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Copyright of Journal of Humanities & Tourism Research (JoHUT) is the property of Journal of Humanities & Tourism Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Eurasian Inquiries / Avrasya Incelemeleri Dergisi is the property of Journal of Eurasian Inquiries / Avrasya Incelemeleri Dergisi and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Management & Quality / Zarządzanie i Jakość is the property of Scientific Society of Organization & Management / Towarzystwo Naukowe Organizacji i Kierownictwa and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In markets, such as those for airline tickets and hotel accommodations, firms sell time-dated products and have private information about unsold capacities. We show that competition under private information may explain observed phenomena, such as increased price dispersion and higher expected prices toward the deadline. We also show that private information severely limits the market power of firms and that information exchange about capacity increases firms' profits. Finally, we inquire into the incentives to unilaterally disclose information or to engage in espionage about rival's capacity and show that they increase firms' profits compared with the private information setting. This paper was accepted by Omar Besbes, revenue management and market analytics. Funding: This work was partially funded by the Austrian Science Foundation FWF under [Project FG 6]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4613. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to make science-based decisions related to business security by the owners and management of the enterprise, the following tasks are solved in the article: the organisational structure of the economic security service of the enterprise, as well as the main functions of its divisions, are developed. The relevance of solving these problems is primarily due to the low efficiency of law enforcement agencies in protecting property rights and economic interests of domestic entrepreneurs. The scientific novelty of the study lies in the development of a basic, universal organisational structure of the economic security service of a modern enterprise. Starting from the goal of creating an economic security service, using a systematic and risk-oriented approach, its tasks have been collected, defined and comprehensively analyzed. Taking into account the increased complexity and confidentiality of tasks, based on the structural and functional approach, the functions of the economic security service of the enterprise were formulated, which were structured and distributed to specific departments. Elements of scientific novelty are also the recognition of the existence of intelligence units of the economic security service of enterprises operating in violation of the law, as well as an analysis of their functions in order to develop the organisational structure of counterintelligence units.

The recent years have witnessed two major events that have deeply impacted cybersecurity threats. First, the COVID-19 pandemic has drastically increased our dependence upon technology. From individuals to corporations and governments, the overwhelming majority of our activities moved online. As the proportion of human activities performed online is reaching new peaks, cybersecurity becomes a problem of national security. Second, the Russia-Ukraine war is giving us a glimpse of what cyberthreats may look like in future cyberconflicts. From data integrity to identity thievery, and from industrial espionage to hostile manoeuvres from foreign powers, cyberthreats have never been that numerous and diverse. Due to the increase of the magnitude, of the diversity, and of the complexity of cyberthreats, the current security strategies used to face cybercriminality won't be sufficient in the post-crisis era. Therefore, governments need to rethink globally their national security services response strategy. This paper analyses how this new context has impacted cybersecurity for individuals, corporations, and governments, and emphasis the need to reposition the economical identity of the individuals at the center of security response. We propose strategies to optimize law enforcement response from police to counterintelligence, notably through formation, prevention, and interaction with cybercriminality. We then discuss the possibilities to optimize the articulation of the different levels of security response and expertise, by emphasizing the need for coordination between security services, and by proposing strategies to include non-institutional players.

All existing companies today want not only to remain in the service market, but also to gain a foothold in it, and methodically develop from year to year. And in the modern world, this is simply impossible to imagine without corporate intelligence. Those firms that did not realize this in time simply went bankrupt or their business does not develop, and economic indicators remain in one place from year to year. Today, there is a wide variety of ways of business intelligence in the world. All types of competitive intelligence can be divided into two large groups: direct and indirect business intelligence. Let’s look at each of them in more detail. A separate subspecies is business intelligence, which can relate to both indirect and direct intelligence, depending on the surrounding circumstances.

