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Although Avicenna does not explicitly develop a 'theory of intentionality', one can reconstruct his account of intentionality through an analysis of his thoughts on the relation between mind, meaning, and thing. We take up this task in this paper through an analysis of Avicenna's theory of the considerations of quiddity. First, we clarify Avicenna's idea of 'quiddity', and show how it functions as a core of 'meaning' which remains identical in its different modes of realization. Second, through an examination of the very notion of 'consideration' (i'tibār), we distinguish between two aspects of the mind, i.e. mental act and mental existence. This helps us clarify what Avicenna means by the existence of a quiddity in mind and in what sense, if any, it is essential to intentionality. Third, addressing the problem of the relation between 'mental existence' and 'external existence', we show how the mode of existence of a quiddity, including its concrete existence, is posited in and through intentionality. This implies that both being and quiddity are moments of the intentional object, and thus, intentionality, for Avicenna, is a dyadic relation between the intentional act and the intentional object. We conclude by reconstructing the structure of intentionality in Avicenna. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to trace a brief history of the attempts that have been made to promote inter-religious dialogue, to outline the accomplishments to date, and to scrutinize both the current challenges posed to this project, and the future requirements to be met if worldwide interfaith cooperation is ever to be achieved. When investigating current inter-religious interactions, it is critical not to neglect the polemical dimension, but to establish the causes for the disagreements, and to effectively remove them. Given the inevitability of religious transmission within families, educational systems worldwide must offer exposure to multiple worldviews and belief systems that accurately reflect the diverse societies and cultures around the globe. In order to liberate themselves from the grip of fanatical thinking, the youth should not only be instructed in the teachings of a single religion, but also be exposed to the origins of humanity's inclination towards religious beliefs and to the various ways in which these beliefs are expressed. This exposure, and the resulting newly-formed mentality will strengthen the response to Leonard Swidler's call for the endorsement of a Universal Declaration of Global Ethics and, together with this indefatigable supporter of inter-religious co-operation, we will finally be able to genuinely proclaim that we are living in an Age of Global Dialogue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this analysis, I employ Husserl's three-part description of intentionality to show how a player/play act/play object model for consciousness helps us see play more clearly. I review Suits' logic-based attempts to amend Huizinga's overly inclusive characterization of play. However, I do so on what I see as stronger phenomenological grounds by describing four kinds of experience embedded in Suits' work-play dichotomy. I analyze two species of play-fortified work – namely, work that requires intrinsic enhancement and work that does not. I also describe two species of play – namely, play that is compromised and play that is unfettered. I conclude by summarizing advantages of phenomenological analyses and underlining the important distinctions this philosophic method uncovers within traditional work and play categories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Based on the characterisation of complex technology as inherently magical, we interpret the engagement with digital systems within the framework of medieval and early modern demonological thought. By presenting a historicising argument that demonic understandings are inherent to the navigation of technological systems, we provide an ontological approach to the debate on the intentionality of technology. In the demonological vision of technology, we engage in digital systems beyond our control, producing moral dilemmas stemming from our inability to clearly discern good and evil demons – the invisible control of our digital lives and the irresponsible transgression of our expertise in decision making. Our trust in the digital systems we engage with, but do not control, is based on faith in the benevolence of demons. We argue that the attribution of intentionality to complex digital systems is unavoidable, even though it may be misguided. Using the epistemological framework of demonology enables us to better understand the consequences and functions of such attributions. This in turn provides a new perspective on the morality and agency of technological systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anscombe seems to think that, even though "the knowledge that a man has of his intentional actions" is not "knowledge by observation", it can be aided by observation. My aim in this essay is to explain how I think we should understand this thought. I suggest that, in a central class of cases, knowledge of one's intentional action is knowledge whose canonical linguistic expression is an utterance of the form "I am doing something to that G": knowledge in which the subject, at once, knows himself "as self" (and so, not by observation), and knows an outer object "as other" (and so, by observation). To characterise this knowledge either as knowledge by observation, or as knowledge not by observation, is to characterise it in a manner that abstracts away from its fundamental unity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When one is intentionally doing something, one represents that thing as a goal to be accomplished. One represents it practically. How should we characterize this practical representation further? In this paper, I argue that when one is intentionally doing something, one's representation of it as a goal to be accomplished must also be knowledge that one is intentionally doing that thing. And I argue that this knowledge must itself be one's intentionally doing that thing. I aim to show, then, that insofar as representing practically just is knowing practically, it is equally acting intentionally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anscombe