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This essay aligns Steve Schwarze's notion of melodrama with Richard B. Miller's call for "empathic indignation" and Louise Knops and Guillaume Petit's notion of indignation as "affective transformation" to argue that indignation is a key component of democratic melodramas designed to address social injustice. Using the controversy over military exercises in Vieques, Puerto Rico, which resulted in the withdrawal of the U.S. Navy from the island, the essay shows how empathy and indignation within melodrama can foster meaningful social change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the works of Annie Ernaux, the alliance of desire and disobedience (which I borrow from Georges Didi-Huberman) crystallises a commitment driven by indignation and sustained, as it was in Camus's oeuvre, by a creative revolt against both the indignities endured by the dominated and the government's shameful acts towards them, as well as against the State's disengagement from public services and any instance of declinist discourse. Annie Ernaux's opposition to power transcends mere protest : reminiscent of Camus, who remains a great inspiration, a positive energy 'for' rather than merely 'against' drives her quest for truth, her belief in the exercise of freedom and her fight for dignity. Her engagement against all forms of injustice (whether it be French migration policy, the treatment of the Yellow Vests by the French authorities or the pension reform of 2023) confirms her role as a key protagonist of the re-politicization of the anti-capital movement. If Jean-Luc Mélenchon symbolises a form of counter-power, Ernaux, on the other hand, embodies the power of desire and boundless imagination. Politics and ethics come together in her stylistics (that encompasses accuracy of expression) and carry the hope of another, better life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper explains the indignation against and stigmatization of return migrants and travelers when Zimbabwe first recorded cases of COVID-19 in 2020. While xenophobic hatred toward foreign migrants enjoyed much media and scholarly attention, the similar risk faced by the return migrants and travelers among “their own” during the pandemic was largely left on the back burner. The paper uses secondary analysis of information from social media, government reports, media briefings, and public utterances of government officials to provide an explanation for the negative attitudes of locals against migrants at the height of COVID-19. The findings revealed that in times of change and dealing with uncertainty, there is a tendency to redraw boundary lines between in-groups and out-groups with negative consequences for those labeled as the out-group. For some time, the returnees were stigmatized as harbingers of the COVID-19 virus and viewed as troublesome and acting in an unreasonable manner, thus courting the indignation of local Zimbabweans. This paper lends support to the view that pandemics create fear, which results in the rejection and exclusion of ordinary members of the in-group. Perceived resource competition, resource scarcity, anxiety, and fear heightened the stigmatization of return migrants and travelers. To build back better from the negative effects of the pandemic, there is a need to review COVID-19 preventive measures, avoid reckless public pronouncements that stigmatize and stoke hatred for return migrants, and invest in the healthcare system.

The Covid-19 pandemic has fuelled indignation. People have been indignant about the breaking of lockdown rules, about the mistakes and deficiencies of government pandemic policies, about enforced mask-wearing, about vaccination programmes (or lack thereof), about lack of care with regards vulnerable individuals, and more. Indeed, indignation seems to have been particularly prevalent on social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, where indignant remarks are often accompanied by variations on the hashtag #WTF?! In this paper, I explore indignation's distinctive character as a form of moral anger, in particular suggesting that what is characteristic of indignation is not only that it discloses moral injustices but betrays our disbelief at the very occurrence of the offence. Having outlined the character of indignation, I consider how the structure of indignation impacts how we do, respond to, and receive indignation. I explore indignation in action, so to speak, in the context of Covid-19, with a particular emphasis on how indignation occurs 'on the internet'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Este artigo assume a forma de um diálogo. Essa escolha pretende ser um prolongamento da forma como Ricœur abordava todos os problemas filosóficos. É na sua obra Le juste que encontramos aquela que é, porventura, a sua definição mais clara de diálogo, a qual designava conversa. Nesse texto, Ricœur sustenta que existem diversas normas que regem a discussão autêntica, e que incluem a necessidade de assegurar a todos a possibilidade de participar na conversa, e de providenciar razões para as teses avançadas. Tais normas requerem que todos têm direito a tomar a palavra mas também assumem a necessidade de ouvir de forma respeitosa. Acima tudo, é preciso que todos “aceitem as consequências de uma decisão”. Ou seja, é preciso chegar a um compromisso. Tal conclusão aplicar-se-á de forma privilegiada ao tópico do trabalho de Ricœur que exploramos neste artigo, a saber, as suas reflexões sobre a tolerância, especialmente as reflexões sobre a intolerância e a erosão da tolerância. O nosso diálogo aborda o contexto histórico do trabalho original, sublinhando diversas referências das Escrituras àquilo que Ricœur descreve como tolerância, e que são essenciais para a sua reflexão sobre a tolerância e a sua erosão. Palavras-chave: Indignação; indiferença; intolerância; o intolerável; tolerância.

