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Objectives: In Italy, asbestos was used intensively until its ban in 1992, which was extended for asbestos cement factories until 1994. The aim of this study was to evaluate the dose–response between asbestos exposure and asbestosis mortality across a pool of Italian occupational cohorts, taking into account the presence of competing risks. Methods: Cohorts were followed for vital status and the cause of death was ascertained by a linkage with mortality registers. Cause‐specific (CS) Cox‐regression models were used to evaluate the dose‐exposure relationship between asbestosis mortality and the time‐dependent cumulative exposure index (CEI) to asbestos. Fine and Gray regression models were computed to assess the effect of competing risks of death. Results: The cohort included 12,963 asbestos cement workers. During the follow‐up period (1960−2012), of a total of 6961 deaths, we observed 416 deaths attributed to asbestosis, 879 to lung cancer, 400 to primary pleural cancer, 135 to peritoneal cancer, and 1825 to diseases of the circulatory system. The CS model showed a strong association between CEI and asbestosis mortality. Dose–response models estimated an increasing trend in mortality even below a CEI of 25 ff/mL‐years. Lung cancer and circulatory diseases were the main competing causes of death. Conclusions: Asbestos exposure among Italian asbestos‐cement workers has led to a very high number of deaths from asbestosis and asbestos‐related diseases. The increasing risk trend associated with excess deaths, even at low exposure levels, suggests that the proposed limit values would not have been adequate to prevent disability and mortality from asbestosis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Assessment of the effective use of international travel measures during the COVID-19 pandemic has focused on public health goals, namely limiting virus introduction and onward transmission. However, risk-based approaches includes the weighing of public health goals against potential social, economic and other secondary impacts. Advancing risk-based approaches thus requires fuller understanding of available evidence on such impacts. Methods: We conducted a scoping review of existing studies of the social impacts of international travel measures during the COVID-19 pandemic. Applying a standardized typology of travel measures, and five categories of social impact, we searched 9 databases across multiple disciplines spanning public health and the social sciences. We identified 26 studies for inclusion and reviewed their scope, methods, type of travel measure, and social impacts analysed. Results: The studies cover a diverse range of national settings with a strong focus on high-income countries. A broad range of populations are studied, hindered in their outbound or inbound travel. Most studies focus on 2020 when travel restrictions were widely introduced, but limited attention is given to the broader effects of their prolonged use. Studies primarily used qualitative or mixed methods, with adaptations to comply with public health measures. Most studies focused on travel restrictions, as one type of travel measure, often combined with domestic public health measures, making it difficult to determine their specific social impacts. All five categories of social impacts were observed although there was a strong emphasis on negative social impacts including family separation, decreased work opportunities, reduced quality of life, and inability to meet cultural needs. A small number of countries identified positive social impacts such as restored work-life balance and an increase in perceptions of safety and security. Conclusions: While international travel measures were among the most controversial interventions applied during the COVID-19 pandemic, given their prolonged use and widespread impacts on individuals and populations, there remains limited study of their secondary impacts. If risk-based approaches are to be advanced, involving informed choices between public health and other policy goals, there is a need to better understand such impacts, including their differential impacts across diverse populations and settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Pakistan, with its diverse points of entry, faced several challenges with implementing the International Health Regulations (IHR) ethically during the COVID-19 pandemic. Aim: To explore the perceptions of point of entry health workers regarding the ethics challenges in implementing the IHR during the COVID-19 pandemic. Methods: From December 2022 to March 2023, this qualitative study conducted 10 focused group discussions and key informant interviews with 40 participants from 10 points of entry in Pakistan and reviewed COVID-19 containment guidelines. The data generated were transcribed, translated into English and analysed manually. The thematic analysis focused on the core ethics principles, including optimization of population health versus autonomy, distributive justice versus equity, trustworthiness versus privacy and confidentiality, and the impact of sanctions and restrictions on vulnerable populations. Results: The study identified ethics challenges relating to containment policies, public health measures (testing, quarantine and isolation), travel restrictions, equitable resource distribution, and emergency operations. These challenges were grouped under 3 main categories, according to the IHR thematic areas: prevent, detect and respond. Respondents said it was difficult to balance between the public health measures and individual rights, address discrimination and stigmatization, and ensure fairness and justice in vaccine distribution and travel restrictions. Conclusion: Navigating ethics challenges relating to IHR implementation during health emergencies requires transparent communication, cultural sensitivity, and a commitment to equity and justice. It is important to incorporate ethics considerations into national emergency response plans to guide decision-making, safeguard individual rights and promote collective wellbeing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In December 2021, WHO’s 194 member states began reaching a consensus to start the process of drafting and negotiating a pandemic treaty under the WHO Act. Although there is already a PHEIC system to deal with sudden public health events such as pandemics, the system is not sufficient to deal with global pandemic events. The draft WHO Pandemic Agreement reflects the negotiating process until 24 May 2024. The negotiating team is faced with legal issues such as the treatment of the relationship between the pandemic treaty and the International Health Regulations, the determination of the contracting model, the attribution of the pandemic definition power and the construction of the dispute settlement mechanism. Through a study of the articles of the current draft and a comparative analysis with other treaties, this paper discusses the need to distinguish the functions of the pandemic treaty and the International Health Regulations (IHR), adopt a soft and hard contracting model, establish an open and transparent pandemic determination mechanism, reform the institutional functions of WHO, and establish an effective dispute settlement mechanism in order to solve the above problems. Ultimately, fairness and justice in international public health governance will be achieved.

BackgroundThe Eastern Mediterranean Region (EMR) faces numerous public health risks caused by biological, chemical, man-made, and natural hazards. This manuscript aimed to assess the multifaceted interventions and strategies used to strengthen the EMR’s preparedness capacities to respond properly to current and upcoming health emergencies.ObjectiveTo address these challenges, it is crucial to implement comprehensive and robust strategic risk assessments and health emergency preparedness frameworks. The World Health Organization (WHO) takes a risk-based approach, emphasizing the significance of all-hazards emergency management and the creation of national health risk profiles using the Strategic Toolkit for Assessing Risk (STAR). Furthermore, the International Health Regulations (IHR) Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (MEF) ensures continuous learning and capacity building among Member States, enhancing their ability to manage health emergencies effectively. Key components include State Party Annual Reporting (SPAR), Joint External Evaluation (JEE), After Action Review (AAR), Intra Action Review (IAR), and Simulation Exercises (SimEx). Moreover, initiatives like One Health, Emergency Care Systems, Safe Hospitals, and Public Health Emergency Operations Centers (PHEOCs) reinforce preparedness and response capacities. Risk communication and community engagement (RCCE) strategies play a pivotal role in disseminating timely information and fostering community resilience. Furthermore, the management of Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBRN) incidents remains a priority, necessitating collaboration between the public health and security sectors. This comprehensive approach aims to strengthen health systems, reduce risks, and improve emergency response capabilities throughout the EMR, thereby promoting global health security and resilience.ConclusionThe EMR is addressing public health challenges through frameworks like IHR-MEF, and RCCE. It is strengthening emergency care systems, ensuring safe hospitals, and establishing PHEOCs. Proactive measures to address CBRN events and collaboration are enhancing resilience. The inclusion of the One Health approach underscores the EMR’s holistic strategy to address the health threats at the human-animal-environment interface. This demonstrates the EMR’s commitment to global health security.