seems to think that, even though "the knowledge that a man has of his intentional actions" is not "knowledge by observation", it can be aided by observation. My aim in this essay is to explain how I think we should understand this thought. I suggest that, in a central class of cases, knowledge of one's intentional action is knowledge whose canonical linguistic expression is an utterance of the form "I am doing something to that G": knowledge in which the subject, at once, knows himself "as self" (and so, not by observation), and knows an outer object "as other" (and so, by observation). To characterise this knowledge either as knowledge by observation, or as knowledge not by observation, is to characterise it in a manner that abstracts away from its fundamental unity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article in AI & Society pays tribute to Daniel Dennett, an American philosopher known for his contributions to various areas of philosophy, including intentionality, free will, mental states, consciousness, Darwinian theory, AI, and the philosophy of religion. Dennett's work was driven by a naturalistic worldview, emphasizing empirical evidence over intuition and a priori theorizing. He proposed the intentional stance as a way to understand behavior, arguing that beliefs and desires are patterns we use to predict and explain actions, rather than inner mental states. Dennett's views on consciousness challenged traditional notions, suggesting that consciousness is a complex phenomenon distributed throughout the brain, rather than a single center of awareness. His naturalistic approach to philosophy and skepticism towards AI's potential impact on society were notable aspects of his work. [Extracted from the article]

Appealing to some analytic tools developed by contemporary analytic philosophers, I discuss Avicenna's views regarding the problem(s) of linguistic and mental reference to non-existents, also known as the problem(s) of 'empty intentionality'. I argue that, according to Avicenna, being in an intentional state directed towards an existing thing involves three elements: (1) an indirect relation to that thing, (2) a direct relation to a mental representation of that thing, and (3) a direct relation to the essence of that thing. Empty intentionality does not involve the first element. Moreover, depending on the nature of the non-existent we are thinking about, the third element may not be involved either. Thus, the necessary element of being in an intentional state towards something is to be related to a mental representation of that thing. The nature of this representation may vary depending on the nature of the non-existent towards which our thought is directed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Status-related impressions influence important interpersonal dynamics, including moral judgments of good or bad, and right or wrong, whereas these impressions can be formed based on subtle cues (e.g., formal versus casual attire of transgressors). The current research examined how attire influences moral judgments in transgressive contexts and for different transgressions. We proposed that attire would have different effects on moral judgments depending on whether transgressions were accompanied with contradictory moral claims (i.e., hypocrisy versus non-hypocrisy), and attire and hypocrisy would influence moral judgments through perceived intentionality (i.e., whether transgressions were committed intentionally or accidentally). We tested these hypotheses in four studies (total N = 1,007; including two pre-registered), by examining both people's moral blame of transgressive behaviors and their moral impressions (e.g., trustworthiness and compassion) of the transgressors. Findings were largely in line with hypotheses: People favored formal- over casual-attire targets when both transgressed in non-hypocritical contexts and with ambiguous intentionality (Studies 1 to 3). However, moral favoritism based on formal attire was diminished when transgressions were hypocritical and perceived as intentional (Studies 2 to 4). For various contexts where people (need to) make moral judgments, our findings suggest that cues of high status are key ingredients to moral evaluations, but signs of hypocrisy and intentionality may seriously undermine the workings of these cues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the issue of historical knowledge in relation to material evidence. More specifically, it asks, What objects capture the historian's attention and what knowledge is gained from those objects? What does the historian's gaze select as "things of history" and thus as removed from a world of object assemblages and fluid matter? Is it the case that only artifacts deliberately produced or modified by humans (regardless of the purpose) count as "things of history"? Or do physical entities produced by unintended human and nonhuman factors also display temporal endurance or alteration occurring over time and resonate with humans? Are "things of history" only entities endowed with shape, or do formless materials qualify too? In this article, I outline a theory of intentionality in relation to material items for two main reasons. First, it allows for a "critique of material evidence," which is still missing in the historical discipline. Second, it enables us to address any remaining epistemological, ethical, or political issues, biases, or contradictions associated with the multifaceted research on material culture that affect the way we do history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A syllabic acrostic (de-ca-te, "tenth") has recently been discovered by Leah Kronenberg at Eclogue 4.9–11. The aim of the present article is to adduce further evidence for the intentionality of this acrostic. The article begins by pointing to corroborative clues in the text encompassed by the acrostic itself. Attention is then drawn to the overlooked deni‑acrostic in the previous Eclogue (3.55–58). This acrostical deni, for whose intentionality arguments are likewise adduced, evidently serves to corroborate acrostical decate. This deni‑acrostic is itself confirmed shortly afterwards by decem (Ecl. 3.71), which is in turn an imitation of Theocritus (Id. 3.10). This Theocritean text, which contains the word δέκα in 'line ten', provides further corroboration of the decate-acrostic, which is likewise centred around 'line ten'. In particular it is argued that this passage of Theocritus has inspired the noun which decate can be shown to qualify. