1. Informative campaigns, overpromising, and policy bargaining.
- Author
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Kim, Dahjin, Lin, Gechun, and Schnakenberg, Keith E.
- Subjects
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CAMPAIGN promises , *CITIZENS , *NEGOTIATION , *GAME theory , *INFORMATION theory - Abstract
What is the relationship between policy positions taken in campaigns and those proposed in bargaining when the final policy outcome depends on other political actors? Why do candidates sometimes advocate policies in their campaigns that are unlikely or impossible to pass given the preferences of other actors in the government? We analyze a model in which candidates make non-binding policy platform announcements and then bargain with a Veto player over the final policy if they take office. In the model, a candidate has private information that is related to the policy preferences of a key citizen group and engages in bargaining with a Veto player who is responsive to this information. When the citizen's group sometimes interprets campaign promises naively, elections are more likely to allow information revelation. Furthermore, in this case, politicians overpromise: the politician's platform is outside of the range of feasible bargaining outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
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