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In this paper, I interpret the first four sections of Human, All Too Human I to argue that Nietzsche's philosophy has diagnostic and therapeutic ambitions. In the first section, I show that his philosophy is psychological. In the second section, I illustrate the descriptive psychology of Nietzsche's philosophy, for which metaphysical doctrines rest on psychological misunderstandings and highly valued sensations and conceptions are based on selfish motives and mistakes of reason. In the third section, I argue that Nietzsche's philosophy is also medical and intellectualist: his inquiry into human psychology allows him, first, to diagnose two types of illnesses, one caused by scientific knowledge (existential illness) and the other caused by metaphysical doctrines (nervous illness), and second, to cure both types of diseases by eliminating their causes with this same scientific knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neste artigo discuto aspectos da proposta Intelectualista sobre know-how a partir de uma perspectiva informada por tópicos da Filosofia da Ação. A tese central do Intelectualista é que há um conhecimento proposicional necessário e suficiente para a instanciação de know-how. Na primeira seção, apresento a argumentação em favor desta tese, a partir de características linguísticas, sintáticas e semânticas, das atribuições de know-how (“S sabe como ?”). Fundamentalmente, será relevante a identificação do tipo de proposição conhecida pelos indivíduos que possuem know-how. Esse tipo de proposição terá a forma geral: “M é um modo para S ?”. Na segunda seção, mostro como essa proposição é idêntica às proposições instrumentais discutidas em Filosofia da Ação. A partir dessa aproximação, apresento na terceira seção a dificuldade que a proposta Intelectualista terá para explicar instanciações de know-how de ações básicas, pois esse tipo de ação não figura adequadamente no tipo de proposição destacada pelo Intelectualista. Por fim, na quarta seção, motivo a tese de que know-how é um termo ambíguo, há uma dimensão teórica do know-how que é adequadamente capturada pela proposta Intelectualista, mas há uma dimensão prática do know-how, intimamente relacionada à execução de ações, que não é contemplada por essa proposta.

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Copyright of Revista Estudios de Filosofía is the property of Universidad de Antioquia, Instituto de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Canaria de Estudios Ingleses is the property of Universidad de La Laguna and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article addresses the problem of free will by examining the relationship between the understanding and the will. The scholastic debate about which of both faculties should be considered free was continued in early Modernity, giving rise to different answers: voluntarists, intellectualists and necessitarians. The first part of this paper presents these three positions in the light of the doctrines of Suárez, Leibniz and Hobbes. The second part is devoted to the Ralph Cudworth's criticisms against them in his Treatise of Freewill. As it will be seen, each of these solutions produces different expressions of what I will call the "paradox of the faculties", which the Cambridge Platonist sought to overcome through an original psychology of action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

La defensa de la normatividad del significado ha derivado en el debate sobre la prioridad metafísica de las reglas o del significado (cfr. Glüer & Wikforss, 2018). Sin embargo, la defensa de la prioridad de las reglas no es más que una variante del intelectualismo y, por ende, está sujeta a las mismas críticas que éste, mientras que la defensa de la prioridad del significado deja sin respuesta a la pregunta metasemántica ¿cómo es qué el lenguaje es significativo? Una concepción pragmatista sobre las reglas permite superar el debate evitando el intelectualismo y proporcionando una respuesta a la pregunta metasemántica.

No presente artigo, faremos uma breve discussão sobre a crítica elaborada por Ryle à epistemologia moral, em específico à teoria intelectualista. A partir desta crítica e de suas elaborações acerca da relação entre a consideração de proposições versus a ação em si, tentaremos pensar este modelo inserido no campo da Filosofia Moral.

En el mundo altamente competitivo y exhibicionista de Luciano, el hiper-aticismo, el (ab)uso de palabras recónditas y arcaicas a fin de impactar deviene en una especie de plaga. En este artículo discuto cómo el Lexífanes se centra precisamente en las asociaciones literales y metafóricas del hiper- aticismo como una enfermedad, prestando especial atención al dictamen médico -articulado en el texto por el doble del autor, Licinio-, según el cual el personaje epónimo del diálogo sufre de melancolía. En lugar de constituir una referencia de pasada al vocabulario coloquial de la locura, la melancolía -sostengo- ayuda a Luciano a asimilar a la fuerza la acumulación de palabras pretenciosas para el desvarío de un loco, un parloteo no sensitivo carente de significado. Al mismo tiempo, Luciano también pretende exponer la presencia de la melancolía en el lenguaje cultural y médico de su época como una enfermedad que de manera especial afecta a los “grandes espíritus”, a las personas de inteligencia excepcional. Al llamar a Lexífanes ‘melancólico’, Luciano reprende la pretensión de Lexiphanes a la vez como hiper-aticista y, no menos importante, como pseudointelectual que está configurando su imagen pública, temperamental y fisiológicamente, como un genio cuya atrabiliaria conformación le permite actuar y hablar en modos extraños.