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes an alternative interpretation—with regard to the current state of research—of Madeline Miller's Circe as a character claiming her agency. In it, I capitalise on Devi and Khuraijam's linking witchcraft and agency in Circe as well as Alvin Goldman's theory of human action. On this basis, I substantiate the thesis that, in Madeline Miller's Circe, the protagonist claims her agency through developing her witchcraft skills. This process consists of manifesting traits pertinent to being an active character, such as intentionality, motivation through desire or beliefs, and the will to initiate. Circe gradually and slowly moves through these stages to reach her independence and self-assuredness, which she lacks in her childhood. Therefore, in order to reflect these stages, the analytical part of the article is divided into three sections. The first section deals with the rare moments of Circe's first attempts at witchcraft, which reveal her resolution and intention, even if she fails to act on them. In the second section, Circe's desires and beliefs are explored as they represent the eventual force behind her future decisions and use of witchcraft. Finally, in the last section, I explore how the previous two stages come to fruition in the shape of Circe actively exercising her will to employ her now superb witchcraft skills in defiance of the rules and conventions that have bound her into submission thus far. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper offers an assessment of some of the central aspects of Edith Stein's conception of intentional acts proposed in Potency and Act. Studies Towards a Philosophy of Being. Her account hinges upon a combination of Thomistic and Husserlian concepts. She borrows from Aquinas two conceptual pairs that are central to his metaphysics and theory of knowledge: the actuality-potency dichotomy; and the distinction between sensible and intelligible species. The distinction and relevant articulation between sensible and intelligible species provide Stein with the basis to present her own conception of intentionality (with special focus on perception): the sensible species is regarded as the correlate of the object's Gestalt; by contrast, the intelligible species is mobilised to account for what Husserl labels noesis-noema correlation. But Stein's ambition is also to inscribe her account of the species sensibilis within an overall (critical) interpretation of Husserl's transcendental idealism. This work was supported by the Czech Science Foundation, financing the project "Intentionality and Person in Medieval Philosophy and Phenomenology" (GAČR 21-08256S). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In organizational contexts, managers often have to judge and predict others' performance. Previous research has consistently shown that when predicting someone's performance, people expect that a local sequence of successful outcomes will continue—the hot‐hand. The present work proposes that hot‐hand predictions occur when local streaks are dispositionally attributed to the agents' intentionality and explores how the inclusion of global performance success rates may guide intentionality inferences and moderate predictions of success after a streak. Three studies, using within‐ and between‐subjects' designs, manipulate agent's global success rate and show that after a local streak, intentionality attributions and predictions of success are lower when success rates are low (vs. high or unknown); intentionality attributions mediate the effect of success rate on predictions; hot‐hand predictions are lower for low success rate agents (vs. high or unknown) as they are not perceived as more responsible for streaky than for alternated performances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that according to Edmund Husserl "tendency" does not designate a specific class of intentional experiences but rather, on par with "consciousness-of," a universal mode of intentionality essential for any constitution of sense. In doing so, I explicate Husserl's distinction between intentionality as tendency (Tendenz), which he describes as a striving (Streben), and intentionality as consciousness-of (Bewusstsein-von), which he describes as a presentation (Vorstellung) of an intentional object. Then, I discuss Husserl's problematic way of relating these two universal modes of intentionality. Although he claims that intentionality as tendency presupposes intentionality as consciousness-of, I argue that the universal validity of this presupposition is put into question by the consideration of drives (Triebe), which Husserl describes as passive tendencies that originally lack any consciousness of the end strived toward, and, hence, do not seem to presuppose any presentation of it. I show that the lack of intentionality as consciousness-of poses two major problems in Husserl's account, in that it makes drives seemingly unintelligible as (i) strivings and as (ii) motivated experiences. Lastly, to find a possible solution to these problems and better clarify the relation between intentionality as tendency and intentionality as consciousness-of at the level of drives, I explore Edith Stein's account of drives as aimless strivings governed by experiential causality (Erlebniskausalität), discussing its advantages and potential drawbacks, as well as its compatibility with Husserl's account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consciousness is the most precious function of brain; however, there is an explanatory gap between consciousness and matter, which is deemed to affect the scientific research on consciousness. We believe that a methodological trap commonly present in scientific research and the incompleteness of logic are the true reasons that affect the research on consciousness. Here, a novel logic tool, the non-identity law, was extracted from physics and applied into the analysis of the visual dynamics related to naturalistic observation of night-shot still life, whose methodological approach is consistent with Descartes' matter-body-mind approach, breaking free from the methodological trap of current research. We show that visual system, the representative sensory system, has a