The current pandemic response system under the International Health Regulations has been considered unsatisfactory in controlling world pandemic outbreaks. Opinions are voiced that a legal evolution incorporating other sources of international law is imperative to meet the system's primary deficiency: the uneven degree of State compliance with the 'core capacity' requirements. Against this background, this paper aims to examine the potential application of transboundary harm rules in world pandemic prevention, where existing treaty obligations are insufficient or ineffective in addressing future obstacles. By comparing their conceptual characters and legal elements, this paper seeks to reveal the inherent link between the two domains, which may further demonstrate an existing manifestation of transboundary harm rules as emerging customary international law in current pandemic prevention practice. Based on the structure of transboundary harm rules, this paper aims to provide an innovative legal framework that justifies the differentiated standards among States with uneven capacity and underlines the obligation of cooperation. Such a framework is designed to improve the level of States' prevention and response towards future global health emergencies raised by world pandemics. Moreover, it hopes to provide practical ideas for formulating the new international instrument on pandemic prevention, which is currently being drafted by the Member States of the World Health Organization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the development of Australia's policy approach towards communicable disease, both domestically and internationally. Drawing on archival records, it considers the methods used by federal and state governments to manage disease in Australia over time, analysing the key beliefs and priorities held by successive governments, and how these reflect Australia's particular character and history. Against these domestic concerns, the article interrogates Australia's approach to global health governance, with a particular focus on the state's contributions to the drafting of major international health instruments on communicable disease. This analysis reveals the idiosyncratic nature of Australia's health policy and the resulting impact on Australia's contributions to the international legal system. It shows that Australia's approach has consistently relied on the creation and preservation of an impermeable national border. This policy reflects an institutionalised belief, held continually since the early colonial period, that disease must be fully eradicated, and that this is best effected through taking advantage of the country's geographic isolation. Domestically, this conception of disease control results in the adoption of strict quarantine requirements, immigration restrictions and broad discretionary powers regarding the entry of people and goods, while in the international context, Australia supports norms that facilitate its reification of its border. Accordingly, the article contextualises Australia's health policy across four time periods of global health governance: the first sanitary conferences of the 19th and early-20th centuries, the post-World War II creation of the World Health Organization, the International Health Regulations 2005 revision project, and those Regulations' operation before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. This article's findings reveal the intrinsic connection between the unique domestic concerns of states and their approaches to international negotiations, which stymies the ability to generate effective cooperation globally. It clarifies this relationship and invites reflection on the resulting obstacles to international law's progressive development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Public Health Forum is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Introduction: The International Health Regulations were created by the World Health Organization with the purpose of preventing the international spread of diseases. The 196 signatory countries are bound by this international agreement. In this article, we conducted a scoping review of the literature concerning the implementation and operationalization of measures at both the continental and national levels to prevent the spread of vector-borne diseases. The purpose was to understand the main strategies and policies adopted, as well as how they have been operating. Methods: Out of an initial search on PubMed™, SCOPUS™, and Web of Science™ using combinations of "International Health Regulations" and "vector-borne diseases", 75 references were obtained, of which 27 were included after careful qualitative analysis. Results: Publication dates of included articles ranged from 1996 to 2022. Four major categories of measures were identified: (a) surveillance and epidemic intelligence; (b) Declaration of Public Health Emergency of International Concern; (c) measures in Points of Entry; and (d) vaccination status. Implemented measures were found in all continents: Africa, Oceania (Australia), Asia (China, India, Taiwan), Europe (Ireland, the Netherlands, and Mediterranean countries), North America (USA), and South America (Brazil). Yellow fever, Zika, Dengue, and Chikungunya were the most cited vector-borne diseases but Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, Japanese encephalitis, Lyme disease, Malaria, Leishmaniasis, Tick-borne encephalitis, and West Nile fever were also mentioned. Conclusion: There are severe asymmetries across countries on the implementation of international regulations with regards to vector-borne diseases, particularly on the issue of surveillance systems. State Parties should consider the lessons learned from the pandemic and perfect their core capacities to prevent future outbreaks of infectious diseases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Background All countries are required to implement International Health Regulations (IHR) through development and implementation of multi-year National Action Plans for Health Security (NAPHS). IHR implementation requires annual operational planning which involves several tools such as NAPHS, State Party Annual Report (SPAR), Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and WHO IHR Benchmarks tool. Sierra Leone has successfully improved IHR capacities across the years through successful annual operational planning using the above tools. We conducted a study to document and share the country’s unique approach to implementation of NAPHS. Methods This was an observational study where the process of implementing and monitoring NAPHS in Sierra Leone was observed at the national level from 2018 to 2021. Data was obtained through review and analysis of NAPHS annual operational plans, quarterly review reports and annual IHR assessment reports. Available data was supplemented by information from key informants. Qualitative data was captured as notes and analysed for various themes while quantitative data was analyzed mainly for means and proportions. Results The overall national IHR Joint External Evaluation self-assessment score for human health improved from 44% in 2018 to 51% in 2019 and 57% in 2020. The score for the animal sector improved from 32% in 2018 to 43% in 2019 and 52% in 2020. A new JEE tool with new indicators was used in 2021 and the score for both human and animal sectors declined slightly to 51%. Key enablers of success included strong political commitment, whole-of-government approach, annual assessments using JEE tool, annual operational planning using WHO IHR Benchmarks tool and real time online monitoring of progress. Key challenges included disruption created by COVID-19 response, poor health infrastructure, low funding and inadequate health workforce. Conclusion IHR annual operational planning and implementation using evidence-based data and tools can facilitate strengthening of IHR capacity and should be encouraged.

