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For all of British Colonial Indirect Rule’s avowed deference to Islamic law and institutions in Northern Nigeria, it radically transformed them. Of the most overt areas in which this occurred was the colonial state’s elimination of diya, the payment of compensation for unlawful killing. Justified by the colonial state on the basis of good order, the abolition of diya was the product of a debate over who had the prerogative to respond to crimes directed at the person: the aggrieved individual or the state. Prominent Muslim jurists argued in favor of the former, citing source texts and the precolonial practice that gave life to those textual prescriptions. On the other hand, colonial administrators insisted that the response to crimes against the person was the state’s prerogative and that interpersonal resolution of such matters challenged imperial authority, the protection of which was not without basis in Islamic law. At the same time, the peculiar design of Northern Nigerian indirect rule meant that statutory, and therefore, unequivocal elimination of diya, remained elusive—at least until the eve of independence. This article traces the contours of the debate over the fate of diya as a lens through which one may apprehend the impact of colonial indirect rule on Islamic law, particularly criminal law, in Northern Nigeria. The demise of diya illuminates colonial indirect rule for what it was: a “constitutional trick” that paid lip service to Islamic law and institutions while radically transforming their essence and, eventually, eliminating them. Ultimately, however, that the means through which the demise of diya was brought about—the reconfiguration of the precolonial constitutional balance between political and juristic authorities—is, at least, as significant as the demise of diya itself. Indeed, that constitutional transformation has endured, surviving colonialism and finding expression in nascent attempts to reinstate Islamic law in the postcolonial state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article analyzes how the Russian Empire managed the administration of its western peripheries, including Poland, Finland, and Bessarabia, in the 19th century. Facing solid social and political structures, Russia adopted a flexible strategy, recognizing the rights and privileges of local elites to facilitate the integration and administration of these regions. This process, driven by pragmatic needs, combined elements of imperial governance with local peculiarities, avoiding forced homogenization. The article highlights the complexity of the relations between the center and the periphery, illustrating how local elites influenced central policies. By acknowledging and integrating local elites into power structures, the imperial administration succeeded in ensuring the stability and legitimacy of Russian rule in these regions, emphasizing an indirect and adaptable governance approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past decade-plus, there has been a surge in anthropological writing on decolonisation. Yet, whereas mid-twentieth century anticolonial revolutionaries fought to uproot imperialism's extractive political economy, certain contemporary decolonial tendencies give primacy, instead, to asserting cultural/epistemological difference. This shift has motivated pertinent critiques, such as that of Nigerian philosopher Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò, of atavistic conceptions of decolonisation. Táíwò's dismissal, however, of the neocolonialism thesis and his conceptual uncoupling of imperialism's material and symbolic dimensions results in a one-dimensional polemic. What gets lost is the much-needed role of decolonisation as an ideological struggle in mobilising populations against an entrenched neocolonial political economy. With this debate as framing, I propose revisiting Talal Asad's 1973 volume, Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter, published at the height of anthropology's disciplinary anti-imperialism. The book's contributors detail how, amid intensifying anticolonial agitation, interwar anthropologists anxious about cultural change among colonised populations advocated a shift to indirect colonial rule through native elites, rather than an abolition of imperialism per se. While spurning colonialism's earlier assimilationist agenda, anthropological calls to institutionalise cultural differences among colonised populations resonated with an imperialist project of incorporating while subverting anticolonial demands. Amid present-day anthropological discussions around decolonisation, these insights remain relevant. This is because contemporary neocolonial relations operate in a manner akin to indirect colonial rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the institutional genealogy of Israeli colonial governance (ICG) and the accompanying patterns of Palestinian resistance in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. It argues that ICG has experienced three phases, each marked by a particular form of direct or indirect colonial rule. Each of these colonial rule forms has been resisted through a distinct pattern of centralized or decentralized collective political agency. I argue that both the form and governing logic of ICG are determined not only by colonialist aims, but also by their interplay with the Palestinian resistance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the relationship between Gjon Marka Gjoni, head of the Mirdita tribes in North Albania, and the phenomenon of mobilization and recruitment of many men from the hinterland of North Albania in the irregular and paramilitary forces, i.e., in the voluntary bands and the Milicia Fashiste Shqiptare [Albanian Fascist Militia], during the Italian occupation (1939-1943). In addition to his personal role and interpersonal ties, it focuses on the personal motivations of these forces, with an emphasis on both economic ones - wages, benefits, and potential banditry opportunities - and emotional ones, the latter driven by various kinds of fears. Finally, to better understand their local activity and the dynamics that emerged, this paper also addresses the nature and the extent of their violence and the consequent impact on the population.