postponed, recurrent out-of-body projection pathway from brain to observed object, besides the well-known feedforward signaling pathway available in existing literature, suggesting that human possesses an instinct of not only subjectively imaging (brain-generated imagery) but also projecting the image back onto the original or a particular place according to the clue of the manipulated afferent messenger light pathway. This finding adds a key piece of puzzle to the visual system. The out-of-body projection, coupled with neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), bridges the gap between consciousness and matter. This study in a self-contained and systematic manner provides a foundation for understanding the subjectivity and intentionality of human consciousness from the angle of visual awareness as well as the isomorphic relationships between unknowable original, private experience, and shareable expression (recording, calculus and deduction), showing that consciousness is obedient to certain rules rather than being unruly. The result paves the way for scientific research on consciousness and facilitates the integration of humanities and natural science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The book "Whitehead and the Pittsburgh School: Preempting the Problem of Intentionality" by Lisa Landoe Hedrick explores the relationship between Whitehead's philosophy and analytic philosophy, specifically focusing on the Pittsburgh School led by John McDowell. The book argues that McDowell's attempts to bridge the gap between nature and normativity, a problem inherited from Kantian critical philosophy, are undermined by assumptions that Whitehead's philosophy could have addressed. The author critiques McDowell's reliance on Hegelianism and Kantianism and proposes that Whitehead's theory of meaning and rejection of bifurcationism offer a more useful perspective for analytic philosophers. The book also delves into Whitehead's critiques of Hume, Kant, and Russell, and provides a dense reconstruction of Whitehead's nonbifurcationist doctrine of experience. Overall, the book aims to establish a dialogue between Whiteheadian process philosophers and analytic philosophy. [Extracted from the article]

This paper introduces a new approach to the study of Paleolithic minds. It is developed on the basis of the phenomenological concept of intentionality: the mind's central characteristic of being about or directed at something. In phenomenology, the world is considered not qua fact, but qua appearance, as a correlate of the mind's intentional activity. Both world‐appearance and the mind's directedness are further considered from a first‐person viewpoint, and in a scaffolding fashion, with more complex acts disclosing new types of objects or aspects of them. This paper develops a framework for applying intentional analysis to minds of the past. This way, the subjective "world‐having" of past subjects can be systematically reconstructed in a manner consistent with the empirical data available. This discloses a new field of inquiry that thus far has not been clearly grasped, even though the questions belonging to it are everywhere recognized as being of the greatest importance to the discipline. The intentional analysis of the scaffolding of acts and what they disclose can help to clarify essential concepts in cognitive archaeological debates, and to better understand the evolution of the hominin mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our memories elicit, in us, both beliefs about what the external world was like in the past, and beliefs about what our own past experience of it was like in the past. What explains the power of memories to do that? I tackle this question by offering an account of the content of our memories. According to this account, our memories are 'token-reflexives', in that they represent their own causal origin. My main contention will be that our memories are able to provide us with evidence for the two types of beliefs due to the self-referential nature of their content. First, I will put forward a series of thought-experiments intended to raise several intuitions about the veridicality of memories. Next, I will introduce the view that memories are token-reflexives, and I will motivate it by pointing out that the view accommodates the relevant intuitions. And, then, I will return to the two types of beliefs prompted by our memories, and argue that conceiving memories as token-reflexives allows us to explain why memory has the power to elicit the two types of beliefs in us. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Common knowledge is ubiquitous in our lives and yet there remains considerable uncertainty about how to model or understand it. Standard analyses of common knowledge end up being challenged by either regress or circularity which then give rise to well-known paradoxes of practical reasoning, such as the Two Generals' Paradox. This paper argues that the nature and utility of common knowledge can be illuminated by appeal to Wittgenstein's Hinge Epistemology. It is argued that those things that we standardly think of as being common knowledge in our lives are the same as those that Wittgenstein identified as hinge certainties. This identification of common knowledge with hinge certainties allows us to resolve the regress problem for common knowledge and explain how the Two Generals' Paradox arises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an original interpretation of the fourteenth-century debate over whether every volitio is a cognitio. This debate, I argue, was at its heart a debate about what constitutes the mark of occurrent mental states. Three participants in this debate – Adam Wodeham, Richard FitzRalph, and John of Ripa – articulated three distinct accounts of the mark of the mental. In doing so, they also developed several philosophical accounts of the intentionality of occurrent affective states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an interview with Amanda LaTasha Armstrong, a post-doctoral scholar with Digital Promise, focusing on the intentional and equitable use of technology and interactive media in early childhood education. Topics include the importance of intentionality, its considerations for planning technology-enhanced learning experiences, and the significance of representation and variability of learners in media choices.