Introduction: The International Health Regulations were created by the World Health Organization with the purpose of preventing the international spread of diseases. The 196 signatory countries are bound by this international agreement. In this article, we conducted a scoping review of the literature concerning the implementation and operationalization of measures at both the continental and national levels to prevent the spread of vector-borne diseases. The purpose was to understand the main strategies and policies adopted, as well as how they have been operating. Methods: Out of an initial search on PubMed™, SCOPUS™, and Web of Science™ using combinations of “International Health Regulations” and “vector-borne diseases”, 75 references were obtained, of which 27 were included after careful qualitative analysis. Results: Publication dates of included articles ranged from 1996 to 2022. Four major categories of measures were identified: (a) surveillance and epidemic intelligence; (b) Declaration of Public Health Emergency of International Concern; (c) measures in Points of Entry; and (d) vaccination status. Implemented measures were found in all continents: Africa, Oceania (Australia), Asia (China, India, Taiwan), Europe (Ireland, the Netherlands, and Mediterranean countries), North America (USA), and South America (Brazil). Yellow fever, Zika, Dengue, and Chikungunya were the most cited vector-borne diseases but Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, Japanese encephalitis, Lyme disease, Malaria, Leishmaniasis, Tick-borne encephalitis, and West Nile fever were also mentioned. Conclusion: There are severe asymmetries across countries on the implementation of international regulations with regards to vector-borne diseases, particularly on the issue of surveillance systems. State Parties should consider the lessons learned from the pandemic and perfect their core capacities to prevent future outbreaks of infectious diseases.

ABSTRACT: Background: An appropriate antimicrobial use (AMU) surveillance system provides critical data and evidence on which antimicrobial stewardship interventions are based. However, Uganda and most other low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) lack efficient systems for monitoring AMU due to unique health system challenges. Methods: We reviewed the key tools available for AMU surveillance in health facilities. Based on our implementation experience, we present arguments on the need for country authorities to adapt a customized and standardized tool for national uses. Results: Despite ongoing efforts to set up AMU surveillance programs in Uganda, AMU data remain sparse, with most of the available data collected through antimicrobial stewardship related continuous quality improvement efforts implemented by global AMR control programs. There is variability in the interpretation of available AMU surveillance tools and a need to identify the most appropriate AMU surveillance methodologies and tools for Uganda and other LMICs. Data fields for sex and gender are incorrectly categorized and there is no tool that records pregnancy variable. Based on the past four years of practical implementation experience since the launch of the World Health Organization's Point Prevalence Survey methodology in 2018 for inpatient settings, we believe that the tool should be modified in cognizance of existing capacity and priorities in resource-constrained settings. Conclusions: The World Health Organization, regional experts, ministry of health authorities, and other stakeholders should urgently review available tools with a view to adopting a customized and standardized facility AMU surveillance methodology suitable for national-level rollout in LMICs.

Abstract Background The One Health approach is key in implementing International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005) and the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA). Uganda is signatory to the IHR 2005 and in 2017, the country conducted a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) that guided development of the National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) 2019–2023. Aim This study assessed the contribution of the One Health approach to strengthening health security in Uganda. Methods A process evaluation between 25th September and 5th October 2020, using a mixed–methods case study. Participants were Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from government ministries, departments, agencies and implementing partners. Focus group discussions were conducted for five technical areas (workforce development, real-time surveillance, zoonotic diseases, national laboratory systems and emergency response operations), spanning 18 indicators and 96 activities. Funding and implementation status from the NAPHS launch in August 2019 to October 2020 was assessed with a One Health lens. Results Full funding was available for 36.5% of activities while 40.6% were partially funded and 22.9% were not funded at all. Majority (65%) of the activities were still in progress, whereas 8.6% were fully implemented and14.2% were not yet done. In workforce development, several multisectoral trainings were conducted including the frontline public health fellowship program, the One Health fellowship and residency program, advanced field epidemiology training program, in-service veterinary trainings and 21 district One Health teams’ trainings. Real Time Surveillance was achieved through incorporating animal health events reporting in the electronic integrated disease surveillance and response platform. The national and ten regional veterinary laboratories were assessed for capacity to conduct zoonotic disease diagnostics, two of which were integrated into the national specimen referral and transportation network. Multisectoral planning for emergency response and the actual response to prioritized zoonotic disease outbreaks was done jointly. Conclusions This study demonstrates the contribution of ‘One Health’ implementation in strengthening Uganda’s health security. Investment in the funding gaps will reinforce Uganda’s health security to achieve the IHR 2005. Future studies could examine the impacts and cost-effectiveness of One Health in curbing prioritized zoonotic disease outbreaks.

Abstract Background Comparative data collection in transborder areas can contribute to informed decision making processes when dealing with borderless health threats such as pandemics, and thus help minimize the negative health effects for its citizens. To examine the pandemic response over time and the impact of infectious disease control in a cross-border setting, a prospective longitudinal study was conducted in the border area between Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. In the spring of 2021, a random sample of 26,925 adult citizens selected from governmental registries was invited to collect a blood sample at home for SARS-CoV-2 antibody testing and to fill in an online questionnaire on attitudes and behaviour towards infection prevention measures, cross-border mobility, social network and support, COVID-19 self-reported infection(s) and symptoms, vaccination, general self-reported health and socio-demographics. In autumn 2021, participants were invited for a follow-up round. An online tool was developed to coordinate fieldwork procedures, real-time monitoring of participation and consultation of antibody test results. Furthermore, a helpdesk in all three languages for participants’ support was set up. Results In the first round, 6,006 citizens in the Meuse-Rhine Euroregion participated. 15.3% of the invited citizens on the Belgian side of the border participated. In the Netherlands and Germany this was respectively 27% and 23.7%. In the follow-up round 4,286 (71.4%) citizens participated for the second time. The participation rate was highest in the age group 50–69 years and lowest in > 80 in all sub regions of the Meuse-Rhine Euroregion. More women participated than men. Overall, more blood samples were returned than completed questionnaires. In total, 3,344 citizens in the Meuse-Rhine Euroregion completed all components of participation in both rounds. Conclusions The collection of comparative data can help better assess the pandemic response and the impact of infectious disease control in a cross-border area. Recommendations for a longitudinal cross-border study include a centralized online environment, mapping out potential challenges related to national regulations in the preparation phase and organizing regional coordination centres to create more familiarity and trust towards the involved organisations.

