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Since the 1990s, insurance has been the primary field focused on the social disadvantages of using genetic test results because of the concerns related to adverse selection. Although life insurance is popular in Japan, Japan does not currently have any regulations on the use of genetic information and insurers have largely kept silent for decades. To reveal insurers’ attitudes on the topic, we conducted an anonymous questionnaire survey with 100 insurance company employees and recruited nine interviewees from the survey respondents. We found that genetic discrimination is not generally considered as a topic of human rights. We also found that insurers have uncertain fears and concerns about adverse selection in terms of actuarial fairness but not regarding profits. When it comes to preparing guidelines on the use of genetic information by Japanese insurers, we believe that public dialog and consultation are necessary to gain understanding of the people.

Purpose Limited research suggests that cancer survivors have problems with insurance. Our study aimed to gain insight into the proportion of very long-term (14–24 years post-diagnosis) survivors of breast, colorectal, and prostate cancers who had problems with health (HI) and life (LI) insurance. Methods We used data from CAESAR (CAncEr Survivorship—A multi-Regional population-based study). Participants completed questions on change in insurance providers since cancer diagnosis, problems with requesting (additional) HI or LI, and how potential problems were resolved. We conducted logistic regression to determine factors associated with change in statutory HI. Results Of the 2714 respondents, 174 (6%) reported having changed HI providers. Most switched between different statutory HI providers (86%), 9% from statutory to private, and 5% from private to statutory. Respondents who changed statutory HI providers were more likely to be prostate cancer survivors (OR 2.79, 95% CI 1.01–7.68) while being ≥ 65 years at time of diagnosis (OR 0.58, 95% CI 0.35–0.96) and having ≥ 2 comorbid conditions (OR 0.61, 95% CI 0.40–0.92) were associated with reduced odds for change. Problems in changing HI were minimal and were resolved with additional contribution. Of the 310 respondents who tried to get LI, 25 respondents reported having difficulties, of whom the majority had their request rejected. Conclusion Most cancer survivors did not change their HI nor tried to buy LI after cancer diagnosis. Problems with changing statutory HI were generally resolved with additional contribution while the main problem encountered when buying LI was rejection of request.

Background Regional prevalence estimation requires epidemiologic data with substantial local detail. National health surveys may lack in sufficient local observations due to limited resources. Therefore, corresponding prevalence estimates may not capture regional morbidity patterns with the necessary accuracy. Health insurance records represent alternative data sources for this purpose. Fund-specific member populations have more local observations than surveys, which benefits regional prevalence estimation. However, due to national insurance market regulations, insurance membership can be informative for morbidity. Regional fund-specific prevalence proportions are selective in the sense that the morbidity structure of a fund’s member population cannot be extrapolated to the national population. This implies a selection bias that marks a major obstacle for statistical inference. We provide a methodology to adjust fund-specific selectivity and perform regional prevalence estimation from health insurance records. The methodology is applied to estimate regional cohort-referenced diabetes mellitus type 2 prevalence in Germany. Methods Records of the German Public Health Insurance Company from 2014 and Diagnosis-Related Group Statistics data are combined within a benchmarked multi-level model. The fund-specific selectivity is adjusted in a two-step procedure. Firstly, the conditional expectation of the insurance company’s regional prevalence given related inpatient diagnosis frequencies of its members is quantified. Secondly, the regional prevalence is estimated by extrapolating the conditional expectation using corresponding inpatient diagnosis frequencies of the Diagnosis-Related Group Statistics as benchmarks. Model assumptions are validated via Monte Carlo simulation. Variable selection is performed via multivariate methods. The optimal model fit is determined by analysis of variance. 95% confidence intervals for the estimates are constructed via semiparametric bootstrapping. Results The national diabetes mellitus type 2 prevalence is estimated at 8.70% with a 95% confidence interval of [8.48%, 9.35%]. This indicates an adjustment of the original fund-specific prevalence from − 32.79 to − 25.93%. The estimated disease distribution shows significant morbidity differences between regions, especially between eastern and western Germany. However, the cohort-referenced estimates suggest that these differences can be partially explained by regional demography. Conclusions The proposed methodology allows regional prevalence estimation in remarkable detail despite fund-specific selectivity. This enhances and encourages the use of health insurance records for future epidemiologic studies.