This paper charts the concepts of grip and the bodily auxiliary in Maurice Merleau-Ponty to consider how they find expression in disability narratives. Arguing against the notion of "maximal grip" that some commentators have used to explicate intentionality in Merleau-Ponty, I argue that grip in his texts functions instead as a compensatory effort to stave off uncertainty, lack of mastery, and ambiguity. Nearly without exception in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception, the mobilisation of "grip" is a signal of impending loss and is offered as a strategy for managing failure rather than as an example of sure-footed mastery. I read Merleau-Ponty alongside Mary Felstiner's Out of Joint: A Public and Private Story of Arthritis to explore these other, attenuated dimensions of grip as an example of a way of thinking disabled embodiment otherwise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article centers on a personal encounter with marginalia in Jane Gallop's "Reading Lacan," highlighting a reader's resistance to overinterpretation, particularly regarding a typographical error. It explores the broader theme of the tension between reason and unreason in humanistic scholarship, emphasizing challenges in discerning intentionality and structure.

Do participants in shared activity have mutual obligations to do their bit? This article shows this question has no one-size-fits-all answer and offers a pluralist account of the normativity of shared agency. The first part argues obligations to do one's bit have three degrees of involvement in shared activity. Such obligations might, obviously, bolster co-participants' resolve to act as planned (degree 1). Less obviously, there also are higher and lower degrees of involvement. Obligations to do one's bit might provide our agency-pooling mechanism. When they do, we act together by virtue of satisfying them (degree 2). Conversely, some shared activities involve no obligation (degree 0). In the second part, I argue shared agency theory is best served by a non-moralistic conception of obligation, one on which co-participants' obligations need be neither strict-performance obligations, nor directed ones. Overall, my arguments suggest that we can choose how to coordinate normatively our shared activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent Law Commission of England and Wales review of corporate criminal liability has presented a range of options to the Government to address current deficiencies in the law of corporate attribution. This article explores the nature and operation of two holistic models closely considered by the Law Commission, but which were not included in the suite: the distinctive Australian 'Corporate Culture' model and a novel model of 'Systems Intentionality'. In so doing, the analysis sheds considerable light on the comparative nature, strengths and limitations of Failure to Prevent offences, which formed a key element in the Law Commission's reform recommendations. Using the Rolls Royce Deferred Prosecution Agreement proceedings as a case study, the article demonstrates how, far from being foreign and uncertain conceptual tools, Corporate Culture and Systems Intentionality are essential parts of the regulatory toolkit that deserve further consideration given the complex reality of modern corporate defendants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that Merleau-Ponty's reading of Hegel's account of experience exerts a significant and hitherto overlooked influence on his attempt to recast Phénoménologie de la perception 's account of intentionality. This reading informs two important claims of his later projects: that intentional relations are more fundamental than their relata, and that a metaphysical condition irreducible to consciousness or object constitutes the structure of intentionality. I argue that these positions inform key tenets of reversibility, and that a revisionary interpretation of Hegel's absolute offers Merleau-Ponty a model for the principle that individuates the basic conditions of experience. In addition to demonstrating that he was a more assiduous reader of Hegel than many commentators assume, and highlighting some overlooked debts to Hegel, these results show that Merleau-Ponty's later thought inherits significant idealist commitments, which should motivate us to reconsider its standing within post-Kantian philosophical currents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traces of you reach me through my senses. But without wondering in your presence, I cannot see you. For beings of sense and meaning such as ourselves, being stirred by another’s presence opens wondering. The implications of such claims are striking for what perception involves, for being in touch with another, and for good relationships. The paper proceeds as a series of “strobes,” from an ancient Greek word for whirling. Turning quickly about, words enact being stirred into wondering, interspersed with visual glimpses, a photographic series. Building on recent work by the author, the paper draws on Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology; Daniel R. Schein feld, Karen M. Haigh, and Sandra J.P. Scheinfeld’s early childhood educational theory, and a phrase by Martha C. Nussbaum describing the intentionality of wondering. This is deepened by attention to what the phenomenological tradition calls “passive synthesis,” and what the author, following F.W.J. Schelling, has called “positive