Despite a political context marked by affective explicitness and an ongoing affective turn in social sciences, representation theory rarely takes affects and emotions into account. In this article, I respond to this gap by focusing on indignation, as a key affect of the crisis of representation. Building on recent constructivist theories of representation and affect theory, I unpack three affective dynamics of indignation which play a constitutive role in representation: affective imitation, affective transformation and the creation of affective publics. I conclude by raising normative questions on the role of indignation, and affect at large, in theories and practices of representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article titled "The Sweet Militancy. Critique of Indignant Reason" is a review of the book written by Andrés García Inda. The author invites us to reflect on the foundations of moral and political education in contemporary society, highlighting the importance of values such as responsibility, loyalty, and commitment. The book focuses on the emotion of indignation and its relationship with virtuous behavior and the promotion of justice and social transformation. It also criticizes baseless indignation, based on revenge and resentment, and proposes recovering gratitude, acceptance of failure, and responsibility as basic dispositions in moral education. [Extracted from the article]

The emotion of phthonos —envy, jealousy, begrudgery—was typically attacked in classical Greece as an irrational, inexcusable, and self-destructive vice. But, in a handful of passages, scholars have argued that it means something like "righteous indignation." This article focuses on these puzzling instances—dubbed "good phthonos "—and reexamines the theory that they are the lexical residue of the class struggles of democratic Athens. It offers a new interpretation of the role of phthonos in classical Athenian political discourses, reexamines philosophical definitions of jealousy from Hippias to Aristotle, and asks afresh why classical orators called on their audience to feel such a disreputable emotion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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I make a distinction between moral emotions and moral sentiments, concluding that moral sentiments are a more developed way to reflect and feel in moral contexts. Furthermore, I examine some of the views ethics and moral philosophy have had on the concepts of anger, resentment and indignation, and I relate them with the Rawlsian notion of a Sense of Justice. Thus, I suggest that the Sense of Justice, together with a sense of solidarity, brings together resentment and indignation and channels them into a collective demand for justice and the construction of a common sense thereof.

The paper analyses the role of alternative far-right media in promoting and organizing mobilization against the Global Compact for Migration – the first intergovernmentally negotiated agreement, prepared under the auspices of the United Nations, covering all dimensions of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner. Exploring four European alternative far-right media: PI-News in Germany, Il Primato Nazionale in Italy, the UK localization of Breitbart, and the transnational Voice of Europe, we show that these media have gone beyond (dis)informing and have actively mobilized and channeled indignation through petitioning and protest organization. While most research on far-right media practices so far has focused either on social media interactions or exclusively on 'disinformation' and 'fake news', we analyse web based alternative news media as part of а far-right social movement that has successfully used progressive left-wing protests repertoires and tactics. We argue that alternative far-right news media act as 'indignation mobilization mechanisms' that not only fuel the indignation of the public by channeling the messages of far-right politicians but also channel bottom-up indignation through online campaigns, petitions, and offline street protests. This unabashedly biased and mobilization-oriented approach is what distinguishes far-right media from mainstream media and guarantees them a loyal and dedicated supporter base. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Resumo: Como observa Alexandre Júnior (1998), no prefácio da Retórica, houve uma explosão dos estudos retóricos nas últimas décadas. Nesse sentido, muitos estudiosos do discurso têm voltado seus olhares para as questões de retórica, muitas vezes seguindo os passos de Aristóteles, que a define como a arte da persuasão, além de observar que se trata da contraparte da dialética, hoje entendida como argumentação. Em 2007, Meyer, para quem a retórica é a negociação das diferenças entre indivíduos, recupera a clássica oposição aristotélica, pontuando que não é possível privilegiar retórica ou dialética. Em vez disso, é preciso buscar caminhos para unificá-las, evidenciando que ambas, na verdade, fazem parte de uma mesma disciplina. Aristóteles argumenta que o orador atinge seu objetivo, ou seja, alcança a persuasão, quando se vale da virtude, da prudência e da benevolência. Esses elementos têm relação com as emoções, definidas por ele como “causas que fazem alterar os seres humanos e introduzem mudanças nos seus juízos, na medida em que comportam dor e prazer” (ARISTÓTELES, 1998, p. 106). Apesar de Aristóteles evidenciar o lugar das emoções no discurso, alguns estudos modernos tendem a negligenciar o domínio do pathos. Desse modo, discutiremos o papel da emoção, especialmente da indignação, na negociação das distâncias em comentários sobre um crime de feminicídio, uma vez que estes são terras férteis para a expressão de diversas emoções. Pretendemos, neste trabalho, verificar em que medida a indignação constitui-se como estratégia argumentativa, aproximando ou afastando ainda mais os sujeitos que participam das trocas simbólicas em redes sociais. Palavras-chave: retórica; argumentação; emoções; indignação; feminicídio. Abstract: As well observed by Alexandre Júnior (1998) in the preface to Rhetoric, there has been an explosion of rhetorical studies in recent decades. Therefore, many discourse researchers have dedicated themselves to rhetoric issues, often following the steps of Aristotle, who defines it as the art of persuasion, besides observing that it is the counterpart of dialectics, which is seen as argumentation nowadays. In 2007, Meyer, for whom rhetoric is the negotiation of differences between individuals, revived the classic Aristotelian opposition, pointing out that it is not possible to privilege rhetoric or dialectics. Instead, it is necessary to find alternatives to unify them, showing that both are in fact part of the same subject. Taking into account the “art of persuasion”, Aristotle argues that the speaker achieves his objective, in other words, achieves persuasion, when they use virtue, prudence, and benevolence. These elements are related to emotions, defined by him as “feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure” (ARISTOTLE, 1998, p. 106). Although Aristotle highlights the locus of emotions in discourse, some modern studies tend to neglect the pathos domain. Thus, we aim to discuss the role of emotion, especially indignation, in negotiating distances in comments on a feminicide crime, since these are fertile lands for expressing several emotions. In this study, we intend to observe to what extent indignation makes up an argumentative strategy, bringing the subjects that engage in symbolic exchanges on social networks even closer or pushing them away. Keywords: rhetoric; argumentation; emotions; indignation; feminicide.