We report previously undocumented evidence of genetic discrimination by Australian insurance companies, obtained through direct consumer reports. We surveyed 174 consumers with cancer-predisposing variants, recruited by cancer organisations Lynch Syndrome Australia and Pink Hope. Questions related to experiences accessing risk-rated insurance after genetic testing. Results indicate that both legal (permitted under current regulation) and illegal discrimination is occurring. Although some respondents had not applied for risk-rated insurance, or had insurance in place before genetic testing (n = 100), those seeking new policies (n = 74) commonly experienced difficulties obtaining insurance (86%, 64/74). Of those experiencing difficulties, 50% (32/64) had no prior history or symptoms of cancer, and had undertaken risk reduction through surveillance and/or preventative surgery. Seventy-seven percent (49/64) reported difficulties related to life insurance. Follow-up telephone interviews with four respondents further described cases of apparent illegal breaches. All reports of discrimination identified were, to our knowledge, previously unreported in the literature. The number of cases suggests a systemic problem with the Australian life insurance industry. We support calls for government oversight of the inherently conflicted model of industry self-regulation in Australia, and an immediate ban on the use of genetic test results in insurance underwriting.

Purpose Health plan disenrollment occurs frequently in commercial insurance claims databases. If individuals who disenroll are different from those who remain enrolled, informative censoring may bias descriptive statistics as well as estimates of causal effect. We explored whether patterns of disenrollment varied by patient or health plan characteristics. Methods In a large cohort of commercially insured adults (2007-2013), we examined two primary outcomes: (a) within-year disenrollment between January 1 and December 30, which was considered to occur due to patient disenrollment from the health plan, and (b) end-of-year disenrollment on December 31, which was considered to occur due to either patient disenrollment from the health plan or withdrawal of the entire health plan from the commercial insurance database. In yearly cohorts, we identified factors independently associated with disenrollment by using log-binomial regression models to estimate risk ratios (RR) and 95% confidence intervals (CI). Results Among 2 053 100 unique patient years, the annual proportion of within-year disenrollment remained steady across years (range, 13% to 14%) whereas the annual proportion of end-of-year disenrollment varied widely (range, 8% to 26%). Independent predictors of within-year disenrollment were related to health status, including age, comorbidities, frailty, hospitalization, emergency room visits, use of durable medical equipment, use of preventive care, and use of prescription medications. In contrast, independent predictors of end-of-year disenrollment were related to health plan characteristics including insurance plan type and geographic characteristics. Conclusions Differential risk of disenrollment suggests that analytic approaches to address selection bias should be considered in studies using commercial insurance databases.

The expansion of genetic and genomic testing in clinical practice and research, and the growing market for direct-to-consumer genomic testing has led to increased awareness about the impact of this form of testing on insurance. Genetic or genomic information can be requested by providers of mutually rated insurance products, who may then use it when setting premiums or determining eligibility for cover under a particular product. Australian insurers are subject to relevant legislation and an industry led standard that was updated in 2019 to introduce a moratorium on the use of genetic test results in life insurance underwriting for policies