The COVID-19 pandemic elicited a surge in the use of digital tools to replace “classic” manual disease tracking and contact tracing across individuals. The main technical reason is based on the disease surveillance needs imposed by the magnitude of the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus since 2020, particularly how these needs overwhelmed governments around the world. Such developments led to stark variations across countries in terms of legal approaches towards the use of digital tools, including self-reporting software and mobile phone apps, for both disease tracking and contact tracing. Against this backdrop, in this article I highlight some of the normative challenges posed by the digitalization of disease surveillance, underscoring its almost non-existent regulation under international law. I look back at the historical emergence of the epidemiological principles underlying this procedure, by referring to John Snow’s trailblazing work in cholera control. I emphasize how the COVID-19 pandemic prompted both technical and normative shifts related to the digitalization of these procedures. Furthermore, I refer to some of the overarching obstacles for deploying international law to tackle future tensions between the public health rationale for digitalized disease tracking and contact tracing, on the one hand, and normative concerns directly related to their legality, on the other hand. Lastly, I put forward conclusions in light of the current juncture of international health law reforms, and how they so far display limited potential to herald structural changes concerning the legality of the use of digital tools in disease surveillance.

Abstract Background Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) poses a global threat to human, animal, and environmental health. AMR is a technical area in the Global Health Security Agenda initiative which uses the Joint External Evaluation tool to evaluate national AMR containment capacity. This paper describes four promising practices for strengthening national antimicrobial resistance containment capacity based on the experiences of the US Agency for International Development’s Medicines, Technologies, and Pharmaceutical Services Program work with 13 countries to implement their national action plans on AMR in the areas of multisectoral coordination, infection prevention and control, and antimicrobial stewardship. Methods We use the World Health Organization (WHO) Benchmarks on International Health Regulations Capacities (2019) to guide national, subnational, and facility actions that advance Joint External Evaluation capacity levels from 1 (no capacity) to 5 (sustainable capacity). Our technical approach is based on scoping visits, baseline Joint External Evaluation scores, benchmarks tool guidance, and country resources and priorities. Results We gleaned four promising practices to achieve AMR containment objectives: (1) implement appropriate actions using the WHO benchmarks tool, which prioritizes actions, making it easier for countries to incrementally increase their Joint External Evaluation capacity from level 1 to 5; (2) integrate AMR into national and global agendas. Ongoing agendas and programs at international, regional, and national levels provide opportunities to mainstream and interlink AMR containment efforts; (3) improve governance through multisectoral coordination on AMR. Strengthening multisectoral bodies’ and their technical working groups’ governance improved functioning, which led to better engagement with animal/agricultural sectors and a more coordinated COVID-19 pandemic response; and (4) mobilize and diversify funding for AMR containment. Long-term funding from diversified funding streams is vital for advancing and sustaining countries’ Joint External Evaluation capacities. Conclusions The Global Health Security Agenda work has provided practical support to countries to frame and conduct AMR containment actions in terms of pandemic preparedness and health security. The WHO benchmarks tool that Global Health Security Agenda uses serves as a standardized organizing framework to prioritize capacity-appropriate AMR containment actions and transfer skills to help operationalize national action plans on AMR.

COVID-19 exposed major gaps in global, regional, state, and local responses to public health emergencies. In preparation for the WHA Special Session to consider the benefits of developing an international instrument on pandemic preparedness, the O’Neill Institute in partnership with Foundation for the National Institutes of Health convened 30 of the world’s leading authorities on global health law, financing, biomedical science, implementation, and emergency response along with leaders from prominent international organizations. This meeting was followed by regional consultations convened in Latin America-Caribbean, Africa, and Southeast Asia. These high-level expert consultations generated in-depth discussions on weaknesses and persisting gaps in global pandemic preparedness and what a new international agreement might include to address them. Regional intergovernmental organizations like PAHO can work closely with related multilateral development banks to develop financial instruments that can smooth systemic economic disruption; and regional centers of research and manufacturing excellence can offer a strong front line for producing medicines and vaccines rapidly during a pandemic. With our research focused on the regional response to COVID-19 we are able to look at country responses individually and collectively to see how Latin America – Caribbean countries can capitalize and leverage their regional connections to strengthen their pandemic preparedness and response. By identifying existing gaps and examining the responses and approaches taken by PAHO, we can better understand the role of international and regional organizations and their collaborating centers in preparing and responding to pandemics.

Introduction: The International Health Regulations (IHR) were developed to prepare countries to deal with public health emergencies. The spread of SARS-CoV-2 underlined the need for international coordination, although few attempts were made to evaluate the integrated implementation of the IHR’s core capacities in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The aim of this study was to evaluate whether IHR shortcomings stem from non-compliance or regulatory issues, using Portugal as a European case study due to its size, organization, and previous discrepancies between self-reporting and peer assessment of the IHR’s core capacities. Methods: Fifteen public health medical residents involved in contact tracing in mainland Portugal interpreted the effectiveness of the IHR’s core capabilities by reviewing the publicly available evidence and reflecting on their own field experience, then grading each core capability according to the IHR Monitoring Framework. The assessment of IHR enforcement considered efforts made before and after the onset of the pandemic, covering the period up to July 2021. Results: Four out of nine core IHR capacities (surveillance; response; risk communication; and human resource capacity) were classified as level 1, the lowest. Only two were graded level 3 (preparedness; and laboratory), the highest. The remaining three) (national legislation, policy & financing; coordination and national focal point communication; and points of entry) were classified as level 2. Conclusion: Portugal exemplifies the extent to which implementation of the IHR was not fully achieved, which has resulted in the underperformance of several core capacities. There is a need to improve preparedness and international cooperation in order to harmonize and strengthen the global response to public health emergencies, with better political, institutional, and financial support.

Copyright of Revista Brasileira de Estudos Politicos is the property of Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (Revista Brasileira de Estudos Politicos) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The COVID-19 pandemic has now affected everyone, threatening every aspect of our well-being with over 617597680 confirmed cases, including 6532705 deaths globally. The context of the Anthropocene is the backdrop for the novel, interlinked, systemic, and global threats. Anthropocene is a term proposed to designate the era in which human beings have become predominant drivers of planetary change, drastically altering the planet’s biosphere. The concept of global health diplomacy (GHD), which connects the domains of health and international relations, has a critical role in advancing human security. Thus, there is a need for new forms of diplomacy, which is critically important in this complex intermestic and interdependent Anthropocene era, where globalization has inevitably linked nations and population health. This paper introduces, analyzes, and attempts to define "Digital Global Health Diplomacy" (DGHD), which has gained great momentum during this COVID-19 pandemic with concurrent health and human security threats. The application of digital formats to the existing traditional structures for dialogue has become a more popular tool recently. Furthermore, digital means are being used during the COVID-19 pandemic to share the health diplomacy discourse at subnational, supranational, international, regional, and global platforms. DGHD reminds us again of the criticality of this multidisciplinary concept involving the contributions of diplomats, global health specialists, digital technology experts, economists, trade specialists, international law, political scientists, etc., in the global policymaking process. If used effectively by trained global health diplomats through innovative digital platforms, DGHD has a great scope of delivering results faster and has more reach than the traditional approach.