Sammendrag Litteraturhistorisk har essaysjangeren i påfallende grad blitt representert av tekster skrevet av menn fra Europa eller det engelsktalende Nord-Amerika. Forholdet har bedret seg når det gjelder kjønn, men fremdeles savnes tekster av forfattere fra andre deler av verden. I artikkelen undersøkes Maryse Condé, «Pourquoi la négritude? négritude ou révolution?», Véronique Tadjo, L’Ombre d’Imana og Arundhati Roy, The Doctor and the Saint. Ut over at de er skrevet av kvinner fra det globale sør, er disse essayene valgt fordi de fremviser en bestemt familielikhet seg imellom. Der det kanoniserte essayets utsigelsessituasjon gjerne innebærer tilbaketrekning fra verden, er den motsatt i de tre nevnte essayene. De representerer en tilknytning til verden. Det vil denne artikkelen vise gjennom en undersøkelse av indignasjon som retorisk effekt.

Moral experience comes in many flavors. Some philosophers have argued that there is nothing common to the many forms moral experience can take. In this paper, I argue that close attention to the phenomenology of certain key emotions, combined with a clear distinction between essentially and accidentally moral experiences, suggests that there is a group of (essentially) moral experiences which in fact exhibits significant unity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Biases towards self-blaming emotions, such as self-contempt/disgust, were previously associated with vulnerability to major depressive disorder (MDD). Self-blaming emotions are thought to prompt specific action tendencies (e.g. "feeling like hiding"), which are likely to be more important for psychosocial functioning than the emotions themselves. Systematic investigations, however, of these action tendencies in MDD are lacking. Here, we investigated the role of blame-related action tendencies for MDD vulnerability and their relationship with blame-related emotions. 76 participants with medication-free remitted MDD and 44 healthy control (HC) participants without a history of MDD completed the value-related moral sentiment task, which measured their blame-related emotions during hypothetical social interactions and a novel task to assess their blame-related action tendencies (feeling like hiding, apologising, creating a distance from oneself, attacking oneself, creating a distance from other, attacking other, no action). As predicted, the MDD group showed a maladaptive profile of action tendencies: a higher proneness to feeling like hiding and creating a distance from themselves compared with the HC group. In contrast, feeling like apologising was less common in the MDD than the HC group. Apologising for one's wrongdoing was associated with all self-blaming emotions including shame, guilt, self-contempt/disgust and self-indignation. Hiding was associated with both shame and guilt. Our study shows that MDD vulnerability was associated with specific maladaptive action tendencies which were independent of the type of emotion, thus unveiling novel cognitive markers and neurocognitive treatment targets. • Blame-related maladaptive action tendencies were distinctive of people with MDD. • These action tendencies include feeling like hiding and creating a distance from oneself. • These action tendencies were not predicted by the type of emotion experienced. • Novel neurocognitive treatments aiming at maladaptive action tendencies are needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although F. Scott Fitzgerald and Philip Roth are not necessarily writers with an obvious thematic or biographical connection, this article argues that both authors were fixated on war and that a central clue to their respective oeuvres is the situation either of the reluctant combatant or the discharged soldier who never sees action on the battlefield—no matter whether the specific theater of combat is the Great War, World War II, or the Korean War. For