BackgroundThe use of genetic test results in risk-rated insurance is a significant concern internationally, with many countries banning or restricting the use of genetic test results in underwriting. In Australia, life insurers’ use of genetic test results is legal and self-regulated by the insurance industry (Financial Services Council (FSC)). In 2018, an Australian Parliamentary Inquiry recommended that insurers’ use of genetic test results in underwriting should be prohibited. In 2019, the FSC introduced an industry self-regulated moratorium on the use of genetic test results. In the absence of government oversight, it is critical that the impact, effectiveness and appropriateness of the moratorium is monitored. Here we describe the protocol of our government-funded research project, which will serve that critical function between 2020 and 2023.MethodsA realist evaluation framework was developed for the project, using a context-mechanism-outcome (CMO) approach, to systematically assess the impact of the moratorium for a range of stakeholders. Outcomes which need to be achieved for the moratorium to accomplish its intended aims were identified, and specific data collection measures methods were developed to gather the evidence from relevant stakeholder groups (consumers, health professionals, financial industry and genetic research community) to determine if aims are achieved. Results from each arm of the study will be analysed and published in peer-reviewed journals as they become available.DiscussionThe A-GLIMMER project will provide essential monitoring of the impact and effectiveness of the self-regulated insurance moratorium. On completion of the study (3 years) a Stakeholder Report will be compiled. The Stakeholder Report will synthesise the evidence gathered in each arm of the study and use the CMO framework to evaluate the extent to which each of the outcomes have been achieved, and make evidence-based recommendations to the Australian federal government, life insurance industry and other stakeholders.

This paper uses survey data to analyse physician views on the risk of cream skimming under a system with activity based financing (ABF) for hospital services. We used data from two nation-wide physician surveys. A survey undertaken in 2006 captures views following a large NPM-inspired structural reform in 2002. In contrast, a survey undertaken in 2016 captures views after a period of a higher degree of institutional and financial stability. We find that the majority of physicians believed that the 2002 reform both provided incentives for and led to more cream skimming. In 2016, however there is less consensus among physicians about the extent of cream skimming. Looking at different types of physicians we find some indications that physicians in leading positions are less likely to view cream skimming as a problem. However, there is concern that hospital management in general puts too much emphasis on economic issues.

This paper studies the impact of advertising as a channel for risk selection in Medicare Advantage. We provide evidence that insurer advertising is responsive to the gains from risk selection. Then we develop and estimate an equilibrium model of Medicare Advantage with advertising, allowing rich individual heterogeneity. Our estimates show that advertising is effective in attracting healthy individuals who are newly eligible for Medicare, contributing to advantageous selection into Medicare Advantage. Moreover, risk selection through advertising substantially lowers premiums by improving insurers' risk pools. The distributional implication is that unhealthy consumers may be better off through cross-subsidization from healthy individuals. (JEL D81, G22, I13, I18, M37)

The aim of this article is to estimate the type of selection that exists in the supplemental health insurance market in Colombia where compulsory coverage is implemented through managed care competition. We build a panel database that combines individuals' information from the Ministry of Health and a database provided by two private health insurers. We perform the correlation test for consumption of health services frequency and supplemental coverage. Following Fang et al. (2008), we condition the estimation on health controls that are available to the econometrician but not to insurers. In both cases we obtain a positive correlation, suggesting that adverse selection predominates. In order to rule out some moral hazard effects, we estimate the correlation between previous frequency of healthcare service consumption and supplemental insurance purchase. The positive correlation obtained is robust to the inclusion of controls for diagnosis implemented by health insurers, suggesting that despite some risk selection strategies, they are not protected from adverse selection. We conclude that some subsidies to supplemental coverage purchase would lower public expenditure in Colombia.

The use of risk-adjustment formulae in setting payments to Medicare Advantage (MA) plans reduces the potential for advantageous selection on factors included in the formulae, but can theoretically worsen overall selection if plans are able to target beneficiaries based on excluded factors. Since MA medical risk-adjustment excludes prescription drug utilization, demand for drugs can be exploited by plans to induce advantageous selection. We show evidence that the introduction of Medicare Part D provided a mechanism for MA plans to increase selection, and that consumers responded, increasing MA market shares among beneficiaries taking drugs associated with the strongest advantageous selection incentives. For the average Medicare beneficiary in our sample, we estimate that this change in advantageous selection following the introduction of Medicare Part D increased the probability of enrolling in an MA plan by about 7.1%.