Aristotelian criticism of the so called "Socratic intellectualism" in Nicomaquean Ethics VII is well known. However, on many occasions Aristotle gives part of reason to the Socratic position. The aim of this work is twofold: (i) to review a specific aspect of the way in which Aristotle may have understood Socratic intellectualism specially regarding someone who is actually knowing that what he or she is aboutto do is wrong; (ii) to review why, in that specific aspect, Aristotle's own position is not, as is often said, so distant from the Socratic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most of the studies and commentaries on Thomas Aquinas such as those made from the scholastic and neo-scholastic perspective have emphasized the intelectualism of his thought. This intelectualism is based mainly but non exclusively on the ontological primacy of the intellect over the will, on the affirmation that the ignorance is one of the pivotal causes of evil actions, and on the fact that the will tends to follow the judgment of reason. Over the last fifty years, however, this reading has been the object of a critical revision by bringing to light in the texts the value of the will in Ethics and Philosophical Anthropology of Thomas Aquinas. Without the least intention of questioning the presence of intelectualist elements in his works, the aim of this paper is to reflect on some kind of psychological voluntarism in Thomas Aquinas, grounded on the role of the will in realizing the moral evil. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The findings of the re-actualization of classical Islamic intellectualism in Indonesia are found in the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama organizations, namely: First, the field of divinity, which includes discussion of God and His attributes and the relationship of the universe with Him. Second, the field of morals (ethics), which includes discussions about humans and their behavior; human relationship with God, human relationship with each other and human relationship with the universe. Third, the field of physics; includes a discussion about the nature of its growth and development, and so forth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

La conmemoración, en el año 2017 del cuarto Centenario de la muerte de Francisco Suárez, constituye un motivo cultural que invita a repensar la persistencia de su legado doctrinal jurídico en la Filosofía y la Teoría del Derecho de la actualidad. En este ensayo se analizan su concepción de la ley, a partir de sus elementos constitutivos y de sus implicaciones. Así como las relevantes observaciones de Suárez sobre las características del lenguaje lega. Este trabajo se propone ofrecer un balance de aquellos aspectos de la reflexión de Francisco Suárez sobre el Derecho que pueden implicar mayor interés para la cultura jurídica del presente. Se analiza, con especial atención, el carácter innovador de la concepción jurídica de Suárez con respecto a la tradición medieval y a las doctrinas de su tiempo. Se pueden advertir así rasgos anticipadores del pensamiento de Suárez con respecto a determinadas concepciones filosófico-jurídicas contemporáneas.

El objetivo del artículo consistirá en analizar las distintas estrategias que encontramos en las fuentes del estoicismo imperial destinadas a poner en suspenso nuestro sentido de justicia, el cual es considerado implícitamente por los estoicos del período como responsable de algunas actitudes no deseables en nuestra búsqueda de la eudaimonía. Organizaré las estrategias de acuerdo a dos grandes grupos: aquellas que atacan la idea de que una injusticia ha sido cometida, y aquellas que apuntan a la idea de que, aun cuando una injusticia haya sido cometida, existen actitudes más convenientes para exhibir ante la misma que la demanda de castigo o el deseo de venganza. Finalizaré enfatizando la dificultad de conciliar los dos conjuntos de estrategias y sugeriré una posible forma de explicar las razones de dicha dificultad.

The purpose of this study is to explore John Calvin's two-fold notion of faith in the 1559 edition of the Institutes and its central implications for pastoral theology in the emerging Reformed tradition, in order to reclaim a broader and contextualized understanding of pastoral care and its relation with faith formation. To that end, this article will focus on the ways the emerging midsixteenth century Reformed church in Geneva applied the Calvinian notion of faith to pastoral theology. Some applications of such an understanding for the church today are also explored, especially for the modern American-Dutch Reformed church. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El presente estudio trata de mostrar la posición defensiva de Husserl relativamente a lo que llama “equivocaciones” de las pretendidas nuevas vías de la fenomenología, en el Epílogo a Ideas. A la vez que se subraya este lado polémico de Husserl, básica aunque tácitamente dirigido contra Heidegger, se defiende la importancia de esta pieza autointerpretativa, dentro del corpus husserliano, como clave fundamental en la definición del rumbo del proyecto fenomenológico. En el centro de la controversia está la respuesta a las objeciones de intelectualismo y solipsismo, y la desautorización de todo antropologismo en la concepción de la subjetividad.