Fitzgerald, much of the sympathy Nick Carraway feels for Jay Gatsby reflects their mutual experiences on the Western Front. In a similar vein, Sergeant Nathan Marx, the narrator of Roth's most controversial story, "Defender of the Faith," feels an innate regard for Private Sheldon Grossbart, the Jewish scammer and shirker whom Marx tries and fails to turn into a conscientious, patriotic soldier. In other cases, the noncombatant regret Fitzgerald expresses in stories such as "'I Didn't Get Over'" (1936)finds something of a parallel in Nathan Zuckerman, Roth's most famous alter ego narrator who appears in nine novels across more than four decades. Surveying a range of Roth texts from his breakthrough 1959 novella "Goodbye, Columbus" to his late novel Indignation (2008), this article argues that corollaries in attitudes toward war, especially as it affects the American home front, can be traced within several Fitzgerald fictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the relationship between theatre and politics based on two texts – one theoretical, the other fictional – by British playwright Dennis Kelly. It throws light on the way the Iraq War is approached in his 2004 play Osama the Hero as well as on the effects produced on the audience. Even though Kelly seems to minimize the political impact of his play in his opening speech for the Stückemarkt in Berlin in May 2012, entitled “Why political theatre is a complete fucking waste of time”, the play can indeed be deemed political, even if not obviously so. The notion of indignation will be scrutinized while the spectator’s stance will be defined as political because self-reflexive, the latter being invited to question his own convictions.

As well observed by Alexandre Júnior (1998) in the preface to Rhetoric, there has been an explosion of rhetorical studies in recent decades. Therefore, many discourse researchers have dedicated themselves to rhetoric issues, often following the steps of Aristotle, who defines it as the art of persuasion, besides observing that it is the counterpart of dialectics, which is seen as argumentation nowadays. In 2007, Meyer, for whom rhetoric is the negotiation of differences between individuals, revived the classic Aristotelian opposition, pointing out that it is not possible to privilege rhetoric or dialectics. Instead, it is necessary to find alternatives to unify them, showing that both are in fact part of the same subject. Taking into account the "art of persuasion", Aristotle argues that the speaker achieves his objective, in other words, achieves persuasion, when they use virtue, prudence, and benevolence. These elements are related to emotions, defined by him as "feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure" (ARISTOTLE, 1998, p. 106). Although Aristotle highlights the locus of emotions in discourse, some modern studies tend to neglect the pathos domain. Thus, we aim to discuss the role of emotion, especially indignation, in negotiating distances in comments on a feminicide crime, since these are fertile lands for expressing several emotions. In this study, we intend to observe to what extent indignation makes up an argumentative strategy, bringing the subjects that engage in symbolic exchanges on social networks even closer or pushing them away. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My aim in this paper is to illuminate the question of how vicarious feeling is possible, by advancing our understanding of vicarious emotions. I address this problem by classifying the reactive attitude into two categories: the vicarious, and the self-reactive. I argue that guilt is constitutively tied to personal responsibility and that the appropriateness of vicarious feeling of group harm derives from a reflection on the appropriateness of our own reactive attitude, that is, vicarious reactive attitude, e.g., indignation or outrage.