Concern is growing in the United States regarding the potential for health insurance benefit designs to discriminate against persons living with HIV as research demonstrates that such practices are occurring. A recent complaint filed against health insurers in seven states alleges that some health insurance companies have been using benefit designs that discourage enrollment of people living with HIV either by not covering essential HIV medications or by requiring cost-sharing for these prohibitively expensive medications. Legislators across the country have reacted by introducing legislation to address these growing problems. This paper describes Assembly Bill 339, legislation passed in California in 2015 and going into effect on 1 January 2017, which provides protection for people living with HIV by requiring coverage for single-tablet regimens to manage HIV while placing a cap on patient cost-sharing. Given California's size and influence, and the uncertainty of the future of the Affordable Care Act, this legislation has the potential to influence the national policy debate.

Health Insurance (HI) programmes in low-income countries aim to reduce the burden of out-of-pocket (OOP) health care expenditure. However, if the decisions to purchase insurance and to seek care when ill are correlated with the expected health care expenditure, the use of naïve regression models may produce biased estimates of the impact of insurance membership on OOP expenditure. Whilst many studies in the literature have accounted for the endogeneity of the insurance decision, the potential selection bias due to the care-seeking decision has not been taken into account. We extend the Heckman selection model to account simultaneously for both care-seeking and insurance-seeking selection biases in the health care expenditure regression model. The proposed model is illustrated in the context of a Vietnamese HI programme using data from a household survey of 1,192 individuals conducted in 1999. Results were compared with those of alternative econometric models making no or partial allowance for selection bias. In this illustrative example, the impact of insurance membership on reducing OOP expenditures was underestimated by 21 percentage points when selection biases were not taken into account. We believe this is an important methodological contribution that will be relevant to future empirical work.

OBJECTIVES A South African insurer launched a rebate program for healthy food purchases for its members, but only available in program-designated supermarkets. To eliminate selection bias in program enrollment, we estimated the impact of subsidies in nudging the population towards a healthier diet using an instrumental variable approach. METHODS Data came from a health behavior questionnaire administered among members in the health promotion program. Individual and supermarket addresses were geocoded and differential distances from home to program-designated supermarkets versus competing supermarkets were calculated. Bivariate probit and linear instrumental variable models were performed to control for likely unobserved selection biases, employing differential distances as a predictor of program enrollment. RESULTS For regular fast-food, processed meat, and salty food consumption, approximately two-thirds of the difference between participants and nonparticipants was attributable to the intervention and one-third to selection effects. For fruit/ vegetable and fried food consumption, merely one-eighth of the difference was selection. The rebate reduced regular consumption of fast food by 15% and foods high in salt/sugar and fried foods by 22%- 26%, and increased fruit/vegetable consumption by 21% (0.66 serving/day). CONCLUSIONS Large population interventions are an essential complement to laboratory experiments, but selection biases require explicit attention in evaluation studies conducted in naturalistic settings.

We report previously undocumented evidence of genetic discrimination by Australian insurance companies, obtained through direct consumer reports. We surveyed 174 consumers with cancer-predisposing variants, recruited by cancer organisations Lynch Syndrome Australia and Pink Hope. Questions related to experiences accessing risk-rated insurance after genetic testing. Results indicate that both legal (permitted under current regulation) and illegal discrimination is occurring. Although some respondents had not applied for risk-rated insurance, or had insurance in place before genetic testing (n = 100), those seeking new policies (n = 74) commonly experienced difficulties obtaining insurance (86%, 64/74). Of those experiencing difficulties, 50% (32/64) had no prior history or symptoms of cancer, and had undertaken risk reduction through surveillance and/or preventative surgery. Seventy-seven percent (49/64) reported difficulties related to life insurance. Follow-up telephone interviews with four respondents further described cases of apparent illegal breaches. All reports of discrimination identified were, to our knowledge, previously unreported in the literature. The number of cases suggests a systemic problem with the Australian life insurance industry. We support calls for government oversight of the inherently conflicted model of industry self-regulation in Australia, and an immediate ban on the use of genetic test results in insurance underwriting.

