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This study investigates the impact of delegation structure of the top management team upon the corporate voluntary disclosure on financial outcomes. The paper develops two competing hypotheses pertaining to the relationship between the degree of delegation and the quality of management earnings forecasts (MFs), the most influential type of voluntary financial disclosure. In support of the literature on strategic information transmission, the empirical findings demonstrate a U-shaped relationship between the degree of delegation and the quality of MFs, suggesting that an internal optimality of responsibility sharing between the CEO and her immediate subordinates does not exist for internal information production and dissemination. Specifically, the paper analyzes four aspects of MFs, and the documented curvilinear forms are generally persistent across the multiple quality metrics. Consistent with the literature on aging executives, the curvilinear relation is more significant when the top management team is led by an older CEO. The paper utilizes a system of structural equations to ameliorate estimation biases and the results are robust to a battery of robustness checks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alongside democratic backsliding and security threats, censorship is increasingly used by governments and other societal actors to control the media. Who is likely to be affected by it and why? We argue that censors are more likely to target outlets and journalists that provide information to politically consequential audiences, while allowing media that caters to non-pivotal audiences to report more freely. In order to test our hypotheses, we built a new dataset of around 9,000 salient censorship events and their characteristics across 196 countries between 2001 and 2015. We find strong empirical support for media market segmentation. Outlets and journalists with wide audiences, collective action coverage and domestic ownership are significantly more at risk of severe censorship actions. We also find that audience pivotality matters more than the number and diversity of outlets for censors' strategic calculus. Our results hold across democracies and non-democracies, for government and third-party censors alike. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Resumo O artigo correlaciona os conceitos de Regimes de Informação com os procedimentos desenvolvidos no processo de monitoramento da implementação das Normas Internacionais do Trabalho propostas pela Organização Internacional do Trabalho (OIT). Especificamente observa-se a Convenção 182 da OIT, que porta sobre a Erradicação das Piores Formas do Trabalho Infantil. São apresentados conceitos que subsidiam a compreensão dos Regimes Internacionais de Direitos Humanos e de seus respectivos Regimes de Informação. São apresentadas as características do procedimento de monitoramento da implementação das Normas Internacionais do Trabalho, com foco nas práticas informacionais que o subsidiam. Por fim, são analisadas as tipologias e os processos informacionais verificados nos procedimentos de monitoramento da Convenção 182, em países do continente americano. Conclui-se que embora o Regime Internacional de Direitos Humanos, aqui representado pela OIT, objetive estabelecer um padrão de comportamento informacional equalizado para todos os seus Estados-membros, existe uma patente variação dos níveis de colaboração por parte de cada Estado-nacional. Conclui-se que os Regimes Internacionais apresentam importância indubitável na consolidação de um contexto de proteção social e de preservação de princípios e garantias fundamentais, contudo, os seus respectivos Regimes de Informação dependem em última instância da vontade política dos contextos nacionais em colaborar de modo adequado com o Regime.

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