a new domain of legal informatics which seeks to develop computational methods for the automation of antitrust procedures and the improvement of antitrust analysis. The present article first introduces it, then explores how agencies, policymakers, and market participants can benefit from it. Against this background, it sets out a research agenda for the years ahead in view of providing answers to the challenges created by computational antitrust, and better understand its limits.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming the space industry by offering unprecedented possibilities for space related activities. AI applications in space include from analyzing large amounts of space data, enabling deep-space missions, mitigating the effects of climate change, combating space pollution, toassisting astronaut crews during their daily operations. In the context of building future human societies on the Moon, AI systems will play a double role: an ex-ante preparation role and a societal consolidative role. AI systems used in the ex-ante preparation phase include various applications used for explorationinvestigations and they will be decisive for the scientifical understanding of the future Lunar habitat. Once the habitats will be settled, AI systems will contribute for consolidation, playing an assistive role, among others. AI systems will be able to offer support in daily activities, including offering mental health assistance. Similar systems have already been successfully deployed on the International Space Station, for crew assistance.The introduction of AI systems as part of future Lunar habitats does not come without corresponding risks, especially from a legal perspective. Several legal challenges may appear in the context of a high reliance on these systems, such as: who will be liable in case an AI system will be involved in accidents causing economic losses or loss of human lives? What type of legal framework will be required to mitigate such risks? Will the existing body of laws representing international space law remain sufficient for addressing these challenges?In such context, the purpose of this paper is to critically analyze the above-mentioned legal risks and to propose corresponding mitigating actions for ensuring long-standing future Lunar societies.

The introduction of advanced new technologies is transforming the space industry. Artificial intelligence is offering unprecedented possibilities for space-related activities because it enables space objects to gain autonomy. The increasing autonomy level of space objects does not come without legal implications. The lack of human control challenges existing liability frameworks. This paper reviews the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention as the main legal documents introducing the legal grounds for attributing liability in case of damages caused by autonomous space objects. Looking at the limitations of these legal frameworks in what concerns the attribution of liability, this paper identifies the conditions that could cause a liability gap. The amendment of the Liability Convention, the concept of "international responsibility" introduced by Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty and several international law principles are analysed as potential solutions for preventing the liability gap and mitigating the risks posed by autonomous space objects.

Since the beginning days of ODR, low-value e-commerce disputes were seen as one of the most suited domains for the resolution of online disputes. First, because the dispute has an online origin, so it seems logical to resolve conflicts online after an online transaction. Second, because courts, in particular in an international context, are not fit for resolving these kind disputes and are also too expensive. The European Union is a big proponent of this argument. They adduced it 20 years ago, 10 years ago, and still today. Their argument is that consumers would trust cross-border e-commerce disputes better if they knew their conflicts would be adequately resolved. The European Union also believes that the amount of cross-border EU transactions is still low because of the lack of trust. However, for many years EU citizens buy from service providers in countries outside the EU. For 20 years they purchase from US websites, and over the last years from Chinese sites, notably Alibaba. Plus, consumers are not interested in resolving via ODR. Rather, they contact the seller directly or post a negative review. That is also what students at the London School of Economics said when I gave a guest lecture on ODR a couple of years ago. Last March, however, quite a few LSE students in the same course believed that if ODR is convenient and inexpensive, consumers might be even interested in resolving low-value disputes by ODR. Clearly, the last word has not been spoken on this topic.

Algorithms are the basic engine of AI and are increasingly supporting and channelling the outcome of deciscion making in all kind of different areas . Algorithms will drive many different applications, from industrial products to administrative and governmental decision making. This includes relevant legal decisions that will require information for data-subjects. The GDPR requires transparency of decision-making and explainability as well as information to the datas-subjects. In what respect and to what extent is this demand feasible? Must algorithms always be explainable or do we accept the black box to be black for different functionalities. Is a separate legal framework for algorithms necessary? It is not always necessary to know what is under the hood of the car to drive...