The digital revolution has been gathering pace for years. Companies benefit significantly from digital data and the fast processing of high storage volumes. However, it is also necessary to consider the threats to companies that arise from digital espionage attempts. The aim of this study is to identify determinants with a significant impact on the threat potential of industrial espionage in SME. It is based on a qualitative approach and a content analysis according to Mayring. The study proves that employee training plays a major role in preventing industrial espionage. In addition, the degree of innovation and the nature of trade secrets also play a major role. It should also be contemplated whether companies are targeted victims or are more at risk from large-scale automated attacks. Based on the findings a revised conceptual model has been created. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we take a postcolonial management approach to exploring the lingering significance of postcolonial imagery in shaping legal disputes between host country and foreign multinational corporations. We apply a critical discourse analysis to the Korea versus Orbotech industrial espionage lawsuit, in which the Korean government accused a foreign multinational corporation of leaking its 'national core technology'. Through this analysis we demonstrate how industrial espionage discourse was used to fight Korea's negative reputation as a technological imitator, associate Korea with global technological leaders, and disassociate itself from other 'imitators'. In response, Orbotech's industrial espionage discourse has aimed to reproduce Korea's imitator stigma. Our findings highlight the continual role of the imagined North/South and West/rest symbolic boundaries in constructing global business hierarchies even when the marginalized party—Korea—has already moved to the elite economies club. While international management studies rarely address industrial espionage beyond its technical meaning, we underline the embeddedness of industrial espionage as a discourse in maintaining and disrupting the geopolitical business landscape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last decade, we have witnessed a significant shift in the way local, regional, or global confrontations are performed with specific roles being attributed to the economic intelligence systems. By executing intelligence and counterintelligence operations, the economic intelligence systems are operating in confluence areas bringing together intelligence communities, governmental and diplomacy apparatus, and the business actors. Also, recently, revamped forms of warfare have illustrated how economic leverage is frequently used in combined and versatile hybrid interventions against democratic state stability and legitimacy. Despite this intense employment of economic advantage, economic intelligence represents one of the concepts that is still looking for conceptual clarity as it is frequently used in conjunction with other proxy terms (i.e., business intelligence, industrial espionage, competitive intelligence, economic security, and economic espionage), while its meaning ascribed in different contexts is rarely explicit. Starting from the premise that when lacking clarification, concepts become broad, ambiguous, and difficult to apply, the paper aims to bring forward conceptual clarifications by exploring and comparing various definitions existing in the literature while seeking to advance an operational definition for economic intelligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Transition: Journal of Economic & Politics of Transition / Tranzicija: Časopis za Ekonomiju i Politiku Tranzicije is the property of Ekonomski Institut Tuzla and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Empirical figures show that, especially in recent years, the frequency of industrial and economic espionage, and consequently its dangers and negative impact, has increased greatly worldwide. This has impacted not only the individual victims of the infringement of trade secrets, but also the national and global economies at large. This espionage cannot be tackled effectively through uncoordinated, stand-alone-actions of individual countries anymore. Instead, the global community must take a more holistic view and find universally acceptable strategies and standards, looking for best practices through the lens of comparative law. The paper compares and contrasts the legal approaches to the criminalisation of economic and industrial espionage in Switzerland and Austria. It aims to show the similarities and differences and to identify the strengths and weaknesses of each jurisdiction. The results are meant to enrich and to contribute to the discussions regarding efficient and commonly acceptable solutions to fighting economic and industrial espionage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Industrial and economic espionage are underestimated criminal offences. Although the phenomena are diffuse and ambiguous, they can result in enormous material and immaterial damage. Referring to results from the German research project WISKOS, the phenomenon of obtaining trade secrets (including the offenders, modi operandi, affected trade secrets, outflow of trade secrets and detection abilities) are described, as too are possible countermeasures and associated law enforcement difficulties. Considering the phenomenological results, potential preventive measures based on the situational crime prevention and deterrence strategies are listed. Legal regulations and sanctions in Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom are compared. Lastly, based on the outcomes of criminal proceedings, it is discussed whether the existing criminal law is an appropriate measure to deter potential offenders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ubiquitous digitization of information and the pervasive connectivity of work systems have inevitably facilitated cyber-enabled industrial espionage. Security failures explain most of cyber industrial espionage incidents, and insider threats represent a significant pattern in many case examples. Insiders can inadvertently or purposefully pose serious threats to organisations by facilitating access to or misuse of proprietary sensitive data. This paper argues that technical security solutions have rather limited scope to tackle this problem, and that a socio-technical approach has potential to provide a better means to address the challenge of preventing and responding to insider threats. Such an approach could bridge the gap between the design and implementation of security solutions and creation of an organisational culture that is security-aware. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most of the research on the role of police in the protection of industrial technology has recommended the expansion of police departments and the provision of education to strengthen the expertise of investigators. However, no research has sought to identify which specific expertise should be strengthened. This study analyzed which competencies are required by professional police investigators in industrial espionage cases to gain expertise. The study used the Developing A Curriculum (DACUM) technique, normally used to develop curriculum through job analysis. The study produced a series of competency items in three stages: (1) created a job model, (2) filtered out unnecessary competency items via expert reviews, and (3) verified the selected items via surveys and focus group interviews. Unnecessary items were filtered out throughout the study. The study found that "knowledge about laws related to industrial espionage," "case types and modus operandi," and "knowledge related to digital forensics and utilization of useful tools" are necessary competencies for the police investigating industrial espionage cases. Several non-essential but beneficial competencies were also found, such as "understanding of the latest technology trends," "knowledge of internal computer systems and relevant organizations," and "ability to use programs to design drawings or program source codes." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of URVIO - Revista Latinoamericana de Seguridad Ciudadana is the property of FLACSO - Ecuador (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Throughout the existence of the Polish People’s Republic (PPR), its scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) supported Polish mining, energy, metallurgy, and machine industries. Cooperation with companies and research and development centers intensified in the first half of the 1970s, as a natural consequence of the experience accumulated by the intelligence service in the previous fifteen years. The most crucial issues related to the improvement of secret methods of acquiring technologies for the Polish economy were defining the scope of the tasks, i.e. the types of technologies which can be acquired by intelligence or purchased in the black market, selecting objects, (i.e. institutions and organizations with the required knowledge), and recruiting personal sources of information in western facilities. Apart from acquiring specific solutions S&TI also developed analyses related to specific countries, as well as to specific technologies in the global aspect or to international corporations that possessed the technologies. Furthermore, S&TI was engaged by the Polish government to provide information to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of International Trade during trade negotiations with foreign contractors. Author draws the history of Polish S&TI during the 70s and 80s, showcasing its operations, explaining its modus operandi and discussing the question about the efficiency of illicit transfer of know-how from OECD for the purposes technical progress in communist Poland. Article bases on recently declassified documents of Polish intelligence service from the pre-1990 period. There are moreover other archival records as well as secondary sources explored.

Throughout the existence of the Polish People's Republic (PPR), its scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) supported Polish mining, energy, metallurgy, and machine industries. Cooperation with companies and research and development centers intensified in the first half of the 1970s, as a natural consequence of the experience accumulated by the intelligence service in the previous fifteen years. The most crucial issues related to the improvement of secret methods of acquiring technologies for the Polish economy were defining the scope of the tasks, i.e. the types of technologies which can be acquired by intelligence or purchased in the black market, selecting objects, (i.e. institutions and organizations with the required knowledge), and recruiting personal sources of information in western facilities. Apart from acquiring specific solutions S&TI also developed analyses related to specific countries, as well as to specific technologies in the global aspect or to international corporations that possessed the technologies. Furthermore, S&TI was engaged by the Polish government to provide information to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of International Trade during trade negotiations with foreign contractors. Author draws the history of Polish S&TI during the 70s and 80s, showcasing its operations, explaining its modus operandi and discussing the question about the efficiency of illicit transfer of know-how from OECD for the purposes technical progress in communist Poland. Article bases on recently declassified documents of Polish intelligence service from the pre-1990 period. There are moreover other archival records as well as secondary sources explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trade secret misappropriation or theft has been estimated to cost U.S. business firms $300 billion annually. Current/former employees and value chain partners have been identified as the primary culprits in this industrial espionage activity. Many corporate security protocols have been suggested as methods for attenuating this theft and protecting organizational trade secrets. However, many of these methodologies can serve to create significant legal challenges and liabilities for organizations choosing to implement them. This paper seeks to both document these legal issues and assist corporations in better balancing corporate security with the requirements of privacy, contract, labor and trade secret laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Industrial espionage and competition issues in the modern world are becoming more ambitious shapes, thereby affecting all spheres of human activity. Create all things, ideas and services subject to fierce competition, as far as the relationship of competition and economic policies can affect international relations. Competition – inherent in commodity production struggle between entrepreneurs in the market for more favorable conditions of production and marketing of products for getting the highest profit. Research competitiveness of goods and services – one of the main links of research in the market economy, which allows to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the products and services offered. In this regard, relevant today is the creation of a coherent system of economic intelligence on the markets, competitors, partners, contractors, new technologies, legislation, etc., and in addition – the knowledge used in the business of ways to search, access, use of information and also used type of deception and fraud. The fierce competition for markets and products, the scope of application of capital and the pursuit of maximum profits forced executives of major corporations to closely monitor the activities of their competitors. It may be used as economic intelligence and industrial espionage.