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Aristotle does not explain why ordinary citizens who lack the virtue of justice nevertheless praise justice and the law. Indignation (nemesis), defined as pain at the undeserved gains of others, is a promising candidate in the list of means regarding virtues and passions in Book 2 of the Nicomachean Ethics. However, as many scholars have noted, Aristotle's description of indignation as a mean is flawed. Moreover, indignation is the only characteristic in the list that disappears from the inquiry thereafter. I argue that Aristotle obliquely criticizes indignation for aligning envy, a base passion, with conventional justice. Aristotle's subtle critique reveals that envy motivates 'the many' to support justice, an unsavory conclusion which he does not highlight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

COVID-19 appeared with its quarantine and forced isolation, and psi experts were quick to make their analysis and recommendations. This essay primarily claims that, for the pandemic to offer an opportunity to do things differently, it is necessary to think through a rigorous psychoanalytic critique not only of the psychologization, but also of the digitalization (the translation of the subjective and the intersubjective into the digital sphere) of the COVID-19 crisis. The triad of concepts obedience, indignation and uprising give us the opportunity to start this task. Therefore, we will examine the paradoxical relationship between obedience and criticism; then we will make a call for the indignation of imposed dignity; and, finally, we will proclaim that the uprising will not be digitized. Is at this point, of course, that psychoanalytic critique must open up to a political project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of emotions in Antiquity has burst in the last decades. In its development, the Aristotelian systematization of affections (πάθη) ("Book II" of his Rhetoric) has received special attention. In this context, it has been noticed that the emotion of 'indignation', as it is defined by the Stagirite (a painful feeling produced by the perception of undeserved prosperity, Rhetoric 1387a8-9) would not have been named by the Greeks as he did it (τὸ νεμεσᾶν). The objection is founded, above all, on the testimonies of forensic speeches (4th century BC). Our proposal incorporates the testimony of Aristophanic comedy into the discussion, since indignation has been considered by many (Cooper, Golden, Rosenbloom, among others) the typical emotion of comedy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the transformative potential of Axel Honneth’s latest model of Critical Theory and is divided in three sections. Firstly, it will be presented the criticisms towards Honneth’s latest model of Critical Theory revealing the largely shared assumption that normative reconstruction is responsible for a conservative bias. The second section will focus on Honneth’s “reconstrutive turn” exposing its reasons and outcomes. (II). The third section will then discuss how reconstructive critique is related to a genealogical proviso that will metacritically denounce the increasing gap between historical promises and the institutional provisions for their fulfillment; a gap that will be the source of the potentially revolutionary sentiment of moral indignation (III). Finally, the text will sketch some brief considerations on the relation of this feeling of indignation and Honneth’s commitment to a renewed idea of socialism.

Alter and Zurn's framework identifies 'frequent companions' to backlash politics including emotive elements. This article addresses those emotive elements. In particular, it defines and unpacks the complex emotion of indignation, an emotion that sets off a dynamic process leading to mutual contempt between political groups. The article shows how indignation and its dynamic processes have helped unleash backlash politics in the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Food production has a high impact on the environment, on working and living conditions worldwide. Therefore Fairtrade of groceries has a key role for sustainable development and lasting positive peace. In order to encourage Fairtrade, it is important to understand what motivates people to support it, also beyond their purchases. The findings of a survey study (N = 124) show that the justice-based emotion indignation adds to the explanation of purchasing intentions and the willingsness to support Fairtrade beyond self-interested motives and personal norms. Both, indigination about unfairness in trade and about Fairtrade prove to be influential ( R² = .07 reps. .04). This shows that justice motives can on an affective level serve as a promising lever to foster fair consumption and that indignation about Fairtrade should be taken seriously.

Based on the notion of indignation and revolt, based on the analyzes of Freud and Lacan de Hamlet, by Shakespeare, this essay discusses the relationship between social disinsertion and the infraction of adolescents in conflict with the law. The Essay goes back to the concept of adolescence and symbolic disorientation to analyze how these subjects are impelled to act through revolt, even if their act may lead them to the worst. Through the José case, the essay shows some possible way out for criminal adolescents that is not reduced to neither neurotic paralysis nor non-dialectable act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the role of emotions in the context of a controversial debate surrounding criminal legislation in Brazil. While several thinkers have criticized deliberation for requiring purely rational discourse, we argue that emotion is a central component in the reasoning process. Whereas existing research on the link between justification and emotion has been theoretical, this article offers a novel analytical framework, based on correlational and content analyses, to examine how anger, indignation, fear and compassion underlay reasoned claims. This study is based on data from a morally charged debate in Brazil's National Congress about setting the criminal responsibility age. Findings reveal that (i) emotions are not randomly distributed, but strongly correlate with the direction of argumentation; (ii) intentional objects, while not involving straightforward cognition, inform perspectives of reasoning; and (iii) these relationships appear unaffected by forum designs. This study helps to understand both personal and social levels of emotional concerns; has methodological implications for surveying emotional dynamics as a socially driven phenomenon; and offers general insights about how the imbrication of reason-giving and emotions is effectively achieved, further away from simplistic notions of rationality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper offers a grammatical investigation of some important aspects of our moral life taking a scene from the movie Mr. Deeds Goes to Town as a test case. The main question I try to answer is whether there are situations in our moral discussions in which the proper and rational attitude is to show disagreement(e.g. by expressing indignation), as opposed to continuing the dialogue. Many philosophers seem committed to a conception of moral reasoning that takes as its end rational agreement among agents; from that perspective, expressing indignation would just amount to an irrational way of trying to get rid of the burdens put upon the agent's shoulders in the context of a moral discussion. Against that widespread viewIwill defend a Cavellian version of moral perfectionism, which takes rational disagreement as a legitimate (and even productive) outcomeof moral arguments. That view, as we shall see, will be predicated upon a distinctive understanding of practical rationality, hence the importance of comparing moral discussion to other forms of rational engagement (e.g., aesthetic, scientific and mathematical).