In the Republic Plato seems to abandon the Socratic intellectualism when he accepts the existence of desires that are independent of the good. Nevertheless, this does not prevent him from still affirming that “every soul pursues the good and for its sake does all that it does”. In order to solve the apparent contradiction I propose in this article to distinguish between desires and values. The desires, generated by the parts of the soul, are closely attached to their proper objects, but the values add to them images of the good and other cognitive elements that transform the desires into acceptable motives for action within the unity of the soul. Therefore I propose to distinguish between the wish of the parts and another kind of volition that operates in the unity of the soul sub specie boni in order to decide between opposed desires which compete with one another.

Hegel se propuso mostrar cómo las doctrinas centrales del cristianismo guardaban la clave para la comprensión especulativa de la verdad buscada por la filosofía desde sus orígenes. Con el desarrollo de la historia del pensamiento, había llegado el momento para comprender el cristianismo como la religión verdadera, ampliando así los límites de la llamada ''teología natural'', e integrando plenamente la filosofía y la teología. Se busca precisar el punto en el que la propuesta hegeliana resulta inadmisible para la teología cristiana, que se ubica en el intelectualismo, en cuanto opuesto al voluntarismo de origen cristiano.

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Copyright of Hypnos is the property of Hypnos / Instituto Hypnos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Pretendo demostrar que a) el tratado De IRA de Séneca incluye no una sino dos estrategias terapéuticas diseñadas para evitar la ira, y que b) que la segunda de estasestrategiasla cual ha sido desatendida en la literatura secundaria– presenta problemas irresolubles cuando la contrastamos contra la teoría estoica de la acción, lacual se funda en premisas intelectualistas.

El fenómeno de la parrhēsia epicúrea ha sido primordialmente analizado durante las últimas décadas desde su perspectiva pedagógico-psicagógica, es decir, en tanto dispositivo terapéutico destinado a producir una determinada modificación en el alma del alumno. A pesar de la multiplicidad de aspectos que han sido abordados desde dicha línea de lectura, el problema relativo a los mecanismos psicológicos que los epicúreos suponían que operaban detrás de la práctica (efectiva) de la parrhēsía ha sido completamente ignorado. El objetivo consistirá en analizar el Peri parrhēsias de Filodemo de Gadara a la luz de dicho problema, y proponer un abordaje del tratado que trae a la luz la matriz esencialmente intelectualista que subyace a la concepción epicúrea de la parrhēsia.

Frecuentemente se asume en los estudios de Platón que su concepción del ἔρως tiene un mero carácter instrumental respecto a la contemplación del bien, la belleza y la justicia; ha sido objeto de debate hasta qué punto los sentimientos y apetitos tienen importancia en su teoría del amor. Podría parecer que para Platón lo verdaderamente importante habría sido el conocimiento, y el amor, en todo caso, sólo entra en la vida porque supone un impulso para la contemplación. Frente a esta interpretación intelectualista del amor propongo una lectura de Platón (concretamente de algunos pasajes del Banquete, Fedro y República) que interprete el amor, en la línea de Charles Kahn, como una fuerza inscrita en lo más profundo del ser humano. Deseo, contemplación y acción no aparecen como conceptos contrarios, sino como elementos fundamentales de su ética.

Em seu livro, "Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge" (2011), John McDowell defende que a garantia fornecida pela percepção é infalível. Para tanto, é preciso entender o papel que a razão tem na constituição de estados perceptivos genuínos. Por meio dela, posicionamos estes estados no espaço lógico das razões. Assim, não só fazemos do estado perceptivo um episódio de conhecimento, mas também obtemos conhecimento de como chegamos a este conhecimento. McDowell sustenta que esta condição para o conhecimento, a posse da capacidade de posicionar um estado perceptivo no espaço lógico das razões, não o compromete com o intelectualismo. Neste artigo, defendo que o internismo de McDowell não está totalmente livre do intelectualismo e que o internismo é mais plausível não só sem intelectualismo, mas também sem reflexividade.

Pentecostal scholars today are beginning to make noticeable contributions to the wider fields of theology, church history, and biblical studies. Although many of these scholars still remain on the periphery of America’s academy, they form the backbone of a burgeoning intellectual subculture. This article utilizes both quantitative and qualitative methods to gather data on some of this subculture’s more formative voices. It argues that many of these individuals seem to occupy an interstitial space rife with apprehension and uncertainty, where each must negotiate how to pursue greater legitimacy in the larger academic community without somehow forfeiting a part of their Pentecostal identity. The article concludes by reflecting on what sociologist Peter Berger labeled plausibility structures – a theoretical framework that might led some insight into the future of the Pentecostal scholarly community in the United States and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The nature of tragedy is a matter of controversy. The intelectualist vision of tragedy has gained ground in the last years. In this paper I intend to discuss on the heterodox and extreme version of the cognitivism, defended recently by Pierluigi Donini in La tragedia, senza la catarsi, which firmly rules out the emotional or cathartic function of tragic drama and asserts that “the function of tragedy is not catharsis, but its crowning or last stage: understanding”. The revision of the arguments stated by Donini will allow to enlighten some obscure points in the aristotelian theory of tragedy, particularly the place of music and entertainment in tragic drama.