Abstract Background From May 2018 to September 2022, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) experienced seven Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreaks within its borders. During the 10th EVD outbreak (2018–2020), the largest experienced in the DRC and the second largest and most prolonged EVD outbreak recorded globally, a WHO risk assessment identified nine countries bordering the DRC as moderate to high risk from cross border importation. These countries implemented varying levels of Ebola virus disease preparedness interventions. This case study highlights the gains and shortfalls with the Ebola virus disease preparedness interventions within the various contexts of these countries against the background of a renewed and growing commitment for global epidemic preparedness highlighted during recent World Health Assembly events. Main text Several positive impacts from preparedness support to countries bordering the affected provinces in the DRC were identified, including development of sustained capacities which were leveraged upon to respond to the subsequent coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Shortfalls such as lost opportunities for operationalizing cross-border regional preparedness collaboration and better integration of multidisciplinary perspectives, vertical approaches to response pillars such as surveillance, over dependence on external support and duplication of efforts especially in areas of capacity building were also identified. A recurrent theme that emerged from this case study is the propensity towards implementing short-term interventions during active Ebola virus disease outbreaks for preparedness rather than sustainable investment into strengthening systems for improved health security in alignment with IHR obligations, the Sustainable Development Goals and advocating global policy for addressing the larger structural determinants underscoring these outbreaks. Conclusions Despite several international frameworks established at the global level for emergency preparedness, a shortfall exists between global policy and practice in countries at high risk of cross border transmission from persistent Ebola virus disease outbreaks in the Democratic Republic of Congo. With renewed global health commitment for country emergency preparedness resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic and cumulating in a resolution for a pandemic preparedness treaty, the time to review and address these gaps and provide recommendations for more sustainable and integrative approaches to emergency preparedness towards achieving global health security is now.