anxiety,” the soul’s excitement around the possibility of sense and meaning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Franz Brentano is well known for highlighting the importance of intentionality, but he said curiously little about the nature of intentionality. According to Mark Textor, there is a deep reason for this: Brentano took intentionality to be a conceptual primitive the nature of which is revealed only in direct grasp. Although there is certainly textual support for this interpretation, it appears in tension with Brentano's repeated attempts to analyze intentionality in terms of 'notional constituents' – aspects of intentionality which cannot come apart in reality but which can be conceptually distinguished. After bringing out this tension, I explore some options for resolving it, ultimately offering my own favored interpretation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of Mark Textor's main aims in Brentano's Mind is to refute Brentano's claim that intentionality – the capacity our mental acts have for being of, about, or directed on something – is the mark of the mental. I defend the view that Brentano analysed intentionality in terms of intentional inexistence (and so wasn't an intentionality primitivist as Textor suggests). And I argue that we can regard intentionality as being the mark of the mental, but only if we give a non-relational analysis of the idea of intentional inexistence. Textor objects to an analysis of intentionality in terms of intentional inexistence for failing to account for the relationship between the object our mental act is directed on, and the 'immanent' or 'inexistent' object which all mental acts contain. I claim that this problem doesn't arise if the object our mental act is directed on just is the immanent/ inexistent object. I argue that Brentano (at least sometimes) seems to identify the two. I then offer my own view of intentionality according to which our mental acts are directed on immanent/ inexistent objects, and that 'directedness' should be understood non-relationally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor explores the article in the issue on topics including intentionality in analytic philosophy, classical phenomenology and Cultural heritage.

Shared intentionality is a specific form of shared agency where a group can be understood to have an intention. It has been conjectured that humans are better equipped for collaboration than other animals because humans but not other great apes share intentions. However, exporting shared intentionality from a debate about the ontology of mental state attributions like intentions to groups does not seamlessly lend itself to evolutionary science. To explore and de-center the implicit assumptions of Western conceptions of cooperation, I look at Zhuangzi’s philosophy of (in)action. This philosophy treats the actions of individuals as always a form of co-action alongside other agencies to whom one must adapt. Thinking of collaboration as a product of skillful co-action, not shared intention, sidesteps asking about cooperation in “kinds” or levels. Instead, it directs attention to the know-how and behavioral flexibility needed to make our constant coordination adaptive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theoretical foundation of human rights is analyzed from the interpretive plane of J. Searle's social ontology, since, by avoiding the illusion of transcendence of the discussion between morality and politics, it allows concentrating on the aspects that make rights possible and effective. For this, the most important features of social ontology and its contribution to the understanding of human rights are presented, especially when reconciling the moral aspects of ontological subjectivism in dialogue with the objective epistemology of political science. Distance is taken from J. Searle's considerations about positive rights, proposing that these can be assumed as aspirations or ethical demands with mandatory implications for supranational institutions. It is concluded that human rights have an instituted and instituting character, due to the fact that they are institutional facts created by performative speech acts, which is why the discussions related to their foundation can focus on expanding reasoned pluralism, which enriches the debate and the practical reasons that make them possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The extant critical literature on international interventions has not only discussed liberal peace interventions from Western subject positions but has also explained its drivers principally from the intention of Western actors to perpetuate neo-imperialism. This analysis, while not illogical, ignores the non-Western involvement in the liberal peace project and, therefore, cannot offer insights into how and why some non-Western actors equally commit to this enterprise. This article moves beyond Western subject positions of this discourse to focus on how and why African interveners engage in liberal interventions despite its Western neo-imperialist instrumentality. Drawing on official documents, interview data and the framework of hegemony, it uncovers African regional actors as practitioners of liberal peace interventions. It argues that they became involved in this practice mainly because they consented to the hegemony of the liberal world order as the only social vision suitable for maintaining domestic stability. Overall, the