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THE 1960s witnessed a decisive contraction of Britain's world position, as the pressures of indigenous resistance and metropolitan decline made it increasingly costly to sustain far-flung responsibilities and duties in [...]

The influence of the Treasury of the United Kingdom on foreign policy in the pre-World War II period is examined. It is concluded that Lord Vansittart, the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office in the mid-1930s, did not allow undue influence by the Treasury as he was later accused of doing.

This article examines the role of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) in Portugal between 1940 and 1942 and discusses its eventual failure. The author, maintaining the SOEs station in Lisbon was exposed by the Portuguese and was forced to withdraw its troops from the country, argues the SOE failed because it did not create a sustainable role regarding British policies toward Portugal.

This article examines British international relations with the USSR from the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August of 1939 to the Soviet attack on Finland at the end of November of 1939. The author argues that regardless of the negative feelings British leaders held for the Soviet Union and communism they opted for realpolitik and maintained connections with the USSR for their own security.

An evaluation is presented on the extent to which British foreign policy in the early twentieth century was powered by the need to conciliate with Russia. Both foreign secretaries of the period, Lansdowne and Grey, saw Russia as a danger to the imperial position of Britain and worked for better relations with the power., The myths In the popular mind a number of myths continue to exist about the subject, and the period, under review in this article. Broadly speaking, the myths are that [...]

ONE relatively mundane but nonetheless still perhaps insightful interpretation of the last fifty-odd years of British history is that it has been a period during which the entire polity has [...]

Accounts of the outbreak of World War One often communicate a sense that Britain was propelled into the conflict by force of circumstance, that it was, in some way, an [...]

The British labormovement sought to strengthen national secuirity toward the end of the 1930s, and this led to a greater role in the coalition government of the 1939-1945 war, as well as the postwar government of Clement Attlee. John Saville sees the consensus over foreign affairs as occurring later, after 1940, but the national security perspective of the Labor Party can be traced to the late 1930s. The approach to national security was linked to an interest in social democracy and in their economic and political institutions.

An urgent need emerged in late 1920 for the winding up of the system of divided control between the Foreign, India and War Offices in the Middle East. This was [...]

David Dutton analyses Austen Chamberlain's impact on British foreign policy, and European affairs, between the wars. Few of those charged with the direction of British foreign policy in the inter-war […]

Why can't the laws that guarantee British liberties be adapted elsewhere? This is Voltaire's famous query that Ian Buruma explores so arrestingly in his new book, Anglomania. Having been imprisoned [...]

In the aftermath of the First World War, two schools of divergent thought emerged among Whitehall s Middle East policy-makers. One, propounded by T. E. Lawrence, found support in the Foreign Office, where many favoured Arab national ideals and backed the Hashemite family for rulership positions in the region. The other, epitomized by Arnold Wilson, the civil commissioner for Iraq, was thought to reflect the India Office view that direct British rule in Iraq was essential and that Hashemite pretensions should be opposed. In this article, the author shows that the lines separating the India and Foreign Offices were not so clearly drawn. Many senior officials in the India Office were disturbed by Wilson's imperial programme for Iraq and some were prepared to support Hashemite aspirations. But Lawrence's 1920 campaign for Hashemite rule and his hyperbolic press attacks on Wilson's policies had the paradoxical effect of moving the India Office to defend Wilson and to revert to their anti-Hashemite stance. The article concludes with an analysis of the reasons behind the triumph of the Lawrentian over the Wilsonian schools at the end of 1920, when Wilson was removed from Iraq and Middle East policy-making was consolidated in the Colonial Office.

There was constant tension between Britain and the United States from 1840 to 1865. The Liberals, who dominated British government during this period, had no doubt why: American governments, pandering to the democratic mob, provoked crises with Britain for domestic electoral purposes. They did this by encouraging acts of aggression or provocation by American citizens, and by threatening and bullying the British government, in order to get their way on issues of contention. Furthermore, they succeeded, even though Britain's leaders usually thought either that right was clearly on the British side or was sufficiently ambiguous to justify greater concessions by the Americans than were finally secured. This policy of appeasing the United States was forced on Liberal governments because their middle-class constituency perceived a 'special relationship' between the two countries, based on blood, religion, liberal traditions, and trade. They would not contemplate the threat of war with the United States, and since no important British interest was involved, the British government usually gave way. When it did not, as during the Trent affair, the British interest was to prevent further crises.

This article revisits the controversy surrounding the protection that Britain accorded the high commission territories on the advent of South African unification in 1910. Instead of incorporating these regions into the new Union from the start, the imperial government retained responsibility for them and further issued a schedule stipulating the terms on which transfer could take place later. The historiographical controversy centres around the respective roles of the high commissioner, the Liberal government, and the African inhabitants of these regions in formulating Britain's policy on this question. The present author agrees with Ronald Hyam that London made the decision to withhold the areas from the Union and that this decision has proved of critical importance to the welfare of the people concerned. This article, however, emphasizes that in the context of 1909 the question of transfer did not appear to possess the importance that it later took on, for all statesmen assumed that, sooner or later, the Territories would be transferred. What seemed more important at the time was the schedule governing transfer. This was primarily the work of the high commissioner - Lord Selborne. Though not without a trace of old-fashioned paternalism, his proposals display a modern enthusiasm for bureaucratic state building.

Only the future will show the sincerity and depth of promises made by the newly formed British government to improve relationships with the European Union (EU). Preliminary negotiations have shown promise that Britain will be faithful despite historical evidence to the contrary. Internal cooperation may aid in balancing the challenges faced domestically, within the EU, and abroad. Forums in place within the British Commonwealth may be a good resource for developing human rights' policies.