Background: Comparative data collection in transborder areas can contribute to informed decision making processes when dealing with borderless health threats such as pandemics, and thus help minimize the negative health effects for its citizens. To examine the pandemic response over time and the impact of infectious disease control in a cross-border setting, a prospective longitudinal study was conducted in the border area between Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. In the spring of 2021, a random sample of 26,925 adult citizens selected from governmental registries was invited to collect a blood sample at home for SARS-CoV-2 antibody testing and to fill in an online questionnaire on attitudes and behaviour towards infection prevention measures, cross-border mobility, social network and support, COVID-19 self-reported infection(s) and symptoms, vaccination, general self-reported health and socio-demographics. In autumn 2021, participants were invited for a follow-up round. An online tool was developed to coordinate fieldwork procedures, real-time monitoring of participation and consultation of antibody test results. Furthermore, a helpdesk in all three languages for participants' support was set up. Results: In the first round, 6,006 citizens in the Meuse-Rhine Euroregion participated. 15.3% of the invited citizens on the Belgian side of the border participated. In the Netherlands and Germany this was respectively 27% and 23.7%. In the follow-up round 4,286 (71.4%) citizens participated for the second time. The participation rate was highest in the age group 50–69 years and lowest in > 80 in all sub regions of the Meuse-Rhine Euroregion. More women participated than men. Overall, more blood samples were returned than completed questionnaires. In total, 3,344 citizens in the Meuse-Rhine Euroregion completed all components of participation in both rounds. Conclusions: The collection of comparative data can help better assess the pandemic response and the impact of infectious disease control in a cross-border area. Recommendations for a longitudinal cross-border study include a centralized online environment, mapping out potential challenges related to national regulations in the preparation phase and organizing regional coordination centres to create more familiarity and trust towards the involved organisations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper outlines the contemporary legal framework of global health focusing on the legal duty of States to cooperate in the surveillance, prevention, and control of epidemic and pandemic disease. The paper details, in particular, the content and nature of States' duty to cooperate under the International Health Regulations – the primary international legal instrument governing the global response to such events. It also examines the role of the World Health Organization and other UN bodies in fostering cooperation between States in the fight against epidemics and pandemics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) poses a global threat to human, animal, and environmental health. AMR is a technical area in the Global Health Security Agenda initiative which uses the Joint External Evaluation tool to evaluate national AMR containment capacity. This paper describes four promising practices for strengthening national antimicrobial resistance containment capacity based on the experiences of the US Agency for International Development's Medicines, Technologies, and Pharmaceutical Services Program work with 13 countries to implement their national action plans on AMR in the areas of multisectoral coordination, infection prevention and control, and antimicrobial stewardship. Methods: We use the World Health Organization (WHO) Benchmarks on International Health Regulations Capacities (2019) to guide national, subnational, and facility actions that advance Joint External Evaluation capacity levels from 1 (no capacity) to 5 (sustainable capacity). Our technical approach is based on scoping visits, baseline Joint External Evaluation scores, benchmarks tool guidance, and country resources and priorities. Results: We gleaned four promising practices to achieve AMR containment objectives: (1) implement appropriate actions using the WHO benchmarks tool, which prioritizes actions, making it easier for countries to incrementally increase their Joint External Evaluation capacity from level 1 to 5; (2) integrate AMR into national and global agendas. Ongoing agendas and programs at international, regional, and national levels provide opportunities to mainstream and interlink AMR containment efforts; (3) improve governance through multisectoral coordination on AMR. Strengthening multisectoral bodies' and their technical working groups' governance improved functioning, which led to better engagement with animal/agricultural sectors and a more coordinated COVID-19 pandemic response; and (4) mobilize and diversify funding for AMR containment. Long-term funding from diversified funding streams is vital for advancing and sustaining countries' Joint External Evaluation capacities. Conclusions: The Global Health Security Agenda work has provided practical support to countries to frame and conduct AMR containment actions in terms of pandemic preparedness and health security. The WHO benchmarks tool that Global Health Security Agenda uses serves as a standardized organizing framework to prioritize capacity-appropriate AMR containment actions and transfer skills to help operationalize national action plans on AMR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic elicited a surge in the use of digital tools to replace "classic" manual disease tracking and contact tracing across individuals. The main technical reason is based on the disease surveillance needs imposed by the magnitude of the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus since 2020, particularly how these needs overwhelmed governments around the world. Such developments led to stark variations across countries in terms of legal approaches towards the use of digital tools, including self-reporting software and mobile phone apps, for both disease tracking and contact tracing. Against this backdrop, in this article I highlight some of the normative challenges posed by the digitalization of disease surveillance, underscoring its almost non-existent regulation under international law. I look back at the historical emergence of the epidemiological principles underlying this procedure, by referring to John Snow's trailblazing work in cholera control. I emphasize how the COVID-19 pandemic prompted both technical and normative shifts related to the digitalization of these procedures. Furthermore, I refer to some of the overarching obstacles for deploying international law to tackle future tensions between the public health rationale for digitalized disease tracking and contact tracing, on the one hand, and normative concerns directly related to their legality, on the other hand. Lastly, I put forward conclusions in light of the current juncture of international health law reforms, and how they so far display limited potential to herald structural changes concerning the legality of the use of digital tools in disease surveillance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The World Health Organization recently began developing a "pandemic treaty" in response to the perceived failures of the global COVID-19 response. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which obligates members to certain global standards in tobacco control, is an example of a global public health agreement that may be used as a model for the pandemic treaty. Several challenges related to the convention, many from the tobacco industry itself, must be addressed if it is to be used as a prototype for a pandemic agreement. These include harm reduction policies, private-sector involvement, and its impact in low- and middle-income countries. A pandemic treaty may encounter similar challenges faced by the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, particularly from industry groups with financial interests related to infectious disease control and prevention. Addressing challenges at the outset may facilitate the development and implementation of a more robust international instrument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Uganda established a National Action Plan for Health Security in 2019, following a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of International Health Regulations (2005) capacities in 2017. The action plan enhanced national health security awareness, but implementation efforts were affected by limited funding, excess of activities, and challenges related to monitoring and evaluation. To improve implementation, Uganda conducted a multisectoral health security self-assessment in 2021 using the second edition of the JEE tool and developed a 1-year operational plan. From 2017 to 2021, Uganda's composite ReadyScore improved by 20%, with improvement in 13 of the 19 technical areas. Indicator scores showing limited capacity declined from 30% to 20%, and indicators with no capacity declined from 10% to 2%. More indicators had developed (47% vs 40%), demonstrated (29% vs 20%), and sustained (2% vs 0%) capacities in 2021 compared with 2017. Using the self-assessment JEE scores, 72 specific activities from the International Health Regulations (2005) benchmarks tool were selected for inclusion in a 1-year operational plan (2021-2022). In contrast to the 264 broad activities in the 5-year national action plan, the operational plan prioritized a small number of activities to enable sectors to focus limited resources on implementation. While certain capacities improved before and during implementation of the action plan, countries may benefit from using short-term operational planning to develop realistic and actionable health security plans to improve health security capacities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the 1990s, three Directives were enacted that aimed to harmonise the regulation of medical devices within the European Union (EU). Custom-made devices (CMDs) were subject to Council Directive 93/42/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning medical devices (Medical Device Directive [MDD]), which was given effect in the UK by the Medical Devices Regulations 2002 (UK MDR 2002). Regulation (EU) 2017/745 (Medical Device Regulation [EU MDR]) replaced the MDD and was transposed into the Medical Devices (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 in the UK. The UK left the EU on 31 January 2020 and entered an 11-month implementation period (IP), during which any new EU legislation that was enacted also took effect in the UK. The EU MDR was scheduled to be fully implemented on 26 May 2020 (during the IP) but this was deferred for one year, until 26 May 2021 (after the IP had concluded), as a result of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Consequently, the EU MDR was removed from the UK statute book by a further amendment to the UK MDR 2002, the Medical Devices (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020. Since 1 January 2021, CMDs manufactured in Great Britain can conform to either the UK MDR 2002 (as amended) or the EU MDR (until 30 June 2023) while devices manufactured in Northern Ireland are subject to the EU MDR alone. CMDs must be supplied with a statement, a label and, depending on the risk class, instructions for use; this paper answers ten questions regarding this documentation following these legislative changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the challenges and shortcomings of current approaches to assessing and implementing global health security capacity. It highlights that many National Action Plans for Health Security (NAPHS) take a long time to develop and often lack effective prioritization and actionable activities. The article suggests that operational planning, which focuses on a small number of critical activities for immediate implementation, can bridge the gap between assessments and long-term planning. The authors provide a case example from Sierra Leone, where operational planning led to improved capacity and implementation. They recommend that countries create short-term operational plans to address critical gaps in global health security. [Extracted from the article]

BackgroundA country’s health system faces pressure when hit by an unexpected shock, such as what we observe in the midst of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. The concept of resilience is highly relevant in this context and is a prerequisite for a health system capable of withstanding future shocks. By exploring how the key dimensions of the resilient health system framework are applied, the present systematic review synthesizes the vital features of resilient health systems in low- and middle-income countries. The aim of this review is to ascertain the relevance of health system resilience in the context of a major shock, through better understanding its dimensions, uses and implications. MethodsThe review uses the best-fit framework synthesis approach. An a priori conceptual framework was selected and a coding framework created. A systematic search identified 4284 unique citations from electronic databases and reports by non-governmental organisations, 12 of which met the inclusion criteria. Data were extracted and coded against the pre-existing themes. Themes outside of the a priori framework were collated to form a refined list of themes. Then, all twelve studies were revisited using the new list of themes in the context of each study. ResultsTen themes were generated from the analysis. Five confirmed the a priori conceptual framework that capture the dynamic attributes of a resilient system. Five new themes were identified as foundational for achieving resilience: realigned relationships, foresight and motivation as drivers, and emergency preparedness and change management as organisational mechanisms. ConclusionThe refined conceptual model shows how the themes inter-connect. The foundations of resilience appear to be critical especially in resource-constrained settings to unlock the dynamic attributes of resilience. This review prompts countries to consider building the foundations of resilience described here as a priority to better prepare for future shocks.