study offers a broad lens for understanding why the undertaking of liberal projects in many non-Western societies, especially in Africa, cannot be solely explained from the standpoint of Western neo-imperial intentions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scientific naturalism—the conception according to which the natural sciences, and possibly physics alone, set the limits of ontology and epistemology—is characterized by a strong monistic tendency. For this reason, all versions of scientific naturalism face the so-called "placement problem", which concerns the features of the ordinary view of the world that, at least prima facie, do not fit into the scientific view of the world (think of consciousness, moral properties, free will, and intentionality). To address this problem, scientific naturalists use three strategies: reductionism, eliminativism, and mysterianism—none of which, it is argued, produces satisfying results. Liberal naturalism opts instead for a pluralistic attitude in both ontology and epistemology but accepts a constraint according to which one should accept no entity or explanation that is incompatible with the scientific worldview. Liberal naturalism faces the "reconciliation problem", which concerns the relationship between the scientific and the ordinary views of the world once one denies ontological and epistemological priority to either of them. Three strategies for addressing this problem are presented: according to the first, the ordinary worldview and the scientific world are categorically distinct; according to the second, the former emerges from the latter; according to the third, between them there is a relation of global supervenience. Other objections to liberal naturalism are finally presented and addressed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Corporeality and historicity in our very experience are focal points of the phenomenological movement as it becomes attentive to human existence. In existential and hermeneutic phenomenology, historicity is understood as experienced meaning: temporality. This actualizes the Aristotelian conception of historical development as the realization of power potentials, where culture and reason are associated with human nature. Of interest is also the post-Hegelian thinking of history as both de-centered and centered existence. In the face of contemporary difficulties (ever since Hegel) in grasping historicity as connected nature and reason, phenomenology points to the bodily intentionality, with which meaning as well as experience are structured on different levels of being in human existence: aesthetic presence, body-in-the-world, speech, praxis, action, and thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the author challenges one of the more widespread assumptions in the phenomenological school, that of the intentional character of perception. Not denying that perception can have some aspects that are intentional (it is linked to attention, it encapsulates sometimes beliefs that are intentional attitudes), he claims that perception is not an intentional relation to the world. Indeed, intentionality is a basic feature of the mind that remains connected to a form of representationalism. Now, as Heidegger has suggested with his concept of In-der- Welt-sein, and as Erwin Straus and Maurice Merleau-Ponty emphasized, perception is rather an innerently bodily relation to world itself, that is, to the world as it exists independently of the mind and beyond all representations. Only such an approach can do justice to our ordinary and philosophical intuitions about the perceived world and leads us to a genuine variety of phenomenological realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I seek to retrace Jocelyn Benoist’s philosophical trajectory, starting from his first project of a phenomenological realism towards the elaboration of a non-phenomenological realism. I show the role played by the theme of the limits of intentionality and why it is abandoned. I also show how the grammatical difference between the normative and the real makes it possible to diagnose a confusion of categories reaching the notion of appearance in phenomenology. Finally, I show how this difference affects the problem of perception and leads the author to defend an ontological autonomy of the sensible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Franz Brentano's project in descriptive psychology and phenomenology, highlighting its relevance to the questions of intentionality and consciousness. Topics include Brentano's theory of intentionality and its influence on Husserl and other continental philosophers, as well as discussions on the reducibility of the mental, the qualitative nature of intentionality, and the structure of intentionality.

Chapters Five through Nine of Book Two of Brentano's 1874 Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint were republished in 1911 with a substantive Appendix of Brentano's remarks. In the Appendix Brentano makes a significant addition to his theory of intentionality. In particular, he introduces new modes within the mode of presentation itself. These new modes are needed to account for our thinking about anything in a relational structure (in recto and in obliquo modes) and for our thoughts about time (the temporal mode). I want to suggest that in the end Brentano simply takes relations to be different kinds of modes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]