El objetivo central del presente trabajo consistirá en poner en cuestión la validez de la interpretación ofrecida por Pierre Hadot, Michel Foucault y John Sellars de la noción de áskesis en Epicteto. Si bien dicho cuestionamiento ha sido sugerido ya por John Cooper, mi objetivo será mostrar en qué sentido específico los ‘ejercicios espirituales’ de Epicteto no constituyen (contra lo sugerido por Hadot, Foucault y Sellars) otra cosa que procesos estrictamente cognitivos. Con este objetivo en mente recurriré al concepto de preconcepciones (prolépseis) desarrollado por Epicteto, a fin de dotar de contenido a la distinción, ya presente en el estoicismo antiguo, entre asentimiento débil y asentimiento firme.

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Copyright of Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez is the property of Anales de la Catedra Francisco Suarez and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In work culminating in Know How (2009), Jason Stanley argues, against Gilbert Ryle, that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. In How Propaganda Works (2015), Stanley portrays this work as undermining a "flawed ideology" supporting elitist valuations of intellectual work and workers. However, the link between Stanley's two philosophical projects is weak. Ryle's distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that lacks the political consequences foreseen by Stanley. Versions of "intellectualism" have as much potential to align with hierarchical political systems as do versions of "anti-intellectualism." Consequently, the debate about knowledge-how and knowledge-that comes apart from Stanley's more recent concerns about flawed ideologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Las prácticas ascéticas propuestas por los estoicos romanos como vías de acceso a la vida virtuosa parecen, a primera vista, establecer un conflicto con la concepción intelectualista de la acción humana defendida por la ortodoxia estoica. Dada la función pedagógica que asumen dichas prácticas en el estoicismo romano, el interrogante acerca de su legitimidad doctrinal se vuelve inevitable, en la medida en que parecen admitir la ineficacia de la argumentación racional como vía de (auto) persuasión respecto de la axiología estoica. El objetivo del artículo consistirá entonces en analizar dichas prácticas ascéticas, a fin de demostrar que, a pesar del origen pitagórico-cínico de las mismas, no sólo no contradicen la matriz intelectualista de la psicología, sino que, por el contrario, representan un dispositivo gnoseológico central para la dinámica de la comprensión desarrollada durante ese período de la escuela.

The recent debate initiated by Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell has called attention on the relation between rationality and unreflective action. In this paper I propose a form of specifying the disagreement between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists, as I will call them. In light of this proposal I argue that the main anti-intelectualist argument can only succeed if at least one of three implicit presuppositions is granted. These presuppositions are far from being self-evident and their truth is challenged by familiar phenomena. I finish with some remarks that suggest the intellectualist ends up in a better argumentative position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The paper aims to clarify some features of Epictetus' specific usage of the concept of proairesis throughout his Discourses. This will be done by suggesting that a number of problematic expressions concerning proairesis and its freedom should be understood as rhetorical-pedagogical expressions of Epictetus' intellectualism. I will mainly focus on a series of problematic passages that have been discussed by several commentators concerning the concept of proairesis, and I will suggest that those passages are best interpreted as rhetorical or, better, pedagogical expressions of Epictetus' strictly intellectualist approach to the psychology of action. The interpretation I will propose does away with the need to resort to certain interpretations of those passages that threaten to obscure the otherwise clear picture of human action offered by Epictetus' intellectualism concerning the psychology of action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article analyzes the role of synchrony between the conscience's judgement and the deficient election, and the capacity of voluntarily suspending the judgement, as requisites of the practical error in the work of Leibniz. This analysis hopes to determine whether Leibiniz's account of incontinence manages to avoid an intellectuallistic determinism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The aim of this paper is to review some of the systematic connections between Socrates' and Aristotle's thinking about action and its motivational mechanism. To this purpose, I will start by presenting an interpretation of the so-called 'Socratic intellectualism' in a 'milder' version, based on the possibility of understanding the concept of έπιστήųη(identified by Socrates with άρετή) in a more comprehensive way. This concept will be seen in the light of certain passages in which the Platonic Socrates refers to his own ignorance and to his famous irony. Further, I will briefly review Aristotle's critic of the Socratic position, and I will point out those Socratic intuitions to which Aristotle is, at all events, indebted in his theory of action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]