Background Genetic testing offers great benefit for the diagnosis of genetic conditions and to identify and manage risk for conditions such as familial breast cancer. However, potential personal insurance implications exist for some patients who undergo genetic testing in Australia. Currently, insurance companies offering risk-rated products such as life insurance can use genetic test results to discriminate, which may adversely affect applicants’ ability to secure a policy. Many comparable countries have banned or restricted life insurers’ use of genetic results, while Australia still permits it. However, the industry proposes to introduce a moratorium limiting the use of genetic results for life insurance underwriting in mid-2019. Objective This paper explores the implications of genetic testing for risk-rated insurance for the general practice workforce in Australia. Discussion Advancements in technology and decreasing costs have resulted in rapid expansion in genetic/genomic testing, which is set to become part of mainstream healthcare. General practitioners (GPs) in Australia will have an increasingly significant part to play in the expanded use of this testing, and it is therefore important that GPs are aware of these issues.

We examine public policy toward the use of genetic tests by insurers when a positive test makes actuarially fair insurance too expensive for some consumers. With state-dependent utility, consumers may decline actuarially fair insurance if the probability of becoming ill exceeds a threshold. In markets with adverse selection, a positive genetic test may cause all or some high risks to drop out of the market (complete and partial genetic discrimination, respectively). Full participation in the market by all consumers requires cross-subsidization. We show that the consent law and mandatory testing are equivalent. Under complete genetic discrimination, the duty to disclose is never Pareto dominated, but either the code of conduct or consent law can yield the same outcome. Under partial genetic discrimination, the duty to disclose is never Pareto dominated. However, partial genetic discrimination and cross-subsidization imply the information ban is noncomparable to the other policy alternatives.

Much of the risk adjustment literature has focused on how persons should be classified and given weights. It has given less attention to the amount of funds in the risk adjustment pool. If, however, there is an outside option, as there is in the principal American risk adjustment systems, there can be favorable or adverse selection in the risk pool. To address any such selection requires that the risk adjustment system not be zero sum; the main American risk adjustment systems differ in this respect.

A key feature of private long-term care insurance is that medical underwriters screen out would-be buyers who have health conditions that portend near-term physical or cognitive disability. We applied common underwriting criteria based on data from two long-term care insurers to a nationally representative sample of individuals in the target age range (50-71 years) for long-term care insurance. The screening criteria put upper bounds on the current proportion of Americans who could gain coverage in the individual market without changes to medical underwriting practice. Specifically, our simulations show that in the target age range, approximately 30 percent of those whose wealth meets minimum industry standards for suitability for long-term care insurance would have their application for such insurance rejected at the underwriting stage. Among the general population-without considering financial suitability-we estimated that 40 percent would have their applications rejected. The predicted rejection rates are substantially higher than the rejection rates of about 20-25 percent of applicants in the actual market. In evaluating reforms for long-term care financing and their potential to increase private insurance rates, as well as to reduce financial pressure on public safety-net programs, policy makers need to consider the role of underwriting in the market for long-term care insurance.

Frequent claims suggest that healthcare and its production are not only different from other goods, but that they differ to such an extent that healthcare should be viewed as unique. Various features of healthcare, such as the lack of a perfect market and the existence of information asymmetry, are cited as evidence of this claim. However, such a view results from unduly emphasising the characteristics of healthcare as being atypical. This article redresses this imbalance by taking an alternative approach and examines the ways in which the economic aspects of healthcare are similar to those of other goods. It was found that the differential aspects are less distinctive than claimed and the economic aspects of healthcare are not unique.Keywords: Healthcare Sector; Medical Economics; Economic Competition; Competitive Behavior; State Medicine; Insurance Selection Bias; Patient Participation; Health Services Research.