The paper offers an account of justified resentment and its importance in preserving human dignity. I situate the argument in the context of Martha Nussbaum's recent work against anger and resentment. Drawing on Enlightenment thinkers, I show the importance of resentment in deterring injury, in creating greater solidarity and humanity, and in preserving human dignity. The paper also offers a preliminary analysis of the norms that help to ensure appropriately expressed resentment.

This essay responds to four critics of Friends and Other Strangers: Studies in Religion, Ethics and Culture: Diana Fritz Cates, Eric Gregory, Ross Moret, and Atalia Omer. Focusing on the book's organizing concepts of intimacy and alterity, engagement with empirical sources, discussion of Augustine's thought, and attention to moral psychology and political morality, these interlocutors take up various strands in the book's argument and extend them into metaethical, normative, and metadisciplinary domains. The author organizes his response under three rubrics: Metaethics and Personal Relationships; Political Morality; and Multidisciplinary Horizons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is focused on the theme of anger in Kamila Janiak's poetry - its forms, types, and understanding that transpire as she develops her poetry. A paradigm of reception assumed herein as a departure point is the category of a "piss-off" (Polish vulgar noun wkurw, a strong sensation of anger), which is synonymous with intense and politically motivated indignation. The author of the article, however, attempts to show that Janiak's poetry has been for a long time defined by other affective registers; emotions and moods in a way supressed - restricted, unfulfilled, most of all: incapable of climaxing and of "exploding." The said state of affairs should be connected with the structure of individual and collective subjectivity appearing in Janiak's poetry, namely, a subject that is shattered and (also politically) dispersed, lacking any devices to develop a coherent narrative, with hardly any access to political forms of anger which frequently cannot exist without consistent narrative. Instead of being expressed by one's indignation, the said subject resorts to "little fits of pique" (a diminutive złostki is used here by Janiak), a series of minor, yet rapidly accumulating irritations, which do not find their outlet. This state of being affectively shattered may be seen in existential categories, but also political and generational ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The widespread assumption that anger is a response to wrongdoing and motivates people to sanction it, as well as the lack of distinction between resentment and indignation, obscure notable differences among these three emotions in terms of their specific beliefs, goals, and action tendencies, their nonmoral or moral character, and the kinds of moral claim implied. We provide a cognitive-motivational analysis of anger, resentment, and indignation, showing that, while sharing a common core, they are distinguishable from one another because they comprise nonoverlapping belief–goal compounds. We also emphasize the usefulness of applying a belief–goal analysis to kin emotions because, by comparison, one can sharpen the analysis and identify the distinctive features of each of them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In “Freedom and Resentment” P.F. Strawson distinguishes between the participant reactive attitudes like resentment and the moral reactive attitudes like indignation described by Strawson as their “vicarious analogues,” where we are not the injured party and it is not our own personal relationships at stake. Through naturalistic description of the participant reactive attitudes a set of conditions for moral responsibility can be discovered that, moreover, are held to be immune to any external review or to require external justification. Except for pathological cases Strawson deems to amount to solipsism, these participant attitudes and their vicarious analogues are deemed to go together and the same arguments to apply equally to each: resentment and indignation are supposed to have the same conditions for being appropriately held or withheld. I find it to be not obvious that these conditions must be the same, but even if they are, the case for immunity that Strawson presents initially for the participant reactive attitudes does not transfer as unproblematically as he seems to assume to the moral reactive attitudes. The aim of this paper is not to analyse Strawson’s arguments, but more simply to identify a number of ways in which we may be resentful without being (or being prone to be in the relevantly similar circumstance) indignant, and indignant without being resentful.