Background: The influx of people across the national borders of Ghana has been of interest and concern in the public health and national security community in recent times due to the low capacity for the prevention and management of epidemics and other public health risks. Although the international health regulations (IHR) stipulate core public health capacities for designated border facilities such as international airports, seaports, and ground crossings, contextual factors that influence the attainment of effective public health measures and response capabilities remain understudied. Objective: This study aims to assess the relationship between contextual factors and COVID-19 procurement to help strengthen infrastructure resources for points of entry (PoE) public health surveillance functions, thereby eliminating gaps in the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of pandemic-related interventions in Ghana. Methods: This study employed a mixed-methods design, where quantitative variables were examined for relationships and effect size interactions using multiple linear regression techniques and the wild bootstrap technique. Country-level data was sourced from multiple publicly available sources using the social-ecological framework, logic model, and IHR capacity monitoring framework. The qualitative portion included triangulation with an expert panel to determine areas of convergence and divergence. Results: The most general findings were that laboratory capacity and Kotoka International Airport testing center positively predicted COVID-19 procurement, and public health response and airline boarding rule negatively predicted COVID-19 procurement. Conclusion: Contextual understanding of the COVID-19 pandemic and Ebola epidemic is vital for strengthening PoE mitigation measures and preventing disease importation.

Objective. To identify correlations between COVID-19, demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, and the capacity of Latin American health systems to respond to health emergencies. Method. An ecological study was performed using secondary data from 20 Latin American countries regarding incidence, mortality, testing and vaccination coverage for covid-19 from 2020 to 2021 as well as demographic and socioeconomic indicators. The preparedness of countries to respond to health emergencies was explored based on the 2019 State Party Self-Assessment Annual Report on the implementation of the International Health Regulations (IHR). Statistical analyses were performed using the Spearman correlation test (rho). Results. A high positive correlation was noted between gross domestic product per capita and the human development index with the incidence of COVID-19, testing, and vaccination coverage; and between the proportion of elderly population and vaccination coverage. No correlations were identified between the covid-19 indicators and previous IHR implementation capacities. Conclusions. The lack of correlation between indicators related to COVID-19 and the ability to implement the IHR may reflect limitations of the indicators used or of the IHR monitoring tool as an instrument that induces the preparedness of countries to face health emergencies. The results suggest the importance of structural conditioning factors and the need for longitudinal, comparative, and qualitative studies to understand the factors that influenced the response of countries to COVID-19. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

COVID-19 exposed major gaps in global, regional, state, and local responses to public health emergencies. In preparation for the WHA Special Session to consider the benefits of developing an international instrument on pandemic preparedness, the O'Neill Institute in partnership with Foundation for the National Institutes of Health convened 30 of the world's leading authorities on global health law, financing, biomedical science, implementation, and emergency response along with leaders from prominent international organizations. This meeting was followed by regional consultations convened in Latin America-Caribbean, Africa, and Southeast Asia. These high-level expert consultations generated in-depth discussions on weaknesses and persisting gaps in global pandemic preparedness and what a new international agreement might include to address them. Regional intergovernmental organizations like PAHO can work closely with related multilateral development banks to develop financial instruments that can smooth systemic economic disruption; and regional centers of research and manufacturing excellence can offer a strong front line for producing medicines and vaccines rapidly during a pandemic. With our research focused on the regional response to COVID-19 we are able to look at country responses individually and collectively to see how Latin America -- Caribbean countries can capitalize and leverage their regional connections to strengthen their pandemic preparedness and response. By identifying existing gaps and examining the responses and approaches taken by PAHO, we can better understand the role of international and regional organizations and their collaborating centers in preparing and responding to pandemics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: From May 2018 to September 2022, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) experienced seven Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreaks within its borders. During the 10th EVD outbreak (2018–2020), the largest experienced in the DRC and the second largest and most prolonged EVD outbreak recorded globally, a WHO risk assessment identified nine countries bordering the DRC as moderate to high risk from cross border importation. These countries implemented varying levels of Ebola virus disease preparedness interventions. This case study highlights the gains and shortfalls with the Ebola virus disease preparedness interventions within the various contexts of these countries against the background of a renewed and growing commitment for global epidemic preparedness highlighted during recent World Health Assembly events. Main text: Several positive impacts from preparedness support to countries bordering the affected provinces in the DRC were identified, including development of sustained capacities which were leveraged upon to respond to the subsequent coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Shortfalls such as lost opportunities for operationalizing cross-border regional preparedness collaboration and better integration of multidisciplinary perspectives, vertical approaches to response pillars such as surveillance, over dependence on external support and duplication of efforts especially in areas of capacity building were also identified. A recurrent theme that emerged from this case study is the propensity towards implementing short-term interventions during active Ebola virus disease outbreaks for preparedness rather than sustainable investment into strengthening systems for improved health security in alignment with IHR obligations, the Sustainable Development Goals and advocating global policy for addressing the larger structural determinants underscoring these outbreaks. Conclusions: Despite several international frameworks established at the global level for emergency preparedness, a shortfall exists between global policy and practice in countries at high risk of cross border transmission from persistent Ebola virus disease outbreaks in the Democratic Republic of Congo. With renewed global health commitment for country emergency preparedness resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic and cumulating in a resolution for a pandemic preparedness treaty, the time to review and address these gaps and provide recommendations for more sustainable and integrative approaches to emergency preparedness towards achieving global health security is now. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite being acknowledged as a major global health challenge, growing levels of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in pathogenic and commensal organisms have proven an awkward fit for international health frameworks. This article surveys the history of attempts to coordinate international responses to AMR alongside the origins and evolution of the current international health regulations (IHR). It argues that AMR, which encompasses a vast range of microbial properties and ecological reservoirs, is an awkward fit for the 'organismal' philosophies that centre on the rapid control of individual pathogens that have characterised international policy-making since the 19th century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent literature on indicators as technology of global governance has shown the power of numbers in shaping knowledge and policy priorities. But not all indicators have powerful effects; some remain invisible. Are such indicators an obverse of powerful indicators? Are the same process of indirect exercise of power to indirectly achieve social and economic effects at work? This paper explores the case of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicator 3.d.1 for the target to build national capacity for pandemic preparedness (target 3d) as a case study of invisible indicators. This indicator has had little traction, despite its relevance in the context of the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. The paper explores the reasons that explain this paradox through the framework of epistemic infrastructures. It argues that the indicator--the State Party Self-Assessment Report (SPAR) score--was an inconvenient tool for the powerful actors in the global health community as it turned out to be an extremely poor predictor of COVID-19 response performance. It would have exposed not only the failings of the powerful countries that lead the policy agenda for pandemic preparedness but also the legitimacy of their expertise and the paradigm of global health security as an approach to governing health risks. The analysis highlights the tight relationship between power and the use of indicators in global governance. While indicators are increasingly used by powerful actors to reframe policy narratives, the indicator of pandemic preparedness has been kept invisible to maintain their existing framing. It thus illustrates the resilience of power structures in epistemic infrastructures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Background Country experiences of responding to the challenges of COVID-19 in 2020 highlighted how critical it is to have strong, in-country health security capacity. The UK government has invested in health security capacity development through various projects and agencies, including the UK Department of Health and Social Care, whose Global Health Security Programme provides funding to Public Health England (PHE) to implement health security support. This article describes the results and conclusions of the midterm evaluation, undertaken by Itad, of one of Public Health England’s global health projects: International Health Regulations Strengthening, which operates across six countries and works with the Africa Centres for Disease Control. It also highlights some of the key lessons learned for the benefit of other agencies moving into supporting national health security efforts. Results The Itad team found strong evidence that the IHR Project is well aligned with, and responding to, partners’ capability strengthening needs and that the three workstreams – systems coordination, workforce development and technical systems strengthening are implementing relevant and appropriate action to support national priorities. The IHR Project is also aligned with and complementary to other relevant UK development assistance although the Project could strengthen the strategic collaboration with WHO, US CDC and other UK government projects in countries. The Itad team also found that the IHR Project could be more effective if the technical assistance activities were accompanied by relevant materials and equipment while maintaining its supportive role. There was evidence of where technical assistance in the form of training and follow-up mentoring had led to improvements in practice and in IHR compliance, but these were not being systematically captured by the Project’s routine reporting. Conclusions There was good evidence that the project was doing the right things and aligning its work in the right way, with more limited evidence at the time of the midterm evaluation that it was making progress towards achieving the right results.