Health care sharing ministries (HCSMs) are a form of health coverage in which members--who typically share a religious belief--make monthly payments to cover expenses of other members. HCSMs do not have to comply with the consumer protections of the Affordable Care Act and may provide value for some individuals, but pose risks for others. Although HCSMs are not insurance and do not guarantee payment of claims, their features closely mimic traditional insurance products, possibly confusing consumers. Because they are largely unregulated and provide limited benefits, HCSMs may be disproportionately attractive to healthy individuals, causing the broader insurance market to become smaller, sicker, and more expensive.To understand state regulator perspectives on regulation of HCSMs and the impact of these arrangements on consumers and markets.Analysis of state laws governing HCSMs in all states; interviews with officials in 13 states; and review of the membership requirements and benefits of five HCSMs.State regulators voiced concerns regarding the potential risks of HCSMs to consumers and their individual markets. However, in the absence of reliable data describing HCSM enrollment, regulators cannot adequately assess harm. Though limited resources and political constraints have made oversight difficult, all states, regardless of their regulatory approach to HCSMs, should obtain data to better understand the role of HCSMs in their markets.

Objective The Affordable Care Act (ACA) introduced reforms to mitigate adverse selection into and within the individual insurance market. We examined the traits and predicted medical spending of enrollees in California post-ACA. Data sources Survey of 2,103 enrollees in individual market plans, on- and off-exchange, in 2014. Study design We compared actual versus potential participants using data from the 2014 California Health Interview Survey on respondents who were individually insured or uninsured. We predicted annual medical spending for each group using age, sex, self-rated health, body mass index, smoking status, and income. Principal findings Average predicted spending was similar for actual ($3,377, 95 percent CI [$3,280-$3,474]) and potential participants ($3,257 [$3,060-$3,454]); however, some vulnerable subgroups were underrepresented. On- versus off-exchange enrollees differed in sociodemographic and health traits with modest differences in spending ($3,448 [$3,330-$3,565] vs. $3,175 [$3,012-$3,338]). Conclusions We did not find evidence of selection into the overall insurance pool in 2014; however, differences by exchange status reflect the importance of including off-exchange enrollees in analyses and the pool for risk adjustment. California's post-ACA individual market has been a relative success, highlighting the importance of state policies and outreach efforts to encourage participation in the market.

Objective To test whether underwriting modifies the effect of state-based incentives on individuals' purchase of long-term care insurance. Data source Health and Retirement Study (HRS), 1996-2012. Study design We estimated difference-in-difference regression models with an interaction of state policy indicators with individuals' probabilities of being approved for long-term care insurance. Data extraction We imputed probabilities of underwriting approval for respondents in the HRS using a model developed with underwriting decisions from two U.S. insurance firms. We measured the elasticity response to long-term care insurance price using changes in simulated after-tax price as an instrumental variable for premium price. Principal findings Tax incentives and Partnership programs increased insurance purchase by 3.62 percentage points and 1.8 percentage points, respectively, among those with the lowest risk (highest approval probability). Neither had any statistically significant effects among the highest risk individuals. Conclusions We show that ignoring the effects of underwriting may lead to biased estimates of the potential state budget savings of long-term care insurance tax incentives. If the private market is to play a role in financing long-term care, policies need to address the underlying adverse selection problems.

This paper investigates consumer inertia in health insurance markets, where adverse selection is a potential concern. We leverage a major change to insurance provision that occurred at a large firm to identify substantial inertia, and develop and estimate a choice model that also quantifies risk preferences and ex ante health risk. We use these estimates to study the impact of policies that nudge consumers toward better decisions by reducing inertia. When aggregated, these improved individual-level choices substantially exacerbate adverse selection in our setting, leading to an overall reduction in welfare that doubles the existing welfare loss from adverse selection. (JEL D82, G22, I13) A number of potential impediments stand in the way of efficient health insur ance markets. The most noted of these is adverse selection, first studied by Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). In insurance markets, prices reflect the expected risk (costs) of the insured pool. Whether the reason is price regulation or private information, when insurers cannot price all risk characteristics riskier consumers choose more comprehensive health plans. This causes the equilibrium prices of these plans to rise and healthier enrollees to select less comprehensive coverage than they would otherwise prefer.