This article explores salt as a substance that lay at the heart of discussions around sovereignty, jurisdiction, criminality and control. Tracing salt administration in late nineteenth-century Rajputana, it argues that the colonial state significantly altered existing local contexts of power and control in the princely states where the salt sources lay. It explores how the colonial state, while maintaining a façade of 'indirect rule', created jurisdictional spaces for itself within the princely states. In the process, local and regional salt production and the trade circuits of Rajputana were subsumed in the making of an expansive colonial enterprise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the impact of popular discontent on the transition from indirect to direct rule? The current literature suggests contrasting theories, variously arguing that rulers are more likely to govern directly when facing either a particularly high or particularly low probability of mass resistance. I reconcile these views by arguing that the decision to rule indirectly is subject to competing dilemmas. In a formal model, I show that these twin tensions influence the choice to centralize power in opposing manners. Accordingly, there are two distinct political logics driving direct rule: one resulting from a high likelihood of revolt and the other from a low likelihood, with contrasting comparative statics. The model therefore reconciles contrasting views in the literature. I illustrate the model's logic with reference to key cases and provide heuristics for predicting comparative statics in new empirical settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents an expansive history of a seemingly discrete event: the decision to extend an indentured labor system created in the Caribbean and Indian Ocean to the British colony of Natal, in South Africa, in 1860. Most work on indenture in Natal takes 1860 as a starting point and treats the migration of Indian workers under indenture in relative isolation. By contrast, this article focuses on the period preceding the first Indian arrivals and examines the colony's turn to indenture alongside three seemingly separate migrations. In so doing, the article shows how antislavery politics, an early system of indirect rule, conflict between settlers and imperial administrators, and important shifts in race-thinking all contributed to the extension of indenture to Natal. In the process, the article illuminates the entangled, decentered nature of imperial rule by integrating lines of analysis normally kept separate, as a disciplinary matter, as "African colonial" and as "imperial" history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within British India, the police were used to suppress challenges to colonial authority. Yet, police actions in fulfilling this role varied by region. Within the provinces, the police were a coercive force to enforce internal security, augmenting military efforts. On the frontier, the aim of the police was to integrate locals into the local security framework and weld their interests to government control, rather than the direct application of force. Relying on Indian archival records, this comparative analysis demonstrates the importance of considering this variation for a more complete understanding of the strategic logic of colonial policing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista UNISCI is the property of Unidad de Investigaciones Sobre Seguridad y Cooperacion International (UNISCI) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Two dominant explanations for ethnic bias in distributional outcomes are electoral incentives and out-group prejudice. This article proposes a novel and complementary explanation for the phenomenon: variation in legibility across ethnic groups. The author argues that states will allocate fewer resources to groups from which they cannot gather accurate information or collect taxes. The argument is supported by original data on state aid from the 1891/1892 famine in the Russian Empire. Qualitative and quantitative analyses show that districts with a larger Muslim population experienced higher famine mortality and received less generous public assistance. The Muslims, historically ruled via religious intermediaries, were less legible to state officials and generated lower fiscal revenues. State officials could not count on the repayment of food loans or collect tax arrears from Muslim communes, so they were more likely to withhold aid. State relief did not vary with the presence of other minorities that were more legible and generated more revenue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rulers face challenges in governing distant or hostile populations. In response, they may coopt elites from those groups into relationships of indirect rule, thereby boosting their perceived legitimacy and ensuring compliance with their policies. Because a ruler's goals diverge from a hostile population's preferences, an important tension results: the elite's cooperation becomes more valuable to the ruler, but their ability to foster compliance is strained. How does that tension influence the ruler's governance strategy and the resulting bargain between the ruler and the elite? I construct a model of cooptation showing that a legitimating elite's bargaining power is non-monotonic with respect to preference divergence between a ruler and the citizenry. Bargaining power for the elite is increasing in preference divergence at low levels and falls discontinuously once divergence passes a threshold. Preference divergence therefore carries implications for rulers' institutional choice, as cooptation is only viable at intermediate levels of popular discontent. I apply the model to the Ottoman Empire's system of indirect rule and show that it explains several features of regime-elite relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study revisits the resistance of women against the British colonial government's introduction of its taxation system in eastern Nigeria and focuses on the problematized relationship between culture and history. Although historical studies have been carried out to explain why women resisted change and why men were largely absent from the struggle against in the colony of eastern Nigeria, new studies on the subject have provided vital information on how women responded to the colonial imposition of tax and how cultural dynamics spurred the women's revolts. Data adopted for the study were taken from primary sources consisting of archival records, participant' observers' reports, as well as information on secondary sources such as journal articles and books, in order to explain the ethnography and culture of the Igbo society. This paper argues that women mainly resisted colonial tax imposition without strong involvement of the men, and expressed their anger against the Native Court and Warrant Chief systems, which were, exclusively, male dominated. It concludes that women were not passive victims of colonial intimidation and oppression, but were vanguards of resistance against a hostile and brutal colonial regime in Eastern Nigeria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of South African Journal of Cultural History / Suid-Afrikaanse Vereniging vir Kultuurgeskiedenis is the property of South African Society for Cultural History and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Omran for Social Sciences is the property of Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Indirect colonial rule in Botswana differed from practice elsewhere in British Africa because of the involvement of local public opinion expressed through the long-practiced kgotla forum. This had something to do with the 'voluntary' way Botswana fell under British colonial rule in 1885. However, problems sometimes arose, with aggressive agitation against and even violent confrontation with agents of the British colonial system. Starting in 1947 the British had plans for decolonising much of their African empire by introducing 'democratic' tribal conciliar systems for running local governments. But there were no immediate plans to do the same for Botswana until widespread turmoil, starting in the late 1940s, led to the introduction of the tribal conciliar system, even though the Tswana dikgosi (chiefs) wanted a more powerful legislative apparatus. Using archival sources this paper demonstrates how this development marginalised popular participation through the open kgotla. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A number of juridical, political and theological controversies arose from the process of incorporation of the American territories into the broader set of the Iberian monarchies. It was discussed not only the legitimacy of the conquests, but also the possibilities of governance, whether through direct or indirect domination of the native “nations”. During the difficult juncture of the Restoration, the top councils of the Portuguese monarchy still discussed the expectations and the projects for the incorporation of Maranhão and Grão-Pará. In the local instance, the municipal council claimed the right to enslave Indians for the preservation of the land, while António Vieira conversely argued that such preservation should rely on pacts, agreements and consensus. Thus, this article aims not only to recreate this debate, but also to demonstrate how the crown discussed and defined mechanisms for legitimizing these territories.