Health security has become an integral part of global health after many epidemics, the latest of which was the COVID-19 pandemic, from which the world is still suffering. The term “health security” was first used in the mid-twentieth century. Now that a globalized transportation industry has allowed for the mass movement of travelers and public health emergencies, such as global warming, affect everyone, “health security” has become a top priority of countries around the world. This article breaks down the stages in the development of health security as a concept and discusses them. To that end, it reviews the most prominent international and regional initiatives in the field of global health security, including the efforts of the World Health Organization (WHO). This review will help to anticipate the future development of global health security and offer some suggestions for further research. The article thus concludes with a call for countries to work together to develop a shared method of measuring health security. Whether such initiative is taken by the WHO or by low- and middle-income countries, greater collaboration is needed to discuss shared concerns and develop new strategies, particularly in the field of digital health.

Abstract Background The WHO’s success in its vital role is constrained by inadequate financial support from member states and overreliance on earmarked voluntary contributions, which erodes autonomy. The agency’s broad functions, including coordination among 194 members, cannot be performed by any other entity. However, despite experts’ well-articulated concerns that the agency’s legitimacy and authority in global health matters have been undermined, a decades-long freeze on member assessments means that WHO priorities are disproportionately influenced by a few powerful donors. A structural defect To overcome inertia in addressing well-known limitations, it may be helpful to consider the weaknesses in WHO’s financing mechanism as a persistent structural defect. This perspective strengthens the focus on corrections needed to remove the defect. In our view, the main features of the structural defect are the self-imposed constraints that foster the perception—if not the reality—that the agency’s legitimacy is compromised. These constraints include WHO’s inadequate level of financing; lack of direct control over 80% of its funds; and unbalanced participation, such that over 60% of financing originates from only 9 donors. With renewed commitment, however, member countries can remove these constraints. Removing the structural defect To meaningfully strengthen structural integrity of the financing mechanism, restore WHO’s autonomy, and minimize concerns about wealthy-donor supremacy, it will be necessary to define specific requirements and implement restrictions on financial contributions. We make five recommendations, including tripling total financing; ensuring that 70% or more of financial support derives from member assessments; limiting contributions from individual members to a maximum of 4% of total WHO financing; and limiting donations from individual partners to a maximum of 3% of total WHO financing (1% for earmarked donations). Although some might consider these measures impractical, they are justified by the magnitude of the crises the world faces, by member states’ increased economic strength in recent decades, and by the importance of shielding the WHO’s financing structure from perceived neocolonialism. This necessary step calls for an adjustment of priorities: the higher level of assessed contribution—from nearly all members regardless of wealth—required to reach the proposed targets would still represent only a small fraction of most members’ annual military expenditures. Conclusion The COVID-19 pandemic, with its devastating toll on human life and global economic stability, presents an opportunity for reflection and refocusing. Realigning WHO’s financial structure to its founders’ vision, as proposed here, would likely safeguard both the agency’s autonomy and member states’ trust, while alleviating concerns about undue influence from powerful donors. Removing the persistent structural defect in financing would empower WHO to lead and coordinate global response to meet the inevitable challenges of the coming decades.

Abstract Background Counterfeit travel vaccination certificates pose a significant threat to public health and compromise disease control measures. We investigated the self‐reported vaccination status, the validity of yellow fever vaccine (YFV) certificates (ICVPs), and knowledge and perception about the disease and its vaccine among Sudanese travelers departing through the Khartoum International Airport (KIA). Methods This was a cross‐sectional survey using a non‐probability convenience sampling technique among Sudanese travelers departing through KIA between October and November 2021. We assessed the self‐reported uptake of YFV and subsequently verified the ICVPs among those reported to be vaccinated. We also assessed participants’ knowledge about the disease in addition to their knowledge and perception of YFV. Results Four hundred travelers were interviewed. Most participants (88.0%) reported being vaccinated. However, two‐thirds of their ICVPs (63.0%) were counterfeit. More than one‐third of the participants (35.3%) had poor knowledge of YF and YFV. Carrying a valid ICVP was associated with participants' overall good level of knowledge about YFV (p = 0.030), knowledge about the nature of infection (p‐value = 0.008), disease transmission (p = 0.016) and prevention (p = 0.028), and countries that require a mandatory YFV proof (p = 0.005). Many participants perceived YFV as important (93.3%), safe (86.5%), and effective (82.0%). Conclusion The proportion of counterfeit ICVPs was high. Many of the participants had a poor level of knowledge about YF and YFV. Counterfeit ICVPs have grievous implications for YF prevention and control in Sudan and other countries. There is an urgent need to revisit the implementation of the International Health Regulations in Sudan to leverage recent technological advancements in immunization information systems such as electronic certification.