Populations with intensive health care needs and high care costs may be attracted to insurance plans that have high quality ratings, but patients may be likely to disenroll from a plan if their care needs are not met. We assessed the association between publicly reported Medicare Advantage plan star ratings and voluntary disenrollment of incident dialysis patients in the following year over the period 2007–13. We found that Medicare Advantage (MA) plans with lower star ratings had significantly higher rates of disenrollment by incident dialysis patients in the following year. Compared to MA plans with 4.0 or more stars, adjusted disenrollment rates were 3.9 percentage points higher for plans with 3.5 stars, 5.0 percentage points higher for those with 3.0 stars, and 12.1 percentage points higher for those with 2.5 or fewer stars. These findings suggest that low plan quality may lead to increased expenditures, as this high-cost population generally must shift from Medicare Advantage to traditional Medicare upon disenrollment.

Background: Asymmetric information is one of the most important issues in insurance market which occurred due to inherent characteristics of one of the agents involved in insurance contracts; hence its management requires designing appropriate policies. This phenomenon can lead to the failure of insurance market via its two consequences, namely, adverse selection and moral hazard. Objective: This study was aimed to evaluate the status of asymmetric information in Iran’s health insurance market with respect to the demand for outpatient services. Materials/sPatients and Methods: This research is a cross sectional study conducted on households living in Iran. The data of the research was extracted from the information on household’s budget survey collected by the Statistical Center of Iran in 2012. In this study, the Generalized Method of Moment model was used and the status of adverse selection and moral hazard was evaluated through calculating the latent health status of individuals in each insurance category. To analyze the data, Excel, Eviews and stata11 software were used. Results: The estimation of parameters of the utility function of the demand for outpatient services (visit, medicine, and Para-clinical services) showed that households were more risk averse in the use of outpatient care than other goods and services. After estimating the health status of households based on their health insurance categories, the results showed that rural-insured people had the best health status and people with supplementary insurance had the worst health status. In addition, the comparison of the conditional distribution of latent health status approved the phenomenon of adverse selection in all insurance groups, with the exception of rural insurance. Moreover, calculation of the elasticity of medical expenses to reimbursement rate confirmed the existence of moral hazard phenomenon. Conclusions: Due to the existence of the phenomena of adverse selection and moral hazard in most of health insurances categories, policymakers need to adjust contracts so that to reduce these phenomena. Given the importance of financing, the presence of such problems can lead to less coverage of health insurance provided by insurers, loss of contracts with health care institutions and service providers, and lower quality of health services.

Eliminating discrimination on the basis of preexisting conditions is a key feature of the Affordable Care Act. But insurers may be resorting to other tactics to dissuade high-cost patients from enrolling, such as categorizing all HIV drugs in the highest-cost-sharing tier.

We develop a model of selection that incorporates a key element of recent health reforms: an individual mandate. We identify a set of key parameters for welfare analysis, allowing us to model the welfare impact of the actual policy as well as to estimate the socially optimal penalty level. Using data from Massachusetts, we estimate the key parameters of the model. We compare health insurance coverage, premiums, and insurer average health claim expenditures between Massachusetts and other states in the periods before and after the passage of Massachusetts health reform. In the individual market for health insurance, we find that premiums and average costs decreased significantly in response to the individual mandate; consistent with an initially adversely selected insurance market. We are also able to recover an estimated willingness-to-pay for health insurance. Combining demand and cost estimates as sufficient statistics for welfare analysis, we find an annual welfare gain of $335 dollars per person or $71 million annually in Massachusetts as a result of the reduction in adverse selection. We also find evidence for smaller post-reform markups in the individual market, which increased welfare by another $107 dollars per person per year and about $23 million per year overall. To put this in perspective, the total welfare gains were 8.4% of medical expenditures paid by insurers. Our model and empirical estimates suggest an optimal mandate penalty of $2,190. A penalty of this magnitude would increase health insurance to near universal levels. Our estimated optimal penalty is higher than the individual mandate penalty adopted in Massachusetts but close to the penalty implemented under the ACA.