This article is a comment on laws concerning famine relief in colonial Tanganyika (now Tanzania Mainland). The key statutory provisions were the Native Foodstuffs Ordinance 1924 and section 8(p) of the Native Authority Ordinance 1926. The article situates these laws in the wider context of British imperial history and the system of so-called indirect rule. It argues that apparently well-meaning laws aimed at the relief of famine can best be understood as a direct attack on the conditions of peasant reproduction. State coercion and market control forced the peasantry to engage in cash cropping at the expense of subsistence and food security. Colonial officials thought that famine was endemic to African peasant economies. They sought to achieve food autarky on a district-by-district basis. District officers were unwilling to call on the central government to supply costly famine relief from outside a district. Therefore, they required Native Authorities to coerce the peasantry into growing subsistence food supplies for themselves -- but not at the expense of their primary obligation to cultivate non-food cash crops for export to international markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Central governments in multinational states frequently deploy indirect rule to contain peripheral nationalism. Through the exchange of economic resources for political control, local notables are co-opted into cementing loyalty to the central state. Although nationalism often has cultural roots, these can fail to bear fruit because indirect rulers prevent them from developing. When the incentives sustaining support for indirect rulers change, this can open a window of opportunity for nationalism. This article examines how culture, institutions and economics influence center-periphery relations, specifically the demand for autonomy and nationalist parties. Utilizing new, disaggregated data and an original survey from the French island of Corsica, we show that indirect rulers have managed to contain nationalist parties in culturally distinct communes, specifically those that are more dependent on public funds. Only where a thriving private sector offers alternatives to state dependence, lessening the force of indirect rule, is cultural distinctiveness associated with nationalist voting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Egyptian sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire started in 1517 and continued for about four centuries. The increasing intervention of the European powers against the Ottoman State and the policy of taking over its territory came to the fore as a characteristic feature of the 19th century. In this context, Egypt, which has a strategic position for the British, was occupied by the British in 1882 as a result of this policy. Although Egypt remained legally part of the Ottoman State with the occupation, it actually came under British rule. Until the British protection, which started with the Lord Granville's telegraph dated January 4, 1884 and announced in December 1914, British indirect rule in Egypt will have solid foundations and will be strongly represented during the 24-year term of Britain's Consul General Evelyn Baring or known as Lord Cromer. In our article, together with the biggest factor in Britain's occupation of Egypt, the process and administration of Lord Cromer to dominate the Egyptian administration will be evaluated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bronisław Malinowski sought throughout his career to make a scientific contribution to understanding and reforming the international order by making analogies with 'primitive' societies. His ethnographic material was important to Marcel Mauss's internationalist project in The Gift, and can still provide lessons in internationalism. This article examines Malinowski's ethnographic figuration of 'the evolution of primitive international law', and documents a set of intellectual exchanges between him and Mauss. This illuminates an unexpected avenue of Durkheimian influence on British social anthropology and situates Malinowski in contemporary imperial and internationalist debates. Despite Malinowski's early criticism of Émile Durkheim's account of 'collective ideas', his later writing shows the (unacknowledged) influence of Mauss's understandings of obligation and intersocial exchange. Unearthing the terms of this exchange between Malinowski and Mauss helps to recover the central normative lesson of the former's final book and his ethnographic work as a whole – namely, that sovereignty should be dethroned as an organising principle of international order in favour of intersocial exchange and the obligations it produces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the introduction of direct colonial taxation in the Sierra Leone Protectorate. By examining the local dynamics of colonial taxation policy, a more nuanced reading of colonial relationships can be reached, that appreciates the minutiae of colonial finance and sheds light on the fundamentally different terms on which people were incorporated into 'states' in empires compared to the western contexts that we encounter more commonly in the literature on taxation. While direct taxation has been given many non-revenue functions, including facilitating the extension of a cash economy and the promotion of wage labour, in this colonial context, the power of the colonial government to shape behaviour at an individual level was sacrificed in the interests of a reliable revenue policy in the context of a state with seriously limited administrative and financial capacity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]