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The smart grid, new generation of the electric grid, aims to improve the energy production, delivery and customer usages. To reach this goal, smart devices, smart meters, etc. must exchange information with the control center in a bidirectional way. The Home Area Network (HAN) manages communications among the smart meter and smart devices inside the home. The ZigBee Alliance developed a profile for the energy HAN called the ZigBee Smart Energy Profile (SEP). While the HAN is vulnerable to several types of attacks (eavesdropping, spoofing, DoS, etc.), SEP defined security mechanisms to join the network and to protect the traffic. In this paper, we identify vulnerabilities of SEP security mechanisms and we propose improvements to the SEP join process and key refreshment. We conducted simulations to evaluate the latency for energy real time applications while using SEP and the success rate for SEP and the enhanced SEP.

The smart grid is an intelligent electrical grid that aims to manage the electricity production, distribution and consumption. One of the Smart Grid key technologies is to integrate a two-way communication between a utility company and its customers. Hence, the Smart Grid covers several networks to exchange data among intelligent devices (Smart Meter for example) and systems (the control center). The Neighborhood Area Network (NAN) relays customer's data from smart meters to the control center. Furthermore, it can relay a multicast traffic from the control center (energy prices, outage notifications, etc.) to a group of smart meters. Several types of attacks (eavesdropping, spoofing, replay, etc.) can be performed against the NAN multicast traffic and lead to an instability of the electronic grid. Hence, security solutions must be envisaged to counter those attacks. In this paper, we propose a security solution based on the IPsec protocol to prevent most of the threats on the NAN multicast traffic.

The energy need is growing rapidly due to the population growth and the large new usage of power. Several works put considerable efforts to make the electricity grid more intelligent to reduce essentially energy consumption and provide efficiency and reliability of power systems. The Smart Grid is a complex architecture that covers critical devices and systems vulnerable to significant attacks. Hence, security is a crucial factor for the success and the wide deployment of Smart Grids. In this paper, we present security issues of the Smart Grid architecture and we highlight open issues that will make the Smart Grid security a challenging research area in the future., {"references":["Z. Qiqi, S. Gang, L. 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In order to connect Vehicle Ad-hoc NETworks (VANETs) to the Internet, most of manufactures car consortia and standardization bodies (IEEE 1609, CALM, C2C-CC, and ETSI TC ITS) proposed IPv6 protocol in the VANET protocol stack. The European GeoNet project was founded to investigate how GeoNetworking and IPv6 can be combined together. The GeoNetworking provides geographic address and routing for vehicular communications. In this paper, we identify attacks that can be performed on mechanisms and protocols necessary to run IPv6 over the GeoNetworking layer and propose a secure GeoNet architecture based on the IPsec protocol to prevent most of the threats.