As one looks into the crystal ball concerning the future of medicine, what might be seen? One vision is of genetic testing being carried out by medical technicians and then, as a result of this analysis, patients will be given a diagnosis of what is wrong with them. Next, they will be given a list of courses of action based on the tests. (Again, this list could be obtained by a technician who merely transfers the test results to the accepted database.) Once the list is presented to the patient, then she will choose her treatment (with the help, perhaps, of some online tutorials). Then a clinician will inoculate her or otherwise administer the genetic therapy. The entire process might go forward without the intervention of a physician!

Background: Regulating the use of genetic information in insurance is an issue of ongoing international debate. In Australia, providers of life and other mutually rated insurance products can request applicants to disclose all results from any genetic test. Insurers can then use this information to adjust premiums and make policy decisions. The Australian Financial Services Council (FSC; an industry body) developed and maintains the relevant industry standard, which was updated in late 2016. Aims/Objective: To review the 2016 FSC Standard in light of relevant research and determine the legitimacy of the Australian regulatory environment regarding use of genetic information by insurers. Results: We identified five concerns arising from the 2016 FSC Standard: (1) use of results obtained from research; (2) the requirement for an applicant to disclose whether they are “considering” a genetic test; (3) failure to account for genome sequencing and other technology developments; (4) limited evidence regarding adverse selection; and (5) the inappropriateness of industry self-regulation. Conclusion: Industry self-regulation of the use of genetic information by life insurers, combined with a lack of government oversight, is inappropriate and threatens to impede the progress of genomic medicine in Australia. At this critical time, Australia requires closer government oversight of the use of genetic information in insurance.

To equalize differences in health plan premiums due to differences in risk pools, the German legislature introduced a simple Risk Adjustment Scheme (RAS) based on age, gender and disability status in 1994. In addition, effective 1996, consumers gained the freedom to choose among hundreds of existing health plans, across employers and state-borders. This paper (a) estimates RAS pass-through rates on premiums, financial reserves, and expenditures and assesses the overall RAS impact on market price dispersion. Moreover, it (b) characterizes health plan switchers and investigates their annual and cumulative switching rates over time. Our main findings are based on representative enrollee panel data linked to administrative RAS and health plan data. We show that sickness funds with bad risk pools and high pre-RAS premiums lowered their total premiums by 42 cents per additional euro allocated by the RAS. Consequently, post-RAS, health plan prices converged but not fully. Because switchers are more likely to be white collar, young and healthy, the new consumer choice resulted in more risk segregation and the amount of money redistributed by the RAS increased over time.

Evidence on insurers’ behavior in environments with both risk selection and market power is largely missing. We fill this gap by providing one of the first empirical accounts of how insurers adjust plan features when faced with potential changes in selection. Our strategy exploits a 2012 reform allowing Medicare enrollees to switch to 5-star contracts at anytime. This policy increased enrollment into 5-star contracts, but without risk selection worsening. Our findings show that this is due to 5-star plans lowering both premiums and generosity, thus becoming more appealing for most beneficiaries, but less so for those in worse health conditions.

To combat adverse selection, governments increasingly base payments to health plans and providers on enrollees' scores from risk-adjustment formulae. In 2004, Medicare began to risk-adjust capitation payments to private Medicare Advantage (MA) plans to reduce selection-driven overpayments. But because the variance of medical costs increases with the predicted mean, incentivizing enrollment of individuals with higher scores can increase the scope for enrolling “overpriced” individuals with costs significantly below the formula's prediction. Indeed, after risk adjustment, MA plans enrolled individuals with higher scores but lower costs conditional on their score. We find no evidence that overpayments were on net reduced. (JEL G22, H51, I13, I18)